

Rethinking society

Individuals, Culture and Migration

Volume 4

Cultural Rhetoric

**Rhetorical Perspectives, Transferential
Insights**

Cultural Rhetoric. Rhetorical Perspectives, Transferential Insights

Edited by

VLADIMER LUARSABISHVILI

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This book demonstrates the main peculiarities of Cultural Rhetoric as a new discipline developed and based on the textual, discursive and cultural possibilities of both General Textual Rhetoric and different literary and non-literary systems. Possessing a critical tool that enables the analysis of texts at different levels, that is, at syntactic, intensional-semantic and extensional-semantic levels, Cultural Rhetoric offers to researchers the possibility of highlighting cultural characteristics and values, in order to understand the structure and nature of different cultures.

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Contributors

JESÚS BAENA CRIADO is a doctoral student at the University of Málaga in the Literary Theory and Comparative Literature. He has participated in different congress, conferences and seminars. He has presented speeches at conferences held in different academic forums about Rhetoric, argumentation and public speech, such as the University of Sevilla or the ESIC Business & Marketing School. In addition, he was invited professor at the University of Málaga. In 2020 he started to work as the academic director of Proyecto Atlantis, where he coordinates a collection of handbooks of Rhetoric for primary and secondary education. Since 2020 he is President of the cultural association and editorial El Toro Celeste. Currently, he works on his thesis and different articles related to Rhetoric, Cultural Rhetoric and Theory of Literature.

ENRIQUE BAENA PEÑA is Full Professor of Literary Theory and Comparative Literature and Director of the Department of Spanish Philology, Italian, Romanic and Theory of Literature and Comparative Literature at the University of Málaga (Spain), where he is Principal Investigator of the Research Group "Literary Theory and Studies. The Critical Traditions of Hispanism", and Director of the Field of Culture and Knowledge Chair. He is a visiting Professor at several European Universities. Among his publications are the books: */El ser y la ficción/*(2004), */Metáforas del compromiso/* (2007), */Umbrales del imaginario/* (2010), */La invención estética/* (2014), */Estudios de Teoría y Literatura Comparada/* (2016), */Los milenios/*, ed. (2020); as well as numerous articles and the coordination and edition of different volumes of Literary Theory and Contemporary Literature. Member of several Royal Academies, Boards of Trustees and Foundations, he is also Director of specialized Collections and Collaborator in prestigious journalistic media.

FRANCISCO CHICO-RICO is a Full Professor in Literary Theory and Comparative Literature at the University of Alicante. Bachelor of Arts and Doctor of Hispanic Philology, he has held research positions at the University of Siegen (Germany) and teaching positions at the Universities of Trieste (Italy) and Düsseldorf (Germany). His main research lines include classical, traditional and modern poetics and rhetoric, text linguistics, literary pragmatics, literary translation studies, empirical studies on literature, interdiscursive analysis and cultural

rhetoric. In these fields, he has published over one hundred research works in the form of books, book chapters, articles and editions —some of them published in German, Bulgarian, English and Italian. Main books and editions: *Pragmática y construcción literaria. Discurso retórico y discurso narrativo* (1988), *La Ciencia Empírica de la Literatura. Conceptos, Métodos, Consecuencias* (1995), *Retórica hoy* (in co-edition with Tomás Albaladejo and Emilio del Río, 1998) and *Ciberliteratura y comparatismo* (in co-edition with Rafael Alemany, 2012). Some of his most recent publications are: “Desarrollos actuales de los estudios retóricos en España: la Retórica desde la Teoría de la Literatura” (*Rétor. Revista de la Asociación Argentina de Retórica*, 2020), “Pragmática y estudios literarios” (Akal, 2020), “Quintilian as a Literary Critic” (Oxford University Press, 2021) and “Retórica y Estudios del discurso” (in co-authorship with Tomás Albaladejo, Routledge, 2022). He is the director of the research group in Literary Theory, Comparative Literature and Theory of Literary Translation (TeLiCom, officially recognised by the University of Alicante) and a member of the research group C[PyR] Communication, Poetics and Rhetoric, from Madrid’s Autonomous University.

EUGENIO–ENRIQUE CORTÉS–RAMÍREZ, PhD (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, UAM, Spain), is Professor of English & Comparative Literature and Culture at the Department of Modern Languages in the Cuenca School of Education Sciences & Arts (Universidad de Castilla–La Mancha, UCLM, Spain). He has lectured on Comparative Literature and Culture Studies throughout different universities worldwide. He is a member of the CPyR Researching Group (Comunicación, Poética y Retórica) at UAM. His main research lines are Philosophy, Critical Theory, Theory of Culture, Poetics and Rhetoric. He has published, among others, *La Poética Sentimental de Michel de Certeau* (2012), *Cultural and Ideological Hegemony as a Method to Study Popular Culture Education* (2013), *Francis Bacon’s Theory of Culture* (2014), *Cultural Hegemony Today. From Cultural Studies to Critical Pedagogy* (2015), *La Hegemonía Cultural y su Impacto en los British Cultural Studies* (2017), and *Reinventing Politics, Gender and Society in Victorian Culture: A New Approach from Cultural Rhetoric* (2019), among others. He is also the author of *La Luz de los Otros. Edward Said y la Revolución Cultural del Orientalismo*, Madrid, UAM Ediciones, 2012. In collaboration with Juan Carlos Gómez Alonso, he has also published *La Retórica Cultural de Juan Crisóstomo como motor de una nueva Retórica Cultural*

(2019), *Edward W. Said (1935 – 2003) or the Critic towards the Orient: The Art of Refurbishing the Conflict through Cultural Rhetoric* (2020), and *Tourism in Commercial Diplomacy from the Perspective of Cultural Rhetoric* (2020).

COVADONGA GEMMA FOUCES GONZÁLEZ is a professor of Italian and Translation at the *Universidad Pablo de Olavide* in Seville. From 1997 to 2001, she was Assistant at the *Università degli Studi di Bologna* teaching Spanish. In 2001 she obtained a PhD (*Doctor Europæus*) in Philology with a dissertation on Italo Calvino's works from the *Università degli Studi di Bologna* (Prof. Umberto Eco) and *Universidad Autónoma de Madrid* (Prof. Tomás Albaladejo). She is a member of the research group Communication, Poetics and Rhetoric (CPyR). In 2003, she had the opportunity of working with the Prof. José Lambert thanks to a postdoctoral stay at the *Katholieke Universiteit Leuven*. Her research interests include the interdisciplinary programmes linked to Translation, Globalisation, Multiculturalism and Comparative Literature. Since 2004, she has been teaching Italian and Translation at the *Universidad Pablo de Olavide* in Seville. Her two last books are *Il gioco del Labirinto. Figure del narrativo nell'opera di Italo Calvino* (2009) Lanciano, Carabba and *La traducción literaria y la globalización de los mercados culturales* (2011) Granada Comares.

JORGE ORLANDO GALLOR GUARIN is PhD in Literary Studies by the University of Alicante and Honorific Collaborator in the Department of Spanish Philology, General Linguistics and Theory of Literature. He has dedicated a monograph and a book to the study of cultural rhetoric applied to a dialogue set in the Renaissance, and several scientific articles to the analysis of influential works of literature of the Spanish Golden Age, both Hispanic American and Chicano, with the purpose of contributing to the strengthening and validation of the aforementioned theory-methodologic instrument.

BENITO GARCÍA-VALERO is a lecturer at the University of Alicante. Doctor of Literary Studies from the University of Alicante, he has been a research fellow at the University of Sheffield (United Kingdom), the University of Osaka (Japan) and the *Università Degli Studi di Catania* (Italy). His main research lines revolve around the relationships between literature and science, cognitive poetics, Comparative Literature and the genres of fantastic literature. He is the author of three books (*El ser y la nada. Existencialismo sartreano en*

los comienzos literarios de Kenzaburo Oe, La magia cuántica de Haruki Murakami and La naturaleza de la luz en la magia literaria). Several of his research works appear in indexed publishers and journals such as “Para una teoría de lo inusual. Procedimientos lingüísticos, planteamientos estéticos” (Visor, 2019), “La muerte viva: violencia y mito en América Latina” (Iberoamericana/Vervuert, 2013) and “Los trazos en el cuerpo, el cuerpo a trazos” (Brumal, 2020). He is the editor of the journal *Pangeas. Revista Interdisciplinar de Ecocrítica* and coordinates the Laboratory of Theory of Literature “Body & Symbol” at the University of Alicante. In addition to being a member of the following two research groups: Literary Theory, Comparative Literature and Theory of Literary Translation (TeLiCom, officially recognised by the University of Alicante), Inscripciones Literarias de la Ciencia (ILICIA, University of Salamanca), he collaborates in the research project “Realidad y ficción del empoderamiento femenino en los papiros de novela griega y su pervivencia en la cultura occidental: Reinas y guerreras, magas y santas, cortesanas y doncellas”.

JUAN CARLOS GÓMEZ ALONSO, PhD, is Professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid (UAM, Spain), where he lectures on Literary Theory and Comparative Literature. Bachelor of Arts from the University of Valladolid. PhD from the Autonomous University of Madrid. Currently, he is member of a researcher group C[PyR] (Communication, Poetics and Rhetoric) and secretary of IULCE–UAM (Instituto Universitario *La Corte en Europa*–UAM). Co–director of *ACTIO NOVA: Review of Literary Theory and Comparative Literature* of the UAM. His main research lines are literary language, rhetoric and stylistic. Among other titles, he is author of *La estilística de Amado Alonso como una teoría del lenguaje literario* (Murcia, Editum, 2002) and editor from Gredos of the book of A. Alonso *Poesía y estilo de Pablo Neruda* (1997). He has published articles on rhetorical memory, on the history of rhetoric and on poetic concepts; has coordinated with other authors the publication of *Constitución republicana de 1873 autógrafa de D. Emilio Castelar. El orador y su tiempo* (UAM, 2014). Recently he coordinated, in collaboration with Concepción Camarero, *El VI dominio de la realidad y la crisis del discurso. El nacimiento de la conciencia europea*, (Madrid, Polifemo, 2017). In collaboration with Eugenio-Enrique Cortés-Ramírez, he has also published *La Retórica Cultural de Juan Crisóstomo como motor de una nueva Retórica Cultural* (2019), *Edward W. Said (1935 – 2003) or the Critic towards the Orient: The Art of Refurbishing the Conflict through Cultural*

Rhetoric (2020), and *Tourism in Commercial Diplomacy from the Perspective of Cultural Rhetoric* (2020).

RUI GONÇALVES MIRANDA is an associate professor in the Department of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Nottingham. He was a FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia) post-doctoral research fellow at the Centro de Estudos Humanísticos (Universidade do Minho) and Nottingham. He has published on literature (poetry and short stories), film, critical theory, the interface between art and politics, and post-conflict studies. His most recent publications include *Personal Infinitive: Inflecting Fernando Pessoa* (CCCCP Press, 2017), "'Aprendiz de Proust': Gilberto Freyre in Search of a Lost Past and a Renewed Future in *Aventura e rotina*" (*Bulletin of Spanish Studies*, 2020) and "Looking back for ways ahead: Revisioning Post-Dictatorship Memories in *Repare Bem* (Maria de Medeiros) and *Luz Obscura* (Susana de Sousa Dias)" (*Diacrítica*, 2020).

LUCÍA HELLÍN NISTAL is a PhD in Literary Theory and Comparative Literature from the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid with the thesis "Writing, displacement and migration: ectopic literature. Analysis of the work of Max Aub, Emine Sevgi Özdamar and Najat El Hachmi". Other research lines include the study of literary mechanisms in connection with their social role and their social placement on the basis of Cultural Rhetoric and Marxist Critical Theory. Her paper "Una travesía política: el extrañamiento de Brecht como propuesta transformadora de la desautomatización del formalismo ruso" (2016) deals with the brechtian *Verfremdungseffekt*. She has also studied the writer Luisa Carnés and the social novel of the 1930s in Spain, which is at the heart of the paper "Tea Rooms. Mujeres obreras: una novela de avanzada de Luisa Carnés" (2019).

SANDRA MORA LÓPEZ graduated in Translation and Interpreting Studies at the Autonomous University of Madrid and is now a FPU predoctoral researcher in Literary Theory, Comparative Literature and Rhetoric. Her PhD project focuses on discursive transferences through translation in Samuel Beckett's trilogy. She has attended to and partaken in a number of national and international congresses and also published in international academic journals. As a translator, she has been a casual collaborator in translation and subtitling tasks for institutions such as Filmoteca Española and Cineteca Madrid.

JOSÉ MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ SANTOS is a professor at Universidad Internacional de La Rioja. He obtained a PhD in Theory of the Literature at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and his current lines of research and scientific publications are focused on the study of stand-up, fiction and comedy, cultural rhetoric and the metaphorical engine. He also works in the field of language teaching, and has published some papers about didactics and pragmatics in the teaching of Spanish as a foreign language. He is a member of the research group C[PyR] Comunicación, Poética y Retórica at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

ALFONSO MARTÍN-JIMÉNEZ holds a degree in Hispanic Philology (Extraordinary Degree Award) and a doctorate of Philosophy and Literature from the Universidad de Valladolid (Spain). He completed his postgraduate studies during two academic years at the Universidade do Minho (Braga, Portugal) and the Collège de France (Paris, France). He has been professor of Literary Theory at the Universidad de La Coruña, the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela and the Universidad de Valladolid, where he is currently head professor of Literary Theory and Comparative Literature. He has published in Spain and other countries a large number of jobs related to the Theory of Literature, Literary Criticism, Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, cited by many national and international researchers. His most important books are *Tiempo e imaginación en el texto narrativo* (1993), *Mundos del texto y géneros literarios* (1993), *Retórica y Literatura en el siglo XVI: El Brocense* (1997), *El “Quijote” de Cervantes y el “Quijote” de Pasamonte: una imitación recíproca* (2001), *Cervantes y Pasamonte* (2005), *“Guzmanes” y “Quijotes”: dos casos similares de continuaciones apócrifas* (2010), *Las dos segundas partes del “Quijote”* (2014), *Literatura y ficción: la ruptura de la lógica ficcional* (2015) and *Compendio de Retórica* (2019). Since 2009 he is co-editor of the digital journal *Castilla. Estudios de Literatura*, and since 2016 director of Ediciones Universidad de Valladolid (Valladolid University Press).

CLAUDIA SOFIA BENITO TEMPRANO is developing her PhD thesis on genre theory and dystopianism at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid under the supervision of Francisco Javier Rodríguez Pequeño and with the funding of the Spanish Ministry of Education. Her career started with a degree in Spanish Literature at the University of Oviedo and a Master's in Art, Literary and Cultural Studies at the

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. During her studies she developed a profound interest in dystopia as a cultural and inter-artistic phenomenon. An Erasmus visit to University College London and a research visit to Queen Mary University London helped her to build a personal approach to this topic. She has published papers on this and other topics, such as science fiction, genre theory or Spanish contemporary literature.

JAVIER RODRÍGUEZ PEQUEÑO is a full professor in the Department of General Linguistics, Modern Languages, Logic and Philosophy of Science and Theory of Literature and Comparative Literature and East Asian Studies at the Autonomous University of Madrid. My research is focused on literary genres, with special attention to peripheral ones that are not studied too often by the academia and have nevertheless a strong presence in society and culture. Thus, I have worked on science fiction, gothic novel, fantasy and crime fiction among others. My books on literary genres and the addressed to *El nombre de la rosa* are examples of it. The other thing to which I have paid attention in my research is to fictionality, deeply related to the concept of verisimilitude. In this sense, one of my main contributions is the widening of the possible worlds' theory developed by Tomás Albaladejo. This line of research had a strong impact, being asked for articles and lectures to give in Spain and other countries. I highlight the following works: *Jules Verne: de la odisea a la ciencia ficción*, recently published in Castilla. *Revista de Literatura y Teoría de la Literatura*, *La ciencia ficción: una definición semántico-extensional*, *Referencia fantástica y literatura de transgresión*, *Lo verosímil de Aristóteles y la moderna teoría de los mundos posibles*, *Mundos imposibles: ficciones postmodernas*, *Possible Worlds: No mimetic credible fiction*. Another line of my investigation with significant impact is crime fiction, field where I have written some chapters of my books, a complete book (*Cómo leer a Umberto Eco: El nombre de la rosa*) and several articles, like *El criminal en su laberinto*, *La cooperación interpretativa del lector en la novela policíaca: libertad vigilada*, *El criminal y la verosimilitud en la novela negra*, *La narrativa de no ficción (o periodismo literario) y la narrativa policíaca*. In the last years I have created a new line of research in Spain with articles, book chapters and tutoring a PhD Thesis on narcoliterature.

PILAR SOMACARRERA-ÍÑIGO is Full Professor of British and Canadian literature at English Studies Department of the Universidad

Autónoma de Madrid. She has published widely on Canadian women writers, especially on Alice Munro and Margaret Atwood, whom she proposed for an Honorary Doctorate at UAM in 2017. In July 2014, she was awarded the Saltire Scholarship for Scottish Literature to attend the Scottish Literature Section of Scottish Universities International Summer School (SUISS). The outcome of this grant is her MA course about Contemporary Scottish Literature at UAM which she has successfully taught during six academic years. She was a visiting fellow at IASH, University of Edinburgh between January and July 2015 to work on a project about the connections between Scottish literature and Anglo-Canadian Literature, which resulted in several articles about the Scottish connections of mainstream Canadian authors such as Alice Munro and Margaret Atwood. Her latest book is *Poder y monstruosidad en la narrativa breve de Margaret Atwood* (Aula Magna-McGraw Hill, 2021).

MARÍA VICTORIA UTRERA TORREMOCHA is Doctor in Hispanic Philology and Associate Professor of Theory of Literature and Comparative Literature in the Faculty of Philology, at the University of Seville, where she currently teaches the disciplines of “Interpretation and Reception of Literary Texts”, “Theory of Literature” and “Literary Criticism”. She was the recipient of the Ph.D. Extraordinary Merit Award in Hispanic Philology. She has also acted as Coordinator of the Official Master's Degree in “General and Comparative Literature” at the University of Seville. She is the director of the magazine *Rhythmica, Revista Española de Métrica Comparada, [Rhythmica: Spanish Journal of Comparative Metrics]* (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED)-Universidad de Sevilla). Her research deals with the areas involving gender theory and contemporary poetics and rhetoric: *Luis Cernuda: A Poetics between Reality and Desire* (Diputación de Sevilla, 1995), awarded First Prize for Literature (1994) in the Monograph Contest organized by the “Archivo Hispalense”; *Theory of the Prose Poem* (Universidad de Sevilla, 1999); *History and Theory of Free Verse* (Padilla Libros, Seville, 2001); *Structure and Theory of Free Verse* (CSIC, Madrid, 2010); *Poetic Symbolism. Aesthetics and Theory* (Verbum, Madrid, 2011); *The Poetics of Disease in Modern Literature* (Dykinson, Madrid, 2015). She has also coordinated several collectively-authored books: *Estudios literarios in honorem Esteban Torre* [Literary Studies in Honor of Esteban Torre], in collaboration with Manuel Romero Luque (Universidad de Sevilla, 2007); *Thought, Fiction and Literary Intrigue in Contemporary*

Narrative (Universidad de Sevilla, 2018), and *Medicine, Ethics and Literature* (Instituto Juan Andrés de Comparatística y Globalización, Madrid, 2020).

CARLOS DEL VALLE is full Professor and Director of the PhD Program in Communication at the University of La Frontera, Chile. He is Postdoctorate in Cultural Studies for the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Postdoctorate in Communication, Media and Culture for the Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina. He is Research Fellow at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Currently, he is the director of the international research network project “Converging Horizons: Production, Mediation, Reception and Effects of Representations of Marginality”, funded by the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation of Chile. His most recent publications include *La construcción mediática del enemigo. Cultura indígena y guerra informativa en Chile* (Salamanca, Comunicación Social, 2021), *Ennemi. Production, médiatisation et mondialisation* (Paris, L'Harmattan, 2021).

Introduction: Cultural Rhetoric. Rhetorical Perspectives, Transferrential Insights

VLADIMIR LUARSABISHVILI

In the history of science few are the disciplines that have both rich past and promising future. One of them is Rhetoric, a classical science of discourse, invented by the Greeks and developed in the Roman Empire, forming part of culture and artistic expressions during different historical periods, such as the Middle Ages, Classicism and Romanticism. The 20th century was decisive for its development and also for the recovery of its historical function, transforming rhetoric into a fertile field for production and analysis of discourses. The General Textual Rhetoric, proposed by Antonio García Berrio (1984), attempts not only to reactivate the rhetorical possibilities formed during its long history, but also implies an extension of the theoretical instruments with the rhetorical contributions produced from the textual approaches (Albaladejo, 1989: 39). Antonio García Berrio opened a path towards the formation of the discipline with a new perspective, of a cultural-rhetorical nature, aiming to highlight the rhetorical ways of formation of cultures and, at the same time, trying to evaluate the role of cultural factors in the composition of rhetorical discourse. The history of Rhetoric itself facilitated the aforementioned approximation of Rhetoric with culture: both in Greek and Roman culture, Rhetoric fulfilled a decisive role in cultural advancement, being considered as one of the key possibilities in teaching (Jaeger, 1978; López Eire, 1996, 2006; Monzón-Laurencio, 2014), communication (Pereda, 2000) and, consequently, in the development of society (Partyka, 2015; Acebal, 2016).

The bidirectional relation of Rhetoric with culture is due to its historical character: being, on the one hand, the discursive technique used in Greco-Latin Antiquity and, on the other, bearing the cultural peculiarities in its communicative and persuasive nature. At the end of the 20th century, José M. Pozuelo Yvancos (1988) distinguished three directions in the development of Rhetoric as a science: The Rhetoric of Argumentation, represented by Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca; the Structuralist Rhetoric, represented by the μ Group; and the General Textual Rhetoric, proposed by Antonio García Berrio. This last

tendency, due to its understanding of rhetoric as the “technique of persuasion” with a discursive and, therefore, textual dimension (García Berrio, 1984: 34), leads to the understanding and formulation of Cultural Rhetoric, proposed by Tomás Albaladejo, which focuses on the historical, social, and communicative relations between Rhetoric and Culture.

Rhetoric has close relations with history, thought and human actions. Historical events are reflected in culture as part of the historical past and literary discourse is composed of the six rhetorical operations (*intellectio, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, actio/pronuntiatio*) (Lausberg, 1966-1968; Albaladejo, 1989; Chico Rico, 1989, 1998). Taking into consideration the mentioned rhetorical operations together with *intellectio* (Chico Rico, 1989, 1998), and the textual, semiotic and pragmatic dimensions in which it exercises its functions in society, the transdisciplinary approach realized by Tomás Albaladejo in a series of the publications in which he proposed cultural Rhetoric in the context of Neorhetoric (Albaladejo, 1998, 2009, 2012, 2014) appears as essential. From this perspective, Cultural Rhetoric is a new discipline that studies its components as constituents of different cultures and, at the same time, evaluates the cultural characteristics in the composition of discourse. Based on cultural components and making possible an analysis of different texts or discourses – political, literary, philosophical, linguistic, etc. – Cultural Rhetoric not only explains the cultural characteristics of the discourse, but also investigates the origin and development of mental operations, and plays a decisive role in the approximation of different sciences in the field of Humanities, Social Sciences and Health Sciences: the analytical-critical tools of the rhetorical system can be used to study authors and their texts, literary groups and movements (Doucet, 2017), to describe rhetoric itself as a part of cultural legacy as *rhetorica recepta* (Albaladejo, 1989), to connect it with the recovery of historical thought (García Berrio, 1984, 1992), to facilitate the process of historical reconstruction in combination with archival materials and to analyze ectopic works written by ectopic authors (Luarsabishvili, 2013, 2020, 2022a, 2022b), to better understand research around memory issues (González Marín, 1998; Phillips, 2019), as well as current advances in neuroscience (Martín Jiménez, 2014; Núñez Fidalgo, 2020).

Cultural rhetoric as a science that possesses a critical instrument of analytical practice offers to researchers a multidisciplinary approach

not only for the study of culture in general but also for the understanding of its linguistic and literary possibilities. One of the notions that can be studied from the perspective of Cultural Rhetoric is a metaphor, the trope that since ancient times has been at the center of cultural research: Aristotle (2011), Fontanier (1821) and Ricoeur (2003) have characterized it from different perspectives, Richards (1965) studied its linguistic capacity, Lakoff and Johnson (1981) have highlighted its persuasive peculiarities, Newmark (2010) described six and Bobes Naves (2004) three different types of the metaphor, Steen (2014) described its new type (deliberate metaphor), Hjelmslev (1980) highlighted its connotative and denotative values, Eco (2000) emphasized its possibility of producing indirect meaning, Díaz (2006) and Arduini (2007a, 2007b) have stressed its cognitive function, Black (1968) referred to the substitutive perspective of metaphor, and Reidemann and Diéguez Morales (1999), Pisarska (1989), Kurth (1995), Arduini (2002), Samaniego (2002), Kövecses (2014) and Luarsabishvili (2016a, 2016b) have highlighted the difficulties of its translation. Finally, we should not forget the studies that relate metaphor to culture, describing it as a component of Cultural Rhetoric (Albaladejo, 2009, 2013, 2016a, 2016b, 2019a, 2019b; Chico Rico, 2015; Jiménez, 2015; Fernández-Cozman, 2016, 2022; Gómez Alonso, 2017a, 2017b, 2020; Martín Cerezo, 2017; Fernández Rodríguez, Navarro Romero, 2018; Luarsabishvili, 2021, 2022c, 2022d).

Within Rhetoric, a cultural-rhetorical component is detected, that encompasses all the components of different nature, i.e., rhetorical, literary, philosophical and others, projected both in rhetorical discourse and in literary or philosophical texts, and of which the common cultural-rhetorical communicative code forms part (Albaladejo, 2016b). One of the key elements of the aforementioned code is the metaphor “[...] for its ability to connect the producing instance and the receiving instance, being based on the semantic leap that occurs in poesis and also in interpretation.” (Albaladejo, 2019b: 174-175). Based on the semantic, syntactic and pragmatic processes of metaphorical creation and proposing a concept of the *translational engine* leaving a space for other tropes or elements of the metaphorical series, Tomás Albaladejo created the theoretical model of metaphor with a central component – the *metaphorical engine* – consisting of the following components: 1) component of the metaphorical series (metaphor, symbol, catachresis, metaphorical network, allegory and other devices of translational basis such as simile or comparison), 2) component formed by different

mechanisms which interact during the metaphorical construction, 3) component consisting of metaphorical engine, and 4) component formed by context and society, where the creation and reception of metaphor take place and are visualized as cross cultural processes in different systems of communication (Albaladejo, 2019c). The construction and reception of metaphor are related with cultural elements, supported by the knowledge of producers and recipients of cultural texts.

Cultural Rhetoric. Rhetorical Perspectives, Transferential Insights is the fourth volume of the book series *Rethinking society. Individuals, Culture and Migration*. Its principal aim is to demonstrate the main peculiarities of Cultural Rhetoric as a new discipline developed and based on the textual, discursive and cultural possibilities of both General Textual Rhetoric and different literary and non-literary systems. Possessing a critical tool that enables the analysis of texts at different levels, that is, at syntactic, intensional-semantic and extensional-semantic levels, Cultural Rhetoric offers to researchers the possibility of highlighting cultural characteristics and values, in order to understand the structure and nature of different cultures. As a book series editor, I would like to thank all authors for their kind participation – I indicate here my sincere debt to them for their encouragement with this project. Special thanks to the members of Editorial and Advisory Editorial Boards for their remarks and suggestions.

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Translation and Analogy in Fanfictions

Javier Rodríguez Pequeño

Abstract: This work aims to observe some analogies and translational operations that take place in the fanfiction phenomenon and that affect the authors, the readers and the cultural system itself.

Keywords: fanfiction, fiction, analogy, translation

For some years now, we have been witnessing the development and consolidation of narrative and cultural phenomena that have found an active and creative audience, with the competence not only to receive stories but also to tell and share them, in any expressive media and in any art form: literature, film, music, etc. One of them is fanfiction: stories created for non-profit purposes by fans of certain literary, film or television works and published on the Internet. Fanfiction is a phenomenon in constant development that has inherited the traditional relationships between the author and the receiver and has reinterpreted them in a collective way around a virtual community that recovers the creative conception of myth and oral literature (Quiroga Terreros, 2016).

Fanfiction, fanfics or fics, are fictions created by fans, followers, fanatics who write their texts based on an already created work (Martos, 2006: 65), whether they are literary texts, television series, films, video games or even real people, from which they take their characters, places, actions, relationships... and places, expanding or modifying them as they wish. Carmen Morán defines fanfictions as fictions based on plots and characters from a pre-existing fiction previously known by the authors and possible readers (Morán, 2007: 32-33). A fanfic can be made within any fan community, this is called fandom, an abbreviation of fanatic and the ending -dom, that could be kingdom or freedom or both (Rutherford-Morrison, 2016) of something or someone (Sessarego, 2018: 115). This satisfies the desires of a reader who becomes the author of stories based on a primary text whose world is expanded at will. Fanfics are usually made about works that fans admire, although they feel dissatisfied or unhappy with some situations, or inspired to create from them in a totally conscious and subordinate way. Other times they aim to improve or specify relationships between

characters, whether from a single work or several, which they call crossover (González Rivas 2018: 104), and sometimes they are also a way of expressing their rejection of what they consider to be shortcomings or defects in the works, such as the fact that there are no LGTBI characters in Harry Potter series. Some understand it as “¿Qué pasaría si...?”, as Rainbow Rowell says in her novel *Fangirl* (2013). In this way, the original world of these characters is modified, expanded or changed (alternative universe or AU). For example, it is possible to read hundreds of versions of Harry Potter, one centred on the homosexual relationship between Sirius Black and Remus Lupin, another one in which Harry studies in a normal high school or an adventure in which the starship Enterprise and the Millennium Falcon meet in cyberspace. In any case, there are fanfictions based on works of fiction but also written about real people (RPF: "Real Person Fiction") resulting in, obviously, works of fiction too. In short, fanfiction can be found within any fandom - a community of fans of something or someone. It is important to say that fanfics are not intended to imitate the original work, but rather to propose alternative versions either to deal with aspects not dealt with in the original or to bring out new meanings from a created world.

One of the main scholars of the genre is Jenkins, who considers five dimensions in the fandom phenomenon: its relationship to a particular mode of reception, viewer activism, its role as an interpretative community, its particular traditions of cultural production and its status as an alternative social community (Jenkins, 2010: 11-12). It is a way of taking part of mass culture by claiming the right to use it for their own creations (Jenkins, 2010: 31), reconfiguring meanings (Foucault, 1994, 1996; Barthes, 1994, 2010; Derrida, 2012).

The fanfic phenomenon is not totally counter-cultural because, although it is not entirely alien to the system, it does not want to destroy it either. In this sense it is closer to popular culture or subliterate, which effectively operates within the system, from a lower level but from within. However, fanfic has some very marked countercultural features, so much so that they define it, such as the fact that it is made from the margins without any pretension to reach the centre (in some cases it could occupy that place), and it is characterised by its difference, despising its valuation and proclaiming its ideology (Eagleton, 2000), which is fundamentally feminist and in favour of the visibility of the different LGTBIQ+ groups, and which remains outside

the market and the means of training and mass communication. One of its purposes is to overcome the authoritarian pressure of the system and proclaim a less moralistic world, proposing new attitudes and points of view, building a space in which to show and reaffirm its identity (Costa, 2018). By way of synthesis, I find very interesting the idea proposed by Carmen Morán according to which fanfiction is a countercultural movement that uses subliterate as a means to exert voluntary pressure on the canon and to question its aesthetic and critical principles (Morán, 2007: 40).

According to María José Vega, the Internet is determinant both from a qualitative point of view and especially from a quantitative way, and in author-reader relations (Vega Ramos, 2007; Morán, 2013). This phenomenon takes place mainly on the Internet, both on specialised websites and on any kind of generalist platform such as blogs, Tumblr, Twitter or YouTube (Kowalczyk, 2014). In the former, works can be included in a catalogue or library according to the work on which they are based, and all kinds of labels can be attached to them in order to guide readers about they will find (genre, romantic relationships, characters). At the same time, users of the website can comment on them, rate them (a system called reviews that allows direct contact with the authors) and follow the author or the story. They are regularly published, although there are also one-shots stories (Martos Núñez, 2006: 66). In the non-specific platforms, there is also a close relationship between the author and the readers, but the design of these pages does not allow for categorisation or specialisation of the platform itself. The authors are amateurs -most of them are women between 15 and 30 years old (Quiroga Terreros, 2016: 28) and do not seek an economic profit. It is important because it is the basis of these writers' defence against those who accuse them of infringing intellectual property law (Carracedo, 2020; Sessarego, 2018: 120). Rainbow Rowell's novel *Fangirl* (2013) is a well-known case, in which the protagonist writes a fanfiction about Simon Snow, a transcript of Harry Potter. Later, in 2015, Rowell adapted that story and published it as her own work: *Carry On*. An interesting debate ensued as to whether this was a kind of fanfiction or metafiction, or a regular fiction novel (Minkel, 2015).

Although Christopher Nolan's Batman trilogy or other reviews of previous films or characters, as in *The Joker*, are very similar to fanfics, the collective communication and the absence of a publishing

agreement differentiates these works from this phenomenon. The difference is clear with *50 Shades of Grey*, an *AU*¹ of *Twilight*. E. L. James, author of the erotic novel, changed the names of the characters, and, as the context is completely different, she avoided the problems of copyright, and at the same time her work was not longer a fanfic because she stopped being part of the community of fans or fandom (Sessarego, 2018: 121). Creation and collective communication in fandom is essential, which is undoubtedly marginal, but at the same time can enter into the publishing market with great success due to the large number of followers it attracts.

The genre is not as new as it may seem. Its origin dates back to 1970s in the United States due to the success of the *Star Trek* series, whose fans published secondary stories in magazines edited by themselves and known as fanzines (Sessarego, 2018). Some consider the origin is as old as literature itself, and argue, for example, that the *Aeneid* is a fanfic of the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad* (Martos Núñez, 2006) or that Jerónimo de Pasamonte with his *Segundo tomo del ingenioso hidalgo Don Quixote de La Mancha* made a fanfic of Cervantes' novel, as well as the sequels of the *Celestina* are fanfics or so many classic works. The fact is that will not be able to understand it nor would it have become so popular without the Internet, which has provided it with its own specialised spaces in which it is possible to publish and read fics, such as *Fanfiction.net*, *Wattpad* or *Archive of Our Own (AO3)*, which are, more than digital archives or libraries, systems of interrelationships between authors and readers (Quiroga Terreros, 2016: 47).

It is not a question, as U. Eco said (1985: 73), of the reader being able to understand, through the analysis of a plot made up of different communicative effects, the original form imagined by the author, but of creating from one's own understanding, of recreating if preferred, completing, changing, evolving, modernising. In conclusion, it is the creation of a different work, inspired by a previous but different one, theirs (from them, since writing can be collective) and new, since to complete, to change... is an exercise in creativity based on translation. It should be borne in mind that in popular and also oral literature, especially before the advent of the printing press, the figure of the

¹ ***Alternate Universe***: A work featuring characters from one series who retain their character and description but are placed in a different story or environment.

author was blurred in comparison with that of the narrator, who was variable and modified the story according to the characteristics and tastes of the audience. The printing press and access to books contributed to organise the social order (Williams, 1992: 23-28) and to some extent eliminated the receivers' action, who in a collective communication became more present and participative. It is possible that the new forms of literary communication, digital writing on the web, have recovered that interrelationship between authors and readers, modifying the canonical form of reading and writing, blurring the figure of the original author and turning the secondary author into a kind of modern minstrel who suggests stories based on his or her experiences for an eager audience to listen to them because they share tastes and the need to intervene in them. This implies questioning the author as an omnipotent being, denying the author's authority, his or her power over the story and the characters he or she has created, although, paradoxically, fans writers also seek recognition, not only from their fandom but also from the publishing sector, since almost everyone wants to be a writer. Then, they abandon the fanfiction genre because we cannot consider the activity as such within the normal publishing market. It is considered fanfiction if it is not part of a commercial activity, if it is amateur. It is logical and coherent with multiple authorship, almost in the public square, that is why the internet and social media are its best scenario.

Emilio Blanco perfectly synthesises these questions when he talks about the pulverisation by the hypertext of the three essential notions of the printed book: sole authorship, intellectual property and the existence of physically isolated books (Blanco, 2003: 68).

This group of stories created and published on the Internet, without any profit motive, by followers of certain literary, film or television works make up a genre and a marginal phenomenon that is interesting because it is based on the recreation or reinterpretation of the relations between the author and the receiver, breaking on the one hand the authority of the main or normative author by granting the group of fans the power to create, but at the same time professing a great tribute to the creator or the first work, but it should not be thought that authorship and originality are despised. The fanfiction phenomenon is very scrupulous, to the point that there is a kind of commission, the Patrulla de Liberación Anti-Plagio, PLAP. (Anti-Plagiarism Liberation Patrol) dedicated to virtual hunting and elimination of authors who publish

other people's fics with their name.² Making fics is not copying, it is using a work to be free and create in a figurative way from it, generally with great respect for the norm and with originality as a criterion. Freedom, originality and quality are fundamental issues. From our point of view, the legitimacy of fanfics is not the most important thing; the main problem is their literary quality, which is very irregular due to the lack of professional control over the works. If they want to survive as a movement, they should be careful with this and ensure the quality of the texts. There is also a figure, the beta reader, a kind of checker or editor who reviews the works and gives advice to the author before publishing. There are also websites specialized in pointing out good and bad works: *Los buenos fics y sus autores*³ and *Los malos fics y sus autores*.⁴ There are even organizations such as the Organization for Transformative Works that provide legal advice, ensure the historical documentation of the phenomenon and facilitate the creation by the fans.⁵

Internet is not only a great library but also a powerful generator, an engine of literary creation produced thanks to a particular process of translation and interpretation. Fics are created from translation and interpretation, it is not new. Thus, the Aeneid arose from a reinterpretation or reading of the Iliad and the Odyssey.

Eco (1985) and Barthes (1987) show explanations for this phenomenon: the reader as a creator, as culmination of the creative process and death of the author, an idea that is neither intended nor considered by the writers (and women writers, the majority) since, although they blur the author's authority over his work, they are always fans, are born as reader-authors without killing the author. But they do share with Barthes the idea that the work does not belong to the author and that his fate is to part with it so that the readers can complete it.

In 2009, the Argentinian writer Pablo Katchadjian published two hundred copies of a work entitled *The Fattened Aleph*, composed of the complete text of Jorge Luis Borges' work, in which he inserted new text

² <https://antiflamers7822.activoforo.com/t145-plap-patrulla-de-liberacin-anti-plagio-foro>.

³ <https://www.fanfiction.net/u/5046843/Los-Buenos-Fics-y-Sus-Autores>.

⁴ <https://malosfics.foroes.org/forum>.

⁵ <http://www.transformativeworks.org>.

reaching more than double that the original. What Katchadjian saw as an exercise in post-modern creation, for Maria Kodama, who owned the legal rights of her late husband's work, was plagiarism, which is why she brought him to justice in a process that lasted years and ended without damages to Katchadjian. One of the writers who supported him was María Pía López, who, among other things, said: “Apoyamos al autor porque nos pareció inaceptable la actitud de la demandante al considerar a Borges como su propiedad”;⁶ to this we can add the words of the defendant: “Es obvio que no se pretende esconder un plagio de forma dolosa, que para eso se pensó la ley. El libro se titula *El Aleph engordado* y al final hay una explicación del trabajo que había hecho. Borges no es un monumento, es un escritor. La historia de la literatura es una constante revisión y reflexión sobre la tradición [...] Toda la literatura es una versión constante de lo anterior”.⁷ All literature is a recreation of the previous works, an eternal dialogue between texts (Foucault, 1969) which authors and readers can make speak in different ways, recycle them, reconvert them, reform them, expand them by manipulating their worlds and their settings.

The fact is that fanfic, as a set of works belonging to the art of language, i.e., the set of literary and non-literary texts that make an artistic use of language (Albaladejo, 1996, 2000), is based on cultural-rhetorical and interdiscursive principles such as the conceptual set formed by translational operations such as analogy, equivalence, polyvalence and transferability. It is certainly considering its relations between literary works in which there is transduction (Doležel, 1986), i.e., in processes of dynamic transmission such as intercultural transfer, transtextuality, recreations, parodies, adaptations... of content or expression of other literary works. In this sense it is related to *imitatio* and *retractatio* as literary creation processes. It also has translational foundations taking into account the intersemiotic relations between literary and television, musical, cinematographic, pictorial works, as can be seen in the countless fanfics of songs or television series of the group Tokio Hotel or the animated series Yuri on Ice!, for example. Probably the most obvious translational operation is the one that has to do with the relations between non-digital and digital discourses (both literary and

⁶<https://www.diarioarmenia.org.ar/pablo-katchadjian-el-hombre-que-doblego-a-maria-kodama/> (Last access: 30/09/2023).

⁷https://cultura.elpais.com/cultura/2015/06/27/actualidad/1435399626_417380.html (Last access: 30/09/2023).

non-literary), as the whole phenomenon is based on the digital translation of non-digital discourses (literary, musical, cinematographic, etc.), although it also shows operations between digital discourses.

Finally, we are interested in the relationship between real worlds and imaginary worlds. This field includes mimesis, fiction and verisimilitude and all kind of fiction they produce and their relations to actual reality, since they are based on analogy, although in this sense there is some difference between the different conceptions of possible worlds, as we shall see below.

These transtextual operations are evident in fanfics insofar as they create a different world from a previous one, and they are also interesting because they contribute to complete (they will never fully complete) the world proposed by the author according to Lubomír Doležel's conception of it, who rejects the mimetic reading of literature that has traditionally been done, even by modern authors such as Auerbach and Ricoeur, because reality is not the only reference for literature. He believes that the writer can create a fictional world of his own, independent of the real world. Doležel developed a theory of possible worlds in the framework of a multiple worlds model (Doležel, 1997 and 1999, among other contributions), where he rejected the mimetic and pseudomimetic traditions. He denies the existence of a single world, since in case it is accepted, we would have to admit that the rest of the worlds are only a copy, and he considers that possible are parallel worlds, without any hierarchical relationship between them, thus breaking the ties that have made the present world the reference point for art.

The text analyses the concept of mimesis and its evolution as a way of conceiving an artistic object. It proposes different types of mimesis,⁸ of

⁸ The other types of mimesis he talks about are real and universal mimesis. Real mimesis: The artistic object is considered a fictional representation of the real. A fictional particular, P(f), represents a real particular, P(r). P(f)->P(r). For example, the city of London in Charles Dickens' works is a fictional representation of the real city of London, the character of Napoleon Bonaparte in Tolstoy's War and Peace is a fictional representation of the historical figure of Napoleon Bonaparte. And universal mimesis: The artistic object is considered a fictional representation of an archetype of reality. P(f)->P(u). For example, Raskolnikov, the protagonist of Dostoyevsky's novel Crime and Punishment, has no historical equivalent, but is the representation of a real

which the most interesting for this case is the mimesis of possible worlds, a type of autonomous fiction, which does not represent or depend on referents of the real life. An example mentioned in *Heterocosmica* is the character of Hamlet. The name “Hamlet” is not self-referential. This means that it refers to an entity existing within the fictional world of the play: there is a person, Hamlet, who is not equivalent to any individual in the extratextual world, nor is the representation of an archetype or concept of the same extratextual world. And yet this possible world shares the same ontological level with the real world. Hamlet exists only because Shakespeare created him, with no real or archetypal referent. Harry Potter, John Snow or Gandalf are the same case.

The idea that the fictional worlds are autonomous entities with regard to the world conventionally assumed as “real” gives them an equivalent ontological existence, since the difference is not qualitative but of different possibilities, as long as each fictional world is a possibility itself. And this is what interests us most from his conception to understand the *fics*: each fictional world exists only as a possibility until a reader constructs it and gives it existence. Its existence is the result of human’s creative activity. Without their textual realisation they do not exist, and they admit as many as we want because although fictional worlds exist independently from reality (more than questionable idea in practice), they do not exist apart from their textual realisation.

In the book *Heterocosmica*, some general rules of the possible worlds are set out. The series of possible worlds is indefinite and of maximum variety, since they do not depend on, represent or imitate the real world (prevailing, according to Doležel) which is finite. Reality is finite/limited. The possible worlds are not. The possible worlds are ontologically homogeneous: All the possible worlds are understood as a set of unrealised possibilities, regardless of their closeness to or distance from reality. Any possible world is as possible as the others: the world raised in J.R.R. Tolkien's medieval fantasy texts is just as possible/fictitious as the world raised by a realist novel of the 19th century, although the latter possibility seems more feasible, closer to the

archetype. This means that the fictional entity corresponds to a pre-existing concept, assumed to be real. This type of mimesis includes literary archetypes such as the hero, anti-hero, damsel, etc. (Doležel, 1999).

real world. The Lord of the Rings and *La Regenta* are equally fictitious, possible. Or what is the same, Madrid is as fictitious in Galdós' work as Hogwarts is in the work of the ineffable Joanne Rowling.

The possible worlds of literature have no real existence, just textual, and they are incomplete. The texts show only a part of the possible world, which is always smaller than the textual world. Does Madame Bovary have moles on her back? Can a reader answer that question? Can he or she imagine and recreate it? This is the mechanism of fanfiction by which it does not go outside the system of possible worlds and would still consist of true statements because they tell a truth about the world to which they refer.⁹ In this way, a statement such as “Eddard Stark is beheaded” could be considered false because it does not occur, but a reader who has read George R. R. Martin's work has empirical knowledge of this event, which is also consistent with Cersei Lannister's behaviour, the accusation of treason and the circumstances of King's Landing. This statement is true within the fictional world of *A Song of Ice and Fire*, since in it, this character dies in this way, not in combat or poisoned, for example. And it would also be true if a reader imagines another situation in another work and narrates it coherently. For example, Harry Potter being sent to Slytherin by the Sorting Hat. This is something that does not happen in J. K. Rowling's fiction but is possible in other fiction, as is describing aspects not developed in the norm, in the first work. It is the essence of fics and it is in Doležel's conception. However, the analogy between the real world and the fictional world is much better appreciated in Tomás Albaladejo's (1986) conception of the possible world, since the autonomy of fiction defended by Doležel is only total in its own limits and not in its relation with the world, which is only theoretical. In practice, it is very difficult to separate one from the other, since neither as readers nor as producers can we abstract ourselves from ourselves, from our context, our reality, which necessarily affects us and affects our creations, creating links between reality and fiction, in one sense and in another, and making analogy necessary for their understanding and analysis. Contrary to what Doležel thinks, we believe that fictional worlds are subject to the

⁹ Doležel works on the issue of the relationship between truth and fiction. Fictions are usually considered as untrue because they are statements that are unprovable in reality. Doležel examines Frege's postulation that says “los enunciados literarios no son ni verdaderos ni falsos” and goes beyond saying that literary statements are true because they tell a truth about the world to which they refer.

requirements of verisimilitude, veracity or probability, without this annulling the autonomy of fiction to be governed by its own laws independently of those of reality, nor, of course, questioning the aesthetic factors and values, which indeed change each period. In general, the theory of possible worlds holds that all fiction creates a world semantically distinct from the real world, created specifically by each fictional text and only accessible precisely through that text. Thus, a work of fiction can alter or eliminate some of the physical laws prevailing in the real world (as in science fiction or the fantasy novel) or retain them and construct a world close to – if not identical to – the real one (as in the realist novel). The only ‘requirements’ for creating a possible world are that it can be conceived and that once conceived it maintains an internal congruence. The relations of that world and its ontological status vary in different theories, but analogy is present as a fundamental operation in fanfic both in its relation to the normative work and in the relationship between the real and the fictional world.

Evidently, fanfic can be seen as a type of textual transcendence of the text or transtextuality (Genette, 1989), but in its poetic consideration it is also very interesting in that it brings it into contact with the two most clarifying theories of possible worlds in this aspect: that of Tomás Albaladejo (1986) and that of Lubomir Doležel (1999), the former is focused on the explanation of the textual construction based on the referential set structure, that is the set of people, actions, places, ideas, etc. that form their fictional universe, which is explained in their analogical relations; the second is concerned about pure possibility, about non-presence in the text, about potentiality. Thus, the authors of fictions such as the series *Los favoritos de Midas* or the film *Enola Holmes* start from a fictional world previously created, and in which they see the possibility of being a generator of other fictions on the foundations that it lays and which they consider canonical. The script by Mateo Gil, Miguel Barros, David Muñoz and Arantxa Cuesta for the fiction *Los favoritos de Midas* starts from a world previously created and fixed by Jack London in a referential set structure, which they modify, expand and create other aspects that produce a different fiction, in which, unlike London’s (in which poor people join to reverse the social order) rich people join to maintain the social, political and economic order. The series in 2020 is original because it deals with class consciousness and economic order in another period and from another point of view, but it could not exist without Jack London’s novel, nor the latter without the concrete situation of the reality of its time, from

which it is explained. Similarly, the film *Enola Holmes* (we could say much the same of many other films, such as *Young Sherlock Holmes*, for example) owes much of its contextualisation of the reader to the world created by Arthur Conan Doyle, in which Sherlock Holmes bursts with a great personality and great possibilities. These and many other fictions rouse the readers' creative dimension, who not only imagine based on what has been said, necessarily completing the first fiction, but also draw on and are inspired by it to create other fictions. The creative seed can arise from the need to experience different adventures with your favourite characters, to place them in another context, to create a past or a future, or it can also arise from the dissatisfaction produced by a lack of some characters or by their inadequate treatment, such as the absence of characters belonging to the LGTBI collective or the lack of diversity in the *Harry Potter* saga. The authors of fanfics or this kind of fiction are not only active in the reconstruction of the world of the text, in the reconfiguration as readers of the moment that Genette (1989) defines as *mimesis III*, but they are also active as producers of a text that would also be created as *mimesis I* but with an engine in its *mimesis III*, acquiring the true value of reconstruction. They are worlds created from others; they are texts provoked, induced and dependent on other texts and on the reality that causes those texts.

Obviously, fiction should be understood not only as the production of plausible stories that have the appearance of reality. A fiction is an artifice, a construction made from the instruments of each art. That construction, that fictional world, that artifact is governed by its own rules and laws that may not be and even contradict those of the real world. But that does not annul its relationship with reality. Fiction has a relationship with reality, and sometimes even a commitment. Proof of this is the existence of censorship, which is responsible for avoiding precisely this relationship when reality is threatened by criticism or views not convenient for power. Writers refer to reality, even if they do not do so formally or materially, and knowledge they provide of it is as great as or greater than that provided by philosophers, historians or journalists. Fanfics are texts that are often lose touch with reality and even from the most fantastic fiction. They can even transgress the rules of the fictional world on which they arise and depend on, but they always maintain a link with it and with reality thanks to analogy.

Analogy and translations are operations that are very present in all types of transtextual texts but are particularly important in phenomena such

as fanfic, which is precisely defined by intersemiotic translation, and which tests the analogical construction of fictional worlds.

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The Impact of the Police Operations Soubriquets in Culture and Society from the Perspective of Cultural Rhetoric¹⁰

Eugenio-Enrique Cortés-Ramírez
Juan Carlos Gómez Alonso

Abstract: In this paper, there is a first invitation to propose a method analysis regarding how the police operations soubriquets are constructed with transfer procedures within a rhetorical field, from the perspective of the Cultural Rhetoric that has been proposed by Prof. Tomás Albaladejo. In addition, there is also a second invitation to study its evolution as a Metaphorical Engine from creation to the construction of the final story, from the title or brand to the final speech as cultural impact on Culture and Society.

Keywords: Cultural Rhetoric. Metaphorical Engine. *Traslatitio* Engine. Metaphor. Analogy. Translation. Police Operations Soubriquets.

1. Introduction: Appeals to designate police investigations in current society

Society is nowadays used to hearing or reading through the media the names of police and judicial operations, those that express conveyed messages about the case under investigation. Making a similar effort, journalists often strive to explain the relationship that has been established between the employed term to describe the judicial or police operation in relation to the cases and, for this, they ask about the relationship between this term and the police case.

A few weeks ago, for example, journalists reported on a case that has been named as *Corvina Operation* where a group of paedophiles were put under arrest with the consequent dismantling of an international criminal organization of paedophiles. In fact, *corvina* is a fish, journalists pointed out, whose natural habitat is the mud of some lakes and ponds where it hides itself easily to get food. According to the RAE dictionary, this term comes from the Latin *Corvinus* and, in its second meaning, in feminine (*corvina*) it is defined as the “marine teleost fish,

¹⁰ This work is the result of research that has been carried out in the R+D+i project PGC2018-093852-B-I00 of the Secretary of Science, Innovation and Universities of the Government of Spain.

of the suborder of the acanthopterygians, about fifty cm long, brown colour with black spots on the back and silver on the belly, obtuse head, mouth with many teeth, two dorsal fins, caudal fin with its central rays longer than the lateral ones, and anal fin with very strong spines ”. However, researchers have selected this name for another reason, due to the habitat where this fish develops and lives hidden to attack other fish in a hidden way, camouflaging itself with the environment where it lives without raising alerts for its predatory actions. This choice is a trope, a metaphor, that designates a police investigation. Subsequently, on this name, as a title, a text is built, a story, that includes all the data of the investigation: characters, dates, criminal actions and police and judicial action.

Since the nineties, there are many names that have resonated in the media and have survived throughout all these years. And diverse is the origin of these names:

los criterios sobre los que se basan suelen ser las circunstancias del caso (**Operación Musaraña, Pokémon, Ballena Blanca, Puzzle**), el lugar donde se cometió el delito (**Operación Faisán o Nécora**), el ámbito delictivo (**Operación Harina**), las principales personas investigadas (**Operación Púnica, Gürtel, Malaya**), los efectos robados (**Operación Lingote**) o curiosidades que rodean el caso (**Operación Abanico, Colapso**). (NombrAND, 2014).¹¹

The use of these names, on the one hand, is a rhetorical act that has been inserted in a rhetorical field, as it will be analysed, that attends to the process of creation with all its components, but above all to the reception of the transmitted message. And, on the other, it becomes or can become a cultural phenomenon that is often inserted in our society and culture through jokes, humour, politics, and communication in general. However, it is not so easy to choose the accurate soubriquet. It must be politically correct and not hurt sensibilities. In fact, when looking for naming for police operations there are certain limits that cannot be crossed. The allusion to the race, religion or nationality of the defendants should be left out. In fact, in the United Kingdom, the

¹¹ The criteria under which they are based are usually each case’s circumstances of the (Shrew Pokémon, White Whale, Puzzle Operation), the place where the crime was committed (Pheasant or Crab Operation), the criminal field (Flour Operation), the investigated main persons (Punic, Gürtel, Malaya Operation), the stolen effects (Operation Ingot) or different curiosities surrounding the case (Operation Fan, Collapse Operation). (NombrAND, 2014).

Metropolitan Police have created a computer program that sets the possible soubriquets at random (Herzfeld, 2016: 76).

These are some aspects that are usually considered when naming operations, these being: The geographical area, hobbies and nicknames of victims or executioners, the jargon of convicts in recorded conversations, the sea as a source of inspiration especially for drug dealing, or even the Roman Catholic Book of Saints. This naming process has been produced by those police officers who uncover these types of scandals. Moreover, those are the ones who give the keyword with which these operations will be initiated.

2. Analysis of translatio procedures from Cultural rhetoric

Our society is marked by the force of communication, the intervention of the modes and the media constantly present in our lives, so it cannot surprise us that the most mediatic cases of police investigations have been installed in our current cultural universe. These serve as a reference to simplify the speeches and limit their terms. Let us see where and why this trend of giving unique names to these investigations arises.

If someone has a look at the Hispanic sphere, as Isabel Méndez has pointed out, in an article that was published in 2016:

... la práctica de bautizar en España a los destacados despliegues de Policía Nacional y Guardia Civil comenzó a principios de la década de los 90. Hasta entonces, las actuaciones se bautizaban con el número de diligencia judicial (1355/90, por ejemplo), un recurso que provocaba confusión, por lo que en numerosas ocasiones eran los agentes los que le cambiaban el nombre y acababan usando el de la víctima o el detenido. Por lo general, los nombramientos de las operaciones suelen llevarlos a cabo los policías o sus superiores, aunque también puede ocurrir que sea el jefe de prensa quien dé la idea para 'vender' mejor el tema (Méndez, 2016: s/p).¹²

¹² "... The practice of baptizing outstanding deployments of the National Police and Civil Guard in Spain began in the early 90s. Until then, the proceedings were baptized with the number of judicial diligence (1355/90, for example), a resource that caused confusion, so on numerous occasions there were the agents who changed its name and ended up using that of the victim or the convict. Generally speaking, the appointments of the operations are usually carried out by the police or their superiors, although it may also happen that it is the press officer who gives the idea to better 'sell' the subject (Méndez, 2016: s/p)".

That is, the creation of these striking and famous names arises from the need to avoid confusion among the agents, to obviate the numbers of the files that could lead to errors: they are messages with very specific and distinct recipients, the police officers of the case. The process of creating these names supposes a masking of the meaning within a rhetorical process that creates through that name a textual indeterminacy and a creative ambiguity (Empson, 1977). These names are located in a central space in the constitution and in the communication of the police operation to society and give the name itself a cataphoric value, of an announcement of a text that did not exist at that time but that is going to be built with all the information that is published about the case and that is like the title and text of any literary communication (for example, of a detective novel). The syntactic ellipsis proper to appellatives generates a semantic ambiguity (sought) and a communicative interest of a pragmatic nature, typical of this system of generation of discursive appellants.

These nominations, these names created by the agents, will be communicated to society at a given moment, while changing and broadening the spectrum of reception: from the agents to the media and from there to society. For this reason, the presence of these names of police operations with a striking name (instead of a file number) makes communication of the cases more attractive to society, actively inserting itself in social communication. On the one hand, these names are usually striking and are not only easier to remember by investigating agents but also by the media and citizens, which both politicians and journalists use effectively in their messages. These names are more than just nominations for police and judicial actions. They have become fundamental elements of communicative and rhetorical action, in the image of police and judicial successes. These are onomastic codes designed for internal communication, at first, and social, later.

This essay will prove below how the creation of these names or *naming* affects the different operations (constituent and non-constituent) of Rhetoric (Albaladejo, 1989) and what elements of Rhetoric are maintained in this communicative action. These names will be analysed from Cultural Rhetoric, a new way of studying Culture with Rhetoric tools:

La Retórica es parte de la cultura y no se concibe una reflexión sobre la cultura que no preste atención a la comunicación discursiva y a su estudio; pero, además, la cultura es necesaria para el funcionamiento y la eficacia de

la comunicación humana, en la medida en que ésta es llevada a cabo por productores y por receptores, que han de estar unidos por un código comunicativo y han de ser conscientes del contexto y de la necesidad de la adecuación al mismo. Retórica y cultura están unidas y no puede entenderse una sin la otra (Albaladejo, 2013: s/p).¹³

Cultural Rhetoric has been able to verify, after having asked some Police Chief Constables, that the authors of these curious names are usually the investigation agents themselves, their superiors or even those responsible for communication from the National Police or the Civil Guard Corps. They use ingenuity, intuition, and arbitrariness to designate cases after having considered that these names are going to be known to society, known, and used. Although it seems that there is no protocol for these denominations, the authors have considered that they cannot go against any person, race, religion, or territory, so the rhetorical concept of *decorum* and that of *aptum* operates according to the receivers. The chosen names respond to a rhetorical, persuasive, and ethical intention. The ethical question (since Aristotle) is linked to the one that makes the speech as something innate, that causes credibility in front of society. Therefore, the names that are associated to the police cases show intelligence in their creation and their ability to identify themselves with each case, as well as the goodwill of the creator of the name who is aware of its pragmatic nature, a pragmatic perspective that puts the selected name to denominate the judicial or police case in the centre of the rhetorical fact (Albaladejo, 1989: 43; Hernández Guerrero. s/f:s/p) in communication with all the components of the communication scheme (author, receiver, text, context, channel, referent, and code). This pragmatic dimension is associated with social action:

La dimensión pragmática de la retórica (dentro de su dimensión semiótica) asociada a la dimensión textual proporciona a esta ciencia del discurso las perspectivas necesarias para incorporar el análisis pragmático y su vinculación al análisis social. Si la dimensión textual de la retórica permite conectarla con el análisis del discurso, es esta dimensión pragmática y su proyección social la que hace posible su conexión con el análisis crítico del

¹³ “Rhetoric is part of culture and a reflection on culture that does not pay attention to discursive communication and its study is not conceived; But, in addition, culture is necessary for the functioning and effectiveness of human communication, insofar as it is carried out by producers and recipients, who must be united by a communicative code and must be aware of the context and the need to adapt to it. Rhetoric and culture are united and one cannot be understood without the other.” (Albaladejo, 2013: s/p).

discurso, que se caracteriza por centrar su atención en la práctica discursiva social (Albaladejo, 2020: 31).¹⁴

The names that call the investigated cases, the police operations, are constituted in speeches, micro-discourses, that project human activity in the investigation and that show it through the selected term. Therefore, it entails an ethical action on the part of the author that will fall on a speaker of whom Quintiliano considers “vir bonus dicendi peritus” or as “bene loquitor homo bonus” in his work *Institutio Oratoria*, also highlighting this moral characterization of the author aware that human activity is projected towards the good, identifying the rhetorical purpose of that appellation with the good and with the maintenance of the reserve regarding the defendants, in which the rhetorical persuasion maintains a teleological character that brings it closer to the good. The authors and producers of these messages in the form of an appellation carry out a conscious plan to identify the case under investigation with their nomination. On the one hand, the natural recipients of this appellation (as if it were the number of the instruction) are the agents and their initial destination is to avoid confusion and improve the memorization of the case by the people who work on that summary. But, on the other hand, the authors are aware and seek communicative success when it comes to showing society an investigation. It is a collective and varied receptor where *polyacrosis* operates (Albaladejo, 1998, 2009a). The word chosen must sell a good image of the judicial and police action (an image of success) and, in turn, remain in the cultural imaginary of society, of the recipients, who each time they hear that term can easily integrate it into their social and cultural universe, although years pass from the first time, they hear it until it has been judged and it becomes recurrent through the media. It is in the rhetorical operation of the intellect where this first action is inserted, the communicative analysis of the process, the case, the participants, police investigation and the members of the same. For this reason, perhaps there is no protocol for the creation of these names, because it is the rhetorical action itself that sets the limits and sets the

¹⁴ “The pragmatic dimension of rhetoric (within its semiotic dimension) associated with the textual dimension provides this science of discourse with the necessary perspectives to incorporate pragmatic analysis and its link to social analysis. If the textual dimension of rhetoric allows it to be connected with discourse analysis, it is this pragmatic dimension and its social projection that makes possible its connection with critical discourse analysis, which is characterized by focusing its attention on social discursive practice.” (Albaladejo, 2020: 31).

ethical rules of these micro-discourses.

Far from the protocol that was determined by Rhetoric and its ethical behaviour could be found in some cases, for example, such as the one called *Linux*, in 2011, this is the arrest of one of the top computer experts of the ETA terrorist band, since this name came into conflict with the brand. That is why the Home Secretary had to publish a statement giving explanations. Or, in another sense, with the soubriquet of *Betún Operation (Shoe Polish Cream Operation)*, from 2008, where the National Police had put under arrest seven criminals in Madrid, several of them were black skinned, for multiple robberies, glass window landings, forgeries and drug trafficking. However, there are also other interpretations that were given as an explanation of this appellation, such as that the initial investigations were harsh, cumbersome, and difficult. In any case, the metaphor works as a constructive semantic element of both indicated meaning, but in the first interpretation the name would be exposed to a social sanction for its inappropriate use.

A unique case, along the same lines, was called *Enano* (Smurf), an operation that was initially called *Pitufo* (Dwarf) and that owes its soubriquet to the short stature of the leader of a criminal network (drugs and robbery). This change of name in the case is symptomatic, a change of name that describes the defendant as a synonym of fiction without making a physical description of it, in accordance with that unwritten protocol to which we have referred before and where is found an ethical component of Rhetoric.

But how do you come to name each of these investigations? How is it verbalised? This chapter analyses how the name of each of the operations has a direct relationship with the case, something that facilitates the memory of both the agents (the first recipients of this message and with the intention of avoiding oblivion or confusion, so it works memory operation) and Spanish society in general (final recipients of this message and to whom it is addressed with a persuasive purpose, not only of the action itself but also of the effectiveness of the judicial and police system). If we consider some names, without knowing the specific cases, we can establish a metaphorical or translational relationship between the term and what it means or suggests. This is the case of the name *Pelícano* (Pelican) where several police agents of the antiterrorist fight against ETA in France had taken

part, since the first terrorist target of that operation had white, grey hair: in this case the metaphor arises from a play on words. Even the *Faisán* case (Pheasant), that of the tip-off, also in the same environment of the anti-terrorist fight against ETA, because the intermediary who had transferred the money ransom was nicknamed as “the pheasant”, in addition due to the proximity of the Pheasants Island, in France. As it can be seen, they are arbitrary names that have been constructed by the agents of the case and have a relationship with the individuals who intervene as an object of investigation, with whom the name establishes a direct or metaphorical relationship.

The same situation happens, for example, with the operation that is called *Puzzle*, a meaning that comes to Spanish from the English word “*puzzle*” and that, according to the RAE dictionary that derives us from the term “*jigsaw*”, in its first meaning defines: “A game that consists on composing a certain figure by combining a certain number of pieces of wood or cardboard, where in each of them there is a part of the figure.” Each person is said to be familiar with what a puzzle is like because everyone could have seen one of them and could have also solved one or even some of them at least once in lifetime. It is a popular game and is remembered as a set of pieces that once put together create the final image. It is considered by itself as both a game and an intellectual, complex, and intelligent activity. Thus, the 2007 case called *Puzzle* was an investigation into the murder of a Colombian, where his body appeared chopped in many gathered pieces in San Martín de la Vega, a village from the Madrid Region. The relationship between the denomination and the case is clear and direct. And this works to make it easy for police officers to recall the case. However, although the author is correct in the invention process, he is not doing the same in the verbalization of the rhetorical operation of *elocutio*. The puzzle idea is adequate, but not the word, as soon as it also involves the concept of play, fun, and free time for the receiver. The term has positive signs that take it away from the description of the judicial or police case. It perfectly fulfils one of the objectives, that of memory and recall, but it moves away from the matter by sweetening the case in the collective memory. Puzzle, in this case, is a metonymy that functions as a logical contiguity on the designated case.

These appellations to police and judicial cases operate as micro-discourses and are titles without text. These have awakened the recipient’s curiosity and have the *attentum parare* Rhetoric function,

preparing the attention of a multiple and diverse society in their recipients. As a title, on these names, the figure of *sustentatio* works (Quintiliano, 1970: 9. 2. 22-23) that, without any further text to sustain itself, is built on the account of the investigated facts, on the actors and on the inflections, interpretations that have been developed by the recipients (Albaladejo and Gómez, 2015). Although this text does not exist originally, when the name is made by the police agents' unit who are investigating the case, once the name is made known to society, a story about the case is constructed. The tale of the events and those agents and elements of those events tell the police operation name with something unexpected, for which the name is a translational anticipator of the metaphorically encoded information and is presented as a communicative support for the receiver in a productive-interpretive dimension, from its pragmatic perspective, which gives thematic continuity to the line marked by the police name, which is based on the figure of *sustentatio*.

In addition, if we consider the horizon of expectations that was exposed by Prof. Hans Robert Jauß for literary texts (Jauß, 1986: 16-17) that also operates in this type of communication, the name of each police operation is consolidated in the receivers by an interpretive process with the logic of the subsequent police actions. These have been carried out with the same dynamics that operates in a literary tale, in a crime or crime roman, for example, fulfilling the expectations established by the appellation once the fable about the that is created. The police name, in its origin, seeks interpretive uncertainty so as not to give clues about police action. But once it is made public, this police soubriquet supposes a discursive inflection, due to the figure of *sustentatio*, that causes the global interpretation of the discourse from the appellative, which will break that horizon of interpretation once the story is consolidated. Once the discursive turn has occurred when the facts and police actions are known, the name follows another thematic path of an identifying and evaluative nature related to the nominee, once the initial purpose has been abandoned.

As with the titles of books, police soubriquets (that have this title function) inform and have their own literariness (Martínez Arnaldos, 2003: 16). These police operations denominations are loaded with semantic suggestions, by which is meant that they operate as key elements in the text that will be described once the police investigations in this regard are presented. And as with literary titles, these soubriquets

have their own identity by themselves. Hence its social and cultural survival. These soubriquets function as signs and in journalistic communication they become an outpost or the first element of contact between the sender of the message and the receiver. The society will identify the cases through them, and they function, at the same time, as a simple communicative act and as a communication system.

For all these reasons, in our opinion, the police operations soubriquets are serving as a *metaphorical engine* in the construction and reconstruction by the memory of a chronicle (narco-chronic, in some cases) of those specific police cases with evocative and fictionalising power:

El motor metafórico [actúa] como impulsor de la creación metafórica desde la concepción cognitiva de la misma y como conductor del proceso metafórico hasta que queda constituida o verbalizada o plasmada, la metáfora, gracias a la capacidad humana de determinar la semejanza por semas comunes entre los elementos que intervienen en dicho proceso como elemento presente y como elemento ausente (Albaladejo, 2016: 55).¹⁵

The same thing that we have analysed in the *Puzzle* case previously, can be said another case of that same year 2007 when analysing the Operation name that was called *Original Sin* where the National Security Forces detained several members of a clan of drug dealers, among whom there were two Colombians named *Adán* and *Eva*, taken as the translational axis for the choice of the name of the case. As in the case that has been described above, the selected soubriquets gather all the necessary requirements for the memorisation of the investigating police agents, but it departs notably in the description of the analysed case of drug trafficking. The use of the *Genesis* passage does not reflect the case, beyond disobedience to higher standards, and does not describe a similar situation. Therefore, in the *actio/pronuntiatio* operation, as in the previous case, there will be a departure from the case of society, unless that analogy is explained. It is a synecdoche where the used part to name the whole operation has to do with the name of two drug dealers and not with the prosecuted action, for which

¹⁵ “The Metaphorical Engine [acts] as a driver of metaphorical creation from the cognitive conception of it and as a driver of the metaphorical process until the metaphor is constituted or verbalized or embodied, thanks to the human ability to determine the similarity by common semes between the elements that intervene in this process as a present element and as an absent element.” (Albaladejo, 2016: 55).

the recipients will have to carry out a process of *translatio* of a few positive semes (the biblical names) to name the group of drug dealers and their actions. It is a process of metaphorical translation:

El *modelo teórico de la metáfora* que propongo tiene el *motor metafórico* como componente central y dinamizador. Este modelo consta de varios componentes: 1) El componente constituido por la serie metafórica, de la que forman parte la metáfora, el símbolo, la catacresis, la red metafórica, la alegoría y otros dispositivos de base translacional, como el símil o comparación, que, como es sabido, no es un tropo, sino una figura de pensamiento; los elementos de esta serie se caracterizan por poseer metaforicidad, aunque en distintos grados según el elemento del que se trate. 2) El componente formado por diversos mecanismos que intervienen en la construcción metafórica: comparación, transferencia, sustitución, interacción, combinación y armonización. 3) El componente consistente en el motor metafórico. 4) El componente formado por el contexto y la sociedad, donde se producen la creación metafórica y la recepción metafórica, que se proyectan como procesos culturales transversales en diferentes espacios comunicativos.” (Albaladejo, 2019a: 567).

The identification of names or surnames of people that are linked to the investigation is something common in the given soubriquets to many cases. *Gloria (Glory) Operation*, for example, was named as a tribute to Police Chief Constable Mrs. Gloria Martínez, Head of the Specialised & Violent Crime Unity at the Madrid Police Brigade. This Police Chief Constable, together with other two colleagues of her, had organised a plan to prosecute and to put under arrest a murderer whose nickname is “*El Solitario*” (The Lonely). After thirteen years of prosecution, “*El Solitario*” was finally put under arrest and into prison in 2007. In this case, this operation soubriquet is again a synecdoche that is close to the surname of the Police Chief Constable this time, the first recipients of that message, and far from society that needs the appropriate clarifications regarding this proper soubriquet. More complex are other similarities of soubriquets with well-known police cases well today, such as the *Gürtel Plot* or even the *Malaya Case*. The *Gürtel Plot* was named from Francisco Correa, whose family name “Correa” means “Gürtel”, in German, and “Belt”, in English. Correa was a public events organisation company owner and the leader and organiser of a corruption and bribery plot where some politicians were notably involved during the first decade of Twenty First Century. The denomination in German (Gürtel) is used as an interlinguistic translation into Spanish. This is translated as the English word “belt” and from there in another process to belt. In this case, the use of German

made this investigation object more complicated for those who do not know that language and serves as the memory of the case for the police officers. Otherwise, the *Malaya Case* (Malay Case) seems to respond to several reasons. The first of them is linked to the main convict's family name, Juan Antonio Roca ("Rock", in English), and the topological relationship established between the two terms has to do with the name of a type of torture, Malay torture, that was applied to those who resisted the most in the interrogations, whose resistant attitudes were stronger than a "rock". There are other proposals that bring this soubriquet closer to an acronym that is created from two of the main cities where the investigation was carried out: Malaga and Marbella (Mala ... + ... lla = Malaya). Furthermore, in *Punic Operation*, where the nominating agent went to the "Punic" whose Latin and scientific name is *Granatum* due to its lexical proximity to the family name one of those investigated, a former politician called Francisco Granados.

The case named *Pokemon*, meanwhile, refers to a set of well-known role-playing video games developed through portable video game consoles in which the characters are many and rare. The name is dedicated to a plot of corruption and bribery in Galicia to obtain council contracts through rigging of public procurement processes. The number of those investigated was very large and, in addition, many of them had nicknames or soubriquets, so the investigators had linked this case to that nickname. It is a metaphor that brings together two worlds, with their own rules and characters, one to fiction and the other to reality. The characterization of these investigated characters, their names and nicknames, their ways of proceeding had led to another case, or the *Pokemon Case* second stage, with the soubriquet of *Manga* that, as it is well known, is the Japanese word for comics in general. Moreover, in the overseas of Japan, the term *Manga* is usually employed to name comics, or even this kind of comics from Japanese origin. In this case, the name *Manga* comes to give continuity to that of the first case, due to its origin, its number, and the relationship between one and the other name. A semantic parallelism and a discursive continuity are established for the recipients of the message, and it fits into the action of the society that already knows and has integrated these terms.

In all these cases, the used names have needed the case references to be interpreted. Hence, these are difficult to understand, guaranteeing discretion process. Once the police investigation has concluded and the

case is open and communicated to society, the assigned name makes sense regarding the referential and contextual elements that help the reconstruction and metaphorical interpretation in each social and cultural environment:

La metáfora es uno de los fundamentos de la comunicación en sociedad mediante el lenguaje y forma parte de los procedimientos culturales implicados en la actividad comunicativa. La metáfora se produce por la condición y la capacidad simbólica del ser humano y por el conocimiento cultural de las posibilidades de creación metafórica como praxis socialmente instaurada, aceptada y compartida (Albaladejo, 2019a: 563).¹⁶

Many other cases can be analysed and all of them are generated from this initial translation creation process by the author to the final hermeneutical process when each case reaches public opinion. It usually happens in cases with names like *Olímpica*, *Guatèque*, *Yogui*, etc. These have become part of the social structure and have a communicative dimension like culture metaphors requiring an adequate field of interpretation. This is what Stefano Arduini has proposed under the concept of the *Rhetorical Field* (Arduini, 2000: 45-57):

[El Campo Retórico] es la vasta área de los conocimientos y de las experiencias comunicativas adquiridas por el individuo, por la sociedad y por las culturas. Es el depósito de las funciones y de los medios comunicativos formales de una cultura y, en cuanto tal, es el substrato necesario de toda comunicación (Arduini, 2000: 47).¹⁷

For this reason, all these police soubriquets, as metaphorical forms that are like, are born in a specific context that describes a file through a nomination but that, once this has been made known, has been inserted into society, and is projected towards the rhetorical fact. It is the way how it is integrated into the cultural tradition. The activation of these names as metaphorical elements requires, as we have pointed out before, as a *metaphorical engine* (Albaladejo, 2019a: 559–583) that

¹⁶ “The metaphor is one of the foundations of communication in society through language and is part of the cultural procedures involved in communicative activity. The metaphor is produced by the condition and the symbolic capacity of the human being and by the cultural knowledge of the possibilities of metaphorical creation as a socially established, accepted and shared praxis.” (Albaladejo, 2019a: 563).

¹⁷ “[The Rhetorical Field] is the vast area of knowledge and communicative experiences acquired by the individual, by society and by cultures. It is the repository of the functions and formal communication media of a culture and, as such, it is the necessary substrate of all communication.” (Arduini, 2000: 47).

Tomás Albaladejo expands in the theoretical development towards a *translative engine*:

El motor metafórico es impulsor semántico, sintáctico y pragmático de la creación metafórica, actúa semántico-intensionalmente y también semántico-extensionalmente con proyección pragmática. Por la dimensión cultural de la metáfora, el motor metafórico funciona contando con el componente cultural de la comunicación, lo cual lo vincula con la Retórica Cultural. En el desarrollo teórico del motor metafórico se ha hecho necesario proponer un concepto más amplio, el *motor translaticio*, en el que estaría incluido el motor metafórico, en su concreción respecto de la metáfora —incluida la metáfora catacrética o catachresis—, que es de índole paradigmático-translaticia, mientras que el motor translaticio abarcaría la construcción no sólo de la metáfora, sino también de la alegoría y de otros elementos de la serie metafórica, dentro de la cual se puede considerar incluso la comparación o símil como recurso no sustitutivo de índole sintagmático-translaticia. Además, el motor translaticio se ocuparía de otros fenómenos translaticios como la transducción en sus diferentes formas (Albaladejo, 2019a: 569).¹⁸

These original and striking soubriquets are, since their creation, parallelisms of an investigated reality and constitute a communicative resource through metaphorical translation. The *Olímpica Case* designates the operation under which the Civil Guard Corps had detained twenty-seven members of the “Isma Clan” (Ismael alias “Isma” Gang), a dangerous *alunicero* (a shop window blower) from Villaverde, in Madrid. As the first of the blows this gang gave was at an *Audi* cars dealership in Tres Cantos (Madrid), the soubriquet author, also a police agent, had come up with the idea that the Audi logo was like that of the Olympic rings and that is where the soubriquet came from. Or in *Camaleón Operation* (Chameleon in English). This was the

¹⁸ “The Metaphoric Engine is a semantic, syntactic and pragmatic driver of metaphorical creation, it acts semantic-intensionally and also semantic-extensionally with pragmatic projection. Due to the cultural dimension of the metaphor, the metaphorical engine works with the cultural component of communication, which links it with Cultural Rhetoric. In the theoretical development of the metaphorical motor, it has become necessary to propose a broader concept, the translative engine, in which the metaphorical motor would be included, in its concretion with respect to the metaphor —including the catachretic or catachresis metaphor—, which is of the nature paradigmatic-translational, while the translational engine would encompass the construction not only of the metaphor, but also of the allegory and other elements of the metaphorical series, within which comparison or simile can even be considered as a non-substitute resource of a nature. syntagmatic-translational. In addition, the translative motor would deal with other translational phenomena such as transduction in its different forms.” (Albaladejo, 2019a: 569).

given name to an investigation into harassment that was perpetrated by a criminal who operated from his computer and who attacked eighty-one girls using multiple identities from anonymity. This soubriquet responds to a metonymic relationship between this individual's ability to camouflage itself and that which the chameleon animal naturally has, as a condition of its own that gives it its name.

In another case, *Guateque Operation* (House Party in English), the case of many administrative concessions of the Madrid City Council licenses for bars, disco pubs, discos, and entertainment venues in Madrid was investigated. It was a plot of illegal traffic of the Madrid City Council licenses for public premises, at the end of 2007, where more than one hundred businessmen, officials and senior officials of the Madrid City Council were involved. The name clearly indicates a metaphorical relationship between these administrative concessions and the entertainment venues, appealing to the name under which house parties were known in the Sixties of the last century, the “guateques”, activating this translational engine.

Another case known as “Yogui”, that refers to the bear of the same name from the cartoons, was an operation of the Civil Guard Corps that had investigated cost overruns in the public works of the Barcelona-Madrid AVE, that were awarded for € 6,882 million and that at the end its cost increased to € 8,996 million. As they explained “the soubriquet comes from the fact that one of the convicts, the ADIF's Infrastructure Manager when the works were awarded, allegedly received from CORSÁN construction company a gift in the form of a pleasure trip to Colorado (USA) as a benefit for having contributed to fatten the bill of the project, according to Anti-Corruption & Bribery Fight Department of Spain. During his stay, the ADIF's Infrastructure Manager had visited some ski slopes and some other natural parks. Was there The Yellowstone Park among them? Not really, because this park is in the state of Wyoming, but the park was said to be there. This rumour created a joke that caused impact among the police officers that were assigned to the operation, who began to call the convict under the nickname of “Yogui” as the Yellowstone Park bear” (Campuzano and Mikel Madinabeitia, 2018: s/p). Furthermore, there is also the *Emperador Case* (Emperor in English), a blow to the Chinese mafias, that takes the soubriquet after a leader of a network where famous people and politicians were put under arrest for money laundering, in an investigation that was carried out in Madrid. In this case, there is a

direct relationship between the leader nickname and the case soubriquet. In the Hispanic cultural world, the term “emperor” is linked to the Orient, power, and wealth.

There is even another case that is closely connected to one of the convicts’ nicknames, this being that of “Anca” (Frog Leg in English), since one of the gang members of the robberies and shop windows blows was nicknamed in that way. The operation was concluded in Madrid, dismantling a dangerous criminal gang, with twenty defendants, for more than fifty crimes against property, robbery with force and violence, as well as drug trafficking. Again, the name “Anca” has its relationship through a synecdoche with the leader’s nickname of the leader, “el Rana” (the Frog, in English). A similar relationship can be established with the *Abanico Case* (Fan in English), that was an operation where a former member of *Locomía*, an Eighties musical group in Spain, was put under arrest for trafficking in “poppers” and other kind of drugs. The *Locomía* group, in their videos and performances appeared with their members dancing while moving large fans at that time. Again, the synecdoche as a form of construction of the appellation that connects with the culture to that it is addressed: today, for example, it would be necessary to explain these terms or visualise a group performance to the youngest people of society.

3. Conclusions

According to the study that has been carried out from the Cultural Rhetoric perspective of the police operations appellations, there are several appreciations, these being, on the one hand, that the authors (appointers) of the police operations appellations are usually the case police agents who agree in a specific denomination. The soubriquets respond to an arbitrariness, to an ingenious idea in its choice, that is related to any of the objects, places or people who were involved in that investigation, those who had tried not to give some clues to possible leaks or communication interferences.

On the other, these names (by way of titles) will function as a brand once this investigation performance or the police operation is broadcasted to society. The media function as a support for the brand that is embedded in society in its different sectors. And it remains in society, integrating itself, at times, into culture using that brand in

ordinary and artistic communication. Therefore, also on the one hand, this transcends the first objective under which that appeal of a police operation was created and becomes a mark that allows distinguishing some police operations from other investigations. Besides, on the other, this becomes important as soon as it establishes a collective and social memory: it goes from being known by the police agents' group in the case to be used by all the media, from being private (and even secret) to belonging to the social cultural heritage. The soubriquets of these operations go from identifying the case with some of its components, to distinguishing one from another, to being recognized as a whole and in its effects by the society where these have been developed and on which the account of events has been built, times and characters. These soubriquets are installed in the *Rhetorical Field* of crime, violence, or corruption and all the elements that are involved in it will be affected by this brand.

Due to this social communicative implication, we must consider that the creation of these nicknames or soubriquets should be carried out by specialists in language (in the environment of the agents), who are specialists in naming or verbal branding, to control the rhetorical process of creation. and communication of these names and avoid going beyond the limits of rhetorical ethics or good taste, and not negatively marking any brand, individual or group, regarding the communicative dimension that they usually achieve and the evident permanence they achieve in the society.

Nowadays, there are also some other new methods that are being used by all police stations worldwide. For example, those that are being used at Kent, a town in the south of the United Kingdom. In this town, all the police stations are using Artificial Intelligence to determine whether a case is going to be solved or not and to direct resources to the investigations with more possibilities. The police ruled out cases of aggression or disturbance of public order that the algorithm considers impossible, a decision that the tool makes considering some different factors, among which is the presence of security cameras, possible witnesses or suspects.

The algorithm, which is called EBIT (Evidence-Based Investigation Tool), has been developed by the University of Cambridge. During the process, this was subjected to training in thousands of cases of assault and disorderly conduct to identify the traits that make a case may or

may not end up being resolved successfully (Roth, 2016: 228).

Finally, suffice is to say that what we have analysed here from the perspective of Cultural Rhetoric on some of the best-known soubriquets of police operations can be also upgraded to some army operations soubriquets such as *Desert Storm Operation* in 1990, for example, of the Tax Agency and of other public institutions, that are not the object of this study.

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Cultural Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Culture in the Discourses about the Independence of Scotland by Scottish writers

Pilar Somacarrera-Íñigo

Abstract: According to George Kerevan, the four arguments to support the independence of Scotland are the better governance argument, the Economic argument, the internationalist argument and, finally, the cultural argument. As Jessica-Homberg Schramm observes, Scottish culture has often been to recreate a unifying national identity. In my chapter, I will argue that the idea of Scottish independence is a rhetorical construction based on arguments by Scottish writers which make up a specific “cultural rhetoric” (Albaladejo, 2016). Modern Scottish nationalism grew out of a profoundly cosmopolitan spirit, repressed for a long time by the narrow confines of British imperial insularity. In fact, the origins of Scottish Nationalism can be placed in the Scottish version of the Modernist movement, the “Scottish Renaissance”—the Scottish version of the Modernist movement—orchestrated by the political activist and poet Hugh MacDiarmid, along with Robert Bontine Cunninghame Graham (1852-1936), a writer of Spanish descent on his mother’s side and first president of the Scottish National Party. The chapter will study the link of the idea of Scottish Independence to Scottish culture through several significant contemporary Scottish authors such as two of the Scottish Makars (National Poets) Edwin Morgan, Liz Lochhead and Alisdair Gray, drawing on the notion of “cultural rhetoric” and “cultural diplomacy”.

Keywords: Scottish Literature. Scottish Independence. Cultural rhetoric. Cultural Diplomacy.

After a failed referendum in 2014, the UK secession from the EU may be the trigger for Scotland’s secession from the UK. While Scottish voters had by majority rejected independence in a referendum in 2014, they voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU during the Brexit referendum. At the same time, as Sinoaidh Douglas-Scott explains, efforts by the Scottish government after the Brexit referendum to obtain a special deal to remain within the EU single market have received only scant attention from the UK government (2017: 3). Nicola Sturgeon, ex First Minister of Scotland,¹⁹ once insisted that Scotland had not voted for Brexit and that the nation’s position was clearer than ever, having the right to choose its own future as an independent country again under the benefits of EU membership (2020: n.p.). Scottish politicians have deployed rhetorical strategies using the Aristotelian modes of persuasion (*ethos*, *pathos*, *logos*) during the 2014 independence referendum (McNulla and Crines, 201: 473) but the focus

¹⁹ As of late March, 2023, the current First Minister of Scotland is Humza Yousaf.

of this essay will be how cultural rhetoric developed by Scottish writers has promoted the idea of Scottish independence since the beginning of the 20th century.

In order to understand the process of Scottish devolution, providing a brief overview of the recent history of Scottish independence referenda is in order. On September 18, 2014 Scots were summoned to vote on Scottish Independence. In response to the question “Should Scotland be an independent country, 44,7% of the voters answered with a “Yes” and 53,3% with a “No”. Thirty-five years earlier, in 1979, Scotland had come very close to obtain a devolved self-governance and win back the Parliament which had been eliminated in 1707. Although most of the population voted “yes” for devolution in 1979, a last-minute clause added by the central Government in London changed the conditions, requiring 40% of the total Scottish electorate to vote out in favour, rather than a simple majority. Due to this disappointment, the 1979 referendum came to be known as “the debacle of 1979” (McGuire, 2009: 9), followed by Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power which threatened to freeze Scotland’s aspirations to devolution for good. However, instead of halting cultural activity in Scotland, the first referendum on devolution gave way to an unprecedented upsurge of creativity, fostering a cultural explosion which came to be called the New Scottish Renaissance.

The devolved Scottish Parliament was established again on July 1, 1999, after a second successful referendum in September 1997. Critics have insisted on the crucial role culture has had in the development of the idea of a Scottish nation. In 1994 Robert Crawford observed that, in the absence of political institutions, cultural institutions are often considered the preservers of national difference (1994: 56). In 1998, Christopher Whyte stated that “in the absence of an elected political authority [in Scotland], the task of representing the nation has been repeatedly devolved to its writers” (quoted in Schoene, 2007: 1). Along the same line of thought, Jessica Homberg-Schramm argues that Scottish culture has often been used to recreate a unifying national identity (2018: 10). Nevertheless, from the political point of view Scotland, despite having a distinct national identity, is still a part of the United Kingdom, as expressed in the title of David McCrone’s book “stateless nation” (1992). In accordance with the aforementioned critics, in this chapter I am going to argue that the notion of culture has been crucial to the articulation of the idea of Scottish independence

through the poetry, fiction and essays of Scottish authors of the 20th and 21st centuries, such as the Modernist Scottish poet Hugh MacDiarmid, the Scottish Makars (National Poets) Edwin Morgan and Liz Lochhead and the polymath and visual artist Alisdair Gray. In addition, I am going to posit that the idea of Scottishness has been influenced by the rhetorical trope of Caledonian Antisyzygy (or union of opposites), a trope which, despite being considered outdated by some critics,²⁰ still has echoes in the rhetorical construction of Scottish independence.

Rhetoric is “the art or discipline that deals with the use of discourse, either spoken or written, to inform, persuade or motivate an audience” (Corbett and Connors, 1999: 1). Rhetoric has formed an important component of the cultural content in which literature in English and in other European languages has been produced (Wales, 2011: 369). Literary texts about the Scottish Nation are part of Scotland’s cultural rhetoric, “insomuch as they are culturally constituted discourses which are produced in connection with the cultural traditions of society and their reception and their effects have a perlocutionary influence on receivers” (Albaladejo, 2016: 21). Many Scottish literary texts send out messages about nationhood and even intend to convince the Scottish electors to vote favourably in a hypothetical referendum on independence.

As I mentioned before, one of the defining characteristics of Scottish literature, is that of “Caledonian antisyzygy” which is related to the rhetorical figure of speech of oxymoron, defined by Corbett and Connors as “the yoking together of two terms that are ordinarily contradictory” (1999: 407). The expression Caledonian antisyzygy was coined by Gregory Smith in his book *Scottish Literature: Character and Influence* (1919) and refers to a union of opposites (a syzygy is a conjunction or coming together of things). Smith refers to the antithetical nature of Scottish literature as follows: “[Scottish] literature is remarkably varied, and becomes, under the stress of foreign influence and native division and reaction, almost a zigzag of contradictions. The antithesis need not, however, disconcert us” (1919: 4). Some of these contradictions perceived by Smith include the contrast between Enlightenment rationalism and folk supernaturalism, the dialectic between Lowlands and Highlands, Protestantism and Catholicism,

²⁰ Robert Crawford argues that the Caledonian Antisyzygy trope is no longer useful in the more diverse and mobile idea of multiple “Scotlands” (2007: 567).

Britishness and Scottishness, among other dualities. As a settler-invader nation which was oppressed by the English and, at the same time, actively participated within the British Empire in the process of colonization, Scotland embodies the oxymoronic condition. Margaret Atwood has applied the psychological definition of this Scottish trope to Canada in the Afterword of her poetry collection *The Journals of Susanna Moodie*: “If the national mental illness of the United States is megalomania, that of Canada is paranoid schizophrenia” (Atwood, 1970: 62). Atwood’s view should not surprise us if we consider that the Scots made of one of the most significant contributions to Canada, both in terms of population and distinct culture and heritage (Bumstead, 1982: 3).

Modern Scottish nationalism grew out of a profoundly cosmopolitan spirit, repressed for a long time by the narrow confines of British imperial insularity (Kerevan, 2014: 86). After a time of economic splendor of Scotland in the British Empire during the 19th century, when Scottish cities gained wealth from the power of the Empire, but they did so as “provincial” places (Crawford, 2007: 482), the “Scottish Renaissance” movement emerged, influenced by the Celtic Revival of Patrick Geddes (1854-1932) who complained about the anglicization of Scottish society. In fact, the origins of Scottish Nationalism can be placed in this Scottish version of the Modernist movement orchestrated by the political activist and poet Christopher Murray Grieve, who wrote under the pseudonym of Hugh MacDiarmid (1892-1978). The adoption of this penname is a rhetorical strategy related to stance (*ethos*) aimed at emphasizing the Celtic connections of Scottish literature. Professor Denis Saurat of the University of Bordeaux gave this name to the group of writers who published in the journals *Northern Numbers* and *Scottish Chapbok* (1923) promoted by Hugh MacDiarmid, who was a veteran of World War I and an opinionated political activist. MacDiarmid’s most important legacy to Scottish nationalism was his invention of a “synthetic Scots” (a term coined by Douglas Young) which gave voice to the new literature of Scotland. Aiming to recover Scots as a literary language, MacDiarmid vindicated the fifteenth and sixteenth century Makars of the independent Scottish kingdom: Robert Henryson, William Dunbar and, Gavin Douglas (Lyall, 2012: 176). “Synthetic Scots” was made up of words from the texts of the latter poets, as well as from standard English, modern Scots and vocabulary from John Jamieson’s Etymological *Dictionary of the Scottish language* (1808-9). MacDiarmid’s first poem in synthetic Scots entitled “The Watergaw”

(“the fragmentary rainbow”), which Crawford refers to as “a minor miracle untranslatable into English” (Crawford, 2007: 544), was published in the *Dumfermline Press* in 1922.

MacDiarmid was fascinated with the principle of Caledonian Antisyzygy, citing it to refer to what the Scots language could offer to the modern poet, especially its reconciliation of the base and the beautiful and its potential for creating images drawn from physical and psychological states no longer available to the urbane and sophisticated English tradition (Watson, 2007: 343-35). Grieve was a contradictory figure: in the early 1920s, he thought that any revival of the Scots vernacular could only invite cultural inferiorism (Lyall, 2012: 175), adopting the motto “Not Burns, Dunbar”, in remembrance of the 15th century Scottish bard and in rejection of the sentimentalism of Burns’s poetry. Paradoxically, Grieve began his career as a poet in the Vernacular Circle of the London Burns Club and wrote his first two poems in Scots at an annual conference of the Burns Federation in 1922. Later in his career, MacDiarmid vindicated his connection to American, English and Irish modernist writers such as T.S. Eliot, D.H. Lawrence and, above all, James Joyce. MacDiarmid’s nationalist zeal led him to declare that the earthly quality he found in the Scots language resembled the linguistic quality of Joyce’s *Ulysses*: “We have been enormously struck by the resemblance ... between Jamieson’s *Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language* and James Joyce’s *Ulysses*” (quoted in Watson, 2007: 36).

Perhaps the best example of how Scottish politics and literature were brought together is the figure of Robert Bontine Cunninghame Graham (1852-1936), a Scottish Politician and writer with Spanish blood on his mother’s side. He was a Liberal MP (1886-92) and became President of both the Scottish Labour Party (1888-95) and the Scottish National Party (1934-36). Popularly known as “Don Roberto”, he spent some years in South America and travelled in Spain and North Africa. Cunninghame Graham was as opinionated as MacDiarmid, whom he was acquainted with, along with other famous writers such as Joseph Conrad, Ford Madox Ford, G.K. Chesterton and George Bernard Shaw. Don Roberto once stated that the worst enemies of Scotland were “those among us born without imagination, bound in fetters of their own conceit” (quoted in Watson, 2007: 25).

Despite MacDiarmid's and Cunnighame Graham's reconciliation of cosmopolitan and nationalist attitudes, the first meaning provided by the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* for the word *cosmopolitan* is "A person who treats the whole world as his or her country; a person with no national attachments or prejudices". Therefore, the contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism becomes apparent. However, in Edwin Morgan (1920-2010) the two antithetical positions — the nationalistic and the cosmopolitan one — are reconciled. Morgan's dedication to a specifically Scottish democracy and cosmopolitanism do not only coexist but nurture one another. Edwin Morgan's most famous external gesture towards Scottish independence was his famous posthumous bequest of nearly a million pounds to the Scottish National Party. As Robert Crawford points out, poetry and the spirit of independence were crucial to him although he was not a member of a political party and only few of his poems explicitly engage with Scottish Independence (2014: 190). Morgan's cosmopolitan spirit, revealed in his activity as translator and polylingual author, is as coherent to the spirit of Scotland's independence as his monetary legacy to the SNP and his service, from 2004 until his death in 2010, as the first "Makar" of Scotland.

The best introduction to Edwin Morgan's cosmopolitan vision of Scotland can be found in two simple poems usually taught to school children. ("The Loch Ness Monster Song" and "The First Men on Mercury") from his collection *From Glasgow to Saturn* (1973). In "The Loch Ness Monster Song" Morgan introduces Scotland's best known (fantastic) creature but makes the monster incomprehensible for the reader, who needs to translate its words. The poem is Morgan's manifesto about the need to overcome a stereotypical and self-centred Scotland and aim for "a translated Scotland," which reaches out to the rest of the world. "The Loch Ness Monster Song" is also a poem about transculturation which Norman Cheadle defines as a process in which A does not merely pass over and disappear into B; rather, the two interact in complex and unpredictable ways to produce something new (ix). In Morgan's well-known science-fiction poem which is attuned to a postcolonial sensibility the Mercurians and the Earth Men end up speaking a hybrid language: they have involuntarily become "translated men", to use Salman Rushdie's famous phrase in *Imaginary Homelands*. Furthermore, as Bhabha famously observes in *The Location of Culture*, translation is the means through which newness enters the world (Bhabha, 1994: 212). Just as Homi Bhabha's third

space, Mercury becomes a cultural crossroads, a location pertinent to a multicultural and multilinguistic nation like Scotland, where the earth men and the Mercurians exchange their languages and are changed as a result of their interaction: “nothing is ever the same,/now is it?” (Morgan, 2000: 70).

Edwin Morgan’s collection *Sonnets from Scotland* published in 1984 with a cover design by Alasdair Gray was conceived to strengthen and complicate Scotland’s sense of identity after the fiasco of the 1979 referendum. Nevertheless, the volume goes beyond that political event as “Morgan’s panoptic imagination runs from prehistory into the distant future, demonstrating a commitment to the resources of Scotland” (Crawford, 2014: 188). Morgan’s political views are perceived even more clearly in this collection. In accordance with Eleanor Bell, *Sonnets from Scotland* engages with a pervasive sense of crisis in Scottish politics and bitterness about the state of its culture (2007: 186) which can only be solved if Scotland opens itself to the external world and adopts a more cosmopolitan attitude. The science fiction setting and the metaphors of many of Morgan’s poems are appropriate considering the etymology of the word *cosmopolitan*, related to the Greek noun *kosmos*, meaning “the universe.” In fact, the science-fiction metaphors of the nation estrange the reader, but they do so in a way that simultaneously invokes national reflection (2007: 186). In Morgan’s sonnet “The Coin” future visitors, possibly from outer space, find a coin with a deer’s head on one side and on the other the words “One Pound” and, shockingly, the inscription “*Respublica Scotorum*”. A coin from a Scottish republic viewed as a historical artifact from a distant future represents Morgan’s republican aspirations, which he has explicitly spelt out elsewhere: “I don’t feel British. I don’t feel, certainly, English. I don’t feel anything but Scottish –So yes, I would like a Scottish Republic, really” (Whyte, 1990: 142).

Morgan’s fusion of cosmopolitanism with a determined empowering of the Scottish nation was an example to younger writers, including Alasdair Gray and Liz Lochhead, who move forward the idea of the cultural rhetoric of Scottish independence in new and exciting ways. Alisdair Gray (1934-2019) is well-known for a sentence quoted on several of his books covers, “Work as if you lived in the early days of a better nation”,²¹ engraved on the wall of the Scottish Parliament

²¹ The sentence is really by the Canadian author Dennis Lee.

building in Edinburgh when it opened in 2004. His political commitment is articulated in his book in his book *Why Scots Should Rule Scotland* which presents arguments for independence based on a connection with Scotland's political and literary past. In relation to Scotland's need to have its own parliament, Gray asserts the following:

I think ...a new Scottish parliament will be squabblesome and disunited and full of people justifying themselves by denouncing others — the London parliament of a tiny scale. But it will offer hope for the future. The London parliament has stopped even pretending to do that...I believe an independent country run by a government not much richer than the People has more hope than one governed by a rich neighbour (1992b: 63).

Despite Gray's clear political convictions, in *Why Scots Should Rule Scotland*, he also introduces a fictional Editor who accuses the author of "bellowing" and "resorting to rhetoric" (Gray, 1992b: 13, 16), following the tradition of the Editor figure who contradicts the main narrative thread in James Hogg's *The Private Confessions of Justified Sinner* (1824).

Apart from being one of Scotland's most remarkable contemporary novelists, Alasdair Gray was a remarkable polymath, and a visual artist—he obtained a degree in design and mural painting at the Glasgow School of Art—with an enthusiasm for painting murals which can be admired in Glasgow, the city where he spent most of his life. The main theme of confinement and entrapment within bodies, systems or codes of conduct permeates Gray's work, in a search for elusive self-definition (Crawford, 2007: 646) which is akin to the spirit of Scottish independence. The scope of this chapter only allows me to discuss two of his main works which are inextricably linked to Scottish nationhood. The first is his magnum opus *Lanark* (1981), which looks to European and American narrative modes while dealing with 20th century Scotland at the deepest cultural and political levels (Watson, 2007: 218). *Lanark* is an experimental book of epic proportions about which Anthony Burgess once said: "Scottish Literature at last had its *Ulysses*" (quoted in McGuire, 2009: 6). Subtitled "A Life in Four Books", *Lanark* deals with two worlds: the semi-autobiographical portrait of Glasgow mural artist Duncan Thaw and the fantastic account of the sunless city of Unthank. In this which *subworld* ("submundo"; Albaladejo, 1998) of Unthank a character named Lanark a man who suffers from eczema-like "dragonhide" and falls through a giant mouth into a monstrous labyrinthine Institute, like Jonah falls into the whale in Alasdair Gray's

favourite book from the Bible. These two worlds can be read through Caledonian antisyzygy in that they stand in the relationship of opposites between “real” and “fantastic”.

The trope of Caledonian antisyzygy is further explored in *Poor Things* (1992), Alisdair Gray’s neo-Victorian rewriting of *Frankenstein*. Ambitious in its thematic scope, *Poor Things* also delves into the Victorian issues of the Woman Question, as and the complicity of Scotland with the British Empire. The novel also provides an overview about the state of medicine in Scotland in the 19th century through the lives of doctors such Doctor Godwin Baxter, the creator of the monster woman, Bella Baxter. Dr Baxter’s names evoke the name of Mary Shelley’s father, William Godwin, and that of William Baxter, his friend, who welcomed Mary in his home during her stay in Scotland 1812.

Poor Things features, once again, Caledonian antisyzygy — Bella has a dual nature containing the personalities of Bella Baxter and Victoria McCandles — spelt out by Dr Hooker when he observes that “Human beings contain two natures, a higher and a lower” (Gray, 1992a: 141). In addition, the novel adopts another Scottish conceit, that of the editor deployed by Alisdair Gray in *Why Scots Should Rule Scotland*. In *Poor Things* Gray purports to be the editor of a unique autobiographical volume and various associated papers related with Dr Archibald McCandles, a 19th century doctor and Scottish Public Health Officer. McCandles’s papers contain information about a medical experiment in Glasgow performed by the brilliant surgeon Godwin Baxter who transplanted the brain of a baby into the drowned body of a woman he named “Bella Baxter”. Bella is portrayed in the novel as “Bella Caledonia”, a fact which, as Kristen Stirling points out, suggests that the author expects us to read the character of Bella in the tradition of the nation-as-woman iconography (2008: 88). Scotland is a young nation, incarnated in the brain of the baby contained in the body of an adult woman, who would be Britain (or Britannia).

Another representation of the Scotland-as-woman figure in twentieth century Scottish literature can be found in Liz Lochhead’s play *Mary Queen of Scots Got Her Head Chopped Off* (1987) where Lochhead continues MacDiarmid’s exploration of Scots language but in a chattier and playful manner as the title of the play comes from an eponymous children’s song. As Crawford points out, Lochhead chooses as protagonist of her play the only famous Scottish woman many people

remember (2014: 212), a woman who has continued to capture the imagination of theatre, opera, cinema and even popular culture, from Friedrich Schiller's drama *Maria Stuart* (1800) to the recent *Mary Queen of Scots* (2018) film directed by Rosie Burke, and the television series *Reign* (2013-2017) which fictionalizes the life of the Scottish Queen for a young audience.

Liz Lochhead, who followed Edwin Morgan as Scottish Makar between 2011 and 2016 was very active in winning the "Yes" vote in the 2014 referendum. She wrote a play about the Scottish bard Robert Burns entitled *Dear Scotland*, staged by the National Theatre in the time prior to the polls. Lochhead depicted Burns as a Scottish patriot (Ferguson and Whitaker, 2014: 3) based on the famous lines Burns wrote after the signing of the 1707 Act of Union between the Scottish and English Parliaments. Burns blamed Scotland for its loss of freedom in his poem "Such a Parcel of Rogues in a Nation", affirming that Scotland had been "bought and sold for English gold" (Burns, 2013: 179).

In a nation in which women feel doubly marginalized as women and as Scots, the play *Mary Queen of Scots Got her Head Chopped Off*, written in Scots, is Lochhead's most ambitious project in what regards Scottish Nationhood, from a writer who has declared, echoing Virginia Woolf, that "My country is woman". The play was commissioned to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Mary's execution by the hands of her cousin Queen Elizabeth I of England but should also be read as a piece of political theatre addressing the Thatcher era in Scotland and Britain (Crawford, 2013: 209). Liz Lochhead is interested in the forces which made Mary a mere pawn in the hands of those who had the political power. Along these lines, she offers the audience not a revision of the historical Mary, but a revision of the myth popular culture has built up around her (McDonald and Harvie, 1993: 125). Mary's figure has commonly been distorted to fit the needs of certain ideologies of the mindset of the era of representation. Therefore, her portraits go from that of a murderous *femme fatale* who lured men into disaster, that of a Catholic martyr — "and almost a saint" (Lochhead, 2009: vii) — to that of a strong woman who was artistically talented and wanted to be the best possible ruler for Scotland. In her play, Lochhead also rewrites the famous story of the "twa queens", who were cousins, as well as rivals and opposites: Mary was Catholic and Elizabeth, a Protestant; Mary had given birth to a male heir (James VI of Scotland and I of England), whereas Elizabeth never married.

Mary Queen of Scots Got Her Head Chopped Off is set during the period of the Scottish Reformation whose leader, John Knox, was notorious for his attack against female rulers in his book *First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstruous Regiment of Women* (1558). The feminist component of the play is encapsulated in the narrative of female empowerment of the English and Scottish queens. Knox represents the suppression of life, sex and the feminine component of religion brought about by Presbyterianism, the Scottish version of Calvinism. To highlight the Scottishness of her dramatic text Lochhead draws on popular culture by using a Scottish ballad (“The Twa Corbies”) as the main intertext of the play, emphasizing the notion of duality. Using the French word for “crow” (“le corbeau”) and giving it a new gender in the female Scots-French “La Corbie”, the playwright creates an androgynous creature (Crawford, 2014: 210). La Corbie’s opening speech avoids a simple definition of Scotland as a nation of opposites:

Country: Scotland, Whit is it?

It’s a peatbog, it’s a daurk forest

It’s a cauldron o lye, a saltpan or a coal mine.

If you’re gey lucky it’s a bonny, bricht bere meadow or a park o kye.

O mibbe...it’s a field of stanes.

It’s a tenement or merchan’s ha

It’s a hure hoose or a humble cot. Princes Street or Paddy’s Merkit

It’s a fsitfu o fish or a pickle o oatmeal

It’s a queen’s banquet o roast meats and junkets.

It depends. It depends... (Lochhead, 2009: 5).

La Corbie’s speech presents a clear rhetorical structure. It uses parallelism as a rhetorical device to perform the function of definition (Somacarrera, 2000: 137). La Corbie appeals to the audience through *ethos* —personality or character - as she challenges them to find a definition for Scotland (“Ah dinna ken whit like your Scotland is. Here’s mines”), insisting that Scotland, along the lines of Caledonian antiszygy, is a compound of opposite characteristics: urban as well as rural, rich as well as poor, royal and popular, fertile country and barren

lands at the same time and, ultimately, an open question (“It depends, it depends”).

Conclusion

After briefly exploring the works of a selection of 20th and 21st century Scottish authors, it can be concluded that the movement towards Scottish independence has been supported, to a great extent, by cultural rhetoric. The literary movement of the Scottish Renaissance led by Hugh MacDiarmid in the 1920s and 1930s had the pivotal role of providing a cultural rhetoric for Scottish nationalism, by using the Scots language and the trope of Caledonian Antisyzygy. The 1980s, the time after the failed devolution referendum of 1979, known in the literary realm as the New Scottish Renaissance, was also period of an enormous creative impulse, in which cultural rhetoric was also been instrumental in the progress towards Scottish devolution, led by author such as Alisdair Gray, Edwin Morgan and Liz Lochhead.

I have briefly discussed three books which prepared the way to recovering the Scottish Parliament in 1999: Alisdair Gray’s *Lanark* (1981); Edwin Morgan’s *Sonnets from Scotland* (1984) and Liz Lochhead’s *Mary Queens of Scots Got Her Head Chopped Off* (197). Two of these writers (Morgan and Lochhead) were appointed as Makars or Scotland’s national poets and thus were expected to write political poetry; nevertheless, never lost their critical stance towards Scottish nationalism. The recently appointed new makar, Kathleen Jamie, has declared that “poetry abides at the heart of Scottish culture, in all its languages, old and new” (Brooks, 2021: n.p.).

Despite no longer needing writers to support devolution after the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, many political discourses in Scotland contain literary allusions. Nicola Sturgeon’s 2021 Christmas post on Facebook showed her Christmas tree with a rainbow hanging from it. Although most Facebook followers will identify this rainbow as the symbol for resilience during the Covid-19 pandemic, the image has literary referents: it alludes to Hugh MacDiarmid’s poem “The Watergaw”, which is reminiscent of the national poet Robert Burns’s “rainbow lovely form/ Evanishing amid the storm.” (Burns, 2013: 205) in his poem *Tam O’Shanter*.

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Past and Present of Literary Consciousness (A Critical Note on Historical Poetics)

Enrique Baena Peña

Abstract: In this article I address some significant connections that literary consciousness has with its origins in the Western tradition. The idea of literary canon, which has become the perception of status upon which hermeneutists and textual critics have formulated their interpretations, is explained from the Homeric memory at the dawn of creation, with the beginning of self-consciousness that arose from an uncontaminated virginal outlook. The foundations of this view lie upon the Socratic values that were transferred to both the idea of the infinite in Plato, and the more realistic thesis of Aristotle—with Plato's *Dialogues*—that would become the two main philosophical lines born in Antiquity. Founded on the literary perceptions of the ancient world and aware of the eternity of mankind that arises from its insignificance, Christian consciousness and its idealizations—with Saint Augustine and Saint Isidore—gave way to Humanism. Hence, by means of the aesthetics that subordinate the sacred, universal reflections that stemmed from each individual case surfaced. These would become the memory of the classics, and from then on a dream about the past would have an effect onto every future. From Neoclassicism onwards, Modernity appeared as a consciousness about the world that substituted the creative imitation from the outside for a unique introspection that narrated the external realm from the inner self. Trying to figure out the abstract and the void, Romanticism, Symbolism and Avant-garde would lead the expressive consciousness of the modern to an extreme end, thus reaching a change of cultural era in our days despite that the itinerary of both the creative and aesthetic consciousness treasures its purity of origin.

Keywords: Literature, Literary consciousness, Aesthetics, Classics, Historicity, Contemporaneity, Modernity, Literary canon.

1. Literary consciousness and canon

In the history of the literature, literary consciousness relates to canon, to norms, to models, or what across eras and stages has been considered the ideal. It has become the perception of status and its horizons upon which hermeneutists and textual critics have formulated their interpretations. In ancient times, at the dawn of creation, this arose from a virginal outlook, uncontaminated by the totality it represented. By the Middle Ages (with Saint Augustine, Saint Isidore and Saint Thomas), Christian consciousness reorganized literary consciousness, retransforming ideas about creation regarding the *auctor*, incarnating in the divine the first figure, but also compelling perspectives about

poetry and genres theretofore unknown. Such is the case of the epistolary, which among other factors appears for political reasons, shaping what rhetorically will become the *artes dictaminis*. Subsequent texts such as *El Lazarillo*, emblematic in Spanish picaresque literature, have been later linked to these *artes dictaminis*. At the same time, while in ancient times the literary act entailed a strong oral component that would remain in the literary consciousness of the medieval mind, at the end of the Middle Ages awareness of a temporal breach grows: the delay that takes place between the creation of the text and its subsequent reading, apart from the silent reading, carrying with it the connotations for the literary consciousness that delving into that inner world would bring about. In ancient times, individual reading was not part of the literary consciousness. For Socratic knowledge and its kin, writing was considered something estragetic because, lacking the spontaneous thinking of the discourse that related more accurately to truth, it allowed for hypocrisy and dishonesty. Borges, in his *Arte poetica*, states how most ancient masters were orators (Borges, 2000: 21).

During antiquity and the Middle Ages, literary consciousness received texts as a creation, and not as a construct. The Golden Age of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—the brilliant Spanish age that took up a term from Greek mythology with which Hesiod referred to utopia—defining most of what theoretically was called Classicism in Western literature, entailed some structural forms of literary consciousness and, among these, an attempt to imitate and recover the ancient authors towards the present. The transversal conception of historical time that was deified comes from the humanists, who nonetheless proclaimed a dream. Theirs was an immense task even though they lacked the means and the knowledge to penetrate into that primitive world; therefore, they mixed the sources they turned to, confusing the dream with the remains (García Berrio, 2008: 160-176).

During the Baroque period of the seventeenth century, the aesthetic literary consciousness opened up when the representations of Renaissance and mannerist forms were redesigned—their characteristics deriving from the *horror vacui* and a massive social conglomerate. Despite the retention of norms, under a classical model, a disbelief of everything took place, generating in the literary consciousness a symbiosis between the learned and the popular, present in the greatest authors, such as Góngora. Enlightened eighteenth-century neoclassicism would introduce in the literary consciousness the

historicity of both literature and all other disciplines by the hand of encyclopedism. The enlightened minority believed they had reached a maximum of knowledge and understood they had reached a peak, suspecting a finite ending, and these two factors led them to anxiously compile all knowledge. Study curricula such as that of Jovellanos in the Colegio de Gijón were their teaching models in Spain, known to be the basis of a permanence in the shaping of a literary consciousness in this country. These forms of canonical wisdom in the real of the literary start cracking because they represent the knowledge of the minority, founded on an imitation of the objective, opposite a norm that already declared the subjective, along Kantian lines. The French Revolution also represented a complete change that would deeply affect the coming of a modern consciousness of literature after the end of Classicism. European Idealism and Romanticism not only brought uniqueness, but also a mythic vision of the people: modes of a literary *Costumbrismo* that helps enter in the literary consciousness the life and history of the unnamed. This is what Unamuno called the characters of the intrahistory, which will progressively surface until they become collective characters in the big metropolitan, tumultuous and babilonic novel of Balzac, Dostoyevsky, Walter Scott, or Dickens, heirs of the old epic that dictates the future and the way of presenting the spirit of the time. As a result, when a new historical subject appears along with the fall of absolutist ways, we also have the emergence and consolidation of the novel, the new polyphonic genre, where individual characters live with a multitude that becomes a collective character formed with diverse social levels (Beltrán Almería, 2021: 21-32).

In the second half of the eighteenth century, a glint of modern poetics sparked. In the Age of Enlightenment, with the final stages of Classicism, a literary consciousness affiliated with the minorities also disappears, interceding from the exercise of enlightened power an idolatry of reason that had turned literary consciousness towards the philosophical. However, in the new dawning age, two figures that had been ignored by neoclassicists because of their irregularities and rejected for breaking the rules of poetics emerge: Cervantes and Shakespeare. In Germany, Lessing was already writing about these two anomalies that will end up becoming paradigmatic of the new literature, since these authors were able to mirror the whole social spirit and subjective prism, bringing novel and theater closer to the immensity of life. The emergence of both authors started the process for these works to be considered uniquely distinctive masterworks of Western and world literature, while with

their characters they create myths of infinite depth in the modern literary consciousness. Therefore, when the modern period began, without breaking completely with the predominant Classicism—that is, with the idea that the work must reflect the world objectively or realistically—*The Quixote*, for example, showed that nothing of what is seen is necessarily objective, bringing reality to the inner look. Objectivity is thus, according to Schlegel, refracted into the creative path of the subjective by the symbolism of the antithetical (Schürr, 1951: 41-70).

For the literary consciousness, from now on subjectivity would rule the perception of objectivity. The first personal voices intensified and gave way to a new subject within the imaginary whose identification obeys to what that personal voice transmits. Consciousness no longer responded to the idea of the hero since the idea of the hero became problematic in this period; rather, it came from the *ego*, which would not be the one canonized by tradition through recognizable archetypes. At the base of these archetypes it was always possible to find a feeling that served the ancient rule, which had been successively restored. That *ego*, that personal voice, would be in itself a metaphor of knowledge, capable of encompassing everything, surpassing objectivity to the point that its own intimacy, not exempt of the knowledge of its predecessors, provides the knowledge of the world. In book X of *Poetry and Truth* Goethe writes about this, and about his conversations with Herder and what this lent to his education. The idea of what is personal and its references, which lead to originality, would surface, and this key aspect would become integral in creativity, as well as in the rising literary consciousness. Beyond Classicism and its attention to rules, this would be the moment to answer energetically and with faithful creation to all the inner energy of the human being (Goethe, 2017: 419-425).

It took a long time for Romanticism to arrive in Spain, first entering with no visibility and later bursting powerfully after some decades; nonetheless there was soon a reaction towards the liberal mark that was adopted. This is why what followed Romanticism in Spain were the ways of the Costumbrismo, together with some other stylized works. A revitalized spontaneity of the people would be displayed in an idealized manner, coexisting in harmony with aristocracy and upper classes. Somehow, however, grand Romanticism did not develop manifestly, despite having the poetic works of Bécquer, or his well-known guide of Spanish temples, among other important texts. For historical and social

reasons, Romanticism in Spain was free of the brilliance and verve that it had in the rest of Europe. Literary consciousness nonetheless was nourished by both the myth of the people and those great ideas of high idealism that it represented. According to Hegel, literature and art were defined in Goethe's time, as were the foundations of comprehension and the literary consciousness inherited from that superb first moment of modernity. While accomplishing his great compendium as did Quintilianus in Antiquity, Hegel declared, with an inherent *summa* of knowledge, the end of the normative world. This was already a memory in his time, the ending of a period of neoclassicism ruled by emulation and objective reproduction. Idealism and Christianity would go hand in hand, manifesting the true history in the collective energy that brings about sublime memories: beams of light marking the course of history and imaginary of the Spirit, an infinity of forces that penetrated the symbols to be represented, unveiling how the whole perfective human evolution develops the most sublime forms of identification. Literary consciousness, which springs from that aesthetics, takes over the milestones there anointed, creating its own historicity beyond the account. Thus, from the indeterminate idea that searches for its figure within the symbolic, being still excessive as an object—for example, the building of the Egyptian pyramids with the commensurable work it entailed—from the substantial change in the ancient Greek world, then the classic world, when the Spirit takes the human body to start manifesting itself as subject yet demanding an effort with the stone, finally Hegel—with Goethe—arrived in his time: romanticism. Now he understood how the Spirit truly manifests as a free subject in the aesthetic and literary writings with no further need, taking for granted a desire for surpassing and sublimating humankind (Hegel, 2006: 189).

With arrival of the twentieth century—a pragmatic replica of the Modern in the guise of the Contemporary—literary consciousness gave way to consecutive critical schools, both formalist and contextualist: Russian formalism, Stylistics or Structuralism, Sociology of Literature, the Theory of Reception, or Thematology, all hermeneutics that were seen in their embryonic stages during the eighteenth century, the origin of our time. These would see their first creative challenge with the Avant-garde, to a great extent the first milestone whose nature completely responded to contemporary Modernity. The idea was to restore the knowledge given to the theory in the light of both history and the rising psychologism; this had a decisive influence in the shaping of the literary consciousness of contemporaneity. When Homer asked himself why he

wrote and transferred his consideration, not only did self-consciousness begin, but literary consciousness too, including creation and reception. These written testimonies turn literature into the evolution of expressive words, the ones that build the language of our feelings, which is substantive of literary consciousness itself: both a tangible and an intangible test of what we are as collective and individual subjects of each period. Culture and civilization settle on authenticity, as well as on the utopia that literature transfers. This consciousness builds upon archetypes that unite all universal eloquence to take us to the individualized knowledge of the *great secret*, the one of every work and author. This happens depending on what we believe and what we read, considering also that one author is always different to another. The key relies on how, according to a un-delimited uniqueness, the universal forms that follow the Kantian doctrine are captured as individuality. Common feelings and experiences that build symbols and archetypes also link civilizations and settle on national myths, or on popular archetypal modes that appear individually in poets and writers; in their writing singularities they share those feelings, beliefs and common concerns (Genette, 1997: 105-111).

At the same time, to the effect of literary consciousness there is no history of a complex chronology since it concerns the archetypal essence, hence that way of symbolic universal characterization of literature also determines the extraterritorial and the uchronia of creation nowadays, when historical poetics are seen in their imaginary light, substantially altering the linear components of periods and spans of time. Moreover, regarding literary consciousness there is, on the one hand, a centrality where archetypes can be found: the idea of death, the idea of life, of time, of feelings, etc. On the other hand, multiplicity takes place in the atomized dissemination that each author represents. But all this has, within that core, an infinity that integrates the emotional dimension that all literature entails for literary consciousness (Scheler, 2003: 81). That category is linked to wisdom itself, to knowledge, placed in the creativity and in the literary consciousness that surround it, as the American movement of New Criticism argued regarding teaching.

In my work *Umbrales del imaginario*, and before, in *El ser y la ficción*, I have tried to highlight the idea of Kantian lineage about needing to imagine enough in order to *do* enough. Between one and the other, creativity and the limits of literary consciousness occur: humankind

must find itself in a beyond in order to be able to advance towards the specific. The writer must write about that immeasurable world—what contemporary structuralist criticism called macrostructure—to then formalize the textual writing itself, the microstructure. Hence, literary consciousness is but the parallel of the fruit of humankind's magnificent imagination, which opens paths and brings down expectations as a predictive instrument in the category of the future. It is, together with the memory that it personifies, a large imaginary area in whose final gratuitousness solidifies the feeling of neverending accretion of our present.

Literary consciousness also has the adaptability to become one in each reader. Even though it may appear rigid, it is really fragile when we think that it is taught using thick manuals under which authors and works are buried, and that it is superimposed on the personal myth of whoever enters the literary world. There is no doubt that having a myriad of appropriate ideas about literature is a required wealth. At the same time, literary theory teaches us to see the uniqueness of each case and to look at the creative process through words as an essential part of what we are. We must name what humanly moves us and instructs us, explain why we receive some texts better than others, or why some works reach a wider colectivity and remain. These are phenomena that have to do with the permeability of the literary work and its openness to time, allowing the literary consciousness to act in different scopes, whether linking, creating images, making feelings and emotions surface, or restoring an integral part of the being that is shaped with dreams, wide-awakeness, memory and present, in which the creative and hermeneutic lines from Plato and Aristotle show no divergence.

2. Development of literary consciousness

Development and *canon* are two conceptual terms upon which literary ideas of our tradition have been forged since ancient Greece (Pozuelo Yvancos, Aradra Sánchez, 2000: 173-187). In the past, there have been outstanding civilizations from which we keep texts, writings, and codes. However, except for the great Chinese tradition and the Far East, ideas about how literature should be are yet to be found. At the dawn of our ancestral time, with Homer and the pre-Socratic, it is questioned how and why to write poetry. Literary consciousness is seen from a Homeric approach as a consideration about writing that is also transferred to

those whom the *aidos* addresses, which is crucial in the process of building the memory of a nation through its legendary characters. There is a reason for literatures that is already strung to the aesthetic consciousness it arouses; without it, the clues for these literatures would only cause bewilderment. During Antiquity, the atmosphere and aura of what was understood to be connected to the quasi-sacred departure—the one with which both collective life and its individual realities must be introduced—strengthens. This happens thanks to the ability to build a number of complex stories and visions that are nonetheless born from the concentrated harmony of writing and singing. Literary consciousness indeed adhered to the proportionality and the architecture of the text and the chant. This consciousness was already a part of the writing, of the creative consciousness where harmonious forms began prevailing along with other artistic, canonical, and formal models. With this I mean a symbiosis between consciousness and stimulus that generates a powerful ability to create new works, works that will search their origin looking for what created them and constitute a precept, thus recognizing the purity of its filiation.²²

The making of the literary consciousness regarding proportions and measurements comes from an external reflection, but it seems better to think about its origin, about words themselves, because those deep roots that today perplex us could be the real symbols inherited by our consciousness, which were implicit in the semantics of the Greek verbs. For example, those verbs that designated the action of seeing and looking (*blépein*, *leússein*, etc.), with a direct object that refers to the thing towards which the eye is directed, and towards the igneous and gleaming substance that the eye projects. That is, rays of fire that carry feelings, passions, moods, verbs built with a direct object that means fear, ferocity, rage. Aristotle argued that if an object affected the eye “the eye also has an effect on the object”, like shiny objects do, because they go back to the core/center of light charged with heat. And Plotinus wrote in the *Eneads*: “the soul sees all that is outside of it (...) if we limit ourselves to catch the imprint of the objects we see, we will not see the objects themselves, but mere images and shadows...” (Baena, 2016: 302). In the literary consciousness everything constitutes a *sôma*, a legacy from the continuous and homogeneous body that, from time

²² See the historical study about the interinfluences from Aristotle in G. Williams, *Tradition and originality in Roman Poetry*, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 335 and subsequent.

immemorial, symbolically belongs, with no ruptures, to ourselves and to the physical world, and by means of its poetical expression we recognize ourselves. Nonetheless, it is also about the ancestral and emblematic Greek verb *poieo*—to do—that gave meaning through its creation, the *poiesis*, to the fact that we transform something from the non-being to the being, despite its also implying a certain unclogging: “I go through myself to accomplish something renewed or beforehand inexistent”. The faraway Greeks, always forging an initiatory climax of intensity and inner strength that grew with the presence of dreams during wide-awakeness, with presentiments, omens, premonitions and oracular prediction: daydreaming, creating an atmosphere that facilitated the dawning of literary consciousness, showing that, while living and dreaming, that Greek man also had a presentiment of what he was missing from himself. In the Homeric conception the dream personifies itself; it is the legacy’s profile to literary consciousness from the beginning; thus, in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* dreams are sometimes travelling entities; they capture the most diverse aspects, they come from outside and visit the one sleeping. These are internal emotions, elusive images, a spiritual Plotinian design that embellishes itself extracting the figures from the outside. These are, too, strong motives that occur down to this present time, when literary consciousness absorbs this whole great inner development, as well as the footprints it has left in the path it has traced.

These old reflections show us their certainty that the future was beginning and, with it, a civilization focused in the *logos*, whose nature was half-reason and half-divinity. If literary consciousness springs from that mythical symbiosis, however, beyond the Greco-Latin world—despite the concealments or the straying of those originary foundations—during medieval culture this consciousness remains in concepts and inherited roots. These, as Curtius argued,²³ would allow, in its own vital time of desolation and tragedy, a succession that developed up to Humanism by its constitutive elements, such as topic or rhetoric, and then consolidated as Renaissance, Mannerism, Baroque and Neoclassicism, thus creating the era of Classicism, which would carry its major impulse from the end of the fifteenth century. In the 1500s humanists, with a renovated spirit, started a universal dream: to

²³ See, after the introduction, the first chapters of volume I by E. R. Curtius, *Literatura europea y Edad Media latina*, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1955 (and subsequent editions).

recover the ancient world with its originals—even if they couldn't decipher them completely—that Christianity had redirected to their beliefs. Literary consciousness would now be nurtured with utopias and emulations that were based on a temporal of temporality. More than history, this leap was a thirst to corroborate itself, exploring the return to some origins that were then seen as the great lineage behing purity. This was possible due to the notion that defined the centrality in the human, crystallizing onto the antropocentric vision. It was a trascendental element for literary consciousness while it recovered from the Greco-Latin tradition the idea of Being, of identity, of the person; some early forms of commitment as stated by Parmenides's key formulation regarding the *ethos* that supported his verses, all with the distant gods as significations of the enigma.²⁴

The ideas of Antiquity, the Homeric ones, the pre-Socratic and the Socratic, the Platonic, the Aristotelic, the Ciceronian, the Horatian, those from Quintilianus, and so many other ancient authors, are all transferred. That is how the ancient world redeems itself, establishing a strong literary consciousness that condenses in the classical humanism, but also in philosophical humanism, and in Christian humanism. These aesthetic lines are first confronted with the canon and then argue with one another the hegemony of creation, the thought and forms of sacred. The celebration of Trento and its requirements for conversion will impact the knowledge and the literary consciousness itself, which will become erudite with Mannerism, and figurative and spiritual during the Baroque. The archaic pagan forms had been assumed; now we find the neopagan forms integrated in the new time, re-reading actively the mythology and variety of their stories, present in all literature, restoring either those ideas that followed the now Christianized old Greco-Latin tradition or the biblical path for canonical poetics and rhetoric.²⁵ In the 1600s, the emergence of this formalized conceptualization of the canonical settles down in the literary consciousness as it surrounds the sacred, understanding now, as do those areas that reach into other disciplines, the double path of its consequences, both the learned and the popular. The idiosyncrasies of this conceptualization will dwell in

²⁴ See M. Heidegger, *Hölderlin y la esencia de la poesía*, "Comentario primero. Poesía y metafísica", J. ed. and transl. by D. García Bacca, Barcelona, Anthropos, 1991, pp. 47-48.

²⁵ See Benito Arias Montano, *Tractatus de figuris tethoricis*, and the precedent from L. Gómez Canseco and M. A. Márquez, eds., Huelva, Universidad, 1995, pp. 9 and subsequent.

how the literary fact is understood and received from that ancient context, growing in the eighteenth neoclassical century with the enlightened rationalism.

The models established in the Western world in the eighteenth century based on Greco-Latin tradition shaped the center of the literary consciousness, radiating from the minorities their cultural projections, although some other concurrent popular reactions responded to a view that was closer to ecclesiastical formulas and common heritage than to models of regulated nature. These models, however, would from then on shape the programmatic studies of every student and exhibit the literary milestones of history. As an account of the past and its repercussions, they would be indelibly associated to literary consciousness: selected classic, medieval and classicist texts shaped the restoration of knowledge. These were supposed to be the basis for educating in the greatest works of literature, being as they were clairvoyant marks throughout history. Nonetheless, the German and Anglo-Saxon worlds, embedded in this long tradition of Greco-Latin origin (although with their own myths, and with languages that coexisted with the Romance languages), emerging from the hidden places of classicism, eager for discernment, together with previous theories from the South, from Vico, Herder or Lessing, with the movement Sturm und Drang and Goethe, with the first English poets of the new sensibility—Macpherson (Ossian), Robert Burns or William Blake²⁶—in the second half of the eighteenth-century gave way to a consciousness with strong echoes that molded an unprecedented perception of life and the world. It is a new literary consciousness that would take longer to settle on the shores of the Mediterranean due to their highly institutionalized and continuous literature throughout history. On the edges of Europe, in the context of a new country, where the British-originated European tradition had been partly clouded, Americans made theirs a new start, finding its revered models in Poe and Whitman. Although that idle bent did not completely disappear during the construction of their literary consciousness, nonetheless an unheard reaction of that dormant tendency came, not without some critical bewilderment, from Harold Bloom, when at the end of the twentieth-century he published his very well known *The Western*

²⁶ See J. M. Valverde, ed., *Poetas románticos ingleses*, Barcelona, BackList, 2010, pp. xiii-xiv.

Canon.²⁷ In his book, among other things, Bloom proclaims the existence of modern landmarks of universal character, and this, despite replicas and insufficiencies that stirred up around his thesis, entailed a loud knock on the door of localisms, including national localisms.

3. Literary consciousness and the primitive world

For the ancient Greek, China (*Tina* for the ancients) represented a distant Eastern distant extraterritoriality with its own aura. The existence, in non-remote temporalities, of a concurrent classic Eastern/Western background regarding canonical texts intensifies when the reading of Confucius, *mutatis mutandis*, finds its equivalent in the ideas of Socrates in the other world, or when in the Taoist poems of Lao Tse we find some reminiscence of Platonic ideas. These are civilizing ways that take written form, building the value of literary consciousness from the immeasurable—as long as it is a recalling—of those originary texts. Some centuries later, the Arab world, and especially Al-Andalus,²⁸ will pick up from Byzantium iconic Aristotelian and classic texts that will transfer once more the general knowledge, thus embracing in its roots what in intercultural terms is this great matter of knowledge. These are permanent traces *ob origine* in the pursuit for both infinite wisdom and the human and, on their way towards expression they deepen their specificity, thus generating the literary consciousness that holds their survival in the long journey from the West to the East and vice-versa. It is a daring view that, while receiving nourishment from the legendary ancestral world, becomes in time and space a universal in the modern idealistic consciousness. It proves that its highest category is precisely the acceptance of the greatest aesthetics with no boundaries, that each language and each culture, each period of civilization gradually provides and creates the desideratum that underpins the Modern. It is only accurately defined with Goethe, who takes intellectual responsibility of all this in the open dimension with which he formulates the Weltliteratur. Goethe himself has cultures hold a conversation in his *Westöstlicher Diwan*²⁹ with poems inspired in Persian poetry and Sufi topics. Despite this, the ideas about the canon

²⁷ Tirante Harcourt, 1994.

²⁸ See *Sobre el intelecto (Averroes)*, ed. and int. by A. Martínez Lorca, pp. 21-37.

²⁹ Goethe, *El diván de Oriente y Occidente*, trans.: La Oficina del Arte y Ediciones, 2020.

of universality will not sink in the Western world, thus it is not until more recently—with a positive aspect of globalization, as it is the current system of communication and economy, and with the far-reaching technological and digital media—that we have taken a leap towards a general aesthetic consciousness that is expansive, however vague and fragmented. But regarding the literary consciousness that reaches essentially the whole Western culture and its adjoining implications, we cannot stop thinking how tradition is made of ignorance and hidden expressions, thus protecting the mystery that relies within the same consciousness about literature. At the same time, this makes of literature a focus for transferring the means of the world's spell. In contrast, we also owe the ancient consciousness of Rome a pragmatic horizon that was drawn upon the rhetorical corpus, as close to education as it was to the spirit of romanization that consolidated the landmarks of the Western world.

Our literary consciousness is thus made of universals, shared archetypes in its symbolic diversity that interact from the greatest influences around the world: the profound affinity Ruben Darío had for China, or the proximity of Juan Ramón Jiménez for Rabindranath Tagore, or that of Yukio Mishima for García Lorca are examples of a consecutive lyric trail of contemporaneity. Evidence of this is the diffusion and influence of the works of Dante and Petrarch in Humanism as the first landmarks of European literature. In the old beginning of that new Renaissance classicism, literary consciousness was also a redeeming force, not only for the seeds that it provided, but also for its formidable ability to cover the atmosphere from which the poetic builds *ex nihilo*, naming things. It is a task naturally located within existence itself: the naming, the highlighting of objects and ideas, orienting conducts.

But before the beginning of poetry, an internal, sublime, intimate discourse had emerged, a monodialogue of the ego with the world as background, with the purpose of naming in a simple and complex manner. That first discourse, the *poités*, settles in as the internal view that projects its energy onto the world's reality so that it can name it. We soon find it in the pre-Socratic Greece, where the *poités* is also a way of addressing the divine that is related to the eudaimonia, the vital dignity, as well as related to fragility and human finity in opposite to the infinity of the celestial, represented by the gods. It is particularly related to poetry in the oral culture and, with these characteristics, will

result too in the shaping of dramatization.³⁰ We are describing an impulse subjected to whoever has the capacity for creation, for the poem or the artistic work, shaping a self-perception that is transferred to the world, although overpassing it towards the unknown, the unseen, the complexity. Those Greeks narrated a weave of god-related stories whose allegory was itself a story that already related to the supernatural. It is a quality that lies in the very narrative of the ancient authors, defining the flux of time's circularity in its reiterations and mythical turns. It is oblivious to the makers, to the concatenated and the consecutive, focused in the Olympic being of those divine characters, subjected to conflicts that, beyond that Greek man, concoct the energy of the cracks in a universe of enigmas. It is a multiplicity, a cosmos that in a web-like manner suggests its own holes through which the force enters and exits, and the gods are the ones personifying and controlling those flows of the universe. Hence, poetry assumes the potentiality of its understanding and its expression, and defines the literary consciousness of the superior and the sublime, despite that this concept would appear later in the first half of the 1st century.³¹

At the same time, the Homeric refers to a multiplicitous instantaneity, a horizontality in whose ideal lay how people are and are driven, going back to the origins and emphatically asserting the difference. Thus, a condensed feeling about what is common, about the knowledge of what they are naming settles in, clearly manifesting. These were the emotions and ideas that covered them up; there was yet no ideology, and in those emotions lay the encounter with the primitive or what comes from Homer, in the fact of building a testimony that is capable and metonymic about how a nation defines itself. At the same time, we find the first words about why to create. This starts both the act of reflection and the aesthetical consciousness, factors that concern the individual being as much as the collective. It would seem that everything is at the service of creation, that from the metaphysics and the contemplation of the pre-Socratic Greece the greatest evolution towards activity has taken place, motivating a movement in the literary consciousness that in order to take place demands both of these domains and their values. Plato himself moves in the ideas, but he creates an order to show us how to walk the righteous path, the one that must be, while dealing with how

³⁰ See B. Vélez-Medina, *Reivindicación del conflicto trágico*, Universidad la Gran Colombia, 2017, pp. 29-30.

³¹ See Longino, *De lo sublime*, Barcelona, Acantilado, 2014, passim.

the human being must act (Nussbaum, 2004: 33) seeing the need for literature to show a realistic way to rise up spiritually in the imaginary. That double side conferred poetry with a dimension of ethical content—the soul—and one that is formal and kinematic—the body. Soon, these two would become in the literary consciousness the similarity required to create in the creative word a recognition that was about-to-be corporealized.

4. The end: literary consciousness facing itself

Literary consciousness refers essentially to the historicity of the creation where it lies, glowing in the sublime. We think that the Greeks did not believe in gods, that it was all a metalanguage. But the ancient man believed in enigma and, by means of a sacralization, created myth. He had an insurmountable feeling towards destiny and fate. Enduring the Christian tradition, it gradually lost its ancient abysmal sense of the unknown, and it became rationalist, especially from the Erasmian reformation onwards. Moving from the faith, theology embraced reason with explanations ad nauseum about mystery. Science itself has narrowed the domain of mystery more and more, however religion and science converse about the origin of the universe. For the ancient Greeks, the remnant of the sacred was to be found in reality; they were like miracles, flashes and messages from the above, warnings about the unknown, that which remained during the Middle Ages. Literature prevailed active within its context, capable of figuring out the extraordinary, even though its nature to unite both the celestial and the human landscape decreased at the end of the Middle Ages.

Aristotle is the one who best deciphers the idea of the gods shaping a world that is absent, distant and which cannot be proved. He relates it to Platonic meta-language and to the impossibility of showing its content. This is why, in order to explain those phenomena that reach the literary, he moves about within the tangible. Since their causes work in the creative domain too, every literary work is founded in all four causes: the material cause, the formal cause, the agentive cause, and the final cause. Each one has its own sense and literary level, which Aristotle explains in his poetics, in the story of Oedipus that follows Sophocles's work *King Oedipus*.

Ultimately, in the long historical path of Plato and Aristotle that expands from the ancestor to the present, literary consciousness finds itself facing itself, between the pursuit of what we see and what we do not see. The links of this were already determined from the origin. The beginnings of Metaphysics point towards an intuition that exists prior to knowledge, prior to how we form bonds to things, prior to how we entangle with life without thinking, and to how we make our own realities out of perceptions that we are not even aware of having. In Aristotle, the metaphysical is but a connection to poetic meaning, which Plato further develops. The fundamental act of imitation joins in both of them as a particular aesthetic experience (Albaladejo, 2016: 49-52). Thus, when situated in the intangible, literature is but an expressive inter act, whereas when in the intangible the mere act of being means much; an image created in words in search of perfection. For literary consciousness, the Platonic is the philosophy of solitude if not a thirst for union, bringing us closer to what we once were. And yet, idealism is deeply rooted in realistic descriptions, while the defense of the material moves towards an Aristotelic concept of the “impossible plausible”. Literary consciousness thus manifests its connection, that is, a unity—only seemingly contradictory—when it stands in front of itself upon the two great pillars of invention and idealism-materialism, born in Antiquity and still present today.

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The Universality of Culture and Art in the Face of Racism and Xenophobia

Alfonso Martín-Jiménez

Abstract: Racist and xenophobic movements tend to highlight cultural differences, and to endow their own culture with greater value whilst deriding that of others. Yet beneath the apparent diversity of cultures and human behaviours (including artistic behaviour) is to be found a fundamental anthropological unit, based on a common genetic inheritance, which binds all human beings and their cultures together, and which belies discriminatory prejudices. Yet racism and xenophobia are also fed by the very nature of human beings, who instinctively tend to take care of themselves and their loved ones, whilst ignoring those who are not close to them. Some scientists believe that genetic manipulation or education might be able to counteract the most selfish and pernicious human instincts, and encourage altruistic behaviour and cooperation.

Keywords: cultural universality, original cultural traits, cultural differences and similarities, rejection of other cultures

In the current era of globalisation, where forced migrations favour intercultural contact, there are conflicting feelings towards immigration. While certain people and social groups are understanding towards the situation of those forced to leave behind their homeland and loved ones in order to seek out a means of survival, and who adopt towards them an altruistic and welcoming attitude, other people and groups strongly reject immigration, and see the foreigners who come to their country as a veritable threat to their well-being. This latter group tend to stigmatise immigrants and try to link them to crime, seeing them as a menace to the fundamentals of their own culture. In interracial societies, it is also common for certain members of a given race to harbour feelings of superiority towards other races, whom they look down on as inferior. Both racism and xenophobia are based on an attempt to highlight supposed differences between societies or races, whilst ignoring those features which bind all human beings together.

Yet beneath the apparent diversity of cultures and human behaviour lies a common anthropological component which, by itself, should be sufficient to dispel any discriminatory prejudice. I have referred to this component in a forthcoming publication entitled *The Universality and*

Originality of Literature and Art. Symbolic Imagination (Martín, 2021), in which I explore the fundamentals of the universality of literature and art, and where I set out a series of arguments that underpin the universal nature of human behaviour as a whole and of literary and artistic creation in particular. By way of a starting point for this work, I shall now sum up some of the arguments put forward in the book.

The existence of universal human emotions and reactions has been supported by the most recent neurobiological studies into the behaviour of the brain. The neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (1999) has studied a specific type of emotion; fear. Through experiments conducted with animals, as well as through the study of human beings suffering from brain damage, and by exploring the brain using magnetic resonance nuclear functional techniques, LeDoux has been able to locate the cerebral pathways related to manifestations of fear (which include two areas at the base of the brain, the sensory thalamus and the amygdala nuclei, and the sensory cerebral cortex). He has shown that, regardless of their culture, the cerebral response mechanisms related to this emotion are common to all human beings as well as to a good number of animal species.

The universal nature of emotions has also been highlighted by Marc Jeannerod (2002, 2009) in his studies into the anatomical structure and functioning of the brain. Jeannerod points out that, despite cultural differences, emotions are recognisable in individuals who belong to different cultures and that such emotions are universal in nature. Jeannerod insists on the importance of anatomical and neurophysiological singleness to ensure the functioning of social life. In his view, the social character of humankind is only possible given the single nature of the brains of all its members since, if our brains were built differently, it would be impossible for us to understand the emotions and reactions of others (Jeannerod, 2002: 19). As Jeannerod explains, social behaviour is determined by the brain's anatomy and by the type of conduct it triggers, which to a large degree is common to all human beings, and that there is an innate predisposition towards acquiring language and towards understanding the expressions of others.

In this regard, it is worth recalling the ideas of Noam Chomsky on the innate capacity to acquire language (Smith, 2001: 116-117). Chomsky asked how it is possible for children to acquire their first language so

quickly and so easily. In Chomsky's view (1988), when a system as rich and complex as language develops more or less in the same way based on highly restricted stimuli, it is to be assumed there is an extremely powerful innate component, which leads him to conclude there is an innate predisposition to acquire language. In his opinion, speakers' linguistic competence is determined genetically and is the same for all children, although the development and action thereof require a particular cultural context in which explicit language stimuli are received (in other words, one or more specific languages). As a result of human evolution, there would therefore be a universal grammar that is handed down genetically and that does not need to be learnt, and to which all languages are subject. Language acquisition is to a large extent driven endogenously, and is not merely a reaction to external stimuli (although these are necessary –but never sufficient, due to the “poor stimulus”–).

Edward O. Wilson (2018: 93-94) also refers to a genetic predisposition towards language acquisition: “The instinctual animal sounds of our ancestors evolved [...] into human speech. The vocabularies came to differ among groups, but the capacity and driving impetus to talk remained genetically programmed”. The notion of an innate language knowledge is supported by Marc Jeannerod, who insists on the fact that new-borns prefer the sound of language to any other kind of noise, and that they are able to determine whether the intonation of a statement is correct. This evidences that new-borns possess some kind of innate language knowledge, and that language, the social sign *par excellence*, is rooted in the human brain from birth (Jeannerod, 2002: 198).

The experimental cognitive psychologist Stanislas Dehaene (2018: 19-21), after analysing the brain circuits involved in the reading process, insists in his book *Reading in the Brain* that writing and reading are also a universal part of the brain. As Dehaene explains, *Homo sapiens* was not initially programmed to read and write, and yet has learnt to do so. This might lead us to believe that the human brain possesses an infinite plasticity that enables it to learn anything in an unlimited fashion, even those things for which it was not initially prepared. Yet Dehaene, by empirically studying the brain circuits involved in reading, has shown that this notion is mistaken, and insists that the anatomy and functionality of the human brain is common to all mankind throughout all eras and all cultures. The brain is able to learn, and this enables it to adapt to the specific norms of reading English, Chinese or Russian,

although this learning is very firmly restricted by mechanisms that are specified by our genes. Cerebral architecture is similar in all human beings, and indeed differs very little from that of other primates. In all human beings and in all cultures, the same areas of the brain are activated to recodify writing. Whatever the language being read, reading travels along a genetically determined circuit (Dehaene, 2018: 20), with the brain managing to adapt parts of itself to the new uses required of it. When we need to learn a new skill, we recycle some of our old primate brain circuits insofar as these circuits are able to tolerate change (Dehaene, 2018: 21). In the case of reading, all human beings in all cultures, despite the differences in the way we write, have recycled the same area of the brain so as to understand writing (a region situated in the temporal-occipital lateral sulcus of the left hemisphere, previously devoted to visual analysis). This has led to a process of “neuronal recycling”, such that one area of the brain, which had a specific function related to visual perception of objects, has come to be used to interpret writing. Dehaene maintains that our genome imposes limits on what we can learn, such that new cultural creations can only occur if we adjust our brain structure (Dehaene, 2018: 181).

Dehaene expands his concept of “neuronal recycling” to the domain of culture. In his view, the cultural manifestations of different societies have a universal core, based on the common anatomy of the brain. The structure of the brain exerts close control over cultural creation. Human capacity for invention is not infinite, but is restricted by our limited neuronal organisation. If human cultures seem to evidence enormous diversity, it is because an exponential number of cultural forms can spring from the myriad combinations of a limited selection of fundamental cultural features.

Dehaene asks why man is the only primate capable of developing a culture, and reaches the conclusion that the human brain displays a plasticity which is far greater than that of other primates. The prefrontal cortex is far more developed in man and has strong long distance connections to other parts of the brain, such as the temporal lobes and the occipital lobe, some of which are specific to human beings. These connections form a common cortical work area that is linked to the evolutionary appearance of reflexive conscience and to human competence for cultural invention, and which enables an infinite number of ideas and thoughts to be merged and recombined at will to create new inventions (Dehaene, 2018: 374).

The discovery of *mirror neurons* (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2006; Iacoboni, 2010) accounts for our ability to understand the intentions and emotions of others. These neurons are a kind of motor neuron, located in specific areas of the frontal lobe and parietal lobe of our brain, which are not only activated when we perform a certain action, but also when we see someone else do so. They help us to see others' intentions when they are carrying out a specific movement. When we see somebody else performing an action, our mirror neurons simulate in our own brain that same action, albeit without actually performing it, maintaining it as a potential action (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2006: 55) or as an internal motor representation (Jeannerod, 1994, 2009), which helps us to understand what purpose we ourselves would have if we were to carry out the same action in that context, thereby enabling us to comprehend the intentions of others. Marco Iacoboni explains that our own movements are almost always associated to specific intentions. When seeing other people act, the same neurons that we use to perform our own movements are activated in our brain, which helps us to understand the intentions of others (Iacoboni, 2010: 37).

Mirror neurons, which are activated automatically and unconsciously, without this involving any rational or deductive effort, and which respond both to visual as well as auditory stimuli, are also related to the perception of language and to the gestures we make when speaking (Iacoboni, 2010: 83-107). When we hear and see someone speak and gesticulate, they trigger a specular reflection in our brain which allows us to understand what we ourselves would wish to express if we were to use those same gestures and expressions.

Moreover, mirror neurons also fire in order to recognise the feelings of others, enabling us to understand their emotional states. When they observe someone else's feeling, mirror neurons trigger an internal simulation of the other person's gestures and facial expressions. This simulation of others' emotions in our brain allows us to experience, without any effort, what we ourselves would feel when making the same facial expressions we see the other person making. This is why mirror neurons are key to favouring an empathy and understanding of the intentions, language-gesture expressions and emotions of others, thereby facilitating social interaction.

Mirror neurons therefore allow all of us to be interconnected, thus evidencing that we are social beings programmed to share our

experiences. In this regard, Marco Iacoboni insists on the universal nature of our brain, which brings all human beings together, over and above historical or cultural differences. In his view, the existence of mirror neurons demonstrates that we are not alone, but that we are connected biologically and are designed in evolutionary terms to interconnect in a deep and mutual way (Iacoboni, 2010: 256). This is the case despite the fact that, much to Iacoboni's dismay (2010: 260), religious and political beliefs continually deny the fundamental neurobiology that interrelates us. Likewise, xenophobic tendencies need to ignore this deep-rooted sameness that exists amongst all human beings, and tend to value their own culture as being superior to the one they seek to belittle, when in fact all cultures are the product of a common cerebral system.

The brain systems that are related to mirror neurons, and which respond to visual and auditory stimuli, not only allow us to explain the reactions we experience when perceiving the emotions or thoughts of others in real life, but may also shed light on human reaction to literary and artistic works.

It is thus possible to understand the infectious nature of the emotions conveyed by actors on stage or on screen (Iacoboni, 2010: 14): when we see good actors performing, our mirror neurons simulate inside us the same emotions, enabling us to comprehend their moods and thereby favouring our empathy towards them. Iacoboni (2010: 97) has also shown that when reading a novel, mirror neurons simulate in our brain the actions described therein, as if the readers themselves were performing them. As a result, literary and artistic works include emotional elements and descriptions of actions which trigger cerebral responses that are designed to allow us to understand their feeling, and these are responses which have a universal nature. We may therefore conclude that literary and artistic works, at least with regard to the actions of the characters and their emotions, generate common relations that underpin the universality of art.

The universal nature of the intentions, emotions and thoughts perceived by mirror neurons not only confirms the social behaviour of human beings, but also that of their artistic behaviour, which is also universal in character (Wilson, 2018: 91). It is not difficult to see how the emotions or ideas expressed and felt when seeing a film or a play or when reading a novel can be transposed, in one way or another, to the

general nature of creative forms and artistic reception, which underlines the universal nature of art and the existence of universal aesthetics. If the processes which make culture and social communication possible—such as the acquisition of language, learning to read, and understanding the intentions, expressions of language, the emotions and thoughts of others—are grounded on a universal foundation, it seems logical to think that artistic communication also possesses such a universal grounding.

In this regard, Yuri M. Lotman (1988: 9-10) reminds us that all human societies create and consume art. Although this is not necessary, either from the standpoint of vital needs or in terms of essential social relations, art is present in all cultures, indicating that it is a universal need. This is the case because, according to Lotman, it enables a particular kind of communication or artistic information, the essence of which lies in the inherent particularities of artistic texts, whose complexity determines a communicative capacity which is superior to that of normal communication texts.

It seems reasonable to assume that not only do creators draw on literary or artistic texts to express their ideas or emotions with greater intensity, but that those who receive them can also do this in their interior. If our brain is programmed to understand the linguistic-gestural expressions of others through internal simulation, it would seem logical to assume that such expressions can also facilitate that special form of communication provided by works of art, such that the content thereof may be recognised through an equivalent process of simulation, albeit far more complex in the case of artistic communication. Just as we comprehend the expressions of others because we understand what we ourselves would wish to say when uttering such expressions, it seems logical to think that we comprehend and value the content of works of art because we perceive in them what we ourselves would have wished to convey had we created them.

There is, however, one essential difference between normal communication and artistic communication. Whereas the phrases that we hear others utter in everyday conversations are very similar to those which we ourselves use and which tend to express a single meaning, works of art tend towards multiple meanings and can surprise us with their artificial, intricate and unexpected nature, with their complexity and originality proving challenging and appealing to us. Yet at the same

time, if we are to identify with them, they must be the bearers of universal elements that are related to us. The effectiveness of art thus depends on its ability to convey in an unusual manner something with which we can identify, expressing it in a way that is different to how we could or would do so.

This is why I feel that the position of those who defend the universal nature of art, such as Antonio García Berrio (1994), to be such a tenable one. For García Berrio, the successes and achievements of the formal expressivity and sensitive beauty of artistic texts are insufficient for explaining the profound appeal which certain works have, but are instruments that provide support for the anthropological foundations which are common to all human beings. And it is that very universality and capacity of each text to suggest this which ultimately determines the artistic value of a work. In the case of literary texts, their poetic nature relates to the enthralling elements which they can express and convey about ourselves. The formal artifices, however ingenious they may be, would prove inconsequential were they not the foundation for anthropological universalities (García Berrio, 1989: 440-441). When a work of art expresses a series of anthropological universalities with which those receiving it can easily identify, and when it also does so by correctly drawing on expressive or fictional resources, it can achieve an aesthetic value that will not only depend on the social conventions of each moment, on the subjective aesthetic judgements of the receiver (Genette, 1997, 2000), and on the value which certain people or institutions may attach to it, but also on the anthropological substance which it conveys in artistic terms.

Works of art not only embrace the actions and emotions of their characters, but also a series of symbols that are universal. A belief in the importance of the anthropological roots that are common to all human beings, and which are determined by genetic inheritance, led Gilbert Durand (2005) to establish a classification of the symbols of imagination, based on the assumption that, beneath the apparent diversity of the products of cultural imagery (myths, rites, ideas, religions, culture, art...) lies a series of universal archetypes. According to Durand, basic psychobiological reflexes, which are common to all human beings, lead to the appearance of these archetypes which, when coming into contact with the material and social environment, give rise to a series of symbols that are apparently different, but which may be reduced to a series of groups that can be classified.

Durand's archetypes and symbols are common to all the arts, and their classification, beyond what may be improved or contradicted in certain aspects, provides proof that it is possible to systematize the products of human imagination and the symbols displayed in works of art. If human communication is based on the existence of a common brain that enables interactivity and an understanding of the intentions and emotions of others, it also seems logical to think that the artistic products and symbols which appear therein possess an anthropological root that is common to all human beings.

As we have seen, Stanilas Dehaene (2018: 355-380) highlights the universality of cultural forms, which are determined and limited by the capacity of the human brain. From a neuro-anthropological perspective, Dehaene contends that cultural features are related to well-defined neural circuits, the collective combinations of which account for the variety of cultural representations (2018: 359-360). In his view, the origin of culture is situated in the human capacity to develop new combinations of ideas. As mentioned, said capacity is grounded on the strong neuronal connection (specific to *Homo sapiens*) which exists between the different areas of the human brain, and which make up a large-scale "area of neuronal work" that is able to deal with, synthesise and distribute all of the information received. The genetic make-up of the brain imposes certain restrictions, given that any invention must adjust to the functional possibilities of the neural circuits. Yet the overall work space allows ideas to be merged and recombined so as to create new inventions. In other words, the common architecture of our brains ensures the universality and uniformity of its functioning, establishing limits, while at the same time allowing for a wide array of ideas and inventions to be envisaged and imagined.

These considerations may easily be linked to the postulates of the poetics of imagination, which are grounded on the universal and at the same time original nature of archetypes and symbols. The products of the imagination and cultural creations (which include art and literature) encounter limitations based on the common structure of the human brain, although this does, however, allow for a wide range of manifestations.

It may well be that aesthetic value resides in achieving an attractive and original way of presenting universal elements. The latter are present in literary and artistic works as a whole (Martín, 2021), which seek to

present them in an original manner so as to make them attractive to recipients. Art entails a complex process of communication, and those involved in its creation and reception are endowed with brain structures that enable mutual understanding. Privileged works are undoubtedly those which are able to convey in an appealing manner a series of ideas, emotions or experiences with which recipients immediately identify, even when they are not aware of what causes this empathy. Those works of art which possess the greatest power of communication may come to enjoy a privileged position somewhat later (which may take some time), through the recognition of cultural institutions, which highlights their power of seduction. Yet their value need not depend exclusively on the recognition they receive, with this recognition possibly stemming from their value.

These considerations on the nature of literature and art can easily be extended to other aspects of the human condition, which is also universal, although it may adopt different manifestations in each culture. Nevertheless, beneath this apparent cultural diversity always lie certain anthropological constants that bring all societies together, and which endow all individuals, regardless of the culture they belong to, with the same rights, stemming from their intrinsic condition as human beings, and which are essentially the same as those of the other members of the species. Although racist or xenophobic movements tend to exaggerate cultural differences, it is clear that underlying these are certain anthropological constants which identify all human societies and all their members, endowing them with the same values and rights.

Nevertheless, and despite the universal oneness of all cultures, love of one's own country and a rejection of all those who do not form part of it also has an anthropological basis. In this regard, Antonio Damasio (2018: 311) reminds us that our social and individual life is ultimately governed by *homeostasis*, which constitutes a form of self-regulation by organisms designed to maintain their internal properties and to ensure their survival, well-being and proliferation. Homeostasis determines affections to a large extent, and these tend to limit pain and to enhance pleasure, particularly at an individual level, such that we pay little attention to other individuals, even those who form part of our group. As Damasio explains, attempts to establish harmony between cultures are faced with a difficulty stemming from human nature itself, since the principal concern of basic homeostasis is to maintain the life of an individual organism within its borders. This endows homeostasis

with a *provincial* character, since it is basically concerned with the self. This concern may extend to the family as well as to a small group of those who are closest and even to larger groups, when there is the prospect of general benefit. However, homeostasis does not tend to concern itself with very large groups, and particularly with heterogeneous groups, and much less so with cultures or global civilisations. This is why to expect that any concern for survival and well-being will naturally extend to large groups is to expect the improbable (Damasio, 2018: 299).

Although “societies”, “cultures” or “civilisations” incorrectly tend to see themselves as large living and unique entities, they do not possess the same unity as individual organisms, since they tend to be fragmented and to be made up of individualised organisms. This is why homeostasis usually concerns itself solely with each individualised cultural organism, leading each one to pursue its own interests, which only include the immediate circle of those closest to them and which extends to their cultural group (Damasio, 2018: 312). As a result, cultural organisms display no natural tendency to merge, which explains the disaffection felt by the wealthiest members of humanity towards their fellow humans from other cultures who are barely able to survive or who in fact fail to do so. The natural tendency of human beings is to only worry about their own well-being and that of their loved ones, and to ignore the problems of others.

The various societies, depending on their geographical environment, have created refined forms of regulating cultural life. Yet Damasio points out (2018: 301) that this rich diversity gives rise to frequent conflicts, since it heightens the differences within groups and between groups, stirring hostility. Given that the natural tendency of each individual or cultural group is to satisfy its own well-being, conflicts sparked by rival interests are almost bound to emerge. Emotional conflicts even occur within each individual, since each organism, as a result of evolution, puts into play diverse emotions designed to safeguard homeostasis, such as sadness, grief, fear, and repulsion. Another emotion, anger, has withstood the passage of evolution since it offers certain advantages (such as persuading an adversary to back down), but it comes at a high price, particularly when leading to anger and violence. In Damasio’s view (2018: 303), anger or rage are negative emotions whose benefits have gradually diminished through evolution, as has also occurred with envy, jealousy, and contempt.

Damasio (2018: 304) reminds us that extreme greed, rage and contempt have led to extraordinary cruelty being perpetrated by certain human beings towards others throughout the ages since prehistoric times. In this regard, we resemble our ape cousins, who are capable of tearing apart the bodies of their rivals. Yet human refinement has taken the way we inflict cruelty to extremes. Chimpanzees have never crucified other chimpanzees, whilst human beings have proven themselves capable of inventing crucifixion and of crucifying other human beings. Human creativity is able to devise new methods of torture and death, such that rage and malice are fortified by knowledge, by the capacity to reason and by the power which technology and science have endowed human beings with.

A possible future ability to manipulate our genes, doing away with those which drive us to anger, aggressiveness and destruction might solve the problem, as pointed out by Stephen Hawking (2018) who, nevertheless, feared that those in power might acquire such a capacity for genetic manipulation and use it for their own ends. Antonio Damasio, who does not support genetic manipulation, but advocates that each human being should forge their own destiny by using their willpower to control the virtues or defects with which they were born (Damasio, 2018: 270), feels that the only reasonable solution to the conflicts that arise from human nature can be achieved by increasing efforts to civilise people through education, so that societies can overcome their differences and work together on basic aspects which affect everyone, favouring cooperative behaviour. Damasio's idea leads us to think that education should first and foremost foster cooperation rather than competitiveness. Through education, the idea is to prevent our genetic inheritance from exercising absolute control over our destiny.

For his part, Edward O. Wilson argues for two types of selection in the evolution of species, which come about through genetic mutation: selection at the individual level and selection at the group level. The former affects the survival and reproduction of a *member of the group*, while the latter affects the features that interact with the group members, such that the success of an individual's genes partly depends on the success of the society they form part of (Wilson, 2018: 101-102). In his view, human beings are located half way between the selection of the individual and that of the group. Individual selection drives the selfishness of those who are only concerned with themselves and with

their immediate family members, whereas group selection encourages altruism and social cooperation. Mankind is faced with an eternal conflict between these two tendencies, and it is this that makes humanity unique (Wilson, 2018: 102).

The notion of “group selection” has been strongly contested and there are many wide-ranging opinions that seek to explain what lies behind the altruism observed in human societies (Pérez, 2015). Nevertheless, and whatever the evolutionary origins of altruism, it seems clear that human beings are capable of perpetrating not only the greatest cruelties, atrocities and evils, but also of behaving altruistically towards others, as Antonio Damasio also reminds us (2018: 309), insisting that the majority of people can be cruel, selfish and foolish, as well as noble, innocent and charming. This leads him to pin his hopes on the positive effects of education, since to date no sufficiently long-term and coherent educational project has ever been carried out to show that this would not lead to an improvement in the human condition which we so desire (Damasio, 2018: 309-310). For his part, Edward O. Wilson proposes the advent of a “third enlightenment”, to add to the two enlightenments described by Anthony Gottlieb (2016), each of which lasted some 150 years: that of the Athens of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle (spanning from the mid fifth century BC to the late fourth century BC.), and that which spread through northern Europe from the 1630s until just before the French Revolution, and in which figures such as Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Hume, Rousseau and Voltaire figured prominently. The third enlightenment requires close cooperation between science and the humanities, which could provide answers to the great questions posed by philosophy throughout history.³² Faced with the pessimism which stems from the genetic determination of our most selfish and sinister emotions, Damasio and Wilson concur in the idea that education, cooperation and the development of knowledge can offer humanity a lifeline.

³² In Wilson’s view, only the *consilience* or unity of knowledge between the sciences and the arts is able to resolve doubts such as: why do we exist instead of never having existed; why did life originate and proliferate; why are there two sexes, and why does sex exist when it would be easier to reproduce by parthenogenesis, or by making descendants emerge from our body; why must we die of age if not of anything else, and why are we guided by a growth and deterioration plan that is programmed genetically (Wilson, 2018: 197-198).

It is here worth remembering the words of Diogenes of Oenoanda with which Wilson (2018: 198) closes his book *The Origins of Human Creativity*:

Not least for those who are called foreigners, for they are not foreigners. For, while the various segments of the Earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire Earth, and a single home, the world.

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A Review about the Notion of ‘Authorship’ within the Framework of Literary Communication: Cognitive, Neurohermeneutic, Poetic and Rhetorical Perspectives*

Francisco Chico-Rico
Benito García-Valero

Abstract: This paper aims to offer a comprehensive understanding of the notion of authorship by assessing the three main elements present in literary communication: the author; the work of verbal art; and the reader. For this purpose, identical importance is assigned to those three key categories in literary communication, thus offsetting the excessive significance attributed to readership and reception in recent decades. In the light of rhetorical and cognitive studies, this integral understanding relies first and foremost on the study of the classical Horatian duality *ars/ingenium*, which accounts for the genesis of works and has been reformulated here in terms of polarity. Nevertheless, due to its comprehensiveness, the understanding likewise extends to the Horatian dualities *res/verba* and *docere/delectare*, which characterise the work of verbal art and the recipient, respectively. The chapter consequently provides a thorough framework to conceive the author as a hub receiving streams from various types of energies (both conscious and unconscious) which take linguistic shape in the literary text, seen in turn as a special use of language that allows for building meaningful ‘knots’ of *verba* which sustain the creative process initially undertaken by the author and enacted *a posteriori* by readers.

Keywords: Authorship, Literary communication, Poetics, Rhetoric, Cognitive poetics, Neurohermeneutics, Foregrounding, Horatian dualities.

1. Introduction

This chapter has as its goal to approach the notion of ‘authorship’ — and, by extension, the three main elements of literary communication, namely: the author; the text; and the reader— from a complex, global perspective that embraces cognitive, neurohermeneutic, poetic and rhetorical standpoints. Each of the aforesaid three elements acquired great relevance throughout the 19th and 20th centuries: biographical

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approaches and their attention to the author's role dominated most of nineteenth-century literary criticism; from the 1920s onwards, the text itself became the main focus of attention for formalist and structuralist theories; and over a large part of the second half of the 20th century, the emphasis moved towards reader-response criticism and the role played by readers. Taking advantage of the contributions made by literary-theoretical studies and cognitive theories, an attempt is made here to assess and establish a balanced distribution of the importance corresponding to each of these three elements when it comes to the literary phenomenon.

In order to achieve this, we will firstly examine some of the different theories about the genesis of poetry —also applicable to any other forms of art— as well as the significance that the author has at that point of artistic communication. Our attention will subsequently focus on the notion of style and formal elaboration of literary texts, whose style dynamics are understood as the most relevant parts for the author and the reader alike during the cognitive operations of interpretation, which appeals to their body/mind. Finally, we will deal with the role performed by readers and the dynamic qualities of meaning that they activate. Our methodology relies on the empirical evidence obtained by interdisciplinary scholars who have been applying cognitive hypotheses to experimental studies, on neurohermeneutic approaches and, also importantly, on classical notions of poetic and rhetorical theory such as those featured in the Horatian dualities *ars/ingenium*, *res/verba* and *docere/delectare*. Through these dualities —which respectively characterise the author, the literary text and the reader—, classical and traditional literary theory have already suggested the compelling need for a balanced treatment of the three key categories in the structure of literary communication and their importance within the literary phenomenon as a whole.

2. The genesis of works of verbal art: the central role played by the author in literary communication

With the aim of explaining the relevance of authorship in the context of the literary phenomenon, this section will initially review the theoretical perspectives from which the process of creation of works of verbal art has been analysed, paying special attention to the cognitive approaches proposed during the last few decades. Afterwards, the overall

approaches to the bodily origin of artistic impulses that lies at the basis of artistic genesis will be connected with the contributions of classical poetics and rhetoric regarding the Horatian duality directly concerned in this question: *ingenium/ars*.

2.1. The bodily origin of the artistic impulse

Broadly speaking, the theories on the origin of poetry can be categorised into two big groups. On the one hand, Plato's views on inspiration —*enthusiasmós*— (*Ion*, 533c-534), serve to assume that the origin of the artistic impulse is irrational: the muses (or some other irrational forces) possess poets and they start to create a piece of art, acting as a catalyst that makes it possible to translate that divine drive into conventional words. On the other hand, Aristotle argued that, since the causes of poetry are natural —*physikai*—, they can be rationally explained (*Poetics*, IV, 1448b). Seen in this light, authors act as agents who consciously work on materials elaborated by them after their experiences with reality.

What insights can cognitive approaches supply when studying the genesis of literary works? It is very tempting to say that cognitive theory could grant a synthesis of both postures, and some arguments would support that belief. According to Antonio Damasio —one of the most prominent neurologists in cognitive studies— the origin of consciousness lies in sensation (2000: 43). Following John Dewey's principle of continuity (1991: 30-31), which establishes no clear-cut boundaries between *high* cognitive faculties (reason or logic) and *low* cognitive ones (such as emotions or sensations), the limits separating irrational and rational processes are arguably blurry, and the two so-called “opposites” concur within the formation of artistic works, including literature.

Most cognitive approaches to art can also be said to align themselves to a slightly greater extent with Platonic views, though, insofar as they tend to regard art as the expression of an artist's inner world, starting with emotions that crystallise into texts made in a specific language. The attention paid to sentiment and feeling in the emergence of artistic works remotely connects with the impulse that Plato identified behind the need to express and communicate a poem. In his approach to the cognitive aspects of narration, Rafael Núñez Ramos, takes into

consideration the definitions offered by Susanne K. Langer, Karl Bühler and Antonio Damasio, all of them closely attached to a broad notion of feeling (2014: 21-27) which, according to Damasio, relates to consciousness in general.

Romanticism laid stress on the sentimental value of art and, in fact, the inauguration of Modern Poetics during that period changed the conception of art forever, something that we still owe to those romantic insights. The notion of ‘genius’ —directly related to the Horatian concept of ‘*ingenium*’ that had so much importance within the framework of the aesthetics marked by entertaining, formal and hedonistic ideals of art, e.g. seventeenth-century Baroque or the Romantic era in the 19th century— not only becomes central to many romantic philosophers and critics but also takes up the mysterious side of artistic creation described by Plato. After all, the genius is a privileged individual whose insights are enjoyed by readers and beholders. As Paul H. Fry puts it, it was widely believed in that period that the best work arises “from the author’s extraordinary mental acuity or spiritual insight” (2012: 29). This *spiritual* drive of art does not necessarily find support in cognitive theories, but the role assigned to sensation and emotions in the emergence of images which are subsequently manipulated by subjects (Núñez Ramos, 2014: 25) in order to create art, among other possibilities, brings cognitivism close to the suddenness of *enthusiasmós* as Plato conceived it. To which must be added that most theories of art after Romanticism include the role of emotion and expression, the latter being a well-known term in modern Hispanic and Italian theories of art, from Gracián and Vico to Croce and Lezama Lima (Aullón de Haro, 2017: 35-36). In the words of Antonio García Berrio, a profound connoisseur of the Horatian concept of ‘*ingenium*’ throughout the history of literary thought, the genius — and the *ingenium*— “are entrusted with the operations needed to discover a world of metaphorical, conceptist bases which disintegrates the system of reality that underpins mimetic art” (1977: 256).³³

Despite the role of sensation and emotion being undoubtedly key to the genesis of art, the essential function corresponding to rational elaboration and conscious work on language alongside the application of techniques can hardly be denied. Although the idea of ‘expression’

³³ The translations from Spanish into English of the literal quotations appearing in this work are our own.

seems to have gained centrality as opposed to mimesis, a cognitive approach would consider the rational manipulation of reality materials, as Aristotle suggested in his description of the phenomenon of mimesis within poetry (*Poetics*, IV, 1448b5-1448b20). Imitation, connatural to every human being in the philosopher's view, appears as a natural action which may be assisted by *ars*, skills and techniques learnt by the authors. However, a cognitive approach, especially if derived from the embodied cognition paradigm, will never separate intellectual processes (to quote but two, the application of techniques and the rational elaboration of language) from sensitive and perceptual processes, embedded in the author's bodily nature and more closely linked to the Horatian concept of '*ingenium*', as a natural ability to perceive and feel based on our interaction both with the environment around us and with our own inner world.

Antonio García Berrio and Teresa Hernández Fernández already recognised the above in a theoretical-critical context that, albeit not strictly cognitive, is perfectly compatible with it —framed within a Poetics of Sentiment (2004: 197-215)— when they stated that the process of elaboration of a work of verbal art, theoretically speaking, responds in the first place “to an undifferentiated *sentimental impulse* (in the sense of the ethical-sentimental impulse disseminated by Dilthey and, above all, by Max Scheler [...]) of a subconscious or diffuse nature and conscious only in the initial stages” (2004: 51). Referring specifically to the creation of *Don Quixote*, “such impulse would correspond to Cervantes' desire to give vent to the feeling of failure and frustration of his personal and biographical illusions, in the face of the bitter experience of witnessing the social triumph of the crudest pragmatism” (2004: 51). Then, a conscious process of literary symbolisation and linguistic intensionalisation allows that initial impulse to be concretised and developed, macrosemantically as well as macrosyntactically, by means of content and argumentation structures. Lastly, the macrostructural construction of a literary text goes through the final process during which its microstructure is built, “the stylistic path of writing texts, which consists in the formal shaping of the *manifested* linear text” (2004: 51).

All of the above, with the exception of the initial —and therefore unconscious and irrational— undifferentiated sentimental impulse, develops in accordance with the *poietic strategy* that the author constructs (Albaladejo, 1992: 87). This rational, conscious strategy

implemented to build the work of verbal art includes inventive or heuristic, dispositional and elocutionary instructions directly oriented towards the determination of the world model where the referential elements to be incorporated into the discourse will be placed, the specification of the most convenient organisation of the semantic material in the textual macrostructure and, finally, a specification of the stylistic features best suited to the author's aesthetic-communicative intention (Albaladejo, Chico-Rico, 2018: 118-119). This constructive strategy undertaken within the framework of the rhetorical system, stems from *intellectio*, the rhetorical operation responsible for the conscious, rational observation and the analysis of the communicative context where authors find themselves and to which the recipients they are addressing belong, either *in praesentia* or *in absentia* (Chico-Rico, 1989, 1998).

In keeping with this theoretical framework, cognitive theory can bridge both Platonic and Aristotelian views via the principle of continuity in which body/mind dualism is understood in non-dualistic terms or as an integrated whole: artists become aware of what their body senses and feels, and translate it into words in literary texts. No well-defined boundaries exist between intellect and body, reason and emotion, conscious and unconscious processes. Since reason is grounded in the body, any technique or rational elaborations of whatever kind undergo filtering through the sentimental qualities of the experiences undergone by the author. A cognitive approach will not pay so much attention to authors' life as biographical criticism did. It would rather witness how their emotional life, experienced sensitively in their bodies, generates abstract constructs like literary texts. Or expressed differently, how sensitive experience is transformed into intellectual structures and schemes, very much as Gilbert Durand suggested when approaching the formation of symbols by drawing their relationship with the body gestures underpinning them (1981: 116) and, of course, referring us back to Mark Johnson's notion of 'image schemata' (1987: xii). We could even find a reference in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* (IX, II) to find an embodied view of mental faculties, since he associates the parts of a rhetorical speech with those of our body as a technique to memorise the text.

In conclusion, a cognitive approach to the origin of the poem needs to consider the *rational* processes as well as the manipulation that consciousness undertakes on embodied sensations and emotions, and

the expressive process that struggles to be represented and conveyed in an *irrational* manner by means of artistic works —the romantic component of the approach to the genesis of art. There are notable exceptions to this romantic view, though, including Edgar A. Poe, whose *Philosophy of Composition* adopts a rational approach to poetic creativity (he compares the composition of his poems with the resolution of a mathematical problem) in order to cause an intense emotional effect. However, his indebtedness to classical notions of symmetry and unity, extremely important in the eighteenth-century poetics that he learnt, is complementary to his yearning for the experience of the sublime and the arousal of psychic intensity (Chico-Rico, 2007). Poe, a crucial romantic himself, very nicely illustrates how body and mind, reason and sensation, or *ars* and *ingenium*, necessarily coalesce in the literary work as a result of the mixture of both elements that brews in the author's mind.

2.2. The Horatian duality on the causes of poetry: *ingenium* and *ars* from a cognitive point of view

As already recognised above, *ars* and *ingenium* arguably constitute the twofold cause of poetry (García Berrio, 1977: 240). The description and explanation of this Horatian duality throughout history has identified *ars* as the reflexive knowledge, acquired through study, of the rules that authors learn for the purpose of performing the operations whereby they analyse the extensional-semantic materials coming from the *inventio*, internalise them in the macrostructure of the literary text and, finally, convert them into an objectively materialised work of verbal art; *ingenium*, has in turn been understood as a natural, thoughtless drive, or the artist's intellectual capacity regarded in its abstraction, without the support of the norms (advisory and corrective, as well as teachable, constituted by *ars*).

Numerous Renaissance commentators in the Horatian tradition associated *ingenium* with *natura*, i.e. with the natural, unacquired capacity or talent (García Berrio, 1977: 240). *Ars* thus came to be identified with technique, literary discipline, regulations and the rules of art, as opposed to *ingenium* or *natura* which stood for inspiration and 'poetic fury' —*furor poeticus*—, a concept which, in Antonio García Berrio's interpretation, would subsequently be understood as an "exaggeration simulating alienation or madness" (1977: 241). The

scope of Horatian terminology then allowed for connecting the concept of *ingenium* with that of poetic furor —inspiration—, although *ingenium* constitutes a force that, the same as *ars*, is internal to the artist's psycho-biological configuration. By contrast, inspiration/poetic furor arises as an external force intensifying the creative possibilities of *ingenium*. In the words of García Berrio, "*Ingenium* [...] was exalted as an innate quality of man, an agent understanding capable of carrying out selective searches for concepts from the deposits of materials of *inventio*: the [so-called] *loci* [...]. Furor equals above all to inspiration, an external and supernatural aid to one's own lights" (1977: 241). Considering the relevance of *ingenium* when ideating inspiration and poetic furor, the artist's expectant, passive abandonment to such external forces "is not a phenomenon of 'regression' to a form of irrationalist primitivism; instead, they serve to recognise humans' tribute to the mysterious dimension of our being and our existence" (1977: 276).

Cognitively speaking, our efforts to merge reason and emotion, or the rational and the irrational in the *continuum* of consciousness, would require viewing *ars* and *ingenium* as two poles of a psychodynamic *continuum*. To put it in another way, rather than mutually exclusive causes, they represent the two poles of a duality which are permanently present in the genesis of each work of art. By way of illustration, when Picasso painted a cubist depiction of a woman crying in his famous work, that was a clear example of his *ingenium* or talent to re-imagine topics, this being perhaps the most important component in the creation of such an expressive portrait. Nonetheless, skilful control on the brush also becomes essential to convey this image so successfully. Both extremes of the duality need to be at stake, despite the prevailing importance of one or the other.

This approach to the polarities behind the efficient cause of poetry comes closer to a cognitive understanding of authorship, insofar as it permits to blend rational and emotional drives towards writing. The artistic period and the mainstream trends in art and poetry may undoubtedly unbalance the duality towards one of its two poles, as Antonio García Berrio showed in his study about the shaping of modern literary theory in Europe (1977: 227 ff.), but a cognitive account of consciousness cannot possibly remove any of them when explaining the sentimental impulse felt by the author in relation to linguistic expression and its artistic outcome.

The *ingenium* pole is perhaps the one that attracts more attention from cognitivist approaches. One of the most intriguing phenomena of consciousness and artistic creation is the suddenness of the drive towards writing, that is, the experiences categorised as *eureka* moments or described as epiphanic revelations. Given their unpredictability, this consideration can be subsumed into the Platonic theories of inspiration. Notwithstanding, it seems reasonable to understand that talented (*ingenium*) and experienced (*ars*) artists are likely to have a greater ability to grasp new insights into reality, consequently being more prone to receiving this inspirational drive.

The theories on the *eureka* phenomenon have become increasingly present in recent cognitive studies because this phenomenon obviously relates to body/mind processes which are hard to pin down. For instance, the psychologists John Kounios and Mark Beeman elaborated on how insights and creativity appear more easily when subjects do not perceive their physical surroundings as demanding (2015). In other words, a relaxed and downbeat activity enables mental connections and associations that cause new ideas to be forged and materialised via literary (or any other artistic) creation. Those moments do not require an intense mental activity, and precisely the relaxation of mind processing may allow the subtle (also known as “unconscious”) information ingrained in bodily sensations to emerge and push to be transformed into symbolic objects. This sensitivity becomes key for a cognitive understanding of artistic creation, since the body/mind forms a *continuum* which cannot be split. However, an excessive attention to intellectual activity (under demanding conditions) appears to diminish the input provided by body receptors in the form of sensations and emotions.

Following along the same lines, Amelia Gamoneda defines poetic epiphany as the adjustment of the physical and the emotional, on the one hand, and of the linguistic, on the other (2018: 49), the latter entailing the effort of translating what the former suggests into conventional symbols. For Gamoneda, *eureka* presents the perception of mental associations as a phenomenon beyond reason, suggesting a connection between the unconscious and the conscious (or between body and mind) which takes place during the genesis of the poem. This proposal is in line with our redefinition of *ars* and *ingenium* as a manifestation of the consciousness *continuum*, grounded in sensing and

emotional processes of the body. In Amelia Gamoneda's words, the subsymbolic zones of signs (i.e. those existing prior to linguistic materialisation) are rooted in the unconscious and the body (2018: 62) which behaves non-linearly or, at least, their causes cannot be rationally accounted for. The correlation between these two sides (the subsymbolic and the symbolic) of the poem has an analogical nature, as Gamoneda explained in a previous work. Poetry would then make possible an unconscious work of analogies between the outcome text and a number of hardly perceptible sensory properties affecting semantics, syntax and phonetics (Gamoneda, 2015: 169). Metaphors would partially result from this analogical work, the possibility thus existing to figuratively understand some of the metaphorical activity by means of reason (Gamoneda, 2018: 63). As for the other part of its meaning, it is simply felt in a myriad of associations that will be addressed in the section of this chapter devoted to the role played by the reader in literary communication.

These theoretical approaches are empirically corroborated by the actual experience of many poets when they describe the genesis of some of their artistic works. Thus, Francisco Brines acknowledges the thematic-semantic basis (closer to the rational than to the irrational) of his poetic inspiration (García Berrio, 2003); in contrast, José Hierro, Carlos Bousoño and Jorge Guillén referred to a rhythmic-sensory basis (or sentimental perception nearer to the irrational) in their personal inspiration (García Berrio, 1985). Guillén openly alludes to this issue in the metapoetic-themed sonnet entitled "Hacia el poema" ["Towards the poem"], where he very skilfully depicts the discursive path that leads from the "pre-conscious sentimental psychic impulse" (García Berrio; Hernández Fernández, 2004: 53), presented as a "jumble" [*barullo*] and "obsessive badly dreaming" [*obseso mal sonar*], to creative consciousness ("clarity of a terrace" [*claridad de una terraza*], the "vivid volume" [*vívido volumen*] or an "outline of flesh and blood" [*perfil de carne y hueso*]):

Siento que un ritmo se me desenlaza
De este barullo en que sin meta vago,
Y entregándome todo al nuevo halago
Doy con la claridad de una terraza.

Donde es mi guía quien ahora traza
Límpido el orden en que me deshago

Del murmullo y su duende, más aciago
Que el gran silencio bajo la amenaza.

Se me juntan a flor de tanto obseso
Mal soñar las palabras decididas
A iluminarse en vívido volumen.

El son me da un perfil de carne y hueso.
La forma se me vuelve salvavidas
Hacia una luz mis penas se consumen.³⁴

The discursive trajectory leading from the unconscious to the conscious progressively crystallises not only in the macrostructure but also in the microstructure of the work of verbal art, constituting “a unanimous and generalised poetic experience of expressive and stylistic conformation” (García Berrio, Hernández Fernández, 2004: 53).

In our opinion, a cognitivist approach to the genesis of poetry would place *ingenium* at the first moment of the artistic activity, this being another reason for relating cognitive theories to romantic approaches towards art. If mind relaxation and the suspension of intellectual activity makes it easier for poetic epiphanies to emerge, then the body needs to speak first in order to achieve a solid and meaningful work of art. This view closely resembles others developed in many previous theories of art, especially those which linked ecstasy and artistic creation. The ecstatic experience serves as a release and amplification of the subject’s self —*éks-tasis* in Greek means ‘placing out’ of oneself. The consumption of drugs could help in the process, Dionysus being the god of ecstasy and wine associated with the activity of theatre, or expressed differently, with playing other characters and aspects of one’s self. Of course, these resources appear in a wide range of cultural environments. An example can be found in the Chinese painter Wang Xia, to whom the birth of the technique of splashed ink is ascribed. He drank wine before painting (Cheng, 2013: 20), which in the context of

³⁴ “I feel that a rhythm is untying for me / from this jumble in which I wander aimlessly, / and surrendering my whole self to the new flattery / I find at least the clarity of a terrace. // Where it is my guide who now traces / cleanly the order in which I dispose / of the murmur and its spirit, more fateful / than the great silence under the threat. // On the delicate surface of such obsessive / badly dreaming the words determined / to light up in vivid volume come to join me. // Their tune gives me an outline of flesh and blood. / The form becomes a lifeline for me / towards a light my sorrows are consumed” (our own translation).

Taoist beliefs is often understood as a method to factor out one's own subjectivity, i.e. the desires, the will, and the behavioural patterns to become one with the Tao itself and let oneself be flooded by its creative flow. These methods may represent another way to favour the *eureka* experience of fading out mental activity to allow the body and the subsymbolic zones of artistic activity to blossom.

In conclusion, *ingenium* could entail both the Platonic view of inspiration, connected with the suddenness of *eureka*, and the Aristotelian account about the genesis of poetry as something natural, rooted in the talent —*ingenium*— of authors, especially those sensitive enough to perceive the outputs derived from the bodily activity underpinning any artistic development. The non-linear qualities of this *unconscious* activity made Platonic views resort to supernatural beings. Such processes cannot seemingly be pinned down by *ars* or training, since their emergence is unpredictably connected with an artist's vital moment and activated by a variety of stimuli affecting their psyche (memories, emotions, physical sensations) as well as their life experience (cultural background, linguistic skills). It is our contention that this same unpredictability affects the concept of 'poeticity,' understood as the highest degree of artistic specificity in the literary text and explained in terms of aesthetic value resulting from the author's artistic (and random) success at the different levels of linguistic description of the work of verbal art (García Berrio, 1985: 49 ff.; 1987; 1994: 117 ff.; García Berrio, Hernández Fernández, 1988: 69-71).

Thus, the author is the centre in which apparently non-linear bodily processes, meant to be perceived by sensitive or talented subjects, become the linear qualities of rational linguistic activity, and then *ars* or skills can play the role of shaping what the body/mind needs to express. Hence the status corresponding to the author —the subject experiencing the genesis of a literary text— as the first important element in the process of literary communication.

3. The coding process and the literary text

As mentioned earlier, the first stage in the coding process occurring in the literary text is not the pictorial depiction of the external world, but the somatosensory drives that reach the brain during an author's being-in-the-world experience, inserted in a specific context and responding

to their surroundings emotionally. The rational filters applied to these inputs shape the experience into a linguistic output: the literary text. According to the neurohermeneutic approach conceived by Federica Abramo, Renata Gambino and Grazia Pulvirenti, during the process of coding or the creation of the artistic text, the neuronal stimuli which prove particularly strong derive in textual passages where language is foregrounded, pointing at “traces” of the author’s brain processes (2017: 9). We owe the notion of ‘foregrounding’ to Paul L. Garvin’s translation of Jan Mukařovský’s concept of ‘*aktualisace*’ in his introduction to the Prague School (Garvin [ed.], 1964: 7-11), a translation that converted the temporality suggested by the idea of ‘actualization’ (to make something actual) into the spatiality implied in the notions of foreground and background (Van Peer; Hakemulder, 2005: 547).

It deserves to be highlighted that the concept of ‘*aktualisace*’ is heir to the Russian formalist concept of ‘*ostranenie*’, put forward by Viktor Shklovsky in his essay “Art as Technique” (1917) —and developed by other members of the school, e.g. Roman Jakobson, Yury Tynyanov and Viktor Zhirmunsky, too (García Berrio, 1973: 93)— and translated as “defamiliarization”: a process whereby an author’s emotional and sentimental experiences erupt into the language, altering canonical as well as traditional norms and breaking the established, conventionalised relationship in language between the sign and the referent through the procedures or artifices of artistic language. According to Russian formalists, literary constructions are defamiliarising thanks to the unique resources prompting a certain distancing between the reader and the literary work. Because of this distance, the message itself draws the reader’s attention and triggers aesthetic pleasure (Shklovsky, 1917). Among the aforesaid resources stand out, to quote but a few, rhythm, rhyme, figures, the interplay of perspectives and narrative points of view or the alteration in the logical-chronological order of the events narrated (García Berrio, 1973: 93 ff. Pozuelo Yvancos, 1980; 1988: 35-39). It is likewise worth recalling Shklovsky’s memorable excerpt in which he explained the meaning of art in the face of the automation that characterises everyday speech:

Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war. «If the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been». And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone *stony*. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived

and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. *Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important* (1917: 12).

The foregrounded parts of the text condensate the most relevant bodily and psychic processes developed inside the author and, as will be seen in the following section; they also activate the most intense emotional reactions in readers. The foregrounding of certain elements in a text consequently makes them become a spatial landmark of temporal experiences compressed into a limited set of words. The condensation of temporal experiences into the linguistic code can be better understood when resorting to Henry Poincaré and Antonio Damasio’s views on the role of memory. Poincaré argues that, for a set of sensations to be converted into a memory susceptible to be classified in time, they need to become non-actual and lose their infinite complexity—that is, the factor that holds their actuality (1970: 41-42, *apud* González Fernández, 2018: 248).

Taking Damasio’s approach to consciousness as a reference, Rafael Núñez Ramos proposes a division of the consciousness *continuum* into three stages: firstly, emotion, or the somatic response given by the organism to any stimuli from its surroundings; secondly, sentiment, or the image of the emotion experienced by that organism which emerges much later than the emotional response; and thirdly, the conscious manipulation of the sentimental image, which includes the possibility of artistic elaboration (2014: 25-26). As Henry Poincaré suggested, some time must elapse between the moment when the set of sensations (and emotions) appear and the emergence of the memories associated with them. Foregrounded fragments in texts represent the *actualization* of those primary bodily sensations and emotions, their intensity being paralleled by the emotive response that they prompt in the reader.

The Horatian duality which examines the foregrounding of language is *res* and *verba*, *res* being the matter or subject—unfailingly permeated by emotional experience—to be translated linguistically and *verba* referring to the stylistic features that use words to point at the relevance of specific foregrounded parts of the text which directly relates to the author’s life experience and therefore connects with the linguistic density of the foregrounded fragment.

Antonio García Berrio states in his extensive study of the three Horatian dualities (*ars/ingenium*, *res/verba* and *docere/delectare*) that “*res* is [not only] equivalent to background or meaningful content, both in the sphere of the intellectual objective and in that of the connoted sentimental appeal” (1977: 413), but also to the “cultural wealth of scientific knowledge and wisdom possessed by the writer” (1977: 413). Accordingly, the concept of ‘*res*,’ as content, “will be created, in short, by the definitive literary elaboration, simultaneous to the same verbal formulation, of a certain series of units within the scientific topic channelled through the *inventio*” (1977: 413). Thus, the rhetorical operation of *inventio* and its result (*res*) allow authors to incorporate into the text both the selected referents of the world that they adopt or construct as an extensional-semantic basis for communication—or extensional-semantic code (Albaladejo, 1986: 63; 1995-1996)—and the cultural elements—or cultural-rhetorical communicative code (Albaladejo, 2016)—needed to guarantee the desired perlocutionary effects of conviction or persuasion on the reader. However, neither of them—extensional-semantic referents and cultural elements—can be linguistically incorporated into the text in an aseptic or objective manner. They will be filtered and marked by the author’s emotional and sentimental subjectivity, hence conditioning the linguistic-material construction of the text through the *verba* and stylistic resources needed to express the emotional impulses that an author’s being-in-the-world experience generates.

Thanks to the rhetorical operations of *dispositio* and *elocutio*, the *res* are respectively intensionalised in the textual macrostructure and linearly manifested in the textual microstructure. This textual construction level evidences the stylistic materialisation both of the rational contents and of the irrational ones present in the discourse. The formalist theoretical-critical tradition had already rejected the conception of the literary text as a *sermo ornatus* and, therefore, as the result of adding artistic-verbal resources or figures to standard language. Instead, this tradition suggested regarding the work of verbal art as a linguistic form (*verba*) that constructively determines its poetic content (*res*). In this respect, we should recall the well-known formulation offered by Dámaso Alonso, for whom “the “form” does not affect the signifier alone, nor the signified alone, but rather the relationship between the two of them. Form is, therefore, the concept which, on the side of literary creation, corresponds to Saussure’s idiomatic “sign”” (Alonso, 1950: 32). Similarly, prior to the European

stylistic school, Russian formalism advocated the conception of art as a linguistic construction differentiated from standard language in order to defamiliarise the communication process, destroying the habitual automated character of non-literary communication, where the interest focuses on referentiality rather than on the message channelling communication.

Within the framework of the neo-rhetorical developments represented by constructivist rhetoric (Pujante, 2016, 2017, 2018), the importance assigned to form in the globality of the sign in particular, and of the text in its entirety, has led to redefine *elocutio* as a twofold operation: firstly, poietic-discursive in the sphere of the physical materialisation of the text; and secondly, poietic-referential in the space of the extensional-semantic construction of the world represented by the text, since great literary works attest that words help to a greater extent than things in the creation of the world and its knowledge (Gullón, 1979: 43).

For David Pujante, the linguistic-material structure of speech —at its phonetic-phonological, morpho-syntactic and intensional-semantic levels—shapes not only a formal sphere but also a complex space for the construction of discursive meaning that operates poietic-referentially both in the process of textual construction and in that of textual reception. In this light, *elocutio* —closely correlated with the rhetorical operations preceding it theoretically, namely: *inventio* and *dispositio*— is reformulated as a process of assigning *verba* to the *res* of discourse and, most importantly, as a process of linguistic cognition that makes our experience conscious and constructs its meaning (2016: 37-38; 2017: 49-58; 2018: 12-23). Therefore, from a rhetorical-constructivist theoretical-methodological point of view, *elocutio* constitutes a mechanism which sustains the construction of the surface structure or microstructure of discourse as well as the construction of the world and of thought. In Pujante’s opinion, understanding *elocutio* in these terms “means considering that the content and its persuasion materialise in the discursive form, at every level of discourse formalization” (2012: 182-183).

The account of *elocutio* provided above, which contributes to resituate this rhetorical operation at the centre of the inherited rhetorical system —*rhetorica recepta* (Albaladejo, 1989: 19; 1998)— does not entail returning to the stylistic tradition associated with the hypertrophy targeted by the framework of what Gérard Genette called a “rhétorique

restreinte” (1970). In fact, it seeks to recover the ontological perspective of constructivist orientation already adopted by some pre-Socratics, sceptics and, especially, sophists in their first reflections and rhetorical theorisations about knowledge and the discourse that conveys it. To quote but a few examples, this perspective has been manifested throughout history in the humanist tradition of the 14th and 15th centuries, Giambattista Vico’s thinking in the 17th and 18th centuries, Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy in the 19th century and, during the 20th century, in the work of intellectuals such as Sigmund Freud, Benedetto Croce, Jean Piaget, Northrop Frye, Hayden White and Siegfried J. Schmidt, among others (Pujante, 2016: 33-36; 2017: 42-49; 2018: 3-7).

We can actually corroborate the cognitivist hypothesis put forward in the previous section—which placed *ingenium* at the first moment of the artistic activity—by resorting to García Berrio’s conception about the system of Horatian dualities and the internal projection or correlation existing between the concepts in the series *ars-res-docere*, on the one hand, and *ingenium-verba-delectare*, on the other (1977: 331-333), because he claimed that “the *furious ingenium* will procure the marvellous *delectare* preferably through literary artifice, basically entrusted to the *verba*” (1977: 235). In addition to this match, and within the framework of the Poetics of Sentiment introduced in 2.1., Antonio García Berrio and Teresa Hernández Fernández succeeded in highlighting the centrality corresponding to the linguistic-material structures of the literary text in the literary phenomenon. After all, these are

carefully calculated according to the artistic skills or the creative competence of the special emitters who are literary writers. Their skills and creative impulse partly stem from an innate and intensely differential psychological ability [*ingenium*] to dive into the *subconscious* and extract from it the *symbols* and thematic *representations* in the text. This ability is coupled with the special artistic skills of the *conscious*, which have a technical and cultural [*ars*] nature and permit to develop the stylistic structures that make creative embodiment possible (2004: 51).

According to García Berrio, the literary-critical analysis of the poietic-discursive path that leads from the impulsive, emotional-sentimental and pre-conscious complex to the elaborative and conscious stage of textual macrostructures and microstructures defines the practice referred to as “*stylistics of the inner form*”, currently feasible thanks to the advances of psychology and, more precisely, of the cognitive

psychology applied to literary criticism —e.g. in the form of psychoanalytical literary criticism and myth-criticism— and of linguistics —particularly, text linguistics— (García Berrio, 1998; 2003). These same achievements also make it possible to implement the “*stylistics of the external form*”, previously defined by Dámaso Alonso in his *Poesía española. Ensayo de métodos y límites estilísticos* (1950) as the critical-literary analysis carried out from the microstructural signifier to the impulsive, emotional-sentimental and pre-conscious meaning triggering it, a path that defines the process through which the reader decodes a text that will be discussed in the next section. In the poststructuralist context characterised by an absolute relativisation of the objective meaning of a literary text derived from reader-response criticism and the aesthetics of reception, as well as from the excessive emphasis that these literary-critical orientations place on the reader’s instance, the complementary conjunction of these two paths to build meaning and of these two stylistics —referred to the inner and the outer form— consolidates the ideal of integral or global critical comprehension of a text (García Berrio, Hernández Fernández, 2004: 52).

4. The decoding process: the reader and the activation of poetic meaning

It can hardly be denied at present that the reader plays the main role in the concretion of textual meaning. This idea arose as the main premise of reader-response criticism and the aesthetics of reception and was heralded by the famous essay by Roland Barthes “The Death of the Author” (1968), which found continuity in post-structuralism via the general belief in the impossibility to obtain the essential meaning of any linguistic utterance. However, in our view, a cognitive approach to literature needs to counterbalance the relevance attributed to textual reception during the 1970s and the 1980s, since the role of authors’ body/mind and the activity on the linguistic material that transforms their experience into textual-stylistic foregrounding cannot be eluded in a complete approach to the phenomenon of literary communication. Body/mind processes in authors play a fundamental role when it comes to shaping linguistic structures in literary works, and this fact easily outweighs the centrality given to readership in reader-response criticism.

The role performed by the reader —or the addressee of the artistic work— still needs to be considered as important as the function of the author and the nature of the linguistic text (Martín Jiménez, 2021: 142 ff.). The difference between therapeutic writing and artistic writing possibly lies in the exposure of the latter after its creation. Following Susanne K. Langer’s account of aesthetics, the artistic work has as its aim to be contemplated (1953: 26, 49, 84). The materialization of bodily and emotional processes into a piece of writing might obviously relieve the author’s psyche, but the exposure to the general audience, a condition to every piece of art, makes the big difference.

Moving on the decoding activity undertaken by readers of literary texts, special attention should be paid to the great cognitive effort required to decipher them which finds no parallel in the requirements of any other art. As Carlos Reis (1985: 15-19) explained, the readers of a literary piece must first decode the linguistic material they have in front of them and, in an almost simultaneous activity, also recreate its depicted objects, referents or worlds. This double effort is exclusive to literature. Cinema, for instance, presents the image of the world to the spectator. Music lacks the linguistic semiosis which appears in poetry. Broadly speaking, these linguistic elements are absent in sculpture and painting too. Consequently, literary reading can be understood as an excellent way to execute many different cognitive skills at the same time.

The extraordinary effort that reading requires is undoubtedly rewarding. The pleasurable experience stands out as one of the most important reasons for which people decide to read literature. As Aristotle put it at a very early stage, recognising objects depicted in the mimetic object is enjoyable (*Poetics*, IV, 1448b); however, reading has currently come to be considered a form of self-recognition as well. The author’s psychic world becomes visible in the literary text, as psychoanalysis proposed and cognitive approaches have likewise proved through the correlation between bodily processes and linguistic foregrounding. But, in addition to the author’s psyche, readers project themselves into the literary text too: their memories and sensations, their cultural backgrounds and their preferences. The process of literary reading and the acquisition of meaning has a dynamic nature, as Abramo, Gambino and Pulvirenti pointed out in their update of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s interpretive model, reformulated as the “neurohermeneutic circle” (2017: 3). Authors lose control on the

meanings configured by them at this point, this phenomenon being especially evident in the foregrounded elements of a text.

In a series of empirical studies, David S. Miall and Don Kuiken (1994a) provided evidence that readers spend more time reading the foregrounded elements of literary texts, as Russian formalism had anticipated with its concept of ‘*ostranenie*’ (Shklovsky, 1917). They also realised that readers found the foregrounded parts of literary texts to be more emotional and meaningful than backgrounded elements (1994b). The liaison between foregrounded elements and the emotional response of readers was confirmed by numerous subsequent studies (e.g. Lüdtke; Meyer-Sickendieck; Jacobs, 2014: 374). In this sense, we share Francisco González Fernández’s recovery of the Proustian terminology to state that costume and “*l’habitude*” are the main anaesthetic factors of sensitivity and creativity (2018: 245), an idea which will be definitely consecrated after Viktor Shklovsky’s groundbreaking paper “Art as Technique” (1917) in Russian formalism, the same period during which Proust produced his masterpiece and formulated his line of thought. Empirical evidence now confirms Proust and Shklovsky’s intuition on the relationship between extraordinary perception and excitement, or expressed differently, the bond linking foreground to emotion. The analogical process that brings about metaphors, referred to in Section 2.2., is then replicated in the reader’s mind but, on this occasion, readers connect their own subsymbolic areas of signs with the signs present in the text. In other words, the bodily processes underpinning stylistic foreground become replicated in readers, albeit filtered through their own life experience. In the neurohermeneutic approach, the dialogue between the reader and the text is not limited to the interpretative process that leads to obtain the meaning: the bodily processes underlying the emergence of meaning need to be considered too, since texts call for the cognitive as well as emotional experience of the reader during that emergence process (Gambino, Pulvirenti, 2018: 68).

Similarly, the specular nature of the links generated between author and reader through the text—or the idea of projection of the authorial experience on the textual-stylistic foregrounding and of the latter on the reader’s experience, the text acting as a reflecting mirror of the experience that the author pours into the text and of the experience that the reader manifests by identifying with the text—was reinforced by Tomás Albaladejo (2014a; 2019) when he proposed the concept of

‘metaphorical engine’ to describe and explain the operation of language’s tropological procedures within the framework of the neo-rhetorical developments represented by cultural rhetoric (2013; 2014b; 2016). Albaladejo’s metaphorical engine arises as the linguistic-cognitive mechanism that enables and explains: firstly, the generation of the metaphor by the author through the construction of a semiotic connection between the referent that will be expressed and the one that will not, which makes him aware of both the translational equivalence between the two referents and the aesthetic and hermeneutic effect(s) that it can cause; secondly, the linguistic-material embodiment of the metaphorical element in the microstructure of the text, which will remain latent in the textual space until being identified in the reading process; and thirdly, its projection towards the reading instance for its recognition and interpretation, thus making possible to make the semantic leap from the expressed element to the non-expressed one, as a reproduction of the semantic leap initially made by the author while generating the metaphor towards the element appearing in the text. This scenario features metaphor in particular, and more generally in tropes, seen as elements of the cultural-rhetorical communicative code that brings receivers and producers together through texts (Albaladejo, 2019: 568-569).

Notwithstanding the above, a complete cognitive approach to literary texts should not reduce the experience of emotion and *aesthesis* to the foregrounded elements, i.e. language. As Pierre-Louis Patoine remarks, the 20th century tended to reduce literature to its linguistic elements (2015: 153), an excess that we try to balance back in this chapter by striving to redistribute the importance of meaning in the three instances of literary communication. The reader’s meaningful experiences are not restricted to linguistic foregrounding, as part of the pleasure involved in reading, and consequently in the emotional commitment to literature, lies in the mesmerising state of mind known as immersion, which transports the reader into the world of the text through a process that weakens the strength of external stimuli present in the reading environment. The joy of embodied simulation, of inhabiting a counterfactual reality, is not sufficiently valued by theoretical currents which place the focus on linguistic deviation, *aktualisace* or foregrounding; however, this stands out as one of the main reasons leading readers to pick up a book and immerse themselves in its story.

This antagonism between foregrounding and immersion might even have a neurological basis. The neurologist Arthur Jacobs designed his *Neurocognitive Poetics Model* to explain the neuronal routes at work in literary reading. This model distinguished two different brain routes which, however, overlapped at some points: a fast route through which the background elements of the text can be processed and the immersion into the fictitious world becomes possible; and a slow route, in charge of slowing down reading which becomes active when deciphering the foregrounded elements and crosses through the brain areas arousing the sense of reward and aesthetic appraisal (2015: 14). Texts written in a standard language may not provoke a strong emotional response in readers, nor the analogical process of connecting the sensitivity behind symbols and their own vital experiences, but they still have the capacity to trigger the pleasure of being transported, alongside the pleasant feeling of turning an external counterfactual reality into the reader's own world. The reader inevitably needs to fill in the indeterminacy gaps—*Unbestimmtheitsstelle*—that Wolfgang Iser (1976: 63 ff.) took from Roman Ingarden (1972: 261 ff.), in backgrounded and foregrounded fragments alike. Therefore, the experience of reading, regardless of whether it is stylistically marked or not, proves rewarding when the reader is fully engaged with the given text. The aesthetic capacity of literary texts resides not only in their stylistic features but also in their potential to involve the reader's body in the simulation unfolded by their linguistic structures, as a full-blown embodied cognition paradigm would put forward.

The feelings of joy and pleasure that literature is likely to arouse appeared among the final causes of poetry according to the systematization of Horatian poetics that we are following here: *delectare* stands out as one of the main purposes of literature, along with *docere*. The cognitive approach developed in this chapter has not addressed the didactic value of literary texts and *docere* would form part of the self-recognition effect that the text can provide to the reader, given that interpretation is a dynamic process whereby readers construct meaning with the addition of their personal experience.

On the other hand, *delectare* comprises the ludic aspect of embodied simulation, as Patoine highlighted, together with the pleasant and rewarding experience of going through the foregrounded elements in the text. This focus on *delectare* seems logical and necessary not only from the perspective of the cognitivist and neurohermeneutic approach

to literary communication adopted here but also from that of the internal projection or correlation existing within the framework of the system of Horatian dualities between the concepts in the *ingenium-verba-delectare* series (García Berrio, 1977: 331-333) —as stated in the preceding section.

Indeed, if the emotional experience lying at the basis of literary creation has to do with inspiration —and, therefore, with the author's *ingenium*— and if emotional experience translates linguistically into an updated or defamiliarised language that primarily affects the *verba*, then *delectare* will be the main artistic purpose. This overvaluation of *delectare* in literary communication has acquired special prominence within the framework of aesthetics marked by entertaining, formal and hedonistic ideals, overall attributed to the revolutionary or heterodox currents of art, and can already be identified in Homer himself, as pointed out by G. M. A. Grube (1968: 3). Two of the most representative classical treatises of these currents in antiquity are Philodemus of Gadara's *On Poems* —a well-known work in Rome of which only a partial reconstruction has survived to the present day where utilitarian purposes of poetry are discarded (García Berrio, 1977: 367) — and Pseudo-Longinus's *On the Sublime*.

5. Conclusions: assessing the roles played by the author and the reader in literary analysis

From a cognitive point of view, meaning cannot be ascribed exclusively to any of the three main instances of literary communication. In our opinion, all three instances are equally important: the psychodynamics in the author's body/mind results in a text that incorporates stylistic foregrounding; these foregrounded elements are then found by the reader as the most emotional parts in the neurohermeneutic process of textual meaning completion, where bodily sensations and rational deciphering naturally coalesce.

A cognitive approach would highlight *ingenium* as the most important cause of literary genesis. After revising the term, we understand it as the blending of bodily somatosensory outputs which are perceived by talented sensitive subjects and translated into words via an expressive exercise that implies self-awareness and linguistic skills, secondarily supported by *ars*. This expressive process relies on conscious and

unconscious activity, the latter mainly rooted in the artist's physical body, marking the start of the consciousness *continuum*. The process is fundamentally triggered by experiencing sensations and emotions as an adaptive result to the environment which can be consciously elaborated after they acquire sentimental consistency. At that point, *ars* contributes to the shaping of the linguistic code used to convey these primary sensations.

In an analogous process, the body of readers reacts to the exposure to literary texts and pulls back from their culture background and life experiences in general, as well as from their physical sensations and previous memories, in an embodied simulative process which filters the coded meaning of the given text. Guided by the author's text, readers let their body react to the literary text, and as a result, meanings that were not even predicted or controlled by the author emerge in the course of the ever-changing historical process of literary reception. Only at this stage do Roland Barthes' main thesis ideas in "The Death of the Author" (1968) are accomplished, since the reader acts as the instance that multiplies meaning, though to a limited extent (García Berrio, 1994: 81-97): the body/mind coding process is restricted to the code and style configured by the author; and the reader can access their simulation, constrained by the limits of each given text. Furthermore, the amount of indeterminacy in the text (Ingarden, 1972: 261 ff.; Iser, 1976: 63 ff.) alongside the abstraction processes working on its configuration give room to the reader's imagination and body, enacted by the work of verbal art in a process that completes its meaning.

The whole operation of reading is endorsed with the *delectare* experienced when readers immerse themselves in the bodily simulation provided by authors and enabled by the text. We can conclude that the three poles of the Horatian dualities which gained more weight in modern poetics after Romanticism (*ingenium*, *verba* and *delectare*) still enjoy prevalence in the cognitive view, since they encode the core features of literary activity, the capacity to indoctrinate or illustrate (*docere*) through *ars* and *res* about the represented world of the latter being a secondary incarnation of its possibilities. This conclusion seems coherent with Horace's own thesis on the pre-eminence of the *ingenium-verba-delectare* series over the *ars-res-docere* series, as proven by Antonio García Berrio with his monumental study of Horatian *topica* in Europe regarding the formation of modern literary theory: although the Latin poet explicitly declared in his *Epistula ad*

Pisones that the *res* element must have primacy over the *verba* element in the work of verbal art, and despite having shown his eclecticism in relation to the terms in the other two dualities (*ars/ingenium* and *docere/delectare*), an exhaustive and profound reading of the poem-treatise, such as García Berrio's, attests to the hypocrisy of an author subjected to the censorial surveillance of emperor Augustus' times.

The thorough analysis of the linguistic-material structure (*verba*) given to the ideological content (*res*) expressed in the *Epistula* unquestionably points to the supremacy of the facts associated with artistic structure and language —textual-stylistic foregrounding— over those linked to rational content —authorial knowledge— and, therefore, to *ingenium* and *delectare* (1977: 426-431). This brings the Horatian *ars poetica* very close to the treatises of Philodemus of Gadara and Pseudo-Longinus, as well as to the whole revolutionary or heterodox aesthetic current which defends the entertaining, formal and hedonistic ideals of art, while making it clear that classical and traditional poetics and rhetoric endorse the contributions of cognitive poetics and neurohermeneutics, additionally stressing that such traditional disciplines are enriched by these contemporary approaches.

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Language and the Prison-house: The Cultural Rhetoric of Brazil's Cultural Memory Wars

Rui Gonçalves Miranda

Abstract: By departing from Victor Kemperer's classic description of the Third Reich's language as "address, exhortation, invective", this chapter will both complement and circumvent discussions surrounding the categorization of Bolsonaro's presidency (as "fascist", "national-populist"; even if the one-time culture secretary did plagiarize a speech by Goebbels to the sound of Wagner's music). A cultural rhetoric approach will stress the limitations of concepts such as "cultural backlash" or "culture wars" while allowing for a clearer understanding of the devices (linguistic and literary) underwriting the political discourses drawing significantly on Brazil's contested cultural memory with a view to glossing over structural injustices and inequalities (while pandering to anxieties and deep-seated prejudices of sectors of Brazilian society). Concurrently, it will draw on the work of artists who have represented the experience of the political prisoner and have homed in on the extraordinary events of recent years in Brazilian democracy, namely the documentaries *Democracia em vertigem* (*The Edge of Democracy*, Petra Costa, 2019) and *Narciso em férias* (*Narcissus Off Duty*, Ricardo Calil and Renato Terra, 2020).

Keywords: Cultural Rhetoric, Cultural Memory, Brazilian Military Dictatorship, Political prisoners, Art and Politics

1. This chapter aims to explore the contribution of cultural rhetoric towards political discourses and slogans that engage heavily with, and often directly draw from, cultural memory.³⁵ It is particularly focused on recent political events in Brazil, with a strong cultural (but also legal, economic) component, in which the legacy of Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985) was strongly felt. Competing cultural memory narratives came into sharp relief following the *Comissão Nacional da Verdade* [National Truth Commission] report of its findings in 2014 after two years of work, during a process in which the military were distinctively uncooperative, particularly in the run up to President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment (in 2016) and up to Jair Bolsonaro's presidency (elected in 2018). Bolsonaro, a backbencher with a long but relatively lack-lustre career spent on the fringes of political discussion,

³⁵ There is a vast bibliography on the theme of cultural memory or the overlapping term collective memory. For a succinct overview of cultural memory studies, see Erll (2010: 1-9.)

came into the spotlight upon making a brief speech during the session voting on President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment. In it, he compared the 2016 impeachment process to the 1964 military coup, signaled the defeat of the left and extolled the memory of a convicted torturer, Colonel Carlos Brilhante Ustra, the head for the *Departamento de Operações de Informações – Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna* (the intelligence and political repression service of the army) between 1970 and 1974, the time during which then political activist and member of armed resistance against the regime Dilma Rousseff was imprisoned and tortured. With hindsight, this very short speech can be considered as the unofficial start to Bolsonaro's successful presidential campaign in 2018.

A cultural rhetoric approach should supplement, and in some cases circumvent, discussions that are restricted to “cultural backlash” or “culture wars”, or classifications (“populist”, “authoritarian”, “fascist”, “post-fascist”) which can at times limit rather than further lines of enquiry. Part of the specificity of Bolsonaro's discourse – not so much its policies, somewhat random but following recognizable patterns which favour big business and the three Bs [*Bala, Boi* and *Bíblia*: the caucuses for military and public safety, farming and agrobusiness, and evangelical Christians] – lies in the fact that it constantly invokes, and distorts, relatively recent historical political fights, attacks current political adversaries as enemies in the present and in the past, and aims to enrage and cause indignation through a discussion of preferred cultural themes. Bolsonaro's political discourse is far from being restricted to evoking the military dictatorship crusade against “subversives”, but this is a distinctive element that comes across in both the populist and nationalist elements of his discourse³⁶ and is a feature of what have been termed the “fascist performances” of the Bolsonaro administration (Resende, 2021).

A cultural discourse perspective may be rooted in rhetoric but, as Tomás Albaladejo reminds us, it “goes beyond rhetorical discourse and communication and is able to deal with literary discourses and other kinds of discourses, since rhetoric and rhetoricalness, [...] i.e., the rhetorical nature, are present in all discourses” (Albaladejo, 2016: 22). To study what Rubens Casara terms the “empobrecimento da

³⁶ See Tamaki and Fuks (2020) for an account of populism, and nationalism, during Bolsonaro's 2018 campaign.

linguagem” [impoverishment of language] in *Bolsonaro: O mito e o sintoma* (2020) or what Victor Klemperer, in his seminal 1957 study of the language of the Third Reich, LTI [Lingua Tertii Imperii, i.e. Language of the Third Reich], has called “poverty” of language (2020: 19) provides a point of entry also into an impoverished political discourse. In this sense, as both Casara’s and Klemperer’s approaches imply, an impoverished language can be both a symptom and a condition for an impoverished political culture. It may seem paradoxical at first glance to focus on an impoverished, stripped down, purportedly a-rhetorical, often anti-rhetorical approach (political actors who do not “talk like a politician”) but such a stance is not devoid of purpose. The effectiveness of Bolsonaro’s political discourse relies to an extent on deliberately eschewing rhetorical conventions of political debate, although this by no means entails a loss of perlocutionary strength. In fact, Bolsonaro’s combative style is a powerful rhetorical instrument that thrives on an impoverished political culture and is successfully expressed through impoverished language. In his considerations on Ur-Fascism, and drawing on Eugène Ionesco, Umberto Eco states that “[l]inguistic habits are often important symptoms of unspoken sentiments” (Eco, 2020: 7). We would add that linguistic habits, when instrumentalized in political discourse, can become a catalyst as well as a symptom of unspoken sentiments. Such an approach would highlight the “decisive role” played by cultural rhetoric in political discourse:

The aim of this component [the cultural rhetoric component] is to describe, analyze and explain the role of culture in rhetorical and literary discourses as a tool for connecting with the receivers (hearers, readers, spectators) contributing to support the perlocutionary strength of discourses in persuading and/or convincing, in attracting and catching the receivers to the contents, expressions and aims of discourses as *poiémata*. Therefore, one of the main elements of this component is the communicative cultural-rhetoric code, which connects the orator or the author with the receivers and allows them to understand and interpret discourse and at the same time can contribute to the receivers’ adherence to it (Albaladejo, 2016: 22-23).

In other words, an approach that would address Bolsonaro’s political discourse purely on its (thin if effective) rhetorical attributes, without being attuned to the wider communicative cultural-rhetoric code, would entirely miss the point. It would be oblivious to the perlocutionary strength that drawing on a contested cultural memory brings to the table as a means to connect with receivers (firing up a base), to facilitate an understanding of an oversimplified message (us *versus* them), and to

promote adherence on the part of receivers. Bolsonaro's anti-pluralist and anti-democratic invectives can come across as "forthright honesty" or "telling it like it is" (Grant, 2021: 141) also because his political discourse (namely, the invectives) is tied to a specific cultural context in which he is able to draw significantly on Brazil's contested cultural memory and pander to anxieties and deep-seated prejudices of sectors of Brazilian society while intentionally glossing over structural injustices and inequalities (racial, class-derived, etc) that characterize Brazilian society.

By mobilizing Klemperer, this article is not pursuing a comparison with the Third Reich, despite Bolsonaro "sounding like a Nazi" (Finchelstein, 2018), and a Minister who would not be out of place in a Roberto Bolaño novel and, in a staged address, plagiarized Goebbels to the sound of Wagner.³⁷ In the same vein, while Bolsonaro is classified as a fascist (Soares, 2020), there are strong arguments against conflating Bolsonaro with classical fascism (Anderson, 2019: 189). It is important nevertheless to bear in mind Umberto Eco's reminder that "fascism is unlikely to return in the same form" (2020: 6), and a closer attention to Eco's Ur-fascism, to "how" fascism works (to pick up on the title of Jason Stanley's 2018 book), or to 21st-century floating, unstable and contradictory political currents which are yet to be crystalized and that Enzo Traverso tentatively labels as "post-fascist" (2017: 12-14) can all prove to be useful. It is also important to note that "even if no one is arguing that Brazil is a fascist dictatorship" it is equally hard to defend that the country is operating within the "established framework" since the 2016 parliamentary coup that ousted Dilma" (Webber, 2020: 160).³⁸ In a 2018 article titled "Jair Bolsonaro's Model Isn't Berlusconi. It's Goebbels", Federico Finchelstein alerted his readers to the fact that things could rapidly change once Bolsonaro was in power but highlighted the fact that Bolsonaro believes in holding elections, which meant he was "not there yet": "Bolsonaro's vocabulary recalls the rhetoric behind Nazi policies of persecution and victimization. But does sounding like a Nazi make him a Nazi?" (Finchelstein, 2018).³⁹ The

³⁷ "Brazil's culture minister fired after echoing Goebbels", *BBC News*, 17 January 2020. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-51149224>.

³⁸ Fascism continues to be a source of discussion; Nathan Crick reviews four recent titles that provide different approaches by Paul Gottfried, Madeleine Albright, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, and Jason Stanley (2019).

³⁹ Finchelstein identified in Bolsonaro's rhetoric clear signs of threat to democracy and Bolsonaro's more recent attacks on Brazil's voting system, in another page out of

answer is no, or not yet at least; but the role that language will play, one way or another, cannot be ignored. I would subscribe to Patricia Roberts-Miller statement that “[...] it is a mistake to think the disasters of Nazism were singularly caused by the power of Hitler’s demagoguery, but it is equally a mistake to conclude his rhetoric was irrelevant” (2019a: 234). Bolsonaro’s rhetoric is equally not irrelevant.

An understanding of rhetoric and language is inextricable from the socio-political and historical contexts, and cultural rhetoric can provide a window both into and looking out of what Frederic Jameson has termed, in his classic critique of structuralism and post-structuralism, the “prison house of language”. This chapter will therefore home in on a selection of political discourse (speeches, slogans and rallying cries in demonstrations) which, although providing a full account of the disputes over the historical memory of the Military Dictatorship in Brazil is beyond the remit of this chapter, will map out significant instances in which the memory of the dictatorship was mobilized as a cultural rhetorical instrument. In order to grasp the communicative cultural-rhetorical code that frames political discourse, the chapter will also address the rhetoricalness (Albaladejo, 2005) of artistic discourses, with a particular focus on documentary films released after the 2018 Presidential election, Petra Costa’s *Edge of Democracy* [*Democracia em vertigem*, 2019] and Ricardo Callil’s and Renato Terra’s *Narciso em férias* [*Narcissus Off Duty*, 2020]. The former provides a panoramic view of the recent economic, social and political crisis in Brazil, encompassing the process of Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, the imprisonment of ex-President Inácio Lula da Silva and finally the election of Jair Bolsonaro, together with an account of the filmmaker’s own political coming of age as Brazil veers away from the “established framework”. The latter provides a first-person account by celebrated musician Caetano Veloso of his experience as a political prisoner of the military in 1968, first recounted in a chapter with the same title in his autobiography *Verdade Tropical* [Tropical Truth], published almost three decades after the facts.

Donald Trump's book, inches closer to confirming Finchelstein's warning that things could change rapidly once Bolsonaro gets in power.

2. Culture Wars, Memory wars: 2016, 1964

For Perry Anderson, a distinguishing trait of Bolsonaro's presidency is that its "main preoccupation has been to prosecute his version of culture wars, at the expense of any other focus of policy or attention" (2019: 201). The discourse employed in the waging of such "culture wars", influenced by fringe thinker Olavo de Carvalho's view that the military dictatorship, albeit triumphant on the economic front, failed to win the cultural war against Marxism, should not be underestimated (see Webber, 2020: 158-159). In fact, as pointed out by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, the weaponization of cultural issues to divide into "US-vs-Them" tribes by design makes dialogue, cooperation and compromise very difficult (2019: 54).⁴⁰ Deliberately so. This strategy highlights the importance of cultural memory, a field of studies that can act as a *compagnon de route* to cultural rhetoric since memory, in the tradition of Maurice Halbwachs's *cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Jan Assmann's distinction between communicative and cultural memory, and the dynamics of cultural memory as addressed by Aleida Assmann's (see Assmann, 2010) can hardly be considered in isolation from the sociopolitical, cultural and communicative contexts in which it operates.

In the case of Bolsonaro, who spent a large part of his political career extolling the virtues of the military dictatorship and bashing the democratic regime, this justification of waging culture wars in order to finish what the Military dictatorship did not accomplish, and/or has been betrayed after the transition to democracy, helps explain why Bolsonaro tied in together 1964 and 2016 as moments of defeat for the left during Dilma's impeachment vote. It is a reaffirmation of 1964 as much as it is a rejection of democratic Brazil post-1985 and particularly since 2003, the period in which Brazil was ruled by the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* [Workers' Party, henceforth referred to as PT]. The

⁴⁰ During the presidencies of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, there was a palpable improvement of socioeconomic conditions for the lower echelons of society, and at a rate that outpaced the increase of wealth by the classes at the top. This rhetoric of resentment – feelings of "resentment and oppression" should be distinguished from "genuine inequality and discrimination", as Stanley reminds us (2018: 94) – lies in the perceived loss of privileges and benefits by upper classes before the factual social mobility of the lower classes. In Brazil, a section of the population feels aggrieved because inequality and discrimination receded, but cultural values (and wars) occupy the airwaves and digital platforms (attacks on cultural Marxism, gender ideology and other attacks to *pátria* and to *família*).

period of transition to democracy in Brazil in the 1980s coincides with the moment at which “new cultural memory studies” emerged, as collective memory “developed into a buzzword not only in the academic world, but also in the political arena, the mass media, and the arts” (Erll, 2010: 9). It is hardly surprising that reactionary sectors rage against the “death of history”, the narrative and anthropological turns that Astrid Erll signals as important factors for the development of cultural memory studies, by dismissing it as “cultural Marxism” while finding solace as well as ammunition in a glorified, nostalgia-infused past dominated by traditionalist values (as well as a neoliberal framework). Memory no doubt played a role in shaping Brazil’s post-authoritarian society as it did in a variety of other contexts (see Langenohl, 2010 for an overview), from the publication of documents compiled by Paulo Evaristo Arns in *Brasil: Nunca Mais* and testimonies and accounts published in *I Seminário do grupo Tortura Nunca Mais: depoimentos e debates* (edited by Branca Heloysa), to works such as Lúcia Murat’s film *Que bom te ver viva* [How Nice to see you Alive, 1989],⁴¹ which openly addresses the specific experiences of women who were imprisoned and tortured in prison during the dictatorship, leading up to legal cases being brought forward and, eventually, initiatives such as the Truth Commission.⁴²

⁴¹ While Lúcia Murat’s film could only be released after the democratic transition, *Os Inconfidentes* (*The Conspirators*, 1972), set in 18th-century colonial Brazil, eluded the tight censorship during the years of harshest repression and managed to evoke, to a knowing audience, the experience of political prisoners. It was partially inspired by the brief arrest of the director, Joaquim Pedro de Andrade, in November 1965 for publicly protesting alongside other artists and intellectuals against the dictatorship. It is also significant that the autobiographical book *Memórias do Cárcere*, by Graciano Ramos (1953), recounting the experience of the author while a political prisoner, without being charged and without evidence in 1936, was picked up by artists during the later phase of the military dictatorship at the time of a gradual and controlled political opening. It was adapted into a film in 1984 by Nelson Pereira dos Santos while Silviano Santiago in 1981 had provided a fictional sequel of sorts with *Em liberdade*.

⁴²The first legal case brought forward by the association of family members of the victims was that of left-wing militant and member of the armed resistance Eduardo Leite, assassinated after torture. The process of an official recognition of Leite’s torture and assassination was accompanied, from the perspective of his fellow activist and partner and their daughter, by director Maria de Medeiros in the documentary *Repare bem* (2013). It should be noted that a recent feature film, *Marighella* (Wagner Moura, 2019), based on the assassination of Communist Party member Carlos Marighella during the dictatorship, saw its exhibition delayed in Brazil.

The irony is that, contrary to other countries in South America in which the initial amnesties for military regimes were at least partially revoked (with ensuing convictions for torturers and perpetrators), Brazil only set up a Truth Commission in 2011, during Rousseff's presidency and shortly after, as Anderson reminds us, the Supreme Court declaring "the amnesty law nothing less than a 'foundation of Brazilian democracy'" (2019: 182). Not only did the Brazilian Truth Commission keep amnesty laws in place but its efforts to openly discuss events were actively resisted, and in some cases thwarted, by the military. In *The Edge of Democracy*, Petra Costa characterizes Brazil's relationship to the military dictatorship by referring to Brazil's democracy as a "democracia fundada no esquecimento" [democracy based upon forgetfulness].

The work of the Truth Commission nevertheless became ammunition for culture wars, denounced as yet another attack on the legacy of the Military Dictatorship. This sense of victimization is fuelled by endeavours such as the "resgate" [recovery] of Brazilian History by, among others, Olavo de Carvalho in TV programmes such as *Brasil: A Última Cruzada* [Brazil: The Last Crusade], shown on the State's educational channels, or the book *A Verdade Sufocada: A História que a Esquerda não quer que o Brasil conheça* [The Repressed Truth: The History that the Left does not want Brazil to know], by Carlos Brilhante Ustra (2006).

By dedicating his vote to Carlos Brilhante Ustra, Bolsonaro was inaugurating a new stage in his political career by continuing to do what he had always done: praising the military dictatorship.⁴³ The context, and the receivers' adherence, primed by an anti-corruption discourse that rode the wave of the 2013 protests, however, had changed. When presenting their votes during the impeachment vote at the Lower House,

⁴³ For Perry Anderson, what had provided Bolsonaro with a national profile during his time in Congress were "virulent rhetorical tirades against the evils of feminism, homosexuality, atheism and, of course, communism, assorted with tributes to the torturers who had made short work of these under the dictatorship" (2019: 201). Wendy Hunter and Timothy Power speak of "his thirty-year career as a fringe defender of the defunct military regime, an advocate of the *lex talionis*, and an antagonist of minorities and human-rights activists", and then of Bolsonaro's rise being boosted by "[f]our simultaneous crises – corruption, recession, polarisation, and rising crime", which created "a favourable environment for an incendiary populist" (2019: 80).

most senators kept to a familiar script, eerily similar to that of 1964. Bolsonaro took it up a notch, aligned and aligning itself with the incensed crowds in the street. Perry Anderson captured the differences between 1964 and 2016:

In Brazil the slogans of the Right in 1964 were Family, God and Freedom, the banners of a conservatism that hailed the arrival of the military dictatorship. Half a century later, the rallying-cries had changed. Recruited from a younger generation of middle-class activists, a new Right – often proud to call itself such – spoke less of the deity, hardly at all of the family, and reinterpreted liberty. For this layer, a free market was the foundation of every other freedom, the state its hydra-headed enemy. Politics started, not in the institutions of a decaying order, but in the streets and squares, where citizens could topple a regime of parasites and robbers. Surfing the mass demonstrations against Dilma, the two leading groups of this radical Right – Vem Pra Rua and Movimento Brasil Livre – have modelled their tactics on the role on [sic] the radical Left of Movimento Passe-Livre in sparking the protests of 2013, the second even deliberately echoing its acronym: for MPL read MBL (Anderson, 2019: 118-19).

Petra Costa's *The Edge of Democracy* argues that corruption as a theme was promoted after the 2014 presidential elections, kickstarted by the defeat of Aécio Neves, since then involved in corruption scandals himself, who led the way in contesting the election results and claimed, in a speech to supporters nine months after the election, that the elections had been lost not to a political party but to a “criminal organization”, while vowing that his party [PSDB] would take power again soon. The tone was set – with social networks and platforms having a crucial, distinctively new impact – for the abovementioned demonstrations on the Right of the political spectrum and for Bolsonaro's pursuit of his own version of culture wars, which draws heavily from a cultural memory while it frames a political attack on corrupt elites, the latter very much in line with how Jan-Werner Müller defines the populist moralist *modus operandi* (2017: 19-20).

Lilia Schwarcz and Heloisa Starling point out how the 2015-2016 demonstrations represent a watershed moment when “conservatism and regressive opinions, such as the idea of a return to a military dictatorship, and a regressive civil and social rights agenda” took control of the demonstrations (2018: 592). The change was not only in content, but also and inevitably in form too as battle lines were drawn, “two irreconcilable parts”, according to Petra Costa:

People got involved to protest either in favour of *or* against the government. [...] Demonstrations in favour of the government always took place on week days, generally starting after 6 p.m. Protesters filled the streets with the colour red: their clothing, flags and sashes, ready to defend the Worker's Party at any cost. Protests against the government usually occurred in the morning, preferably on Sundays, and participants wore mainly green and yellow, like Brazil's national football team jersey. They demanded that president Rousseff be impeached and they accused Lula and the Worker's Party of corruption. They also carried blow-up dolls of Lula and President Rousseff, dressed in prison garb (2018: 593).

By tauntingly referring to Ustra as “Dilma’s nightmare” [o terror de Dilma], Bolsonaro struck a chord with the ongoing “culture wars” that were being staged most visibly in demonstrations across Brazil and in which the memory of the ideological conflicts of the 1970s became source material for invectives during protests. By calling on the person responsible for the imprisonment and torture of the President of Brazil at the time, Bolsonaro was doing more than reaffirming the official narrative of the regime, it mocked those who were tortured⁴⁴ in a tone suited to the crowds that delegitimized opposition leaders by parading their effigies in prison garbs.

Bolsonaro’s reference to prison is consistent with such a polarized environment and has a performative dimension. It is a symbolically violent reassertion of domination and violence, a throwback to the memories of the past conflict in which President Dilma was treated (i.e., imprisoned, tortured and tried) as nothing more than a terrorist. In fact, conservative media had been consistently exploiting President Dilma’s political past, among other things, to stir up fears and feed resentment (see Di Fanti and López-Muñoz, 2020). More importantly, the constant calls for imprisonment, however farcical in form, are a threat: namely, that political adversaries should be treated as common criminals. This is particularly significant since both Dilma Rousseff and Inácio Lula da Silva were imprisoned during the military dictatorship as a consequence of their opposition to the regime (Dilma for her role in armed resistance, Lula for his role as a trade unionist). The political prisoner, and this is how Lula da Silva defined his condition in an interview to Will Grant

⁴⁴ As recently as December 2020, Bolsonaro cast doubts on for ex-President Dilma’s torture during imprisonment and challenged her to produce the x-ray for her broken jaw during the time she was imprisoned by the military. See Nicholas Shores e Gustavo Porto, “Bolsonaro ironiza tortura a Dilma na ditadura: ‘Traz raio X’”. *Terra*, 28 December 2020 <https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/politica/bolsonaro-ironiza-tortura-a-dilma-na-ditadura-traz-raio-x,0bf7168b3b85f8c243409647100825c6qr5bx0o3.html>

(2021: 149), is a symbol and an important rhetorical resource.⁴⁵ Dilma did not fail to invoke her imprisonment and torture when she confronted those pushing for impeachment, as shown in *The Edge of Democracy*, and supporters of President Rousseff drew on the memory of the military dictatorship by using photos from her arrest and trial during the early 1970s as a means to signal their support in demonstrations against the impeachment. Those pushing for impeachment taunted political opponents with threats of incarceration, and downplayed or denied the political repression under the military dictatorship in Brazil. Handheld signs asking for a new military intervention could be easily spotted in demonstrations from the Right and, as the footage in *The Edge of Democracy* shows, symbolic demonstrations of violence against the effigies of Lula and Dilma were commonplace.

When the celebrated singer and songwriter Caetano Veloso published his biography in 1997, the chapter “Narciso em férias” narrated his experience of being arrested in 1968. The chapter excruciatingly narrates the loss of human touch (including with his own self), but it also describes the transition from society into the world of the military, who imprisoned him and conducted an enquiry into a bogus denunciation. In a chapter deeply concerned with language (in fact the chapter starts with a reference to Proust, but a number of other books, and lyrics sung or composed come up), Caetano Veloso describes how his memory of events (in which, lest we forget, legal and political rights, personal freedom or human contact were all eroded, called into question or denied *tout court*) as one in which “the noun has evaporated and only adjectives are left” (2003: 224). This reflects not only Veloso’s difficulty, but an assessment of a reality (and, therefore a subject as Casara reminds us) that was “impoverished”.

The documentary *Narciso em férias*, released in 2020, covers much of the same ground in terms of episodes narrated and the overall tone.

⁴⁵ These calls for the imprisonment of political adversaries might be reminiscent of the chants of “Lock her up” during then candidate Donald Trump’s rallies leading up to the 2016 presidential election in the United States. There is a significant difference, however, when one considers the manner in which Lula da Silva was in fact stopped from participating in the democratic process, as demonstrated by the exchange between the Judge Sergio Moro and Chief Prosecutor of the investigation known as *Car Wash*, Deltan Dallagnol. See Glenn Greewald, Leandro Demori, Betsy Reed. “How and why *The Intercept* is reporting on a vast trove of materials about Brazil’s Operation Car Wash and Justice Minister Sergio Moro”. *The Intercept*, 9 June 2019 <https://theintercept.com/2019/06/09/brazil-archive-operation-car-wash/>

Noticeable from the start is a sharper focus on the description of the prison cells, with more precise descriptions. This is aided by non-verbal elements, as Veloso – filmed in a visually austere setting – elaborates on the dimensions of the prison cell and the height of windows. The composition of the documentary, largely made up of medium and close-up shots of Caetano, with a concrete wall in the background, reinforces the sense of confinement. One of the most moving scenes of the documentary evokes an episode also described in the book: Caetano Veloso seeing the photos of planet Earth from space for the first time. In the documentary, Caetano is presented with a copy of that same issue of the magazine in which he had seen the photos for the first time. Visibly moved, he muses about how he felt seeing Earth for the first time when he was enclosed and harbouring doubts about whether the world outside those walls existed.

Without attending to the cultural-rhetorical codes, the strength of both this particular scene and the documentary as a whole can be overlooked. Indeed, the scene would not have the same appeal or effect were it not for the fact that one of the most influential advisers to the President, Olavo de Carvalho, is a flat earther. As for the documentary as a whole, particularly with the added bonus that Veloso is able in 2020 to go through the report of his imprisonment and enquiry, its significance is impacted by the fact that the current administration praises the military dictatorship (indeed denies there was a dictatorship) and has more military in positions of power (including as a vice-President) than during the military dictatorship.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the President's son, member of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Bolsonaro, floated in October 2019 the idea of reinstating the *Ato Institucional 5* in the face of political upheaval and demonstrations in Chile and the election results in Argentina. The Institutional Act 5 inaugurated the harshest period of repression during the military dictatorship, it was a draconic set of laws that annulled a number of legal and political rights, and which framed the arrest of then young Caetano Veloso; as well as of many others, as Caetano often reminds both readers and viewers. And as Caetano shows a mix of perplexity and amusement when he reads in his report that his music was thought to have an emasculating effect (*desvirilizar*), one is reminded of, among other things, the misogyny

⁴⁶ See “Governo de Bolsonaro terá mais militares do que em 1964”, *Veja*, 16 December 2018 <https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/governo-de-bolsonaro-tera-mais-militares-do-que-em-1964/>

and *machismo* that have become a staple of political discourse from some sectors in Brazil from 2015 onwards.

Viewers will have been exposed to Bolsonaro's landslide win in which his virulent discourse seems to have energized loud sectors of the electorate. One could be excused to think, at the start of the Presidential campaign, alongside Perry Anderson, that praise of the "dictatorship and its torturers, and vituperations at large, appeared such conspicuous handicaps" would relegate Bolsonaro to the "also-rans" (Anderson, 2019: 170). In his book on 21st-century populism in Latin America, Will Grant offers an effective summary of how that turned out not to be the case:

Millions of voters were seemingly unconcerned about his virulently homophobic language, suggesting he would prefer his son be dead than be gay. They weren't put off by his misogyny, either, saying of a particular congresswoman that she was not "worth raping". They appeared unfazed by his dire approach to human rights or the environment or indigenous peoples. They ignored or, worse still, agreed with his attitudes on race, climate change or Brazil's violent military dictatorship. He relentlessly banged the drums of militarization and evangelicalism. [...] To those who voted for him, it mattered not at all to hear these radical provocations. Quite the opposite. The more outrageous he became, the louder he blamed Lula, Dilma and the Worker's Party for Brazil's ills, the more they lapped it up (2019: 140-41).

As aforementioned, the scapegoating, in political discourse, of ex-political prisoners Dilma and Lula with their effigies being paraded in prison grab for their alleged corrupt practices, immediately delegitimizes political opponents. Viewers would also be aware, for instance, of how the legitimacy of the process against former President Lula da Silva which led to his imprisonment in 2018, and would effectively stop him from running in the election when he was a frontrunner,⁴⁷ was called into question by the revelations that Judge Sergio Moro (later to be appointed as Minister of Justice) and Chief Prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol were colluding, as revealed by *The Intercept*.

⁴⁷ As Hunter and Power noted, "Bolsonaro's easiest path to the presidency lay in a runoff election in which he would face a candidate from the weakened PT – but not Lula himself. This is exactly the scenario he got" (Hunter and Power, 2019: 76-77).

The Edge of Democracy achieves a similar effect of retrospection and introspection by viewers when it features then federal deputy Bolsonaro, still an outlier presidential hopeful then but self/proclaimed hero, proudly displaying the photos of the “last Presidents”; i.e., the Presidents during the military dictatorship. Regarding Ernesto Geisel, Bolsonaro states in a humorous tone that the left does not like him because, during his presidency, “criminals were treated as criminals”. Viewers of the documentary will be conscious that Bolsonaro’s inflammatory short speech praising family, God and the figure of a torturer while denouncing communism, “gender ideology” and “leftists” was followed up by his vow, during a speech a week before the election (see below), to take the supporters of the Workers’ Party to “ponta de areia”.⁴⁸ They will have recognized in Bolsonaro’s campaign slogan, “Brasil acima de tudo, Deus acima de todos” [Brazil above every thing, God above all], yet another not very subtle dog-whistle attempt to reclaim and reactivate the political legacy of the military dictatorship by a retired captain of the paratroopers; and to entice, with the second part of the slogan, the support of the Christian Right. The slogan “Brasil acima de tudo” was first adopted by the Brazilian paratroopers during the harshest years of political repression in Brazil, and met with some internal critique at the time because of the way in which it mimicked “Deutschland über alles” (see Casali, n.d.). They will have seen Bolsonaro, once elected, encourage the celebration of the 1964 coup in military barracks and, as abovementioned, people close to the President suggesting that AI-5 be reinstated.

Bolsonaro’s rhetoric had found an adequate audience in the chamber and in street demonstrations. It is hardly surprising then that supporters of the PT government and candidates shouted “Democracy” on the street and in parliament against what they perceived as a coup. In *The Edge of Democracy*, Lula is shown by Petra Costa to make continued references to the rules of democracy; in his final speech before turning himself in, he says he created a party – rather than pursuing a revolution – because he believed in democracy. Demonstrators picked up on a historically left-wing tradition when they sang in the streets against the impeachment: “Golpistas, fascistas. Não passarão” [Coup plotters, fascist. You shall not pass] and there was an even more explicit

⁴⁸ Translates as “edge of the beach”, the name by which the Brazilian Navy base in Restinga da Marambaia, Rio de Janeiro state, a centre of execution for the opposers of the regime, is known in military circles.

throwback to the resistance to the 1964 military intervention in the slogan “Não vai ter golpe” [There will be no coup]. Similarly, by shouting “O povo unido, aqui não tem partido” [The people united, there is no party here], the anti-PT, pro-impeachment demonstrators were provocatively subverting, in a trademark presentation of their own cause as supra-party and even a-/anti-political, the well-known Chilean *nueva canción* anthem “el pueblo unido jamás será vencido” [the people united will never be vanquished].

Another of Bolsonaro’s election campaign slogan, “O meu partido é o Brasil” discloses both nationalist and populist undertones to Bolsonaro’s discourse (Tamaki and Fuks, 2018), and fits with Jan-Werner Müller’s singling out of antipluralism, alongside a “claim to exclusive representation [...] in a moral sense, speaking in the name of the people as a whole” as distinctive marks of populism (Müller, 2017: 20; 106). This purported bypassing of the parties, whose credibility was at a low after *Lava Jato* and other proceedings (Schwarcz and Starling, 2018: 599), was important when Bolsonaro was more known as an anti-candidate (running against the PT) and he did not have a political programme or economic proposals to speak of (Chagas-Bastos, 2019: 95). This is the “either for or against” model that Schwarcz and Starling detected in demonstrations, a literal us vs them: “It’s us and PT; it’s the Brazil green and yellow, and them, that represent Cuba, represent the Venezuelan government, with its flag that is red with a hammer and sickle on top of it” (quoted in Tamaki and Fuks, 2020: 116).

In this sense, the “vá para Cuba” and “vá para Miami” [Go to Cuba/ Go to Miami] insults directed at political adversaries during the 2014 election as people threatened to leave the country depending on the result of the election both evoked the motto “Brazil: Ame-o ou Deixe-o” (Love it or leave it) and foreshadowed Bolsonaro’s speeches in which he deployed military dictatorship era anti-communist rhetoric as, abovementioned, he evoked executions under the military dictatorship and promised a purge:

Petralhada, you will all go to the edge of the beach, you won’t have any more shots in our homeland, because I will cut off all of your luxuries. You won’t have any more NGO’s to satisfy your hunger for mortadella. It will be a purge never seen in the history of Brazil! (quoted in Tamaki and Fuks, 2020: 115).

In the end, in 2016, it is the rhetoric of 1964 that is being utilized. Not by accident, by design. To not address its cultural dimension will only

hinder our understanding of the rhetoric. And in not fully coming to terms with the rhetoric and the cultural rhetoric codes, a grasp of political discourse and political actions remains elusive.

3. War means war. Us vs them and weaponized communication

The title of Petra Costa's documentary, *The Edge of Democracy*, registers in many aspects Steven Levitsky's and Daniel Ziblatt's *How Democracies Die* and the concerns that military coups and such other frontal assaults are being replaced by gradual, piecemeal and very effective attacks from within a democratic framework, where "government moves to subvert democracy frequently enjoy a veneer of legality" (2019: 77). Indeed, the impeachment against President Dilma can be read, somewhat charitably, as "constitutional hardball" with little regard for the rules or safeguard of democracy in which politically motivated charges were being brought forward by a Chamber of Deputies in which "over half of whose members face criminal investigations of one kind or another" (Anderson, 2019 :134).⁴⁹ While the urban middle class had conspired with the military to launch the 1964 coup, in 2016 it "mounted a parliamentary coup" instead, "overthrowing the president within the framework of the constitution, rather than suspending it" (Anderson, 2019: 154).

The documentary registers also a deep chasm, both reflected in and promoted by the polarizing political discourse. The official poster for *The Edge of Democracy* shows the metal fences erected in the Ministries Esplanade in the capital, Brasília, in 2016. The image reveals that the fence separates both the building from the demonstrators, but also the two different groups of demonstrators from each other:

A telling sign of the times was the two-metre-high metal fence built around the Ministries Esplanade (the location of many important federal government buildings in Brasília), ordered by the Federal Secretariat of Public Safety precisely on the day of the impeachment vote. There was a clear, quasi-didactic meaning behind the move: to separate those demonstrating in favour of impeachment from those demonstrating against (Schwarcz and Starling, 2018: 599)

⁴⁹ "Constitutional hardball" is a term coined by Mark Tushnet (quoted by Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019: 109).

In the documentary, Petra Costa too finds symbolism in this arrangement. Neatly separated by a no-man's land and clearly identifiable by the colour coding (red for supporters of the government, green and yellow for those supporting the impeachment), the different parties are set out like opposing armies in a battlefield: tightly formed, knitted, and closed groups are, paraphrasing Carl von Clausewitz, using all-out war (rhetorical and symbolical) as a means of doing politics. Would this justify the attack of figures such as I. A. Richards, in *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936), on the "combative impulses" that dominated the teaching and rules of rhetoric, that constructed rhetoric as a weapon of controversy: "an exploitation of a systematic set of misunderstandings for war-like purposes" (*apud* Dixon, 1990: 71)?

Both of the insights above are food for thought (whether one would fully endorse them is another matter), but what we have been trying to address under the rubric of "poverty" or "impoverishment" of language in a given political discourse goes beyond both the rhetoric of conflict or rhetoric being understood as an instrument to win. In other words: we are not discussing political discourses that want to advance an argument (even if it is the promotion of conflict) or win the argument at whatever cost. We are addressing a type of political discourse that aims to avoid reasoned argumentation *tout court*.

Thus, Klemperer's discussion of poverty as the distinguishing feature of LTI ("Its poverty is a fundamental one; it is as if it had sworn a vow of poverty" (Klemperer, 2020: 19)) alerts us already to Umberto Eco's consideration of the language of Ur-Fascism as one which follows in the tradition of "Nazi and scholastic texts", "based on poor vocabulary and elementary syntax, the aim being to limit the instruments available to complex and critical reasoning" (2020: 26). Language is not destitute by accident but by design; the impoverished language is both condition and outcome of an impoverished thought, and typical of a political culture in there is no longer room for fruitful exchange or dialogue. Stanley's statement about fascist propaganda applies also to propaganda that harks back (through references in slogans and speeches) to the military regime and that similarly undermines language as a "tool of information" in its aim to "mock and sneer at robust and complex public debate about policy" and, ultimately, "to eliminate its possibility" (Stanley, 2018: 54).

A speech “will cross the boundary separating populism from demagogy and mass seduction”, Klemperer alerts us, “as soon as it moves from ceasing to challenge the intellect to deliberately shutting it off and stupefying it” (Klemperer, 2020: 53). Petra Costa’s documentary offers a significant contrast in this respect: whereas Lula appeals to a tradition of resistance and solidarity as he faces imprisonment and is stopped from running in the elections, Bolsonaro claims, a week before the second round of elections, that “we” are the true Brazil (“Brasil de verdade”) and that “we” will “varrer do mapa os bandidos vermelhos do Brasil” [rid Brazil of the red criminals].⁵⁰ The calculated deployment of controversial statements, in social media and beyond, through which “they occupy the national debate instantly [...], blocking any possibility of serious debates around the country’s needs” (Chaga-Bastos, 2019: 97), fulfils a similar purpose.

Bolsonaro’s active avoidance of presidential debates (there is a preference for direct – unchallenged – communication via social media platforms) acts as further proof that a reasoned exchange of arguments and fact-based discussions were not only *not* a priority, they were hardly ever contemplated. His programme *was* his form, that of the invective. Bolsonaro’s public addresses are always, incessantly rhetorical, even if it is “poor” rhetoric; with Bolsonaro there is a succession of provocations and attacks in soundbite form. The same is true of the language of Bolsonaro as it is of LTI: it only serves the cause of invocation (Klemperer, 2020: 23); everything has to be “address, exhortation, invective” (Klemperer, 2020: 22). This is about more than comparing past heights of political rhetoric to the present, it is a question of assessing the perlocutionary force of such an impoverished language; in other words, Bolsonaro’s purportedly anti-rhetorical style (i.e., “telling it like it is”) speech is also an effective rhetorical device.

For the purposes of this study, and in an attempt to home in on a cultural rhetoric approach to political discourses that are not just expressions of “populism”, “fascism”, “authoritarianism” but also a calculated attempt (however seemingly anti-rhetorical) to engage with the receivers, it

⁵⁰ See Heloísa Mendonça and Naiara Galarraga Gótzar, “Bolsonaro a milhares em euforia: “Vamos varrer do mapa os bandidos vermelhos””.

El País (Brasil). 22 October 2018

https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/10/22/actualidad/1540162319_752998.html

might be useful to consider Enzo Traverso's insight on populism, first and foremost, as a style:

Populism is first and foremost a political *style* and not an ideology. It is possibly a rhetorical method which consists in praising the "natural" virtues of the people, in pitting the people against the elites, the civil society against the political system, in mobilizing the masses against the "system" (Traverso, 2017: 20; my translation).

Cultural rhetoric is uniquely placed to address Traverso's comment on populism as a "style", such as Bolsonaro's, that leans both on the politics of *us and them* that Stanley diagnoses and on what Patricia Robert-Miller's, from a rhetoric studies angle, defines as demagoguery:

[...] a polarizing discourse that promises stability, certainty, and escape from the responsibilities of rhetoric through framing public policy in terms of the degree to which and means by which (not whether) the out-group should be punished/scapegoated for the current problems of the in-group (2019b: 16).

Demagogic rhetoric represents an attack on democratic institutions (Skinnel, 2019), and Bolsonaro's political discourse fits into the notion of "weaponised communication" (Mercieca, 2019). In this sense, the fact that Bolsonaro's political discourse lacks a clearly defined ideology makes the need to create a narrative that pits *us against them*, to draw on a historical past and political discourse of Cold War ideological polarization, more pressing. Bolsonaro linking up 1964 and 2016 despite such obvious differences, perhaps because of these obvious differences, and the insistence on a "communist threat" that was brought up in the 1930s (by classical fascists) and in the 1960s and 1970s by those supporting the military dictatorship can be understood as a rhetorical device aimed at indignation and pathos. Insults thus pass off as an ideological outlook and a political programme.

The wall erected by authorities in Brasília provides visual confirmation of what language had long since already stated, and staged: there is no common ground, and there is no expectation than one can be reached. It symbolises a crack (an "edge" in the English title; vertigo in the Brazilian version) in democratic debate, an absolute lack of openness and/or receptivity to the other, and consequently of the possibility of dialogue, and recognition of valid opinions different from one's own. The political adversary is nothing but just another an enemy: hence why *The Edge of Democracy* shows Lula da Silva being cheered as "Lula, guerreiro do povo brasileiro" [Lula, warrior of the Brazilian people] and

Bolsonaro's political merchandising which refers to Bolsonaro as "o Mito" [the Myth], that feature the symbol for Marvel Comics' The Punisher, or have *Duro de Matar* [the Brazilian translation of John McTiernan's 1988 blockbuster *Die Hard*, in a reference to Bolsonaro surviving an assassination attempt during the campaign] printed on them. Bolsonaro's gesture of pretending to shoot guns in public appearances is an ambiguous posturing that signals both a support for the liberalization of gun rights as well as a combative, threatening attitude. This is culture wars, with emphasis on war; the continuation of politics by other (impoverished, but no less powerful) means.

In 1974, in a response to the emergence of neo-fascism at home and abroad (Chilean coup of 1973, Greece), Primo Levi famously issued a warning – which was also a reminder – that every age has its own fascism ("Ogni tempo ha il suo fascismo"). Primo Levi's statement is unequivocally linked to the memory of the past, as the title of short essay in *Corriere della Sera* indicates: "A past we thought would never return" ["Un passato che credevamo non dovesse tornare più"] (quoted in Pugliese, 2016). The past can always return, in one way or another, and the form in which it returns may (yet) be unrecognizable, and unclear whether it truly implies a return of the past. If "every age has its own fascism", then each age may have the fascism, or "post-fascism", it deserves. Whereas the propaganda of 20th century fascists would draw from heavily idealized medieval and/or antiquity imagery disseminated via state propaganda, the image of Bolsonaro "Mito" (the myth, an apt reminder of Roland Barthes' definition of a myth as a "mode of signification" with formal, no substantial, limits; Barthes, 1957: 193-94) circulates via memes with pop culture references. Bolsonaro's face is superimposed on the body of Will Smith, the actor who plays the leading role in the 2007 film adaptation of Robert Matheson's 1954 novel *I Am Legend*, leisurely carrying a gun in a post-apocalyptic scenario. Bolsonaro is no less of a saviour than your traditional fascist leader on horseback and full body armour, but the world in which the "myth" is called to act upon is now not only in danger, it is already destroyed.

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From Hegemonic Colonial Cultural Rhetoric to Against-hegemonic Decolonial Cultural Rhetoric in the Representations of the Indigenous in America⁵¹

Carlos Del Valle

Abstract: This work addresses two perspectives of cultural rhetoric, so that although the rhetoric is born in culture it is important to highlight this character, namely, “the cultural function of different kinds of discourses in rhetoric as well as in literature and of the cultural elements included in rhetorical and literary discourses” (Albaladejo, 2016: 21). In this case, it is about the cultural function of the different discourses of the cultural industry (especially the press and literature) that sustain the conflict between the nation-state of Chile and the Mapuche indigenous people. In the first case, the deployment of cultural rhetoric of the enemy by the nation state in Chile towards the Mapuche indigenous people will be analyzed. In the second case, cultural rhetoric deployed by the Mapuche people against the nation-state of Chile will be analyzed. In both cases, we find the composition of grammar, semantics, and pragmatics of the enemy, which will justify the actions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we will observe that in the first case it is a process of enmity that has been carried out since the second half of the 19th century. On the other hand, in the second case, it is a process that begins -in its current form- in the early 90s, but as a movement has its origin in the first half of the 20th century.

Keywords: Hegemonic colonial cultural rhetoric, against-hegemonic decolonial cultural rhetoric, enemy, civilising rationality, colonial matrix

1. The hegemonic colonial cultural rhetoric of the enemy

The colonial representation of the indigenous ‘other’ has been expressed—as we have demonstrated in many previous works—in different ways, depending on the age, from the savage and the barbarian from the mid-nineteenth century (repeating sixteenth-century

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representations) to the beginning of the twentieth century, to the terrorist from the end of the twentieth century down to the present day.

These representations reflect different levels of enmity (Nandy, 1983) towards the indigenous Mapuches, including a number of intermediate ones, as was the case in the mid-twentieth century, when they were considered as being an obstacle to economic growth. In this connection, the discursive construction of the enemy served to justify the implementation of genocidal policies and practices (Mbembe, 2001, 2017), plus their dispossession, exclusion, judicialisation (Jakobs and Cancio, 2003) and criminalisation (Zaffaroni, 2015; Misse, 2017).

Although the first thing that is observed are the discourses, it is important to consider the following: (a) they are constructed in the interests of those producing them; (b) a general pattern can be observed in those discourses generally relating to the enemy; and (c) this pattern involves general (moral, criminal and neoliberal) rationalities and more specific (political, economic, social and cultural, as in the case of extermination, dispossession and criminalisation) practices, which acquire different expressions according to the importance of the interests involved.

Similarly, it is possible to identify—on the basis of the foregoing—global rationalities, such as evangelisation (transforming souls), disciplining (subjecting bodies and despoiling territories) and entrepreneurialisation (reconverting the workforce into more productive forms of labour).

On the other hand, there were certain spectral aspects, above all at two specific moments, namely, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, during the process of independence from the Spanish crown for the purpose of underscoring ‘patriotic values’; and at the turn of the twenty-first century, due to the need to underscore certain ‘positive values in the fields of sports and journalism’. As will be seen, in the second half of the nineteenth century and during the following one there were times when positive and negative representations coexisted.

In the main, all these representations have been reflected in the press, literary fiction (novels) and non-fiction literature (chronicles, expert reports, etc.).

1.1. The cultural rhetoric of the civilising rationality and colonial matrix

The civilising rationality would be expressed in very specific ways, ranging from territorial domination and the control of production processes to the creation and implementation of disciplinary techniques for controlling the indigenous peoples and their forms of community organisation. These disciplinary tools include exclusion, marginalisation and denial, through the adoption of diverse educational, health and cultural policies, which have been historically expressed in a systematic and institutionalised manner in enforced impositions or land dispossession (Tuhiwai, 1999).

The colonial matrix of power is based on the existence of a civilising project that justifies the domination of one group over the rest and which has been historically deployed in a systematic and institutionalised manner for the purpose of establishing ways of representing and treating indigenous peoples, through literary and media accounts, as well as different forms of colonialism of images (Giordano, 2012).

This colonial matrix of power has been historically expressed in diverse ways and to a different extent, as will be seen below.

For the Argentinian writer and politician Domingo F. Sarmiento, this colonial matrix of power came about in response to a historical dilemma in which a chosen few were called upon to meet the challenge of building the future: ‘We, however, desired unity in civilisation and freedom and have been given unity in barbarism and slavery instead’ (Sarmiento, 1845: 24).⁵²

Although the Polish-Chilean scientist Ignacio Domeyko (1846) maintained a similar stance, he introduced naturalist nuances typical of his calling, thus recuperating the spiritual character and the possibilities of evangelisation in the context of an indigenous status grounded in ‘coarse beliefs’ and ‘blind superstitions’.

For his part, the writer Alberto Blest Gana, who authored what is considered to be the first Chilean historical novel, held the same view, underscoring the barbarous status of indigenous peoples in one of the dialogues of his characters: ‘In actual fact, I do not know what I would

⁵² All translations are mine, unless otherwise stated.

fear most,' Don Fidel exclaimed, 'the liberals or the barbarous Araucanian Indians' (Blest Gana, 1862: 90).

Having said that, the colonial matrix of power was so deeply entrenched, socially and culturally speaking, that it gave rise to a highly complex relationship between the coloniser and the colonised, to the point that the colonial status cannot now be remedied, but only shattered, because the picture that the coloniser produces and reproduces is internalised by the colonised, as 'the result of colonisation and not its cause. It emerges after and not before colonial occupation' (Memmi, 2003: 132).

In this sense, the colonial matrix of power takes root in a territory and spreads to those inhabiting it, thus establishing a permanent dynamic of control over the territory and its inhabitants, because it is expressed in a historical, systematic and institutionalised fashion. So what remains are colonial relationships that tend to persist over time. For instance, colonisation is currently expressed in the major multinational corporations that own land in Argentina (Benetton) and Chile (Angelini and Matte), whose presence is underpinned by the legal conditions obtained and the support that they receive from state institutions. Evidently, this colonial relationship differs from the genocide and dispossession policies implemented by both nation-states since the mid-nineteenth century.

1.2. The cultural rhetoric of the criminalisation and entrepreneurialisation

Considering the culture industry as an operative concept that enables us to understand the economic, political, social and cultural role of the hegemonic press and literature since the mid-nineteenth century, what can be seen is a systematic and institutionalised process of producing indigenous peoples as enemies of the civilising project of nation-states. In the case of the hegemonic press, the process of constructing enemies is for all to see (Del Valle, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022a, 2022b), as will be illustrated below with several examples.

In this province, official news about whether or not the Government really intends to take action against the neighbouring enemy is anxiously awaited; and many believe that importance should not be attached to this conjecture, for what is involved are merely the idealisations of some columnists, on the grounds that the Government does not have the wherewithal or will to declare

war against this terrible enemy. Is that possible? (*El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, 27 July 1859).

Thus, the main strategy consisted in revealing the attributes of the enemy by employing terms such as ‘assassins’, ‘savages’ and ‘aggressors’.

And how will the Republic react to the repeated outrages of which the defenceless southern peoples are victims? How will it treat the assassins who cut short the lives of our brothers, satisfying their most ferocious and savage instincts? How will it treat those thieves who seize the property of Chilean citizens? In fine, how will it treat those who carry a spear in one hand to kill with and an incendiary torch in the other to destroy Christian abodes? [...] The flag of the Republic will submissively prostrate itself before a stupid and cruel aggressor! [...] And it will be us, who have the strength, who will be humiliated (*El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, 29 July 1859).

Before marching ‘the bulk of the army to the place under attack in order to confront the enemy always with an imposing force’ (*El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, 8 October 1862), it was also essential to leave no doubt as to who the enemy was to justify such action.

This evinces a strategy for defining criminality on a racial basis, since it would have been the result of the ethnic mixing between Europeans and indigenous peoples, which would have made the latter more restless and rebellious (Lombroso, 1887).

Another important dimension in the construction of the enemy was the racialisation of the economy, as contended by Francisco Encina:

In the origins of modern-day France, Italy and Spain and, by and large, in those of all the nations in which Graeco-Roman civilisation was covered with a layer of German barbarism, there was, as in our case, the interbreeding of races with a different level of evolution. [...] In other words, after a number of centuries the barbarian and civilised elements had partially merged in the same proportion in all social classes. [...] In Chile, the Spanish conquistadores interbred with indigenous peoples who were still anchored in the Stone Age. And the distance as to civilisation tends to be much greater between these elements than between those who formed the ethnic base of the modern nations of Europe (Encina, 1911: 98).

1.3. The globalisation of the hegemonic colonial cultural rhetoric of the enemy

The phenomenon of the globalisation of the enemy, which is, at the same time, the globalisation and hegemony of the nation-state, and which, among other situations, leads to the exclusive use of force and violence. Therefore, the globalisation of the enemy is no more than that of violence; the spread of violence to the body and spirit; the proliferation of a violence that annihilates, humiliates and excludes. On the other hand, it also involves the consequences of the long process of colonisation and of how its shadows still remain, by and large transformed by the elites of a Creole bourgeoisie—who designed and established nation-states—into new relations of power with the ‘people of the land’,⁵³ in which land is now the new object of dispute. Having said that, as the processes involved are also historical, systematic and structural, land disputes take several shapes, ranging from extractivist exploitation to expropriation and dispossession, which have gathered steam since the mid-nineteenth century. But, over the past decades, the globalisation of the enemy has acquired another destructive facet, namely, that of not only disputing land, but also confronting the people inhabiting it. This new form of struggle is the consequence of centuries of institutionalised efforts to subject the ‘people of the land’, especially through their production as intimate enemies, that is, neighbouring, close enemies. Firstly, as savage barbarians to be feared because of their ‘strange’ links to the land, an almost mythical relationship that practically converts them into a part of those unexplored, unknown, untamed and, at times, appealing territories. Here, the body and the land merge into one sought-after object of conquest. But as the central purpose is the land and what can be extracted from it, its inhabitants are subjugated so as to convert/evangelise them or to eliminate them, by dint of doctrine and resistance. After the establishment of nation-states, the policy has then been to annex lands and to put them into production. In this new scenario, the old stigmas of indigenous peoples as decadent, fatigued and, by extension, unproductive have prevailed. The aim is to

⁵³ The expression ‘people of the land’ is employed here in a dual sense. Firstly, to refer to the Mapuches, the natives of southern Argentina and Chile, who are mentioned frequently in this work and whose name, in their language, means precisely that: ‘che’ = people; ‘mapu’ = land. At the same time, this expression is used here to refer to the relationship between the different ethnic groups of America and Europe and the land, insofar as the latter is a means of livelihood and also a space contended by the elites.

substitute those bodies by implementing a policy of land dispossession (and consequently transferring them to less productive lands) and replacing them with ones regarded as productive, namely, the bodies of European colonialists, who already form part of the new economic regime, for which bodies are only valid if they can be put to work and, in turn, with which a commercial agreement is reached; in this case, as an agricultural labour force—the same that in Europe was converted into an industrial labour force.

Nonetheless, these criminal facts are barely recognised nowadays, even less so their far-reaching socio-cultural and politico-historical consequences. By the same token, nor has there been any (material or symbolic) redress that makes the unpardonable more pardonable. The records all but avoid—probably out of shame—providing estimates for the number of Mapuches casualties on both sides of the Andes. Only war records proliferate, including reports on military actions in border areas, those sent by the generals in command and correspondence between different civil and military actors, such as the letter that the Argentinian president Julio Roca sent to the Chilean general Manuel Olancoaga, one of whose most relevant passages eloquently describes the conflict's characteristics:

Instead of being enemies or bad neighbours, distrustful of each other, Chile and the Argentine Republic should forge closer ties and develop friendly relations not only to combat the savage tribes side by side and following the same plan, but also to influence decisively and together the major goals of progress in South America (Rojas, 1997: 68).

In this sense, Césaire Lombroso (1887), for his part, compared criminals to savages and noted some of their common characteristics, such as 'vagrancy', 'obscenity', 'laziness', 'contentiousness'; in sum, he would say that 'the characteristics of a criminal' were akin to those of a 'savage man'.

Finally, since the twenty-first century is being characterised above all by vindications and demands relating to human rights, the region's indigenous peoples have assumed—as a sign of the times—the character of a robust social movement, for which reason there will be no qualms about going a step further than the label of 'rebels' to brand them as 'terrorists', namely, those who move between anarchism and radical violence. As the figure of the terrorist embodies the lawless dissident, who poses a threat to 'public order', he deserves the application of criminal law as an enemy (Jakobs and Cancio, 2003),

expressed in the nation-state's invocation of the Anti-terrorist Law, the Law on State Homeland Security and other emergency laws, as has occurred in Chile over the past decades. In this third stage, Chile and Argentina have once again begun to tread the same path, especially during the last two decades. But while this stage commenced in Chile in 1997—with the first fire bomb attack and the consequent invocation of the Law on State Homeland Security—and reached an important milestone in 2002 with the death of the first Mapuche as a result of the conflict, in Argentina it began in 2017, with the first protests and land seizures and also the first Mapuche casualty.

The hegemonic press would tend to reinforce the modes of production of the enemy, based on the status of barbarism and the consequent need for aggression on the part of the nation-state, as in the case of Chile.

[...] Men were not born to live uselessly or like wild animals, without benefitting from mankind; and an association of barbarians as barbaric as the Pampas Indians [Argentina] or as the Araucanian Indians [Chile] is no more than a horde of beasts, which it is urgent to chain or destroy in the interests of humanity and for the sake of civilisation [...] (*El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, 24 May 1859).

In this province, official news about whether or not the Government really intends to take action against the neighbouring enemy is anxiously awaited; and many believe that importance should not be attached to this conjecture, for what is involved are merely the idealisations of some columnists, on the grounds that the Government does not have the wherewithal or will to declare war against this terrible enemy. Is that possible? (*El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, 27 July 1859).

And how will the Republic react to the repeated outrages of which the defenceless southern peoples are victims? How will it treat the assassins who cut short the lives of our brothers, satisfying their most ferocious and savage instincts? How will it treat those thieves who seize the property of Chilean citizens? In fine, how will it treat those who carry a spear in one hand to kill with and an incendiary torch in the other to destroy Christian abodes? [...] The flag of the Republic will submissively prostrate itself before a stupid and cruel aggressor! [...] And it will be us, who have the strength, who will be humiliated (*El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, 29 July 1859).

The occupation of Araucanía will be the most popular enterprise that could be undertaken; an enterprise that will immortalise and cover the government undertaking it with glory [...] with sufficiently expeditious means of action and mobility so as to be able to march the bulk of the army to the place under attack in order to confront the enemy always with an imposing force (*El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, 8 October 1862).

Lastly, there is also the case of certain literature of the elite, based on the production of narratives about the science of marginality, the aesthetics of the massacre, the pedagogy of ignorance and the economy of misery, among others. For example, some naturalist works written in the mid-nineteenth century, together with descriptions of the southern landscapes, highlight the customs of the natives, calling them ‘barbarous practices’, ‘superstitions’, ‘crass beliefs’ and ‘blind superstitions’, all being unequivocal signs of a perspective that was both bewildered and ignorant.

The language recalls other historical episodes in which the massacre of enemies is elevated to the status of authentic epic, such as ‘the axis of evil’, formed by Iran, Iraq and North Korea by the administration of George W. Bush, and the generic and discretionary designations of ‘Chechen terrorists’ and ‘Zapatist terrorists’, among others, to justify military actions.

On the other hand, the hegemonic press yet again offer several examples of the production of narratives of justified expropriation, whether for political, economic or other reasons, in the following century, because it made no difference that

next week, a bill for reforming the indigenous legislation will be presented to Congress, which, in the main, tends to assimilate the aboriginal element to common law. As a foretaste, we have been told that, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, a bill aimed at agricultural reorganisation characterised by the agrarian reforms, with effective measures for decentralising the economy, has been elaborated. The intention of the reforms is to purchase or expropriate underworked private land so as to exploit it in a rational manner; (2) colonising and putting government-owned land to better use; and (3) the gradual dissolution of smallholdings in Chile (*El Mercurio*, 18 August 1950).

To discuss the project of the Directorate General of Public Works, which has ordered the expropriation of the land currently occupied by the indigenous settlements in Temuco, a delegation made up of Mr Pedro Galindo and Mr Martín Collío of the Galvarino Society, and Mr Alfredo Huincahue and Mr Domingo Curaqueo of the Araucanian Cultural Alliance, both institutions representing those settlements, visited Mr Luis Muñoz M., the director of the Town Planning Department of that government agency. They stated that the Araucanian Indians did not accept that project, which envisages the transfer of those settlements to land in the Nahuelbuta Mountains, with a view to handing over the land that they currently possess to European colonists. The aforementioned project is based on the need to increase the agricultural production of the province. [...] They declared that there were around 40,000

vagrants in the capital who should be taken to the unexplored territories of the central area, and considered that this should take precedence over the settlement of immigrants (*El Mercurio*, 7 May 1952).

The main provisions that it contains. – It would be promulgated in the same way by the Government. – The legal framework protecting indigenous interests. [...] On the legal framework of indigenous property, Heading II contains the provisions regarding above all the restriction of the legal status of the natives. That restriction is objective because it is related to the real estate of the communities, so that a native who possess property outside the area envisaged in the law, will not be affected by it. [...] As a way of introducing indigenous peoples into a more cultured and productive ambience, rules are established for the transfer, during the court proceedings on the division, of the land necessary for fulfilling educational, religious, sports and social purposes. [...] Lastly, the expropriation of land in favour of the indigenous communities which is currently occupied by them and for which there are titles emanating from the state in the name of other persons claiming its material possession is also envisaged. Natives will not be able to purchase more land than that which is necessary for completing an economic unit (*El Mercurio*, 14 December 1960).


These people were opposed to this, asserting that the land was theirs, because it had always belonged to their forbearers. When the expulsion order was about to be executed, with the support of the security forces, more Mapuche families joined those who were going to be expelled, willing to fight the policemen by all means possible. Since such a situation would have led to bloodshed, the Government ordered the mayor of Malleco to suspend the expulsion order. The Directorate of National Land and Assets issued a report in this regard and the Ministry of Land and Colonisation issued the respective expropriation decree. The same directorate should submit a report on the value of the land to the Judge of Indians, who will immediately establish the price that the state should pay for the expropriation. The judge should personally hear the owners of the land and the Indians, represented by the defence council of indigenous communities of the Ministry of Land and Colonisation (*El Mercurio*, 2 January 1962).

In this scenario of expropriation of the lands of the indigenous communities and the resulting process of re-colonisation, it is possible to observe a new operation launched by the nation-state, which would be characterised by an initially iron control that would then gradually diminish, with a misleading impression of governability, in which invariably ‘the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of “civilization”’ (Mbembe, 2003: 24). The greatest problem is that, at some time or another, there has been an apparent politico-legal vacuum which has been misinterpreted in folk society, because this alleged absence of law corresponds rather to the racism of

the nation-state, which denies any type of relationship between colonists and indigenous peoples. This is so because, even though the latter inhabit spaces of folk society, they retain their wild status and continue to be ‘something alien beyond imagination or comprehension’ (Mbembe, 2003: 24).

In this sense, we can represent the above in the following way

Figure 1.



Source: Self made.


2. The against-hegemonic decolonial cultural rhetoric

This part of the work develops an analysis of the ways of countering the production of enemies and the hegemony from Mapuche social movements, especially their resistance and offensive strategies.

The different stories emerging from a series of interviews with Mapuche subjects with leadership roles have made it possible to understand that the cultural rhetoric used is especially aimed at highlighting the central role of the State, as the historical responsibility for the conflict with the Mapuche people, through the political exercise of violence and discrimination and the insertion of the Mapuche people into capitalism.


On the other hand, we can observe a transition from a resistance strategy to an offensive strategy, which is consolidated through three phases, namely, 1) the intervention of the hegemonic media agenda at the beginning of the 90s, installing the rhetoric of territorial claim and the demand for political autonomy; 2) the generation of its media since the late 1990s, especially through a counter informative exercise, to install confrontational rhetoric, which is based on the enmity of the state and its institutions; and 3) the consolidation of a system of its means of communication, which is aimed at installing a counter-discourse based on the criminalization and enmity of the state and its institutions. In this sense, we can represent the above in the following way

Figure 2.



Source: Self made.

Figure 3.



Source: Self made.

Final considerations

In the case of the Southern Cone of America, it is impossible to make progress in resolving the conflict between the nation-states and the Mapuche Indians without convinced dialogue—an initiative in which transnational corporations should also be involved. Similarly, it is also all but impossible to make progress in that dialogue without first sincerely acknowledging past historical events. In this respect there is no place for euphemisms: they were genocidal military operations. Everything else is rhetorical. In Chile, this is regrettably a habit, because 40 years later the debate on whether the dictatorship was the result of a military intervention or a military coup is still dragging on. Well, I suppose that there are still people who confuse intervening politically and doing so militarily.

Moreover, it is essential that the acknowledgement be both material and symbolic, because together with policies of distribution (of land, uses, access to healthcare and education, etc.) there is a need for implementing policies of symbolic acknowledgement, like, for example, constitutional recognition and that of regional autonomy, among others.

This is particularly complex in the context of a ‘private indirect government’ (Mbembe, 2001), which administrations representing the entire ideological spectrum insist on maintaining, if not on openly deepening, because it is the accomplishment of their oldest dream: privatising states and from there achieving the paradise of the ‘free flow of goods’, which is no more than guaranteeing the profits of the new oligarchies, without restrictions.

This state of affairs is particularly complex, for the neoliberal economic model has underpinned the very foundations of the system as a whole for quite a time now. In this respect, the World Bank has played a key role in the case of Latin American countries, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, although their economic and political position still holds: ‘Ethnic groups can thus both generate benefits and inflict costs on societies’ (Bates, 1999).

However, the problem is much more convoluted than that. As has been seen here, the transformations of the enemy—in different ages and contexts—make his presence both material and immaterial, so that his appearance and disappearance express both his own status and that of whoever produces him. Because the enemy is above all a relationship, a spectral dialectic. These characteristics imply a capacity for always being there. The enemy is a circumstantial enemy and, at the same time, a historical enemy. He is not only the enemy of colonisation, the nation-state and the market, but also the enemy ever-present in human history. He has the capacity to rise up in arms against the genocidal invasion of the Chilean and Argentinian states, without ceasing to be the intimate enemy of the nation-state model, who would constantly emerge. An enemy like that can be killed and, likewise, cannot be killed, because a spectre is not a being. It only appears, disappears and reappears.

Nation-states can constitutionally recognise indigenous communities, whether this is done in the way in which Colombia, Ecuador or Bolivia did it, or in the way in which it has not been done in Chile. It is possible to adopt a policy for returning bodily remains to families, as in the case of the National Museum of La Plata. A land restitution policy, as in Chile, can also be implemented. But the enemy will always be there, because he is the creation of whoever produces him and, for that matter, does not only represent himself, but also his creator. The enemy of the market has the ability to adapt inherent to the neoliberal model. The enemy of the nation-state is even able to reproduce the state on his own

territorial scale. The enemy is currently the peasant who resists state policies for managing violence and, tomorrow, will be the guerrilla fighter who participates in another form of management of violence.

The enemy is not only all these things, but is also the casual worker, excluded from the healthcare and education systems and condemned to the misery of the pension system. The enemy is marginal.

In a nutshell, the enemy is a relationship and a reaction. He is the measure of the will of whoever creates him. Yesterday's revolutionary is today's casual worker, and vice versa. Criminalisation and entrepreneurialisation are both attempts to establish a relationship, but will also produce a reaction.

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Metaphor and culture in the *Diálogo de doctrina christiana* by

Juan de Valdés

Jorge Orlando Gallor Guarín

Abstract: Using Cultural Rhetoric as a theoretical methodological instrument, the cultural elements present in some metaphors in the *Diálogo de Doctrina Cristiana* are investigated with the purpose of identifying the cultural background of the Juan de Valdés and the use that was given to this rhetorical figure in the beginnings of the Spanish Golden Age. Metaphor is more than a trope as it helps us think, organize and illustrate our ideas and thoughts through the cultural foundation, mutually shared between producers and primary receptors in a same play space, allowing the construction of a rhetoric-cultural communicative code that links them.

Keywords: Metaphor, Cultural Rhetoric, play space, Jewish convert, Spanish Golden Age Literature, Juan de Valdés.

Most of the charm and gentleness
of the Spanish tongue
consists in speaking through metaphors
Juan de Valdés, *Diálogo de la lengua*.

To Hadasa & Andrés G.

Introduction

Language is one of the elements that marks the DNA of a culture because, among other things, it helps its components define and express through words the ideas about themselves and the medium that surrounds them, their worldview. If the language used by a producer, inside a specific culture, has not only the purpose of communicating but also persuading its primary receptors, then we understand that when he is creating his message, he is employing Rhetoric. To any reader or receptor that may want to understand and interpret the *intentio auctoris*, it will be necessary to understand the context and cultural conscience in which the rhetoric text was elaborated and communicated. The farther away we find ourselves from the time and space in which the text was produced, the more important it is to pay attention to both the cultural context as well as the play space in which the communication we are trying to interpret took place.

When a speaker or, in our case, a writer has decided what does he want to say and in what order, he must focus in how to say it on a way that results the most effective, attractive, persuasive and motivating. Amongst the numerous resources and rhetorical figures that helps him with this goal, the metaphor stands out. Through the study of choice and use of the metaphors used by a writer we can get to know much about the presuppositions, talent, imagination, sensibility and understanding of his audience (Kennedy, 2003: 56).

But metaphor is more than a trope, “it has cultural links that place it as component of Cultural Rhetoric” (Albaladejo, 2019: 593), given that “we think and organize in the world through metaphors that flood daily language” (Fernández Cozman, 2008: 17). We propose to investigate the cultural elements present in the metaphors used by Jewish convert Juan de Valdés in his first work DDC.⁵⁴

Metaphor and Cultural Rhetoric

To Francisco Chico Rico, “the study of figurative language constitutes one of the most interesting objectives for cultural Rhetoric” (2015: 315) and, amongst those figures “metaphor is, without a doubt, the rhetoric-poetic device that most attention has received historically from the set formed by figures and tropes” (Albaladejo, 2019: 560), attention which has allowed it to be studied from very different perspectives⁵⁵. In our case, from the point of view of cultural Rhetoric, the works of Tomás Albaladejo, Francisco Chico Rico, Mauro Jiménez, Juan Carlos Gómez Alonso, Iván Martín Cerezo, María Amelia Fernández and Rosa María Navarro stand out. In this context we revise the use of metaphor as a rhetorical figure, which has a direct cultural implication, because culture is the platform on which metaphor constructs the codes of meaning used both in present expression (the one that interprets), absent (but imagined) and the relations existing between them, in the process of construction and reception of general linguistic and particular literary communication. As Lakoff and Johnson accurately point out, “metaphor permeates daily life, not just language, but also thought and

⁵⁴ We will follow Ángel Alcalá’s edition (1997).

⁵⁵ As, among others, the works of Oriana Masid Blanco (2019), Michel le Guern (1973), Eduardo de Bustos (2000), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2012), Rosario Herrero (2006), and Carmen Bobes (2004).

action” (1980: 39), therefore this queen of poetical figures plays a central role in the exposition of our ordinary circumstances and, most importantly, in the elaboration of concepts and ideas with which we define our reality according to the worldview a specific culture might have.

Artifex and work

In Juan de Valdés we find a writer in which two cultures merge, the one from a Jewish convert and the Spanish one from the beginnings of the Golden Age. Cultural reality that constituted the base for the arguments that came both from the author as from the things in the DDC (Gallor, 2019: 195-206). The Cuenca writer thought and expressed himself in clear and common terms to someone that read and understood the Scriptures from his converted Jewish worldview, but which was not the same to many of the members of this society, old Christians, which came from a catholic background, that defined and understood their worldview according to how they interpreted it and set the guidelines of the Court and, in particular, of the predominant religious organization at the time.

We can attribute Juan de Valdés to being, together with his contemporary and also Jewish convert friar Francisco de Osuna⁵⁶, the initiatory generation of mystic-spiritual literature of the Spanish Golden Age, with a very particular style in each one of them. Both have the merit of contributing in a decisive way to Spanish, vernacular language at the time, an appropriate tool for the expression of spiritual concepts and experiences. To Domingo Ricart:

Juan de Valdés, Spaniard from la Mancha, strives to create, first in DDC, and later in *Consideraciones* and other doctrinal writings, a prose, before anything else, clear, logical, reasoned, often complex, with the rational structure and the geometrical balance of a Renaissance palace or better, of the blacksmith concept seen in the Escorial. The resources of classical rhetoric, in the way the Renaissance understood them, are used with a single purpose, to convince and declare. Any superfluous argumentation is erased in an ascetic literary effort in service of a profound sincerity (Ricart, 1964: 13).

⁵⁶ His first works were published few years apart, the DDC in 1529 and *Third Spiritual Alphabet* in 1527.

The same author points out that, in his first youth work, the DDC, Juan de Valdés contributed “in a decisive way in making of the Spanish language an apt instrument for the expression of the highest concepts and of the most profound spiritual experiences” (Ricart, 1964: 9) when he published his dialogue in Spanish prose in the first years of reign of Carlos V (1529), when he was a young student in the University of Alcalá; reflecting both the popular talk as well as the more cultural one of the kingdom and the court as well as translating from their original languages to Spanish the chapters five to seven of the Gospel of Matthew, passage from which he sourced for many of his religious metaphors which we will find in his work.

His work, *opera prima* and only one which would get published in the life of the author, was written with the purpose of correcting basic doctrine that was taught in catechism, used those days to indoctrinate the commonfolk, showing the base of Cristian faith in which once someone is born again (John 3:3). He wanted to give meaning of that doctrine which is preached from the understanding of someone who knows the original sources of such, Jewish culture, culture that has been receptor of the divine message and now preached in a very distorted way to the intention of the Divine Author. It was written in a very cautious manner, not absent of self-censoring to avoid the suspicion of the Inquisition (which in the end could not be avoided- even though he published his work anonymously), and was forced to flee to Italy to evade the Supreme Institution. For José Constantino Nieto, “In regards to historical relevance, the works of Valdés is found in the vanguard of all literature of cathequesis that the Europe of the Sixteenth century, under the impact of Protestantism, was going to produce” (1970: 195).

Types and origins of the metaphors in the DDC

Following Carmen Bobes’s (2004) typology, we find that the metaphors used in the novel *Artifex* come from two sources: from the common talk – with a very special section for those that come from spiritual or religious backgrounds – and from literary language. We will now revise some metaphors paying attention to the origin and cultural elements present in each one of them, because doing so will provide one of the keys for the satisfactory understanding of the contemporary reader.

Metaphors in common talk

Defined as those that are “halfway through linguistic metaphors, already codified by the system, where they go to the competence of every speaker through learning, to finally stay in his memory” (Bobes, 2004: 11), some of these metaphors may be seen in the following segment:

ARCHBISHOP: “[...] but in this case the trials of the commonfolk, and even more than commonfolk are, so corrupted, than when I think of it it’s true than by pity my bowels are *ripped apart*”⁵⁷ (Valdés, 1997: 13).

The social and religious context in which it was lived in the early XVI century makes it that it was almost impossible to differentiate between true and false Christians, as some looked that way with exterior virtues that they did not live upon. The situation was worsened by the trials the people gave the situation, which produced in the prelate such sadness that it was one of the reasons of his proposal of an episcopal reformation through catechism that the three characters where revising now. In this case the analogy is taken from the physical pain that a person might experiment when, through a concise and violent act, their most vital and deep organs are ripped apart. The writer appeals to the *pathos* of the reader making him imagine that he listens to the only historical figure⁵⁸, Fray Pedro Ramiro de Alba, archbishop of Granada.

ANTRONIO: You say great truths in everything, and I wish you could also give their *check*⁵⁹ to the priests, so that my part may have fit in me, but I think you left it so that as mean the *check*⁶⁰ may be as we are, we could later be *mate*⁶¹ (Valdés, 1997: 131).

“*Check*” and “*mate*” are metaphors brought from the game of chess, it means to give accountability of the acts of the priests that, if they were told, would be the final point, the check mate, in the social reality they lived.⁶²

⁵⁷ Metaphorical expression.

⁵⁸ The other protagonists of the dialogue are fictional characters, taken from the works of Erasmus (Gallor, 2019: 217).

⁵⁹ Metaphorical expression.

⁶⁰ Metaphorical expression.

⁶¹ Metaphorical expression.

⁶² See the commentary by Marcel Bataillon in his edition of the DDC (1925: 128).

In the section dedicated to the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, in the parliament 333, the prelate says:

ARCHBISHOP: [...] so the soul whom God gives this high gift knows very well to apply to himself and to profit of all things, in all of them he finds God, all preach and say of the greatness, goodness, omnipotence and wisdom of God, in all he knows it, finds it, and sees it, so in the end he understands all, in which may profit his salvation, in a way that wisdom gives *weapons*⁶³ to the mouth, and understanding *arms*⁶⁴ the heart (1997: 82).

The term “*weapons*” is a metaphor that comes from the army which, in the XVI century, had a high status in Castille and its lifestyle, customs, characteristics, weaponry, etc., were all widely known by the population. Valdés had accompanied the imperial Court in many travels⁶⁵ because his brother and protector, Alfonso de Valdés, was secretary of Carlos V. To the first-time reader of the dialogue it would be easy to relate the direct and concrete meaning of “*weapon*” (tool or medium used to attack or defend), with the indirect or imagined meaning of the action, both of the wisdom as of the understanding, in the believer.

Metaphors in religious talk

A type of defined resource, following Carmen Bobes’s theory, inside the so called “metaphors of special languages”, also including philosophical language. They are fixed metaphors, of essential use given that they give shape of expression to concepts and arguments that do not have direct terms and are only constructed by analogy (“the light of faith”, “the fire of love”). They voluntarily intent to give clarity to the message, illustrating a concept or producing emotions:

It answers to an attempt to give more sensible presence to the idea, to improve and to make perception more alive and, I think, to also follow an abstract line of argumentation with diagrammatical parallelisms: if an object from reality can be segmented and it is used as a metaphorical term for an idea, this idea should also be able to be segmented. If we say that

⁶³ Metaphorical expression.

⁶⁴ Metaphorical expression.

⁶⁵ Stefania Pastore, following Bataille’s hypothesis proposes that it was in one of those travels, the one made to Granada in 1526, that the ideas that young Valdés would later portray in his DDC would start to take form (Pastore, 2010: 256).

metaphorically imagination is a butterfly, we may also say that it flies, that it has wings, it ascends, beautiful (Bobes, 2004: 22).

Metaphors in religious language predominate in this short work, and examples of them are the following: “with his spirit he will shine on our hearts” (1997: 11); “Firm hope and perfect love [...] militant church” (1997: 35); “where we see that the eye may reach”(1997: 36); “the heart is instructed” (1997: 37); “clean matter with which to edify [...] we may be clean from sin” (1997:40); “huddle of gossipers” (1997: 41); it calls our attention “*cathedra pestilente (pestilent cathedra)*” (1997: 41) because, as the author himself explains in the right margin of the page, it is a translation of Psalm 1, where we would nowadays read “counsel of the ungodly” (Psalms 1:1 in the King James Bible from 1611); “insatiable beast of avarice [...] root of all evil” (1997: 50); “the tree of adultery” (1997: 53); “his self-love blinds it” (1997: 57); “starting to walk in the path of truth” (1997: 69); and so forth, we could point out an extense gallery of metaphors of religious language throughout the whole text. The reason for it being that lays in that the Dialogue pretends to instruct readers: “[...] from where him and I, not only would we go educated, to that which would be convenient for us, but instructed in those things that are needed to instruct others” (1997: 9), and metaphors are a great tool in education for they help to illustrate ideas that, in this case, being abstract, need of an intellectual operation that has cultural bases. Note that all absent referents are taken from common language, simple and even rural, very fitting to the context.

In the parliament 132, we find the following metaphor coming from the culture of old Christians or born Catholics:

ANTRONIO: By the *robe of Saint Peter*,⁶⁶ that because of some friends' information I was wrong with that Erasmo of who you speak of, from here on out I will be right, for you my Lord praise him so much [...] (1997: 13).

We do not find records in Spanish texts before Valdés where the expression “*robe of Saint Peter*” is used that may allow to track the cultural significance. Richard Robert believes that it may be about a religious order and signs to Juan de Ávila, Jerónimo de Alcalá and Miguel de Cervantes (1957: 304) as authors that also made use of this saying. If the author refers to the dress they used in that religious order – which would be very respected in that cultural context –, then that

⁶⁶ Metaphorical expression.

dress, because of what it represented, could certify or back what a person was saying in the cultural imaginary shared by creator and receptors.

We want to dedicate ourselves now to the type of metaphors that come from a culture, the Jewish convert, different than the one most primary readers of the Dialogue would come from (old Christians or Catholics). Being a religious dialogue, with marked didactical character, these types of metaphors which have the Scriptures⁶⁷ as a background stage are abundant, some of them fundamental in the whole Christian worldview. The first two have as a purpose to affect emotions, the *pathos* of the reader and of all true believers: “ARCHBISHOP: [...] because the lays the summa and compliment of Christian doctrine, and telling them this you will try to make them take a liking and love of the evangelic doctrine [...]” (1997: 17). In addition to explaining the creed, the ten commandments and the chapters five to seven of the Gospel of Matthew, the masters must produce in the disciples the emotions that encourage them to obey and walk in them.

In the fourth explanation of the creed we find the following metaphor:

ARCHIBSHOP: And I know, but it is also convenient that we know that he was *lamb*⁶⁸ without stain and that he willingly suffered all this things, no fault of his own, and that he for good faith in our salvation very much desired it, and that it was all in ordinance of his eternal father (Valdés, 1997: 22).

The metaphor “*lamb*” has its direct meaning proceed from three references in the Old Testament, very known and sacred to the Jews: 1. The Passover lamb, one of the seven most known and sacred Jewish festivities, the Passover (Exodus 12); 2. The lamb of the offering for sin (Leviticus 14:12-21); and 3. The lamb of Isaiah 53:7. The three can be applied, and so did John the Baptist, with indirect meaning and fulfilling of all of them (John 1: 29, 36) when presenting the Messiah and making reference to the “maximum and definitive sacrifice of Jesus in the cross for the atonement of the sins of the world” (MacArthur, 2012: 2351). Metaphorical meaning that, as not being shared by the same

⁶⁷ The *Artifex* had proposed himself to present the doctrinal proposals of archbishop Hernando de Talavera through his successor and most advanced disciple, Friar Pedro de Alba (Pastore, 2010: 269).

⁶⁸ Metaphorical expression.

extensional-semantic by Jews and Christians, illustrates about one of the biggest differences between them.

In parliament 287 we find six metaphors. The priest who, when recognizing that Christians have lost their effectiveness in the world, says:

ANTRONIO: By the orders I received I cannot say another thing, but that to do what you say, it is needed to *sink and be made new again*.⁶⁹ Oh, God gracious, in what *blindness we live in and what darkness*,⁷⁰ even those that consider ourselves the *light of the world and salt of the earth*!⁷¹ [...] (Valdés, 1997: 70-71).

Simple parliament yet rich in metaphors, situated by Valdés in the fourth rhetoric unit when the comrades present their last arguments about the seven deadly sins (Gallor, 2019: 279). We observe six metaphors in four lines: “sink and be made new again”, “in what blindness we live in and what darkness” and “light of the world and salt of the earth”.

When he says “it is needed to *sink and be made new again*”, he is thinking, as is indicated in the bible passage written in the margin of the page, in what Jesus spoke to Nicodemus: “truly I say to you he who is not born again cannot see the kingdom of God” (John 3:3).⁷² “Being made again”, “being born again” or “born from above”⁷³ that Valdés himself experimented years back and from what he left proof by an autobiographic affirmation,⁷⁴ when he was yet a lad in the service of the Marquis of Villena. This metaphor means the new beginning of a person when being submerged and guided by the Holy Spirit, in a new

⁶⁹ Metaphorical expression.

⁷⁰ Metaphorical expression.

⁷¹ Metaphorical expression.

⁷² In the New Testament Greek, the verb used is “γεννάω” (gennaō) that means to “procreate”, “give birth”, “being born of”, “engender”.

⁷³ The “being born again” or “regeneration” (in the theological sense) was one of the pillars of all Valdesian theory that here, in his first work, is found sketched but that he would later develop in later works when he is installed in Naples, where he has to flee because of the inquisition.

⁷⁴ In the midst of a profound crisis of faith that led him to question every religious aspect of the time and to have a personal encounter with Christ, fact narrated by him in his *Gospel according to Saint Matthew*: “I can say this about me, that I was made to arrive to Christ in such a violent manner that I am certain that, even if I would have wanted to resisted, I wouldn’t have been able to do so” (1999, online version).

dimension that for the natural man is completely unknown (John 3:7-15).

The lifestyle of that time, for the *Artifex*, could be described through the following metaphors: “to *walk in blindness and darkness*”. “Walk” is a verb very used in the Scriptures, appearing forty-four times, to express the conduct or the “walking” of any person or a believer (Gn. 5:22-24; 6:9; Ro. 6:4; 8:4; Eph. 4:1; 4:17; 2 Pt. 3:11; 1 Jn. 2:6; among others). “Blindness” and “darkness” are metaphorical expressions that he must have also taken from the Bible; the first one appears, among others, in the following verses: 2 Cor. 4:4 and 1 Jn. 2:11; in the first one he refers to the natural state of man and in the second one to the state of the believer that hates his brother.⁷⁵ The second is employed for the moral darkness⁷⁶ of man as consequence of the fall (another metaphor!).

The metaphors of *salt* and *light*⁷⁷ have their origin in the passage known as the Sermon on the Mount (Mt. 5:13-16),⁷⁸ passage that he translates directly from the original language at the end of the book,⁷⁹ as an appendix.⁸⁰ For Juan de Valdés, Christians from the beginning of the XVI century had lost their presence (*salt*) and action (*light*) amongst

⁷⁵ In Mt. 23: 16-26 there is statement about the void faith that Israelites professed towards God and in Jn. 12:40 their blindness in law.

⁷⁶ Is. 9:2; Mt. 4:16; Jn. 1:5; 3:19; 2 Cor. 6:14; I P. 2:9; Jud. 6, 13.

⁷⁷ Amply worked in Christian cosmovision both by Catholics as well as protestants in all ages. Through the catholic way we have, among others, Juan Martín Velasco (2012) and Isidro Catela Marcos (2013); through the protestant way we may point towards, besides the previously mentioned, Luz Ulrich (1993) and L. Bonnett and A. Schroeder (1977).

⁷⁸ We follow the Reina Valera 1995 for all texts of the Scripture.

⁷⁹ As there didn't exist in the time of the DDC the division in chapters that we have today, Valdés segments the passage in numbered paragraphs noting, in the right margin, what they are about:

X. You are salt and earth, for if salt loses its strength, with what will it salt? It is obvious that from there on it is only useful to be thrown in the street and be trampled by men.

XI. You are the light of the world. The city that is assented in some mount is impossible to be hidden, and when a candle is lit, it is not hidden under a bushel, but rather on the candlestick, so it may light al who are in the house. In the same way I want your light to shine before all men, that they may see your good deeds and give glory to your Father who is in heaven (Valdés, 1997: 142).

⁸⁰ The translation and position of the final passage of the book has the purpose to strengthen, through the *Ethos* of the Scriptures, all that has been explained and to encourage his adversaries to revise in the light of the sacred text all that has been exposed.

their other concitizens. The interpretation Juan de Valdés makes of these metaphors is found in one of his works, written ten years later. In the *Commentary to the Gospel of Saint Matthew* (1999)⁸¹ he would explain them in the literal sense⁸² in Greek and not in Latin as it was customary.⁸³

Having Christ showed that the happiness of the kingdom of heaven in the present life is all interior and spiritual, he comes to show the greatness of dignity of those who are his disciples, mostly of those who imitate him in all that is imitable, and constitutes this dignity in two things: one in that they are salt of this earth, two, that they are light of this world (1999: online version).

For him, the main characteristics of a subject of the kingdom of God should be qualities of an interior life, deep. With his interpretation he corrected one of the biggest distortions that Christian faith has suffered throughout the ages: being reduced to a mere way of forms, external and material appearances. Both in the *Dialogue* and in the *Commentary*, we see he maintains the same line of thought.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Edited in Madrid in the year 1880 by the Hispanist Boehmer from a Spanish manuscript, yet not from the original, found in the National Library of Viena. It is believed to be written around 1539.

⁸² In that time, patristic education, proposed by Juan Casiano (360-435 a.C), defined four methods regarding the study the Scriptures: literal, allegoric, moral and anagogic (Pauline A. Viviano, 2008: 2).

⁸³ He would explain this in the introduction that precedes the first chapter: “Faithfully translated from Greek to Spanish Romance and declared according to the literal sense with many considerations taken literally. Very necessary to the Christian living (1999, online version). A good translation of that same Gospel, this time from the vulgate, was the one made by the converted Jew Martín de Lucena, the Maccabee.

⁸⁴ About Christians as “salt” he says:

Where I understand that being the salt of the earth belongs to the Christians is in two ways: the first one in that, in the same way salt gives flavor to the meats and that without it it would be unpleasant to us, so do the disciples of Christ give flavor to the world, making God happy to conserve and maintain it, and the other so that the same way meat is protected from corruption by salt, so is the case with life, in which with doctrine and with preaching or intimacy of the gospel that belongs to the disciples of Christ are the men of the world preserved, in this life of corruption of customs and in the other of the eternal death.

That of “if the salt were to disappear”, or stop being salt, with what follows, belongs to warn the disciples of Christ that they know their dignity and to keep within it, making in the world what salt does to the meats. Saying “with what will it be salted?” etc., understands that, so as when salt stops giving flavor nothing can give it back, being the salt what gives flavor to other things, and having no flavor it is rendered useless and thrown out and stepped on, so happens to the disciples of Christ when they stop having faith and Christian customs, there will nothing to give them

Literary metaphors

The literary metaphor, also called “creative metaphor”, is fruit of an individual creative process “that has nothing to do with the conventions of a linguistic code, or with the memory or education of the speakers. Creative metaphor, alive, is a medium with which to achieve literary clarity, ornament, beauty, ambiguity, or polyvalence” (Bobes, 2004: 12). It has as basic characteristics being unique (allows recognizing the author), ambiguous and polyvalent (in text) and being almost always surprising (to the reader). It is a metaphor which can change meaning amongst different readers and where the play space⁸⁵ in which it was created must always be taken into account, as it is not lexicalized and “doesn’t belong to the general isotopy of the text, but rather it integrates in the unity of sense through the interpretation that each reader may give

perfection, them being who with their preaching give that perfection to others, and when not having Christian faith or customs, they are of no esteem and so God discards them and despises them (1999: online version).

About Christians as “light” he explains:

I also understand that being the disciples of Christ light of the world belongs to them in such a way that, the same way that through exterior light from the sun we see the exterior things we would not see without the sun, so with our interior light from who are and have been disciples of Christ we see all things interior, spiritual and divine; the how I let the more spiritual people decide, those who having seen light with the light of others and serving others with their light, can by their own experience give testimony of this. It must be understood that the disciples of Christ, even though they are the light of the world, they are not light in themselves but as they are disciples of Christ, who in himself is light of the world; Christ gives them their light; and so they are light of the world in participation with Christ, who says of himself “*Ego sum lux mundi*” Jo. 8 in a way that it can be said that between the light of Christ and his disciples there is the difference of the light of the sun and the moon and the stars, so in that way it would be better to compare the disciples of Christ to the light of the candle, and I have not done so because a candle is not light of the world nor are any candles [...]. And saying Christ “so they may see your good deeds” etc., shows that the main thing that the disciples of Christ are light of the world is in the Christian living, imitating Christ, because to this living I understand he calls good deeds, which are light of the world as in they do men see Christ. Deeds, which can be faked, I mean, that can be made without faith or charity, are not light of the world even when made by Christ’s disciples, because by imitation of Christ they are light of the world. Adding Christ “and glorify your Father” he teaches that the motivation of his disciples must be when being light of the world must be the glory of God and not their own glory (1999: online version).

⁸⁵ Play space is understood by Tomás Albaladejo, from the concept of “*homo ludens*” of the Dutch thinker Johan Huizinga, as a “action space that is culturally established and delimited and from which participants have awareness in their relationship with communication” (2013: 14).

the text according to their own competence and the ambiguity of the discourse” (Bobes, 2004: 33).

In the work which constitutes our object of study we do not find literary metaphors, but we would like to give constancy of the use Juan de Valdés made of them, as a man in language and literature. We ask the kind reader allow us the digression of going to his second work, the *Dialogo de la Lengua* (1535), written in Nápoles in the moment in which the Cuenca writer is an ectopic writer (Gallor, 2020) and whose central theme is the use of Spanish language; in it, exercising as a literary critic⁸⁶, we find mention to the metaphor (as for example, the quote that precedes the present work (2006: 246)), examining some cases in how it is used, through examples rooted in the culture of Castille, and exhibits it as one of the major difficulties one has when translating any work to Spanish.

To Juan de Valdés, the one who made better use of this figure till that time, near the end of the XV century, was Antonio Velasco;⁸⁷ “Oh, how he skillfully persevered in the metaphor! I had never seen a better thing in my life” (2006: 214), he says it in a way of conclusion after having narrated his comrades some couplets of nicknames of the author in question. The interesting thing for our study is to see the importance of the cultural background in which the poem was created, couplet in this case, to understand the metaphor used;⁸⁸ as Maxime Chevalier well explains, “It is well known that couplets of nicknames tend to be allusive texts, and he who ignores the environment in which they were born not always perceives the allusions they enclose and, what is even worse, he doesn’t always understand the joke they withhold” (2000: 334). Valdés exposes some couplets that had extense diffusion in his native land, for which he now has a certain melancholy, and that the Italian characters do not understand (particularly Coriolano).

⁸⁶To Miguel Ángel Pérez Priego, “Juan de Valdés was surely the most original, documented and suggesting writer from all the Spanish Renaissance in his linguistic and literary judgements” (2000: 229).

⁸⁷ Antonio de Velasco is a poet of the ones called from the *Cancionero General* from the ends of the XV century and beginnings of the XVI.

⁸⁸ Most of the scholars from today would define the terms in which Valdés works (“*correr*”, “*ostias*”, “*cuerta*”, “*falta*”) as polysemic or mere wordplays; but in the end of the XV century and starts of the XVI, time period in which the cited couplets were written, scholars understood them as metaphors.

The first couplet is “Vuestro rocín, bien mirado” (t/n: *Your nag, well observed*), (2006: 211), where the metaphor is in *run* in “que él de flaco no corre, / y vos de flaco os correís” (t/n: he’s so thin he doesn’t run, / and you are so thin you run) because instead of “its own significance, which is to RUN, it has another, and it is this one, that we say “one runs” to who, when mocking him, becomes angry” (2006: 211).

More complicated is the explanation of the couplet “Ostias pudiera enviar” (t/n: *Oysters may be sent*) (2006: 212-213), where when he says *ostias* he doesn’t go to the first meaning, which in that moment was *shellfish* (which was later changed from the Spanish *ostia* to the Portuguese *ostra*), but he rather goes for the meaning of *hostia* (communion wafer, in that time without an “h”), that means a thin round loaf of unleavened bread that they offer in catholic religion, in mass, to commune. In Spanish from Spain from today it may also mean *slap*, which would lead to an interesting case: the contemporary reader has lost the first meaning described and can confuse it for the second one.

In the same couplet we find another metaphor which for the nowadays reader would be almost impossible to find out, with the exception of those versed in the matter, as it refers to a physical particularity of a very well known character of the time, and that Valdés declares: “And you must note that in Rome there is another beauty, that alluded that the queen Elisabeth, had her nose a bit blunt, even when she gave signs to favor to the commendatore, in the end she would not favor him against the will of the king his husband” (2006: 213); thanks to the explanation we understand the verses: “because Rome will never give what her husband denies”.⁸⁹

A bit later we find a metaphor that, unfortunately, we have lost with time:

Touch (t/n: *tocar*) is the same as TANGERE and PERTINERE, and it also means “to dress ones head”; I believe it comes from dress (t/n: also called *tocar*), which is why they say “a crazy head does not dress” (t/n: “*cabeza loca no sufre toca*”) and “the crazy lady by the list buys the headwear” (t/n: “*la moza loca por la lista compra la toca*”, untranslatable to English). Now look how the friar in three words significantly alluded three meaning, so, when a nun demanded he that he gave her a headdress, he answered: “When

⁸⁹ TN: This is a wordplay regarding the word blunt in spanish, which is pronounced the same way as Rome (*roma*).

it is my time to dress you, more than that I will do” (Quando toque a mí tocaros, con más que esso os serviré) (2006: 213).

Torres’s answer, the other native Spanish speaker that partakes in the dialogue, does not have any waste for the two metaphors he employs: “Oh whoreson and what a good friar!” (“¡o hi de puta y qué buen fraile! ¡gujarrazo de villano y palo de sacristán!”).⁹⁰

Some lines later, the character Juan de Valdés explains a couplet which he finds worth mentioning and divides in two parts. About the first one, written about the double meaning of rope (t/n: *cuerda*):

Rope means *cautious*, and also what in Latin they call *funis*; from this misunderstanding don Antonio Velasco profited beautifully when speaking of the ball game (which, as you know, you play above a rope) in a couplet he made to don Diego de Bovadilla, who made profession to serve a lady, daughter of the man of the house where they played. The couplet says so [...] (2006: 214).⁹¹

About the second part, written about the amphibological game of the term foul (t/n: *falta*):

Foul is used, as you know, for the ball game, also to say: “Pascual is evil, but no evil ever lacks him” (t/n: malo es Pascual, más nunca le falta mal). To these two meanings don Antonio de Velasco alluded in a couplet that in the same purpose as the other one to a sir of the House of Rope, which was esteemed as unwise, which said as follows [...] (2006: 216).⁹²

Finally, about the difficulty to translate any language to Spanish because of the problem that may occur when translating a word following the literal sense and not the absent meaning corresponding to the absent expression:

Because, being that most part of the charm and gentleness of Spanish language consists in speaking through metaphors, and being the translator tied to now write more than is written in the language he translates, he has

⁹⁰ TN: The words in question are *gujarrazo* and *palo*, but given the extremely colloquial expression, and that nowadays they have lost practically all meaning even in Spanish, the sentence is rendered untranslatable.

⁹¹ Pérez Priego (2000: 233) thinks that the couplet presents superior variants that clarify and make more intelligible Valdés’s text.

⁹² Cristina Barbolani, in a footnote, thinks that “the couplet turns out incomprehensible, mostly in the second part” (2006: 216). Pérez Priego thinks that the text “is deformed and must be corrected according to the cited *Cancionero de Palacio*: [...]” (2000: 234).

great difficulty in giving Spanish the charm and polish that if writing from his head we would give. Because if one translates that that Terencio says” ¿IDNE ESTIS AUCTORES MIHI?”. Not wanting to separate from the written word he must say “From this you are authors for me?” and this will make impossible to understand what the author wanted to say, but if he writes from his head, wanting to say the same thing he will write “This is what you counsel?” and it will be the same thing the poet felt, even if it is in other words. And in the same way, if one wanted to write in Romance that from the same Terencio “O FACTUM BENE, BEASTI ME” and said “Oh how well done it is! You have done me well”, he would not speak proper Spanish nor would he wring out well what the poet wanted to say as if, not caring to look at the word, but rather at the sense, he said “This is the best in the world, you have given me life” (2006: 246-247).

For Juan de Valdés you must adhere to the letter, but without betraying the sense of what is wanted to say, so that in many cases the literal translation cannot express the main meaning and must be substituted for metaphors that are typical of the Spanish language.⁹³

Conclusion

We have seen in a work from the beginnings of the Golden Age that metaphor fulfills the purpose of a link between writer-text-reader, when it is constituted in the culturally founded communicative code (Albaladejo, 2010: 11). This discourse figure is also used by the author as a functional persuasion mechanism, used in in a very simple language, apt for the simple audience, where the use of shocking give verisimilitude to the instructions that want to be taught in terms difficult or impossible to explain any other way.

Juan de Valdés, victim of his reformist zeal, had a message to transmit and tried to persuade his readers to either believe, to embrace and assume it and for that he didn't doubt to use metaphors both in the common as in religious language, this last one taken from his Jewish background as a Christian.

Lastly, it must be said that metaphor has deep cultural roots and, making use of it, members of a same culture can express their thoughts with the

⁹³ About Juan de Valdés as an author se Cristina Barbolani's introduction to her edition of the *Diálogo de la lengua* (2006), Marco Antonio Coronel Ramos (2007) and Juan Luis Monreal Pérez (2011).

conviction that the first receivers of their message will interpret it correctly given the shared communicative rhetorical-cultural code.

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Global Mobility in Today's Narrating: the Role of Translated Literature in the Italian Literary System

Covadonga Gemma Fouces González

Abstract: We regard recipient cultures as fragments of an international system of linguistic groups and of national or supranational cultures. Today, the new cultural industries, with the erosion of national borders, have driven transnational works to circulate all over the world in translated versions, giving rise to a new *transliterature*. We analyse this unprecedented translation activity seeking to understand the relationships of linguistic dominance that operate in the circulating of European narrative production. Knowing a country's translation activity means understanding the scope of its cultural imports and the position of its language in the international *language market*. To illustrate a peripheral culture in Europe, we conducted an in-depth study of Italy's current literary production and examined the specific weight of translated works in today's Italian literary system.

Keywords: Translation, Italian narrative, literary system, cultural critique.

1. A transnational perspective on the history of literature

The need to approach the history of literature from a transnational perspective has generated a growing interest in literary transfer. Numerous studies (Heilbron, 1999; Casanova, 1999; Bourdieu, 1992, 1999; Albaladejo & Chico Rico, 2018) have highlighted the key role of translated literature in the constitution and transformation of national literary systems giving rise to a history of renewed literature. The latter finds its origin not only in national literature but also in the interactions between local production and the mechanisms of circulation and global recognition (Casanova, 1999). These studies on literary transfer reveal themselves to be one of the most promising ways to build an integrated history of European and world literature.

In order to describe an object of study that goes beyond the confines of different disciplines, we must shed light on the methodological aspects. In this article, we refer to the polysystem of Even-Zohar (1978, 1999) as well as Bourdieu's literary field (1992) which has lately given rise to a sociology of translation. With the concept of polysystem, Even-Zohar (1978) insisted on the stratifications inherent to each literary system. He identified one of the principles of change in the movement (transfer) of certain elements or functions from one level in the polysystem to another. With his concept of literary field, Bourdieu (1992), focusing

on the specific logics that drive the various groups to invest in literature, highlighted the collective work necessary for literature to exist as a social and symbolic activity. Both authors agree, however, that translated literature plays a decisive role in the genesis and transformation of literary systems.

Translation, therefore, is not only a linguistic phenomenon. It also represents a range of social operations: of selection, of identification and of reading of a work (Bourdieu, 1992 [1995]: 339). The decision to translate a book does not taken exclusively according to market criteria, as generally assumed in the disciplines of editorial history and sociology. In reality, “the material manufacturing work would be nothing without the production work of the manufactured object’s value” (translation of Bourdieu, 1995 [2002]: 337), without its recognition. The publisher “places artists in the market of symbolic goods [...] thus ensuring that the product of artistic work [the book] gains a recognition that is all the more authoritative [the publisher] is recognised himself.” (translation of Bourdieu, 1995 [2002]: 337). And here comes into play the drawing-up of the best-seller lists published in the main Italian newspapers. We will examine them here because they contribute to introducing and giving a symbolic value to translated foreign authors.

One must understand, however, the role of translation as the mediator of knowledge transmission and circulation among cultures. Not only should we study the role of translation in the receiving society’s literary system, but it is also indispensable to understand the receiving cultures as fragments of an international system of linguistic groups and national or supranational cultures. An implicit postulate has dominated Europe’s almost entire history of translation theories: that two-way relationships exist between different linguistic and cultural spheres. This perspective has been replaced today by a more dialectical vision, in which languages and cultures are conceived as necessarily unbalanced entities, divided between the dominant and dominated.

Today, with the erosion of national borders, new cultural industries have led to the emergence of transnational works, the translations of which circulate around the world, leading to the emergence of a new *transliterature* (Sanz Cabrerizo, 2009: 127). We examine below this unprecedented translation activity in order to understand the linguistic

domination mechanisms that underlie the circulation of cultural goods, i.e. works of narrative fiction.

According to Heilbron (1999: 432), transnational cultural exchanges do not simply reflect the world economy's structural contradictions, as has been hitherto suggested. Cultural exchanges have their own dynamics, based on a certain degree of autonomy with respect to the world market. In this way, rather than understanding the cultural domain as a symbolic space that derives from economic structures, it is more fruitful to interpret transnational cultural exchanges as a relatively autonomous sphere.

According to his classification, Heilbron (1999: 433-434) considers the international translation system above all as a hierarchical structure. In Europe, the hyper-central language is English. Moving down from there, certain languages play a central role. Finally, below this latter group of central languages, some languages play a peripheral or semi-peripheral role.

Twenty years later, the 2019 *Rapporto sullo stato dell'editoria* corroborated Heilbron's hypotheses regarding the hyper-central role of the English language:

According to the report published on authors' cultural mobility in Europe in 2019: in 2018, 61.6% of translated works were in English (equivalent to 71-73% of copies, 13.5% in French, 9.6% in Spanish, 3.6% in Slavic languages and 11% in other languages (IEA, 2019).

To finish this section, Europe's central position in the global translation system remains to be confirmed. The *Index Translationum* provides useful percentages on translation dynamics. "Thus, it turns out that Europe produced 80% of global translations and 85% of literary translations in 2015 alone; despite the fact that translation rates differ considerably from one country to another, English is always the main source language." (Speciale, 2016: 32).

2. The role of translated literature in the literary polysystem

The notion of *literary polysystem* (Even-Zohar, 1978, [1990: 227]) considers all types of literary and non-literary texts as an aggregate of systems. In other words, a culture's literary polysystem comprises several translated literature systems together with national literature. In

this way, translated literature ultimately becomes an integral system of any polysystem, as well as one of its most active ones.

These systems are not static. They engender a dynamic movement within them between dominant elements, located in the centre, and dominated elements, located on the periphery. The major issue is the search for the conditions under which certain texts participate in the process of change within the polysystem. We can thus refer to the movements that represent the principle of innovation as primary activities, and those that tend to conserve the established code, as secondary activities. (Even-Zohar, 1978 [1999: 229]).

We are brought to ask: what is the position of translated literature in this context and what role does it play within these dynamics? What is truly significant is translated literature's transformation into a primary or secondary activity, i.e. an innovative or a conservative one, according to the cultural rationale of the system in which it is integrated. Translated literature can occupy a secondary position when it remains on the system's periphery. In such circumstances, it does not influence the important processes and is built according to the centre's established conventional norms. Paradoxically, translation, synonymous here with external innovation, thus becomes a factor of conservatism. An example is the English cultural system which, due to its long tradition, occupies a hyper-central position in Europe and translated literature takes on a peripheral position. The central French and German languages follow this pattern, though to a lesser degree.

However, to affirm that translated literature occupies a primary position in the target literary polysystem implies that it plays a decisive role in configuring the centre and is part of the drivers of innovation. In this way, translated foreign works tend to be an instrument that contributes to the new repertoire, introducing new aspects and new literary models into local literature. In other words, when translated literature maintains a primary position, it actively participates in modelling the centre of the receiving system and its strength is such that its innovative effect imports poetic models, techniques and languages that did not exist in the receiving literature.

But what conditions allow for such a situation? "One case is when peripheral literatures are sometimes not satisfied with their national production and believe they desperately need a repertoire relating to a neighbouring literature" (Even-Zohar, 1978 [1990: 226]). The most interesting consequence is that these peripheral literatures establish a

relationship of dependency within themselves with respect to translated foreign fiction. Western peripheral literatures tend to be small countries or countries with minority languages. We can thus recognise that hierarchical relationships have been established within International Literature, as in the case of European literatures, placing some languages in peripheral positions.

In this article, we propose to examine the Italian cultural system, in which, due to its peripheral position in Europe, translated literature has a relatively central position, compared to languages such as French, German or English. And not only that, we must remember that when we affirm that translated literature occupies a central position, we are not referring to translations as a whole, but to a segment of the translated literature, in our case—as we will see later—certain literary genres such as *noir* can have a central role, while other types of literature remain on the periphery.

3. A world to be translated: a geo-editorial map of translation

To understand the role of translation in the Italian literary system compared to its role in the hyper-central language of English and the central French and German languages, we consulted the work of Büchler and Trentacosti (2015). This latter study analyses British Library books during the 1990-2012 period in order to measure, based on data, the translation flows between the different languages, focusing on the publication of literary translations.

Knowing a country's translation activity means understanding the extent of its cultural import and the position of that language on the international language market (Heilbron, 1999). As an example of peripheral culture in Europe, we will study the situation of Italian literary production in detail, which implies using statistical sources to quantify the activity.

These statistics are based on books deposited in the British Library: first the translations included in all the categories of the Dewey classification, and second, all literary translations included in the Dewey classification category 800 (Literature). According British Library data of 2011:

	Total books published in a country	Total translations	Percentage
Germany	96.237	11.819	12,28 %
France	81.268	12.921	15,90 %
Italy	63.800	12.569	19,70 %
United Kingdom and Ireland	87.412	2.770	3,16 %

Source: British Library in Büchler & Trentacosti, 2015: 9.

If we continue with the data collected from the British Library and filter only the literary works translated into English (Dewey classification 800), across all creative genres, we can observe an approximate 40% reduction in the total number of translated works. However, we must bear in mind a 69% increase in the number of translations of literary works into English between 2000-2012. The data are as follow:

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
342	338	365	390	388	417	421	497	523	526	489	587	578

Source: British Library in Büchler & Trentacosti, 2015: 15.

While Italian publishers receive a significant number of works translated from other languages, i.e. 19.7%, the Anglo-Saxon world proudly presents a translation autarchy. "In the U.S. and Britain, only 3% of commercialised books are translations, a figure that drops dramatically to 0.7% when considering fiction only" (Speciale, 2016: 31).

If we look at the statistics of foreign fiction translations into English, the first five languages with the highest volume of translated works (by number of copies) over the 2000-2012 period are:

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
France	77	82	82	97	93	95	92	80	117	99	84	109	110	1217
Germany	57	37	43	43	44	47	51	61	51	73	60	89	73	729

Spain	24	20	25	38	45	43	38	42	54	32	45	39	36	481
Russia	14	16	24	35	28	23	20	38	45	44	44	43	58	432
Italy	20	25	22	29	21	25	27	32	25	36	45	41	35	383

Source: British Library in Büchler & Trentacosti, 2015: 15.

Only 383 Italian novels were translated into English in 2011.

Of the total number of translation requests from English-speaking countries (United Kingdom, United States), they account for only about 5% of translation requests, the figure still being small in absolute numbers, though on the rise, since they increased from 5% to 8% in 2015. (Speciale, 2016: 30).

Yet we ask ourselves: if the English market does not request translations of Italian authors, how can foreign countries get to know Italian literature? One instrument is the ‘translation incentives’, a widespread practice in all European countries (not only European ones) which, by covering all or part of the translation cost, encourages foreign publishers to request a translation of an Italian author. The 2013 and 2014 data also allow drawing a geo-editorial map of the countries that issue requests for Italian translations (by number of works) and the countries towards which contributions have been directed.

In 2014, publishers who published in the Balkan countries (from Romania to Croatia, from Macedonia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Hungary; but we also added Poland and Estonia to the New European Countries area) requested 42% of the total (39% in 2013). European countries, i.e. Italian publishers’ “traditional” outlets, follow with 30% of works and 25% of the resources. Much further down the list we find other regions: the Asia-Pacific area (including Korea and Vietnam) with 13% of contributions to Italian book translations (8% of works); southern Mediterranean countries (from Egypt to Lebanon, from Turkey to Israel) with 10% of works and contributions. All countries have increased their requests while demand from the Latin American region (7% to 8% in 2013) and North America (4% to 3%) has gone down (Peresson, 2016: 29).

These figures pose a difficult dilemma. Should we guide the flow of translations to secondary markets which are undoubtedly being integrated into the European Union, following the principle of making

known and translating Italian authors in these countries that would otherwise be unknown or overly expensive to translate? Or should we direct them towards much closer English-language markets, betting on the fact that a translation into this language opens the door to a global dissemination of the author, story and publisher?

If we examine the peripheral situation of Italian works in Europe according to the criteria of Heilbron (1999) and Even-Zohar (1978), we observe that they are gaining ever more weight in the international translation system:

While in 2002/2003, 23% -24% of the works published in Italy were a translation of a foreign language, [placing Italy on the periphery of the European literary system], the data, ten years later, for 2013/2014 was 17.9%. (source: *Rapporto sullo stato dell'editoria in Italia* 2014), pointing to a drop of almost six percentage points over ten years. Meanwhile, the total number of 1,800 works of which the rights were sold in 2001 reached 4,914 in 2014. (Peresson, 2016: 26).

It is by observing the medium and long-term trends, however, that one can best appreciate how internationalisation dynamics are changing.

Over the last sixteen years (2003-2019), the sales of rights have achieved a much higher average annual growth rate (+23.5%). The drivers of growth turn out to be children's books and in recent years, fiction: together, they account for over 64% of the exports of publishing rights (AIE, 2020).

This trend reversal corresponds to specific publishing decisions that have chosen to focus more on Italian authors than on the translation of foreign authors (Scarabelli, 2016: 24). The second reason is related to the market's globalisation that we will come back to later: even the Italian creative sector has had to go back to the drawing board (from the author's conception of the story and characters to the sale of rights) following a mostly *cross-border* logic, as foreign publishers have become increasingly interested in Italian works (Peresson, 2016: 26).

4. Literature translated into the Italian polysystem: the case of bestsellers

We now turn to the difficult task of demonstrating the position of translated literature in the Italian polysystem. To this end, we deemed it was appropriate to explore certain domains belonging to the literary translation market, where, by definition, the trend towards

internationalisation is more visible. The domain we believed was the most suitable was commercial narrative fiction, specifically, bestsellers (Fouces González, 2011: 141-193).

To do this, we consulted Italy's 2018 bestseller booklist. The data collection and processing were based on sales figures collected by GfK, the multinational market research company which, like Nielsen, provides some of the major national newspapers with weekly ranking data of the best-selling works from a large, evenly distributed, nationwide sample of bookshops. Therefore, we added the weekly sales rates for each book, from the first week of November 2017 to the last week of October 2018, as provided by the *Corriere della Sera* each Sunday, to calculate the first ten works of the year.

During the first step of our analysis, we identified the percentages of national and translated literature to assess the consequences for national production. Second, we verified whether these authors, who were best sellers in their country, were translated into English. The idea was to analyse the status of translation between peripheral languages and the hyper-central language of English, a phenomenon that often implies a certain "transfer of legitimacy".

Italy's ten best-selling books in 2018 were: 1) Andrea Camilleri, *Il metodo Catalanotti*, Sellerio; 2) Fabio Volo, *Quando tutto inizia*, Mondadori; 3) Dan Brown, *Origin*, Mondadori; 4) Helena Janeczek, *La ragazza con la Leica*, Guanda; 5) Francesca Cavallo e Elena Favilli, *Storie della buonanotte per bambine ribelli 2*, Mondadori; 6) Joël Dicker, *La scomparsa di Stephanie Mailer*, La nave di Teseo; 7) Alicia Giménez-Bartlett, *Mio caro serial killer*, Sellerio; 8) Marco Malvaldi, *A bocce ferme*, Sellerio; 9) Me contro te (Luigi Calagna e Sofia Scalia), *Divertiti con Lui e Sofì*, Mondadori Electa; 10) Maurizio de Giovanni, *Il purgatorio dell'angelo*, Einaudi.

At first glance, the most striking fact is that six of the ten works effectively belong to fictional narrative, pertaining mainly to the thriller category and in series mode (Camilleri, Brown, Dicker, Giménez-Bartlett, Malvaldi, De Giovanni) and, to a lesser extent, to the more romantic-sentimental category (Volo, Janeczek).

In the first stage of our analysis, we determined the percentages of national literature and translated literature, respectively, obtaining a ratio of 60% national books vs. 40% translated books. The translated

literature centres on *noir*, with Dan Brown presenting for the fifth time the well-known protagonist of the *Da Vinci Code*, Robert Langdon; the French-speaking Swiss writer Joël Dicker proposes *The Disappearance of Stephanie Mailer*, a *noir* with a complex structure set in an American province in the 1990s; and the Spanish author Alicia Giménez-Bartlett offers another *noir* serial thriller, starring inspector Petra Delicado .

With *Le Storie della buonanotte per bambine ribelli 2*, Francesca Cavallo and Elena Favilli repeat the success of their first volume with interesting biographies of exceptional women. Although the authors are Italian, the conception and realisation of the book was developed entirely in the American market, where both writers have been working in recent years. The original English text *Good Night Stories for Rebel Girls* was published in the US in 2016 and the 2017 Mondadori edition, as well as the second book, are translations by Loredana Baldinucci. (Terreni, 2018: 174).

We counted Helena Janeczek as Italian. This German journalist lives in Italy and wrote a historical novel in Italian with biographical overtones about the photographer Gerda Taro. The protagonist and imaginary world are Spanish-German. The book won the Strega Award catapulting it to the bestseller list. It is interesting to note that the translated books belong either to the crime novel genre or to what we could call novels for and by women.

Before looking at the bestseller lists, we need to briefly address the question of translation in publishing practices. According to Bourdieu (1999), the practice of translation allows establishing a counterpoint between publishing houses within the literary field. Indeed, translation has different functions depending on the size of the publisher. While small-scale publishers operate as discoverers who invest their cultural and linguistic competence in avant-garde works, large publishers can afford international bestseller translations that secure sales.

While the publication of translated literature by small publishers is characterised by the quest for an increase in cultural capital, through the translation of foreign literature from peripheral languages, due to questions such as the low copyright cost and also the support of institutions in these countries, interested in their own culture being disseminated and recognised, thus succeeding in promulgating the culture of a literature recognised as peripheral and authors of literary quality. Another small-scale publisher strategy is to gain an advantage by dominating a niche, for example, the specialised publication of translations of languages of a certain region or of

a certain genre. Large-scale publishers that accumulate greater amounts of cultural and economic capital often translate acclaimed authors, almost always from English. (Bourdieu, 1999: 16).

Bourdieu's sociological approach reveals that selection and editing practices are not merely related to “taste”, but rather respond to the rules underlying the editorial field that structure them. Publishers deploy their very own strategies according to their position in the field, in relation to the capital at stake.

In fact, of Italy's ten best-selling books in 2018, under study here, the translations from English were conducted by Mondadori, a giant in the publishing world. Sellerio, a medium-sized publisher who succeeded in avoiding being absorbed by large-scale publishing groups by specialising in crime novels, has 3 works on the sales lists, all of them in the *noir* genre with a translation from Spanish. The other publishers with works among the first ten are: Guanda, an independent publisher that has belonged to a small publishing group for years and which is publishing this year the 2018 Strega Prize; and La nave de Teseo, a tiny publisher created in 2015. The latter's only option is to be a discoverer of authors in order to acquire cultural capital and is consequently publishing the translation of the very young French-speaking Swiss writer Joël Dicker.

Of the eight novels in the classification, six belong to the *noir* genre: three of the four translated works, and another three Italian works which reflect the variations of the *noir* genre. Among the Italian works, Camileri ranks first with *Il metodo Catalanotti*, returning with an umpteenth episode of Commissario Montalbano's series. Marco Malvaldi with *A bocce ferme*, proposes a new episode of the BarLume series, set in an imaginary town in Tuscany, which, far from adopting Dicker's *noir* tone, can be described as a “comic *noir* novel... yet another variation of the thriller genre, on the path to becoming in this case a comedy of manners.” (Terreni, 2019: 213-215). Maurizio de Giovanni reaches the sales list with *Il purgatorio dell'angelo*, where Commissario Ricciardi stands out for his paranormal gifts in the historical setting of 1930s Naples. “A historical crime novel dotted with paranormal phenomena. Through its elegant and thought-provoking language, it brings new subtleties to crime fiction.” (Terreni, 2019: 216).

Two works for young audiences complete the category: Francesca Cavallo and Elena Favilli with *Le Storie della buonanotte per bambine ribelli 2*, repeating the success of the first volume with a new series of interesting biographies of exceptional women; and Sofia Scalia and Luigi Calagna, with *Divertiti con Lui e Sofì*, an editorial product derived from their YouTube channel.

The question we could put forward is: what margin do best-selling Italian authors have to become visible in Europe through translations, especially into English, the hyper-central language? In a way, we could plausibly advance that thanks to globalisation, Italian authors may have a greater chance of appearing in the European language market. It has also been difficult, however, for Italian authors to achieve international recognition of their work via translations into the hyper-central language of English- though some progress has been made in recent years.

Let us now reveal how many of these ten best-selling books in Italy have been translated into English. Books linked to television do not arouse interest in themselves in other countries, once they are disconnected from the audiovisual medium. Thus, Fabio Volo and the Sofia Scalia and Luigi Calagna duo have not been translated into English. Of the remaining four writers who all publish in Italian, one work at least has been translated into English: Camilleri, since 2004, was the first to cross the border, translated by Stephen Sartarelli; Maurizio de Giovanni has been translated since 2012, by Anne Milano Appel and Antony Shugaar; Marco Malvaldi was translated in 2014 by Howard Curtis and the last and only translated novel by Helena Janeczek was produced in 2019 by Ann Goldstein.

Signs of possible change are not few. Italian writers are increasingly aware of the importance of making their work known abroad through coordinated initiatives. Two illustrations of this are: the birth of *The Florentine Literary Review*, a journal founded in Florence in 2016, which proposes unpublished texts by Italian authors in original language and in English; and the opening of the *Festival of Italian Literature* in London (October 2017) devised by two Italian writers who live in the capital (Marco Mancassola and Claudia Durastanti), in collaboration with the *Istituto Italiano di Cultura* and in association with the *Salone internazionale del libro di Torino*. (Scaffai, 2018: 47).

We wait for these initiatives (and others) to increase Italian literature's symbolic strength, shedding light on its identity and role outside Italy. Meanwhile, the situation remains contradictory. Italian literature translated abroad has indeed, over recent years, maintained constant figures, but it does not have a central position, nor has it reached the level of appeal it had for example during the period of Neorealism. (Scaffai, 2018: 47).

5. The collective imagination in translation: Italian crime novels.

As we saw above, the best-selling Italian genre in Italy coincides with the most successful genre abroad

which unsurprisingly is the *crime novel*: especially in countries which benefit from a large group of readers curious to open up to other cultural horizons such as the German public. In Germany, authors such as Lucarelli, Camilleri and obviously Saviano are popular, in accordance with an image of an Italian nation that finds it difficult to move beyond the well-known stereotypes of organised crime and mafia (Speciale, 2015: 189-190).

In our era of *world literature*, *Weltliteratur*, “*République mondiale des lettres*” (Casanova, 1999) it would seem, at first glance, that some countries have become specialised in a very narrow segment of the production of global narrative fiction and that they export a certain “narrative model” (Sullan, 2016: 37). If we apply the subgenre filter, we can define which countries present a greater publication intensity in some of them, for example the black thriller/novel in Italy. This confirms that the genre element is an essential component of a given nation's “production of works for export”. The recovery of the genre and its relationship with specialised productions for export invites us to reflect on the continuity of some national data in this global era, which are much more present than one would have thought at first (Sullan, 2016: 44).

European crime novels, particularly Scandinavian ones, are booming, for example with works such as Stieg Larsson's *Millennium* Trilogy and Henning Mankell's “Wallander” (Albaladejo & Chico Rico, 2018: 125). But the *Italian noir* is also finding its place, inspired by the dark side of Italian society. The Italian black novel has recently regained its former splendour following the path opened by Andrea Camilleri.

In this way, we can postulate that in the Italian cultural polysystem, in the terms of Even-Zohar, crime novels translated from English are occupying a highly central or primary position. They establish themselves as the canon. The Italian crime novel is situated within this horizon of American inspiration and Niccolò Ammaniti is one of its clearest exponents. Indeed, young Italian writers are no longer inspired by the tradition or canon of prior Italian narrative. The presence of Gadda, Moravia, Pasolini, Calvino, Sciascia, to name but a few, can no longer be found. They look for their models in foreign narrative, especially the great influence of the French neo-polar writers, the politically committed American writers of the 1920s and today, the Scandinavian thriller. The linguistic and cultural model of a certain Italian narrative is thus rather translated literature, giving rise to the import of new poetics.

Some Italian writers have begun to focus on a certain genre, learning to model their writing to the tastes of the Anglo-Saxon market. Michael Connelly, Ken Follett, Joe R. Lansdale or thriller genre masters such as Stephen King have ostensibly created a following and generated proselytes: “the mysteries of Donato Carrisi are consciously conceived with a very “American” rhythm, structure and writing (Scaffai, 2018: 48), in addition, the Italian *noir* is highly sought after, especially in France and Germany [making it a suitable genre for translation] “literature that does not fit into a genre or is not oriented towards entertainment is not translated as easily.” (De Santis, Grattoggi, 2016).

As we have seen, among the 10 best-selling books of 2018, three out of the six in Italian language are thrillers and of the four translated, three belong to the *noir* genre. This implies that translated literature’s reference is not foreign literature generally, but rather a certain genre of foreign literature translated into Italian, previously selected by publishers. Therefore, this foreign literature is perceived from a perspective that is filtered by the national publishers’ market.

Consequently, it is possible to regard some translated literature, in this case thrillers, as a driver of the transformation of Italy’s receiving literary system. We must bear in mind that a national literary system constantly feeds off translated literature, appropriating it and (re)producing it. Thus, reconstructing publishers’ economic and symbolic logic of selection and import is of great interest. As we are witnessing, this “recognised translated literature” can be interpreted as

a powerful driver of change in the destination literary field. It can often be more powerful than the “autochthonous” expression, giving rise to new poetics and new canons. In this way, a future history of Italian literature will be inseparable from a history of Italian “translated literature”.

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The Cultural-rhetorical Construction of Marginality in the Spanish Stand-up comedy: Race, Origin and Sexual Identity⁹⁴

José María Rodríguez Santos

Abstract: Stand-up comedy is a genre that sometimes draws on marginality as a strategy for the creation of humoristic texts of social criticism. In this work, we will focus on those texts whose main theme is the social exclusion situations that are caused due to race issues, origin or sexual identity, based on the work of comedians such as Yunez Chaib, Asaari Bibang or Elsa Ruiz, among others. The analysis of these texts will take into account the theoretical basis of Cultural Rhetoric.

Keywords: Cultural rhetoric, cultural-rhetorical communicative code, marginality, stand-up comedy

Since the Greek comedy that Aristotle (1974: 1449a31-34) defined as “*imitación de personas inferiores*” in which “*lo risible es parte de lo feo*” not only physically, but psychically and intellectually, up to the stand-up comedy that we are dealing with in this paper, there is room in literature for a long list of marginal characters whose main mission is to fulfil comic, parodic and critical functions to provoke laughter and, sometimes, to convey deeper contents (García Varela, 1994: 277). In popular social representations such as Carnival,⁹⁵ the marginalised becomes the protagonist who for a limited time can attack the dominant system of values. The laughter that provokes transgression and its liberating effects represents a temporary but paradoxically necessary chaos to maintain order. This license to express oneself with impunity against the system is concentrated individually and without time limitations also on the fool, a figure closely linked to the stand-up comedian in academic studies. Like him, the stand-up comedian makes

⁹⁴ This work is the result of the research carried out in the R&D Project “Analogy, equivalence, polyvalence and transferability as cultural-rhetoric and interdiscursive foundations of the art of language: literature, rhetoric and discourse (TRANSLATIO)” (Reference PGC2018-093852-B-I00), financed by the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities.

⁹⁵ At this point, it is appropriate to refer to the work of Rodríguez Pequeño (2001) on grotesque realism and carnival, in which laughter is mentioned as a constant in the demotion of what is elevated to the level of the material and the body that is produced through parody and popular language; these features corresponds to the stand-up comedy. The important works on the carnival by Caro Baroja (1986) and Huerta Calvo (1989) are also suggested.

use of a pact with the public by which he can say what cannot be said, and he uses rhetorical resources proper to the genre to do so.

In the stand-up comedy a single character on stage plays a skillful text of a persuasive nature that seeks the laughter of the audience. The comedian is usually the author of the text pronounced by the fictional character he/she represents. However, there are many examples where the authors of the texts are not the ones who pronounce them.⁹⁶ Its main function is the entertainment, although it can also fulfil a social purpose of criticism of certain behaviours or events, as well as an anthropological purpose.

Meier and Schmitt (2017) point out four fundamental aspects of stand-up comedy that reveal the rhetorical potential of this genre. The first one is the consideration of this discourse as comedy, which implies the expectation and acceptance of entertainment. Laughter becomes the main objective.

Secondly, it represents a physical act in which the comedian stands alone on a stage, usually standing in front of a seated audience. This distribution of agents participating in a stand-up comedy act makes the comedian the prominent figure, capturing the attention of his audience. On the other hand, the predisposition of the audience to listen to the one who is giving the speech is a necessary condition for the achievement of other objective: the acceptance. Humour becomes the main strategy for the adhesion of the public to the comedian, to his humour, to his way of interpreting reality

Thirdly, considering the meaning of the term stand-up as the act of getting up, of standing up – it is no longer just a matter of standing up, as we pointed out earlier – the idea of movement is introduced. A movement from the comedian to the audience he tries to persuade to join in by laughing. It is a physical and intellectual movement of approach to make that audience identify with what is being communicated.

⁹⁶ In the Spanish TV programme, *The Comedy Club*, for example, well-known characters from the theatre, cinema or television performed texts written by the screenwriters of this famous programme. It is also possible to observe this in the case of Andreu Buenafuente, who at the beginning of his television programme plays a text that has been prepared by the scriptwriters' team. This is something common in the programmes known as late night.

And finally, a particular aspect that focuses the attention of this work, which is derived from the meaning of *stand-up (for)* as a confrontation, duel or defence against the dominant, where marginality can act as a tool for making visible and changing social realities. Although the achievement of the primary objective of laughter can be fulfilled through other mechanisms that do not necessarily constitute a message of assertion/claim, there are many examples in which comedy, through the marginalised character, serves as a vehicle for transforming objectives that transcend laughter and applause.

In addition to these more recent considerations on the rhetoric of the term stand-up comedy, earlier works such as that of Andrea Greenbaum (1999) point out that the comic narratives of this genre form an eminently rhetorical discourse, with a structure oriented towards persuading the audience to adopt certain ideological positions and, consequently, full of discursive strategies to that end. Among all these strategies, we are interested in those related to the classic concepts of *ethos* and *kairós*. On the one hand, the *ethos* as a means for the construction of the comic authority that is part of the identity of the comedian. And, on the other hand, the *kairós*, which supposes an adaptation derived from the evaluation of contextual factors, since the concrete situation, the environment, the characteristics of the audience and, especially those related to the culture.

According to Albaladejo (2016), culture is present in the entire rhetorical system. There is an inseparable relationship between Rhetoric and Culture that places us in what Albaladejo (2013, 2016) has called Cultural Rhetoric, and whose principles are based, firstly, on the role of the culture in Rhetoric to produce and interpret rhetorical discourses because of its connecting function between senders and receivers. And secondly, on the role of Rhetoric within culture, which includes the discourse analysis previously produced with the aim of establishing guidelines to create future discourses. This implies the consideration of the discourse as a product of transmission that generates a cultural baggage capable of influencing subsequent texts. Thereby, the *ethos*, which “posee un poder de convicción que es, por así decirlo, casi el más eficaz” (Aristotle, 2014: 1356a18-19), is also determined by this cultural component.

A strategy directly related to this classic concept of *ethos* is that known as *posicionamiento* (positioning) (Rodríguez Santos, 2019), taking as a reference the issues developed in the text and the public it addresses.

The levels that can be adopted in these positionings are three: inferiority, equality or superiority (Rodríguez Pequeño, 2017); and the values that define these levels depend on the specific cultural context. This context is constituted by the behaviours, attitudes and beliefs that are shared and recognised as acceptable or not acceptable in communicative, ethical, moral, ideological, economic or other terms. In the case of marginality, this is related to an accentuated level of inferiority in which the comedian is situated.

For marginality to exist, there must be a cultural centre and a boundary delimiting what is outside and what is inside. In other words, what is marginal, what is not and what is approaching. This centre, the boundary and the margins are dynamic and vary according to the cultural context of the audience, so that what at a given moment represents a situation of marginality or approximation to it for some receivers, for others may represent the centre of the culture that marginalises them. This variety of receivers and interpretations or *poliacroasis* is an essential feature of literary and non-literary communication and, therefore, also of stand-up comedy, which has a particularly heterogeneous audience. *Polyacroasis* is a term coined by Albaladejo (1998) which, from the Greek, refers, on the one hand, to *polýs*, *pollé*, *polý*, ‘many’, ‘numerous’; and, on the other, to *akróasis*, ‘hearing’, ‘action of listening’ (Albaladejo, 2009). *Polyacroasis* is an element of cultural Rhetoric that occurs when the same text is received by multiple receivers, so that each of them can make a different interpretation based on their own beliefs, ideology, social position, etc. Marginalisation is, in this sense, a culturally based construct whose comic effectiveness on stage depends more on the interpretation of the receiver than on the intention of the producer.

Undoubtedly, a key component of cultural Rhetoric in the construction of marginal discourse in stand-up comedy is the communicative cultural-rhetorical code (Albaladejo, 2016, 2019a, 2019b) that connects producers and receivers and being shared by both, makes possible the interpretation of literary works and rhetorical discourses as creations of the art of language (Albaladejo, 2019a: 564). Within this linguistic and referential code, figures and tropes are included, with special focus to metaphor. The cultural component is decisive in their construction and use, since the aesthetic and perlocutionary effects in search of laughter depend on the adequate interpretation by the receivers. For this reason, the metaphorical engine is at the centre of the theoretical model about

metaphor proposed by Tomás Albaladejo (2019a: 568), this engine is put into operation by the producer in the construction of the metaphor and by the receiver for its adequate interpretation, and that is maintained by the spoken or written text. Moreover, there are three other components that complete the theoretical model: (1) the metaphorical series formed by the metaphor itself, the symbol, the catachresis or metaphorical network, and other elements of a translational basis characterised by metaphoricity such as comparison or simile. (2) The mechanisms that intervene in the metaphorical construction, such as comparison, transference, substitution, interaction, combination and harmonisation. And (3) the context and society in which metaphorical production and reception occur.

In the construction of the marginal or marginality, as a rhetorical strategy the comedian can represent to a greater or lesser degree and with different objectives, the difference between sociological marginality and rhetorical marginality is important (Gilbert, 2004, 2017). The former is the result of a system that operates in the real world and whose consequences impact on the people who make up that social reality. Sociological marginality entails stigmatization, and those who are marginalized are often distinguished by some unchangeable trait such as gender, race, age, size or some form of disability or disfigurement (Gilbert, 2004: 6). Other features such as sexual identity, origin, behaviour, habits and customs, beliefs, religious or otherwise, ideology, intellectual level or membership of a particular socio-economic stratum can be added.

The stereotype of the stand-up comedian has also been constructed with features of sociological marginality: nightlife and disorderly life, loneliness, alcohol and other drugs consumption, troubles with emotional relationships, disdain for their professional and artistic activity, problems with the law, etc. This stereotype becomes an important resource to create rhetorical marginality which, unlike sociological marginality, is constructed in the text and in the performance and, therefore, can empower those who represent it and become a weapon for demand and social change, without this marginality necessarily transcending the artistic fact and having a reflection in the author's real world. In this way, it is possible to observe since comedians who fictionalise in different ways a marginality they also experience in reality, to comedians who represent a marginality

that only exists in the fictional text, on the stage, without that marginality being reproduced or originating in the real world.

The issues that are part of the stand-up comedy texts are influenced by culture. The presence of stereotypes and the shared knowledge that the same community owns is essential, since through them it is possible to achieve greater recognition by the audience of what is being told. These stereotypes, which are grouped here into two main types, can be both intercultural and intracultural. The first type is constructed through the contrast between two or more cultures and usually work from the logic of one's own culture. These will be the ones that attract most attention in our analysis. Intracultural stereotypes, on the other hand, are formed from the values, habits or customs shared by the same community. For example, it is very common to find those which show a confrontation between the avant-garde and the traditional to ridicule one of these two parts. The use of stereotypes of one kind or another with a comic purpose looks for making people laugh, the effects of which can be shaping or disfiguring (García Costoya, 2001). Shaping effects cause the one that transgresses the norm to be ridiculed. And the disfiguring effects provoke make the norm be ridiculed, taking it to extremes in which it loses its initial logic and becomes absurd. The representation of marginality can pursue either of these two effects. In cases where rhetorical marginality reflects sociological marginality, the desired effect with comic discourse is fundamentally disfiguring. However, when the marginality is rhetorical and responds to that traditional representation of the comic character, the effects are usually shaping.

In the Anglo-Saxon stand-up comedy, the representation of marginality with subversive purposes is wide and varied. The development of the genre since the second half of the 20th century and the characteristics of the North American society, made it possible to emerge comic figures such as Jackie Mabley, Richard Pryor, Margaret Cho, Ali Wong, or a long list of successful African-American comedians linked to the HBO programme Def Comedy Jam, to cite just a few examples. In all of them, marginality is a common feature of their performances: race, gender, origin and socioeconomic status are features that build rhetorical marginality into their performances. In the case of the stand-up comedy in Spain, whose development and expansion are much more recent, these features appear with greater profusion in recent years due to the presence of comedians who can transfer these marginal realities

that affect them to their texts, to do that they make use of the expressive rhetorical-cultural resources provided by the linguistic code.

In this work, we will show as examples of the construction of rhetorical marginality from the translation of sociological marginality some texts by Asaari Bibang, who we have already referred to in another work (Rodríguez Santos, 2017), Bianca Kovacs, Yunez Chaib and Elsa Ruiz represented in Phi Beta Lambda.⁹⁷ The four comedians give shape to that marginality from features such as race, origin or sexual identity. All of them also share a structural characteristic: these traits of marginality are noticed at the beginning of their texts, so that from the first moment they are presented as the main axes around their performances revolve. In order to do so, they usually use the cultural stereotype shared with the receivers to disfigure it, thus claiming full integration in the cultural centre; they also use the resources of gender such as dialogue and self-diegesis, as well as the use of different figures and tropes to convey, through the cultural-rhetorical communicative code, the aesthetic, comic and claiming effects they seek.

In the case of the Guinean comedian Asaari Bibang, being black and a woman are the main reasons on which marginality is shaped. This can be seen in her performance in 2020:⁹⁸

Qué malos son los prejuicios, ¿no? No, lo comento porque hay gente que se piensa que como soy negra tengo algún tipo de sensibilidad especial para ciertos temas y... no. Yo voy por la calle y me encuentro a los chavales esos de las ONGs y yo tampoco me paro.

–¿No quieres cambiar el mundo?

Digo: –No, quiero cambiar un bolso. ¿Me dejas pasar?

–Si solo nos tienes que dar tus datos personales y un número de cuenta. Es para las niñas de África.

⁹⁷ Once finished the stand-up comedy recordings by the television channel Comedy Central, Antonio Castelo is organising, through a project called Phi Beta Lambda, the recovery of stand-up comedy recording sessions with comedians who perform in Spain. In this project, unlike the one carried out by Comedy Central (previously at Paramount Comedy) or El Club de la Comedia, the texts of the comedians are not revised by a script coordinator, nor are there scriptwriters who produce texts for them to be represented by others. The different recordings are available on the Phi Beta Lambda YouTube channel:

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCFKcIYyLxfQBAD4r0Bq1RfA>

⁹⁸ Available at: <https://youtu.be/NVzIL-YV8iI> (12/05/2023).

Digo: –La última vez me dijiste lo mismo y no me ingresaste nada, hija de puta.

As we pointed out earlier, from the beginning of the performance it became clear that her status as a black woman is the main reason for marginalisation. Based on the stereotype according to a person who suffers from a certain marginality has to be an activist for change, the comic character disfigures it by exposing her own experience, which coincides with the usual behaviour of those she considers to be integrated into the cultural centre: “me encuentro a los chavales esos de las ONGs y yo tampoco me paro”. To achieve the comic effect, she uses the referred dialogue in direct style with a fictitious character, a girl from the NGO, with whom she introduces the parallelism constituted by “¿No quieres cambiar el mundo?” and “No, quiero cambiar un bolso” which suppose a contrast between the allusion to a serious matter expressed through metonymy “cambiar el mundo” against another more frivolous and superficial one, without using the metaphorical sense of the first term of the parallelism. The continuation of this dialogue includes a new punchline using the concrete cause of the girls of Africa and taking up again the explicit expression of her marginal identity.

In the same text, we can find again a feminism demand message based on the same features: woman and black. In this case, the comedian introduces certain affectionate names (chocolatito, bombón) used by her ex-partner. These are metaphorically created by sharing the semes colour and sweetness with the comic herself in this context of sentimental relationship, which leads to an analogy between black women and the Christmas sweets, characterised, among other, by chocolate:

A mí me pasó un poco igual con mi ex, ¿sabes? Que todo el mundo sabía que era gilipollas menos yo. Y eso que me llamaba cosas como caramelito, chocolatito, bombón... Y a mí me gusta sentirme una mujer, no un surtido navideño, no sé si me explico.

Finally, at the end of the text it is showed a denouncement of racism through a famous South African figure for his fight against apartheid, Nelson Mandela. A young man’s questioning the comic after a performance is used to introduce her anti-racist claim by using irony and the apparent paradox of a man not properly rehabilitating himself (race is obviously unchangeable) after so long in prison.

Nelson Mandela fue un activista sudafricano que estuvo 27 años en la cárcel solo por ser negro y salió negro. Es el peor caso de reinserción de la historia.

Another case of marginality derived from the origin is the one we can see in the Romanian comedian Bianca Kovacs. The cultural stereotype based on a certain Romanian population serves as a starting point for comics to present themselves as different. This stereotype identifies the Romanian population with criminal activities such as theft, in which she insists; other activities they perform at traffic lights to collect money such as cleaning the windshields of vehicles that stop; the taste for gold teeth, a false sympathy with the aim of stealing or prostitution, in the case of the female population.

Soy rumana. Sé que hay más rumanos en la sala, voy a actuar con el bolso ¿vale? No me fío.

Yo soy una rumana diferente, yo compro en Zara. Y hay gente que me dice: –¿Qué tiene de diferente? Digo: –Comprar.

Que yo me encuentre una cartera y la devuelvo. El dinero, no.

El parabrisas de mi coche me lo limpio yo sola, señores. Y sé que os lo estáis preguntando, no tengo dientes de oro. Los tengo pedidos.

–Tengo una chica en casa, es de tu país, pero ella es simpática. –Lo que no sabes es que la simpática se acabará llevando todo tu cobre.

El otro día, paseando por Montera escuche a dos españoles diciendo: –Todas las rumanas son putas. Digo: –¡Eh! Que os estoy entendiendo. Les cobré el doble.

El otro día después de un *show* me espera un paisano mío y me dice: –Flaco favor nos haces con tus bromas. Luego me devolvió la cartera.

As can be seen, one of the most widely utilised resources is the continuous use of referred dialogues with an undefined interlocutor, whose function is to provide a link for the comic punchline. This punchline is sometimes expressed through a rhetorical figure as a vehicle to reinforce the comic effect, as in the case of the polyptoton “yo compro en Zara/Comprar”. In other cases, surprise is sought through the paradox: “El dinero no”, “Les cobré el doble” and “Luego me devolvió la cartera”. Thus, what might initially lead to claiming and explicitly breaking the stereotype, finally becomes a reinforcement of the marginal identity for humorous purposes.

In the third example, Yunez Chaib deploys a whole rhetoric of the marginalised with disfiguring objectives based on his Arab origin and its relationship with the stereotype of the terrorist, as can be seen in different parts of one of his performances at *Phi Beta Lambda*.⁹⁹ This begins with an introduction in which key identity elements such as name (Yunez) and origin (Arabic) are highlighted by repetition. The paronomasia in Spanish between his name “Yunez” and the North African country “Túnez” is the generator of the humour and, at the same time, it shows the cultural marginality, causing that his own identity is overshadowed due to the inanimate auto-correction tool integrated in an electronic device changes his name for the name of the country. The form of expression chosen is personalization (“el autocorrector me llama...”) and, therefore, the translation of human features such as the intelligence to designate – or to ignore in this case – a digital tool that constitutes a cultural reference of a very specific period – its incorporation is relatively recent – and without whose knowledge it would be impossible to interpret such a figure of speech adequately. Moreover, this personification is the basis on which the underlying analogy is constructed based on the ignorance of the auto-correction tool and also of the people who cause their social marginalisation.

Me llamo Yunez porque soy árabe y mis amigos me llaman Yunez, porque mi nombre es Yunez y es un nombre árabe. Mis amigos me llaman Yunez, porque mi nombre es Yunez. Y el autocorrector me llama... Túnez.

Then, the comedian introduces an anecdote in which he explicitly relates what he considers a “experiencia racista”.

Cada semana vivo una experiencia racista. [...] Hace poco estaba en la cola de una estación de tren esperando en la máquina de tiques para comprar un tique. En la cola, delante de mí había dos señoras mayores que iban a sacar un tique, después yo y detrás dos chicas de unos 19 años, dos chicas jóvenes. Las señoras mayores no sabían sacar los tiques, se giran en busca de ayuda, yo me ofrezco, una de las señoras me mira y hace [gesto con la cabeza y sonido de negación]. La otra me obvia con la mirada, mira a las chicas que tengo detrás y le dice a su amiga vieja: «Estas niñas nos ayudan seguro». Y a mí me ofendió eso y me acerqué como: «Eh, que yo puedo ayudar». Y una señora se gira y me dice: «Respete la línea, señor». Cuando una vieja te dice «Respete la línea, señor» es porque por la cabeza se le ha pasado «Respete la línea, puto moro» pero ha dicho: «No, eso mejor no, porque es una estación de tren y, bueno, los moros ahí hacen cosas...».

⁹⁹ Available at: <https://youtu.be/CSav0kEbQgM> (12/05/2023).

In this narration, that takes place in a train station, the author uses dialogues in direct style to justify the anti-racist claim. These characters are fundamentally characterized by the age factor, referring to them as “señoras” or “amiga vieja”, with which he tries to fix some behavioural characteristics linked to conservatism and the rejection of the other. This becomes even more explicit when through a parallelism the author replaces the vocative “señor” of the expression pronounced indirectly by one of these characters with the pejorative term “moro”, which the author reinterprets from his point of view. The consolidation and link with the stereotype of the terrorist is introduced at the end of the block, when in his interpretation of the thoughts of the fictitious interlocutor, the comedian alludes through the aposiopesis to a historical event that the receivers have to reconstruct: the terrorist attacks that took place in Madrid on 11 March 2004.

If we eliminate the factors of origin and race, but we incorporate the sexual identity, it becomes necessary to refer to the transgender comedian Elsa Ruiz, in whose routines the translation of sociological marginality is very present. Elsa Ruiz has a show called *Pizza con piña*, which serves as a metaphor for her transgender sexual identity by relating the pizza dough to the female identity, and the pineapple, which usually generates rejection, to the male genitals. This metaphor would be incomprehensible if the cultural aspects that determine it were not taken into consideration, since in other cultural contexts it could happen that such a substitution were not possible because this famous dish of Italian origin does not exist with an ingredient such as pineapple, or that this ingredient is not valued negatively by consumers. Therefore, in order to the metaphor be properly interpreted by the receivers, they must share those features that the sender has used as fuel for the metaphorical engine in the production of the trope. As in her YouTube channel where she produces a serial called *Lost in Transition*, the issues she develops in her performances are closely related to her sexual identity and the claim to integrate this reality, which is currently still on the margins, into the cultural centre. In order to keep that sexual identity defined by the pineapple pizza always present, in addition to the explicit allusions to the definition of transgender, Elsa Ruiz uses a running gag in her routine on her male genitals. The marginality, coming from that stereotyped sexual ambiguity with which the comedian plays in the construction of her performance, is also represented rhetorically through the combination of a feminine appearance on which she puts the focus and those allusions to her male genitals as a counterpoint. In

her performance for *Phi Beta Lambda*,¹⁰⁰ Elsa Ruiz interprets a text in which the main issue is the description of a part of transgender person reality in which the social marginality that this sexual identity entails is made explicit, for which she initially uses an analogy between the process of changing sex and the process of obtaining a driving licence.

Ser una persona transgénero es bastante complicado, ¿vale? Aquí en España, primero te tienen que diagnosticar. Primero tienes que ir a la seguridad social y tienes que tener una serie de entrevistas con psicólogos y psiquiatras para que certifiquen que tú estás bien de la puta cabeza, y que entiendes los riesgos médicos y de exclusión social a los que te vas a someter. Yo lo llamo, por abreviar, sacarte el teórico de trans.

As part of the repeated allusions to her sexual identity, the comedian uses translational structures such as comparison or analogy through which she introduces the contrast between femininity and male genitalia.

Me molan los unicornios. Es mi animal favorito. Yo creo que es el animal que mejor me representa porque es un poquito infantil, como de fantasía y, a parte, yo me considero un unicornio, pero con el cuerno desplazado.

Las tetas para este tipo de gente son los manguitos que les permiten no hundirse en esa profunda y tenebrosa piscina que es cuestionarse su sexualidad. Y se quedan perdidos en la superficie diciendo: –No hago pie, pero floto.

In the first example, the focus of the comparison with the unicorn is the equivalence of the horn with the male genitals which, as we have already indicated, is a constant during the text. However, in the second case, the allusion to female attributes are the starting point of a deeper analogical reflection that identifies the questioning of heterosexuality with a “profunda y tenebrosa” pool. This is socially risky for those who, as the story tells, want to experiment with transgender people, and for whom such female attributes allow them to safeguard, at least partially, their heterosexual identity.

The stand-up comedy is a genre with a highly develop in Spain since the end of the 20th century. Its presence in theatres, comedy clubs and the media attract a large audience and, therefore, it has become a space for artistic creation based on language to entertain and, also, to claim. This development has allowed comedians with very different characteristics to communicate their point of view about the reality that

¹⁰⁰ Available at: <https://youtu.be/jUDEbXbbHEc> (12/05/2023).

affects them, making the represented marginality adopt new forms of expression that were unusual until then. Being a cultural construct, the rhetorical-cultural resources of linguistic expression acquire a special relevance for the connection between producers and receivers, since such resources are put by the authors at the service of the two main purposes they pursue: laughter and claiming from the margins.

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Cultural Identity and Metaphors of Disease in Literature

María Victoria Utrera Torremocha

Abstract: This article argues that the vision of illness in literature is a sign of cultural identity. In this sense, disease in literature corresponds to a cultural and social model and often becomes a metaphor that identifies social problems and deficiencies or that claims personal authenticity. Whether collective or individual, metaphors for disease in literary and non-literary discourses point to a series of ideological and value implications that are rooted in a given culture.

Keywords: illness, metaphor, culture, literature, identity.

Metaphorical generation and interpretation are processes generated by the cultural aspect of Rhetoric, and are therefore related to the field of Cultural Rhetoric (Albaladejo, 2013; 2019a; 2019b), which is itself linked to General Textual Rhetoric (García Berrio, 1984) and to Studies in Culture (Albaladejo, 2019c: 562). Within this theoretical framework, the present study focuses on certain cultural aspects of disease as a rhetorical device in literary texts (Albaladejo, 2019c: 563). Scientific knowledge and, more specifically medicine, has traditionally featured as a socio-cultural reference in many essays and literary texts.

On October 12, 2020, on the occasion of Spain's National Feast, the traditional military parade was replaced by an austere celebration at the "Plaza de la Armería", within Madrid's Royal Palace, just the site where the victims of coronavirus had been honored earlier on, in July. Members of the Spanish Royal Family along with some of the highest authorities in the country were present at that event, even if their number had been limited because of the pandemic. Some representatives of the Spanish National Health Service attended the celebration too. The role of health workers, already hailed as heroes in the July tribute to the virus casualties, had also been emphasized by journalists and politicians throughout 2020. The fact that health workers were asked to attend a military event points to a warlike view of the COVID-19 pandemic, a view also held by people in other countries. Doctors and nurses, together with such public servants as members of the police or the fire department, were regarded as soldiers at war against a virus in an unevenly matched combat, the sick and the dead

being their casualties. A tweet from the Ministry of Defense—whose minister is Margarita Robles—confirmed that the country’s top priority was war against COVID, a struggle in which all citizens should be involved in order to overcome the disease. Various foreign leaders shared a similar view. Ms. Angela Merkel, for instance, in her speech of March 18, 2020, pointed out that the new virus was Germany’s greatest challenge since World War II.

War imagery has a long tradition in the medical and artistic fields. Various metaphors have been employed to explain a disease’s process. In medical terms, the presence of a pathogen is often viewed as an invader, an enemy the immune system tries to repel with the help of drugs. Literature has repeatedly dwelled on the idea of disease as an invader that has to be driven out. Epidemic stories all seem to point in that direction, as it will be shown below.

If the war metaphor with regards to COVID-19 is deeply ingrained in society, the same rings true for other diseases like cancer, mental illness or AIDS. Nevertheless, in the case of coronavirus, as in other types of plagues, war images are not only employed to refer to the very individuals who have to fend off the sickness, but to all members of society, at war against a common enemy. Hence, the politicians’ constant calls for patriotic unity and solidarity in order to defeat such serious threat.

This idea is certainly linked to that of a welfare state in which health is considered a common good, the individual is regarded as being part of a strong social framework and scientists are considered trustworthy. In other types of societies however, it is a common belief that nature must take its course and people should overcome all diseases or plagues either by praying to their gods or through their own physical resources. Contrary to our own enlightened, modern approach, a primitive, naturalistic view prevails in those societies. Failure at acknowledging the disease or its medical treatment may have another, more pragmatic origin: the belief that economic gain and the functioning of the current global system are placed well above any personal interest. In those cases, there is a certain ideology that permeates all discourses. In this manner, the disease itself and the way people deal with it become a social and ideological issue.

Philosopher and psychiatrist Karl Jaspers explains the influence exerted by certain diseases at some specific moments in history, and the way

disease is viewed depending on the cultural background. With regards to schizophrenia, for instance, he discusses the impact of some schizophrenic artists and writers on twentieth-century aesthetics. Whereas hysteria had been considered of paramount relevance in the past, up to the 18th century—the case of Saint Teresa, for instance—the spirit of the modern age—more prone to dreams and to the mysterious, the inner life and the primitive—became more interested in schizophrenia (Jaspers, 2001: 258). The significance and the very meaning of disease may vary according to current social and cultural values. A similar approach is held by Michel Foucault in his historical and social study of madness (Foucault, 1964). In this regard, as Karl R. Popper (1994) points out, all studies and facts relating to medicine should be viewed within its own historical context, and the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity should be considered as well. As Luis Rojas Marcos highlights, our cultural background determines the way we perceive our experiences. He considers that such feeling as optimism is presented in a negative light in Europe, owing to a long philosophical tradition: Hobbes, Hume, Voltaire, Kierkegaard, Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, Sartre, and so on. Similarly, “la visión de la enfermedad y las metáforas que se generan a partir de ella tienen un profundo asiento cultural” (Rojas Marcos, 2020b: 36).¹⁰¹ In this regard, the difference between hysteria and neurosis, linked respectively to women and men, the concept of madness and melancholy in relation to creativity, or the connection of epilepsy to sacredness, are clear instances of that. In many cases, disease achieves a special, social, communal significance that turns its very concept into

¹⁰¹ “The view of disease and the metaphors that go with it are ingrained in their own cultural background” (the author’s own translation). Rojas Marcos states in a recent interview: “Ejemplos de enfermedades de reconocimiento relativamente reciente con profundas connotaciones sociales y culturales incluyen el SIDA, la demencia de Alzheimer, la anorexia, la bulimia, la obesidad, las adicciones y el TDAH. El significado de estas dolencias y su tratamiento hacen brotar un sinnúmero de enjuiciamientos y debates basados en costumbres, valores sociales y principios culturales. Y esos juicios o prejuicios varían dependiendo de la enfermedad en cuestión, así como la edad, el sexo, el estado civil y la clase social del paciente que la sufre.” (Rojas Marcos, 2020a: 222-223). “Examples of newly acknowledged diseases with deep social and cultural connotations include AIDS, Alzheimer’s dementia, anorexia, bulimia, obesity, addictions, and ADHD. The significance of these ailments and their treatment give rise to countless opinions and debates based on customs, social values and cultural principles. Those opinions and prejudices vary depending on the type of disease, and also on the patient’s age, sex, marital status and social class.” (the author’s translation).

a sign of individual character, activity or social paralysis. Needless to say, this view helps create new metaphorical constructs from specific diseases.

Certain metaphors help explain the disease and its functions—the war images with regards to COVID-19, for instance—but the disease itself can also be used as a social or individual metaphor. Political and social unrest is commonly expressed through disease images. In this regard, José Ortega y Gasset describes Spain’s historical problem, that of being a fragmented, decadent society, as a disease –the “grave enfermedad que España sufre”¹⁰² (Ortega y Gasset, 2002: 89). Spain’s lack of moral values and, above all, its lack of a united national spirit together with its hatred of its most gifted citizens seem to be some of the symptoms of that disease. In Ortega y Gasset’s opinion, Spain would have never been truly healthy, its decay originating in the “alma misma de nuestro pueblo”¹⁰³ (Ortega y Gasset, 2002: 207). Thanks to the medical discourse, the idea of disease as a sociopolitical image is a recurrent feature in the Western literary tradition.

In the Hippocratic tradition, health has to do with man’s inner balance of the bodily humors, and also with the harmony between man and nature.¹⁰⁴ Likewise, illness is the result of internal and external disorder. Even if Plato states in *Phaedrus* that the sole concern of the Hippocratic medical view is the body itself, Hippocratic physicians did also pay attention to the psyche and to man’s environmental circumstances, as it may be noticed in such treatises as *On the Nature of Man* or *Regime*. In this regard, inner and physical balance is linked to moral conduct. According to those approaches, sickness is related to physical or mental imbalance, to an outburst of emotion, or to any other type of natural or social disorder. As is patent in Greek tragedy, *hybris* not only drives man to personal destruction, but also to disease. So, it is not surprising that disease, originated in external or internal disorder, can be linked to a sinful, decadent, immoral conduct (Laín Entralgo, 1982: 88-89). Its

¹⁰² The “serious disease Spain suffers from” (the author’s translation).

¹⁰³ The “very soul of our people” (the author’s translation).

¹⁰⁴ By means of the theory of humors, Hippocratic physicians highlighted several basic human types: phlegmatic, choleric, sanguine and melancholic. This theory had followers in many physicians and thinkers of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. A well-known example is humanist and physician Juan Huarte de San Juan (Torre, 1977: 101-102; 1984: 127-128).

use as an image for social and personal imbalance has certain moral, ideological, political and aesthetic connotations.

Beyond any individual consideration, the classical approach to illness as a moral problem also applies to plagues or epidemic diseases. In the Hippocratic works (*Epidemics*, for instance), a plague is explained as an imbalance of the social environment. In *On Airs, Waters and Places*, attributed to Hippocrates, for instance, a line is drawn between Europeans and Asians, as they differ from one another depending on several factors of which climate and geographical location are essential (López Ferez, 1986; García Gual, 1983). Not surprisingly, classical literature attributes the origin of plagues and epidemics to Eastern countries. The moral notion of disease and particularly of plagues is quite evident, for example, in Thucydides whose *History of the Peloponnesian War* mentions a plague originating in Ethiopia that ravaged Athens in 430 BC. The Athenian epidemic broke out in the midst of such natural phenomena as solar eclipses, droughts and earthquakes. Thucydides describes in great detail the terrible symptoms and the effect the disease had on the Athenians, often resulting in cases of improper or immoral behavior. A similar view on plagues recurs in various other works. The narrative frame of the *Decameron*, for instance, dwells on the moral attitude of the Florentines with regards to the plague of 1348.

The ethical aspect of diseases and plagues very often involves the commonplace topic of divine punishment. Susan Sontag has studied the influence that moral prejudices exert on the origin of plagues and epidemics, very often regarded as punishments inflicted upon corrupt societies. That topic, which recurs in various books of the *Bible*, is found in some classical works too. A plague, viewed as divine punishment, is described in *Samuel* (II, 24). Similarly, when Agammenon offends priest Crises's daughter in the first canto of the *Iliad*, Apollo takes revenge by sending a devastating plague on the Achaeans. The plague is presented as divine punishment for the unpunished murder of Laius in Sophocles' tragedy *Oedipus Rex*. Sontag, who has dedicated several works to the study of the disease imagery both in literature and in real life, focuses mainly on such diseases as AIDS, syphilis and cancer, but she offers an overview of disease as a recurrent topic in Western literature and thought (Sontag, 1990: 39-40).

The moral issue is a common topic in most epidemic stories (Sánchez Lozano, 2019: 53ff.). A favorite topic with regards to diseases that result in death is that of the plague. Owing to its horrifying death toll the very term *plague* has become synonymous with all sorts of collective disasters,¹⁰⁵ to the extent that it is employed as a synecdoche to refer to other epidemic diseases, such as cholera or AIDS. That is the case, for instance, of Gabriel García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, as the inhabitants of Macondo suffer from the insomnia plague.

Epidemic stories usually address the topic of man's mortal nature which is normally cast in a mythical, tragic light, with some obvious moral implications. That is quite evident, for instance, in Daniel Defoe's *A Journal of the Plague Year* (1722), which deals with the outbreak of the bubonic plague in London in 1665, in Alessandro Manzoni's *The Betrothed* (1827), about the 1630 Milanese plague, or in Poe's allegorical tale "The Mask of the Red Death" (1842);¹⁰⁶ also in Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice* (1912), about cholera, in Margarite Yourcenar's *The Abyss* (1968) which is set against the social background of a plague, and of course in existentialist author Albert Camus's novel *The Plague* (1947) that deals with a bubonic plague in Oran. All those stories take place in the past, though there are certain dystopian narratives set in a future age, such as Mary Shelley's *The Last Man* (1826), or Jack London's *The Scarlet Plague* (1912) which follows in the footsteps of both Poe and Mary Shelley.

Shelley's narrative is particularly interesting, for despite its clear apocalyptic, dystopian mood, *The Last Man* offers certain existential, philosophical undertones which tend to be overlooked. Like other epidemic stories, its ideological message is conveyed by means of the disease imagery. In the novel, the plague becomes a metaphor for personal loneliness and also for the moral and political failure of the main characters, whose utopian goals get eventually shattered because of the pandemic and the frailty of human nature. Mary Shelley's narrative seems to be highly critical with regards to utopian and revolutionary romantic principles, while remaining quite skeptical, in

¹⁰⁵ Plague "has long been used metaphorically as the highest standard of collective calamity, evil, scourge [...] as well as being a general name for many frightening diseases." (Sontag, 1990: 132).

¹⁰⁶ Perhaps influenced by Manzoni, Edgar Allan Poe also wrote the allegorical burlesque tale "King Pest the First" in 1835.

line with the philosophy of David Hume or Immanuel Kant (Sterrenburg, 1978; Mellor, 1988: 77ff., 136; Lokke, 2003). In this regard, locating the plague in a future age makes perfect sense, for in this manner there is little room for an idyllic life, either in the past—those of the family circle—or in the future, when dealing with human and political goals. Here, as in so many other epidemic stories, disease is viewed as an external pathogen that originates in the East and then becomes a sign of total devastation. War and struggle images permeate this work in which the plague is personified as Queen of the World and Destroyer of mankind.

The moral implications of the disease are quite evident in Shelley's novel, for its characters get infected as they deteriorate in a moral and social sense. As a destroying agent, Evadne becomes a synecdoche of the physical and moral pestilence, for she interferes in Perdita and Raymond's marriage. The plague has also a negative effect on the people's moral attitude, for city dwellers seek immediate pleasure through dissipation, parties, and debauchery, drawing out the worst traits of human nature. In this manner, the plague becomes synonymous with the monstrous: an active monstrosity in moral degradation and collective disorder, and a passive monstrosity shown through horrible images of piled up corpses. The way the author describes space dwells on the monstrous nature of the plague itself, for in deadly, quiet, numb Constantinople, a personified pestilence rules over the city from Saint Sophia's Church. Plague is described as a gigantic, monstrous ghost whose objective correlatives are the various natural, empty locations of the novel. As in other epidemic accounts, the disease imagery spreads over all places, since neighborhoods and cities become metonymies and metaphors for the calamity. In this regard, as in the old classical works, landscapes and locations help explain once again the extent of human calamities. The recurrent topic of epidemics originating in foreign countries is forever present. Thus, Venice becomes a labyrinthine sick city to all foreign visitors in *Death in Venice*; dead rats coming up from the underground invade Oran in Camus's *The Plague*; the London plague in Defoe's work comes as a *visitor*.

The metaphorical use of disease suggests certain aesthetic implications. Mary Shelley's ideological critique of Romanticism and her defense of balance, morality, and health are not alien to the traditional literary view of sickness. In this sense, according to Horace's *Ars poetica*, artistic and literary works must be ruled by harmony and balance whereas any

outbursts of violent attitudes and feelings, or the chaotic world of nightmares, ought to be banned. In the Horatian poetics, mimetic consistency should rule out all absurd, meaningless images, which are significantly compared to a sick man's dreams ("velut aegri somnia") (Horace, 2010: 87). Thus, Horace's aesthetics seem to run parallel to the classical medical view which recommends natural balance as the key to a healthy body, whereas chaos and disorder bring about disease.

According to the logic of Horace's poetics, it seems that aesthetics and its moral implications are directly related to the duality ancient-modern, classic-romantic. In this regard, the disease topic becomes an important aesthetic source of inspiration in literature and the arts, as disease is always a disruption of the established order and natural harmony (Aullón de Haro, 2000). That is why disease, assumed as a metaphor, may give rise to a new type of literature that breaks away from conventions and classical patterns (Utrera Torremocha, 2015). Johann Wolfgang Goethe's distinction between the classic and the modern must be considered within this framework, for he identifies the former with health and the latter with disease in his conversation with Eckermann of April 2, 1829. The difference between classical and romantic poetry is also based on other similar concepts such as order and harmony versus chaos and disruption, an ideal beauty versus the grotesque, light versus sublime darkness and abyss, social order versus individual genius, reason versus madness, good versus evil. That is to say health versus disease.

In this manner, disease achieves both a moral and an aesthetic significance. That implies that illness is cast in a positive light in the works of romantic writers, since it becomes a feature of the individual, regardless of the nature of the disease. That would also explain the artistic implications of a disease such as consumption (T.B.). According to Susan Sontag, consumption came to be regarded as beneficial since it dissolved the body but developed the mind, thus enlarging its psychological power. That is why certain authors tended to associate consumption or tuberculosis with a special sensitivity in the case of artists and writers. On the other hand, being healthy could be regarded as a banal, vulgar state. In this sense, Novalis, Blake, Poe, Gautier, Nerval, Byron, Shelley or Keats linked illness to poetic creativity, introspection and a visionary personality (Sontag, 1990: 25-31). Illness would lead to an enlightenment of the mind and, subsequently, to an open, rich imagination and creativity.

The new view brought about by Romantic poetics often entails the disruption of some well-established categories within the traditional literary canon, categories which up to then had been considered immutable. The relevance of concepts such as the sublime, the infinite, the unconscious, the mysterious, the hidden, dreams and nightmares brought about an idea of the arts in which chaos, disorder and the bizarre played an active role. From that moment onwards, disease, death, evil and, above all, the explicit subversion of classical balance and harmony became quite significant and got integrated into the very concept of beauty. The modern aesthetics of the antithetical, the bizarre and the grotesque supported by Victor Hugo or Charles Baudelaire must be viewed in this context, in which disease becomes an important item in a somewhat new, revolutionary literature, and both writers and artists are regarded as sick people. The new aesthetics is also linked to big cities and to the *ennui* of modern life (Steiner, 1971; Culler, 1989; Jauss, 1989). And that *ennui* becomes essential in the new writers' identity, for it is at the very root of their own creative impulse, very much like melancholy had been in previous authors. And it is in this context that illness becomes a defining trait for the new artist. It is also an ideological and social paradigm: illness is now considered a key feature in the rebellious mood of writers and artists, who pose as revolutionary, anti-religious, forever engaged in a personal inner crisis. Ultimately, the notion of the artist as a sick man parallels that of *homme révolté* put forward by Albert Camus (1951). That is why disease can also be related to satanic dandyism and to the praise of evil and the strange, as can be noticed in Charles Baudelaire's poetics of dissonance, or in Arthur Rimbaud's visionary, wild poetics. In both cases, deformity stems from the monstrous, just precisely to show the intellectual superiority of the artist, who is a sick though untamed person. There are moral issues at stake here too, but the subversive moral of the new writers rejects all previous social and aesthetic standards.

The concept of moral degeneracy associated with a sick, decadent literature is recurrent throughout the 19th century. New literary forms and the breaking away from old classical aesthetic standards are identified with imbalance and delirious linguistic expressions (Deleuze, 1993: 9), as well as with monsters, the devil and evil imagery. The new artistic goals are permeated by the outlandish, gruesome and decadent, hence the model of the decadent artist as a sick man, as may be noticed, for instance, in such emblematic decadent icon as Duke Jean Floressas des Esseintes, the main character in the novel *Against Nature* by

Huysmans. However, the great innovation in *Against Nature* is not the fact that des Esseintes is a sick man, but rather that he is a *névrosé* who purposefully regards his own sickness as an essential part of his artistic side. Neurosis has become a powerful source of knowledge to him (Livi, 1976: 61-63). Rubén Darío, who deeply admired the character, honored him in a chapter of *Los Raros*, in which he rejects the opinions on neurotics expressed by Max Nordau in *Degeneration* (Darío, 1950: 461). Other heroes, created both before and after Des Esseintes, are presented in a somewhat decadent, morbid light; for instance, Mikhail Lermontov's Grigory Alexandrovich Pechorin, Ivan Goncharov's Oblomov, Flaubert's Frédéric Moreau, Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, or Ramón María del Valle-Inclán's Marqués de Bradomín. Faced with the idea of degeneracy, the *névrose*, that is, the great disease of that century, became the sign of an evident intellectual superiority in the works of several 19th-century writers.

According to Sontag, disease is praised in a particularly daring and ambivalent manner in Friedrich Nietzsche's *The Will to Power* and several other works of his. In Nietzsche's view, disease can be a cultural and social alternative, a superior means to access to knowledge, a greater category of health, linked to higher intellect and superior artistic insight. He considers it unlikely being an artist and not being sick, and agrees with various other contemporary authors who point out the clear relationship between illness and an artistic, spiritual, visionary insight. André Gide, for instance, includes Dostoevsky in a group of very singular men such as epileptics, visionaries or prophets to which Muhammad, the prophets of Israel or Luther would belong. Dostoevsky would also appertain to a series of disturbed, suffering writers such as Nietzsche, Rousseau, Socrates, Saint Paul or Pascal. In Gide's view, being a genius is synonymous with being neurotic, for he believes that writers who suffer from a particular disease are able to fully develop a different, unique perception of reality which enables them to set the basis for new literary and artistic concepts and forms (Gide, 1981: 174-175).

This cultural perception of the nineteenth-century artist has to do with the new moral and social landscape in which such concepts as the sublime, the bizarre, and the monstrous—that is, ideas relating to big cities, mechanization in the industrial age, the aesthetics of ugliness—are essential. Monstrous deformity becomes an aesthetic, ideological category which is associated with disease and evil, to which the motif

of the “double”, whether of an interior or exterior nature, may be added, thus becoming a metaphorical image of one’s own identity. That is why human nature can be shown through the double in Stevenson’s *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. In this work, a scientific experiment causes the main character’s inner and outer transformation. Immoral conduct and evil practices usually go together in that kind of symbolic personifications. In Kafka’s *The metamorphosis* the main character’s sickness give rise to Samsa’s awesome transformation into a monstrous insect and to a metaphorical spatialization of both individual and social consciousness. However, the insect, K.’s “double”, is not linked to a purely devilish personality.

The concept of the double acquires a particular interest in Dostoevsky’s novels, in which disease functions as a complex imagery of personal, family and sociopolitical calamity. As pointed out by Pareyson, Dostoevskian man is morally unstable (Pareyson, 2008; Berdiaeff, 1935: 26-28). Dostoevski himself explained that he tried to explore the depths of the human soul and all its contradictions, and that is why Steiner (1959) regards him as a metaphysician of the extreme. That could explain, perhaps, why his narrative is full of split personalities and sick contradictory characters. As in other cases, the perception of disease and mental instability go together with a particular concept of literary space as a metonymy of identity. According to Pareyson, Dostoevskian locations are indoor, inner, spiritual spaces: bedrooms, studies, attics, something that had already been noticed by Bajtin (1986) as he described the *chronotopos* of crisis in the author’s works, and the use of symbolic spaces to signify anguish and distress. Pareyson chooses Dostoevsky’s *Notes from Underground* as a particularly significant work to get to understand the author’s way of thinking, since it shows the revelation of the hidden man (Pareyson, 2008: 33). He also argues that all Dostoevsky does in his works is speak about the *homo absconditus*, which features in St Peter’s second Epistle (3,4) as *kryptòs ànthropos* (Pareyson, 2008: 37).

Unlike other authors, Dostoevsky does not praise disease as a means of liberation, nor does he consider it a superior type of knowledge. On the contrary, in his view, it is a symptom of social and personal decadence. In many of his novels, disease features not only as an individual trait, but also as a social evil that originates in the transgression of certain moral and religious principles. In this regard, *Demons* may be interpreted as a symbolic work with a social, moral and political

message. Rebellious, amoral Stavrogin is somehow an image of satanic perversion, which links this character with descriptions of disease and morbid, visionary states. Stavrogin's hallucination about the devil is not alien to the modern Nietzschean idea of the superman, for only the devil can challenge divine order. A quite nihilist Stavrogin stands for the decadent culture of modern times, forever threatened by evil forces, namely, by devils, as an image for such a sick, anti-religious society. That character's devilish hallucinations foreshadow those of other characters in future novels, similarly ill or mentally unstable. In *The Brothers Karamazov*, for instance, the triumph of evil and a nihilistic attitude are patent in Ivan who, like Stavrogin, suffers from hallucinations in which he is able to behold his personal devil, as a personification of his own sick, monstrous mind. Dostoevsky's works abound in devilish and evil images, which are normally associated with disease and mental illness, along with anti-religious attitudes and modern revolutionary political ideals.

This same figurative use of the devil as a moral double and as a sign of individual and collective disaster does feature in other authors. Under the influence of Nietzsche's philosophy, Thomas Mann often employs his characters' sickness as personal and social metaphors, and for that reason he also dwells on the idea that the sick are potential great literary creators, just as they are damned sinners: "My reverence for the intimates of Hell, the devout and the diseased, is fundamentally much deeper –and only therefore less vocal– than my reverence for the sons of light" (Mann, 1945: 2). In Mann's opinion, the work of great geniuses such as Nietzsche or Dostoevsky can only be understood as having originated in a sick inspiration and a life of suffering. His main interest lies in disease as greatness and greatness as a disease (Mann, 1945). For him, certain goals can only be achieved through illness and madness. His attraction to disease is evident in his novels, whose characters suffer from migraine, consumption or syphilis and, being geniuses, feel lonely and isolated, and that drives them to madness.

Nietzschean philosophy on evil and the disease of modern man is a nuclear topic in *Doktor Faustus*, which is an example of the merger of ideology, disease and Satanism. The novel has often been interpreted in a political view, in relation to the rise of National Socialism in Germany even if, as Luis Montiel argues, it encompasses a much broader subject, for it poses the problem of the artist's moral commitment. According to Montiel, the core of the story would be the Faustian pact with the devil.

In the case of Adrian Leverkühn, there is a clear difference between him and the character in Goethe's *Faustus*. Faustus' pact is explicit and willing, whereas in Mann's work the dialogue –and the pact itself–with the devil is caused by the character's neurosyphilis, which was the consequence of a sexual encounter fully consented (Montiel, 2020: 144).

Following in the footsteps of Dostoevsky, Leverkühn's dialogue with the devil dwells on the metaphysical, individual view of the *homme révolté*, devoted to inhuman, sinful ethical practices. His conversation with the devil somehow parallels those of Ivan in *The Brothers Karamazov*, or Stavrogin in *Demons*. Leverkühn, like those other characters, can see his demon because he is sick, as the narrator points out and he himself acknowledges. His delusions are those of a sick man who beholds in the *other*, as a double, the objective correlative of internal and external evil. Leverkühn's devil resembles Dostoevsky's as a personification of social evil and the protagonist's personal illness. The Nietzschean philosophy is present once again here because of the devils' praise of disease as an essential need in the act of creation. The artist is likened then to the criminal and the madman.

This view of sickness as the basis of creation is especially evident in relation to mental disease, which is often metaphorical for the individual genius, regardless of any sociopolitical connotations, as shown by the positive opinions on melancholy, neurosis or madness (Jaspers, 2001; Mauron, 1962; Clancier, 1973; Paraíso, 1994, 1995, 2020; Leal, 2002, 2020; Pujante, 2018, 2020; Utrera Torremocha, 2015, 2020). In any case, either with a subjective, individualistic bias, or with a political, social view, the illness topic in literature is determined by prevailing cultural and social values, thus acquiring a metaphorical sense in relation to morality, religion and politics. From all cases cited above it may be inferred that there is always a projection of cultural values and prejudices on all literary works. Likewise, those cultural items reveal the functioning of the “metaphorical engine” in the cultural- rhetorical communicative code connecting authors and readers (Albaladejo, 2019c: 561).

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The Rhetorical Nature of Dystopian Literature

Claudia S. Benito Temprano

Abstract: The rhetorical approach to genre studies has been widely explored by theoreticians in the field of Languages for Specific Purposes, who tend to analyse institutional or professional genres. However, given the continuity between non-literary and literary discourse proposed by Bajtin and emphasized by Todorov, it seems plausible to integrate a rhetorical analysis of literary genres, conjoining two separate traditions such as rhetorical and literary theories of genres which, as has already been stated by Devitt and Frow, are not so far apart as they could appear.

This paper aims to explore dystopian literary models under the assumption that, alongside certain thematic features, this genre is defined by recurrent rhetorical tools. It will focus on the highly convincing intention of dystopian narratives, that appeal to their reader's human identity to make them participate in certain open debates of contemporary societies.

Keywords: Dystopia, rhetoric, literary genres, literary communication, dystopianism

1. Literary and rhetorical theories of genre

Genre theory is perhaps one of the vastest fields of Literary Theory and has accompanied almost every theoretical approach to literature since Plato's first thoughts, as can be seen in the histories traced by García Berrio & Huerta Calvo (2015) or Schaeffer (2006). Although most traditional scopes consisted in the search for an adequate vocabulary to distinguish different categories of works to develop a better understanding of their inner building and their intertextual links, most modern developments on this subject have taken into account questions related to the institutional nature of genre and the consequences of generic expectations in the reception of aesthetic forms. Henceforth, genericity has become more of a socio-cognitive issue than a textual one and nowadays, theoreticians are more concerned with the way reading conventions change than with the correct adscription of particular works of fiction to their presumed generical tradition: it might be said that Genology has become a metatheoretical concern.

Duff's compendium on *Modern Genre Theory* (2014) can provide an insight on this shift from structuralism towards pragmatism, as it

includes the most representative texts of 20th-century thinkers about this topic. Most recent works such as Ryan's "On the Why, What and How of Generic Taxonomy" (1981), Fishelov's *Metaphors of Genre* (1993), Beebee's *The Ideology of Genre* (1994), Fowler's *Kinds of Literature* or Frow's *Genre* (2006) also insist on the necessity to focus on the communicational nature of genre, relegating taxonomy to a second position. Those approaches inherit in a way Todorov's distinction of "theoretical" and "historical" genres (1970), and make challenging assertions such as the following:

To confuse genres with their critical formulations is a serious error. Even the best descriptions cannot be identified with the genres themselves. For one thing, generic operations are partly unconscious. [...] For another thing, the changing and interpreting nature of the genres is such as to make their definition impossible (Fowler, 2006: 25).

Literary theorists seem unable to provide a coherent and complete explanation of a literary genre because each individual can only know a part of it. As an intersubjective construction, genre is inapprehensible, constitutes an entity that no one can grasp in its entirety. And yet we, as readers, are somehow capable of establishing which genre conventions does a literary text follow. Moreover, we can even correct another generic ascription of the text, valuing it as far-fetched or extremely correct: we have an operative knowledge on how to use generic conventions that comes both from our social environment and enculturation and of our previous reading experiences.

Given the assumption that generic conventions are invisible due to their conventional nature, it seems that there are only two options to delve into them: through an individual, cognitive study or through a sociological one. Cognitive semantics have provided fruitful insights and concepts for Literary Theory. In the genological branch, Spolsky's *Gaps in Nature* (1993) and Fishelov's articles (1993, 1995a, 1995b) are seminal works that explore, in an almost speculative way, how conceiving a piece of literature as related to a generic convention helps the reader to develop an interpretation. Genres are thought of as semantic prototypes, and literary texts are seen as instances modelled by those prototypes, that can be either central or marginal. Once the reader finds a hint that links the text she is reading to a prototype, she follows an interpretive path associated with the generic model, changing or correcting her previous assumptions if needed.

This version of how genres work on a cognitive level, although summarized and simplified, seems promising. The contemporary theorist is not expected to generate a perfect account of the sufficient and necessary conditions that a text needs to accomplish to be assigned a genre: she rather focuses on how a reader's ideas about genre influence her reading. Thus, she only needs to know the reader's conception of the genre, her "generic competence".

But how do we determine a reader's "generic competence"? It should not be forgotten that cognitive semantics is a *sociocognitive* approach, and its central unity of meaning (prototypes) are social structures, idealized cognitive cultural models (Freeman, 2009). A prototype is not an individual's mental image of a concept, but an intersubjective one. Thus, if we think of a genre as a semantic prototype, we necessarily need to look for communal agreements on our use of that prototype or, at least, think of ourselves as some kind of "ideal reader". And, from a sociocognitive point of view, we have to ask ourselves whether genre is a 'democratic' construction or an 'oligarchic' one, using Gardenförs (1998) terminology.

Most sociological studies of literary genres come from Marxist or Feminist theory, and for this reason, they are prolifically critical. Although innovative and eyes opening, those works often verge into historical and philosophical considerations over the more social analysis that we are aiming for here. Jameson's *The Political Unconscious* (1981) or the articles reunited in Eagleton's *Feminist Literary Theory* (2011) are good models for this kind of critical study. Mention apart deserves Altman's *Film/Genre* (1999) which, although restricted to the cinematographic sphere, makes an accurate and attentive description of the social environment that informed the industry's generic decisions and the later social effects of genres upon spectatorial communities. Altman's theory will not be further explored here following his remark that it is not a literary theory but a cinematographic one, and therefore its conclusions should not be brought to Literary Theory.

Bare of Jameson's and Eagleton's critical impulse, Swales *Genre Analysis* (1990), although focused on the teaching of English for specific purposes, provides an attractive account of the way genres in use are constantly revalued and positioned in a discourse community. This continuous observance of generic conventions is not always made

explicit, as Miller exposes (2005): it is created by recurrence, typification, and feedback, understood as authorized comments upon discursive uses capable of sanctioning or rewarding. Genre is, thus, a type of social action inscribed in a “way of life”, and its use is always goal-oriented, intentional: it does not imply uniquely a particular type of texts, but also processes of producing, distributing and receiving those texts (Kamberelis, 1995). It only exists as long as the discourse community finds relevant the set of communicative purposes and the conventions followed to fulfil them. The consensual nature of genre can be easily understood by relating them to speech acts, as has been proposed by Bazerman (2013). To be successful, texts (likewise speech acts) must fulfil certain formal, structural and situational conditions that can be considered generic restrictions. Then again, genres are not only regulative but constitutive (Bawarashi, 2000): they contribute to shaping our social actions, helping us recognize which activity are we immerse in or even creating a new kind of discourse for an unprecedented situation.

The definition of genre is somehow circular: awareness of the existence of a series of tacit agreements, regarding the production of a discourse oriented to a given purpose, defines the belonging of an individual to a discourse community. At the same time, texts belonging to a genre are constructed, shaping the rhetorical situations they occur into. For instance: a lawyer becomes so by knowing the conventions (some of which are discursive) that regulate court interchanges. Her skills regarding those conventions will qualify her as better or worse in her work, and will give her credit for sanctioning or welcoming interactions emitted by other individuals. Once she has become a full member of the community, passing from a ‘novice’ status to an ‘expert’ one, she will acquire the right and authority to modify the discourse genre that helped her reach her current position. On the other hand, genres such as the “defence” of a suspect, controlled by the lawyer’s discourse community, were created at the same time as the “defence” situation within a trial, and their shape portrays common values and rights held by our judicial system. Genre is, thus, a constitutor of social identity (Bawarashi, 2000: 353), as well as a product and constitutor of social actions. Berkenkotter and Huckin (1993) named this circularity with Gidden’s phrase: ‘duality of structure’, which clarifies the social significance of discursive conventions.

1.1. Methodological exchanges

Theoretically, Swales' appreciations can be translated to literary genre theory if we consider Bakhtin's explanation of literary genres as secondary speech genres (1986). Bringing down the wall that divides literary and rhetorical genres opens a new, fruitful field of inquiry for literary theorists.

Devitt (2000, 2014) briefly explores the applicability of rhetorical genre theories to literature. *Prima facie*, rhetorical and social views of genre would not apply well to literature, since their focus is on paratextual facts (function and situation), relegating form and content to a secondary level. But on another note, they fit current interests of literary theoreticians such as those alluded to before (Beebe and Fishelov, for instance). Some points of consensus commented by Devitt between both fields are: the need to define genres by what they are not as well as by what they are; the historical and dynamic nature of literary genres, which are classifications with specific purposes; the awareness that authors, audiences and critics partake in the definition of genres, which are "historical, institutional, cultural and situated" (Devitt, 2000: 701); a conceptual rather than formal approach to generic expectations.

So dissensus seems not to be a matter of epistemological ground, but a methodological disparity. Devitt herself points out the difference between both disciplines in their approach to generic categories:

Where rhetorical genre theorists often seek texts that typify a genre, examine writer's conformity to generic conventions, and study readers' roles in promoting generic expectations, literary genre theorists are more likely to seek texts that break the rules of a genre, to value writers who violate conventions, and to act as readers promoting unconventional generic readings. (Devitt, 2000: 704-705)

Although debatable, this observation informs about the value both rhetorical studies and literary theories usually assign to originality. Literary and professional discourses are valued according to certain cultural notions which are not always clear, but it can be certainly understood that, whereas innovation is priced in artistic endeavours, it is not equally considered outside the "art world". Nevertheless, Devitt points out the necessity of rhetorical theorists to acknowledge innovation outside of literature, noting that it is also positively valued in specific situations and distinguished from incomprehension of the generic rules.

The methodological enrichment of fields seems difficult to happen the other way around, since it is almost impossible to give a proper answer to questions about the function of literary genres and the communities associated (constructed and constructing) those genres. The strategies and theoretical constraints of literary theorists are of use to rhetoricians regarding originality, for instance, but it is not so clear how can rhetorical perspectives welcome in literary studies.

The empirical approach posited by authors like Schmidt (1987, 1982) links functionality to specific cognitive effects pursued by each genre, which is perceived in a certain way by all those who have received common literary socialization. There can be deviations in the perception of generic works, as there can be modifications of a generic pattern originated in innovative creative enterprises, but this theory aims to explain continuity over originality without muting the dynamic nature of social constructs: several social systems are overlapping, and when studying a genre, it must be understood that it is inscribed in a subsystem that does not affect to a whole society but to a speech community, an unspecific part of the social spectrum. Even when social systems are inherently conservative, younger audiences do not share generic expectations with older ones, although the literary system they attend to is not radically different from the previously existent.

Schmidt's theory is particularly interesting in the way it defines the roles that individuals can adopt in social action systems linked to literature: production, mediation, reception and transformation of literary communications are comparable with the activities of rhetoric speech communities: each role is associated with certain valued actions preestablished by previous settlements and, meanwhile, it helps define what is the correct engagement with literature and what can be considered literature pragmatically.

From this point of view, Schmidt understands that the literary system can be studied socially, observing how literary texts or literary communications relationship with those four roles are institutionalized: a thorough insight into the official or unofficial institutions that converge in the production, transmission, reception and transformation of a genre can be significant to understand the "literary communities" that conform it.

Some methods sketched by literary empiricists focus on the pole of reception and intend to reach quantitative results to shed light on the

way literature is co-created by the reader (Groeben, 1980). But to grasp the whole idea of what function does a genre fulfil in a social environment it is needed a holistic methodology that accounts for all four social activities involving literature and, more specifically, a literary genre. Although far away from the scientific purposes of the Empirical Science of Literature, Convergence Theory, posited by Henry Jenkins (2004, 2008) aims to explain how knowledge is created and distributed through different media in our society. One part of this theory is the recognition that online interaction takes over elder social communities and power structures, allowing for a participative culture in which every member has a voice to share and a partial understanding of what is going on. Internet is thus a sort of collective intelligence: a perfect tool to study cultural relationships between production and consumption (two new names that summarize Schmidt's agents of literary socialization) and brings up social reactions to what is happening in literature.

In the aim to integrate the theories here alluded (and oversimplified), I will approach dystopia as a media genre: I will understand that, although a literary or aesthetic genre, all dystopias are considered so because they fulfil certain expectations, serving a purpose socially stated. Theoretically, the evaluation of dystopias as good or bad responds to the degree to which texts can meet their generically determined goals, which are fixated by producers, transmitters, audiences and transformers of the artistic products (individuals who most often converge in contemporary online communities). A thorough internet search addressing the social perception of different products can make clearer the way these discourses are rhetorically produced, not by an individual but by a series of social agents that create needs and try to meet them with cultural products.

The analysis of data produced by social agents is not an exhaustive method, but it diversifies traditional studies and informs about the social power of genre that has already been acknowledged out of the literary field. Devoid of an extremely complicated methodological apparatus, internet texts and site designs purport a lot of information ready to be dug in.

2. Dystopia as a literary genre

It does not seem pertinent to discuss here the origins of dystopian literature or the poetics traditionally associated with the genre, given the rhetorical attitude we seek to adopt. To explain how this literary kind works, it can be stated shortly that dystopias are often considered “genre fictions”, at the same level as (and sometimes mixed with) science fiction or fantasy books.

As a basic, initial description, we can address dystopia as a written literary genre, thus produced by a literary author and received by an audience, which includes the description of a non-existent (fictional) society intertwined with narrative passages depicting an individual’s actions in that society. This initial description will serve as a starting point, contrasted by different perspectives found on the internet, that aims to show some indicators of the social value assigned to dystopian works.

Dystopias’ literary nature and the fact that they constitute written texts has an interesting effect on their rhetoricity, as author and reader rarely coincide in the same place. The occasion of the reception of the literary genre cannot be described as a recurrent and strongly typified one, as the communicative exchange does not respond to a stable pattern. There are some common traits given by the standardization of literary behaviours through literacy: it is now used to read individually, in silence and as a leisure activity (Manguel, 1996), but this way of confronting a text is extensible to almost every written piece of knowledge. So, the social activity linked to the dystopian reading needs to be more of a representative and inner (moral, sentimental, or political) action, in which the author represents in a certain way a fictional society and the reader reacts with some thoughts about the item represented: not in vain, Phelan emphasizes that narrating itself is an action that implies “the telling of a story by someone to someone on some occasion for some purpose” (1996: 8). As those actions’ effects are not explicit or visible, they cannot be inscribed in a specific locus: they must be implied from its symptoms, extracted from readers’ responses and exegesis.

2.1. The voice of producers: The author's opinion

When studying the deliverer of dystopic narratives, it might be useful to use Phelan's distinction among the author, the implicit author and the narrator (or narrators) voice (1996). It would be fallacious to attempt a classification of actual dystopian authors corresponding to their social features: generalizations about their political positions or their public figure would be over-simplistic. However, it is more interesting to focus on the narrator of dystopias, usually composed following the scheme of the diary or report written by the protagonist of the story (as it can be seen in Orwell's *1984*, Zamiatin's *We* or Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale*, for instance; Huxley's *Brave New World*, using the third person, or Collins's *The Hunger Games*, using first, are exceptions to this feature, that is not a necessary but an accessory one). The homodiegetic narrator writes his text not knowing who is going to read it as an act of rebellion and self-determination. His or her purpose is to give an account of what she has lived, as well as to express what she is feeling towards the regime she used to consider the normal or natural one. The protagonist is entitled to narrate those situations that function as counterarguments against a given political regime because she has (fictionally) lived them: the *authoritas* here comes from experience, and the genre adopts the form of testimonial narrative, although it is speaking from a projected future.

From this perspective, the real author displays her thoughts not as clear statements but as conclusions the audience could or should extract, as a matter of common sense, from different situations witnessed by a character, whose experience remains untainted by an extrinsic narrator. Texts are convincing devices that attempt to raise some thoughts in the audience, and their effectiveness relies upon verisimilitude, which will allow readers to empathize with the suffering narrator and (virtually) with the author.

2.2. How the text reaches us: Mediators

All the components of the book industry, from publishing houses to distributors, marketplaces, publicists, and critics, help the readers to form a first impression of what they are about to acquire. Addressing the members of the audience as consumers, all those agents intend to draw readers' attention towards their products, enhancing their features

and properties. Thus, the book industry introduces texts and genres in the readers' lives and place them in specific spots, shaping the function those texts will have (as fictional or non-fictional documents). As mediators, those institutions have a powerful impact on how different texts are received and interpreted and can be considered part of the paratextual display in which the text itself is merged.

The book industry is not the only mediating agent that influences receptors readings of a text or genre: school is also a powerful force I will not address here. Just talking about Spain, governmental frames for primary and secondary education take into account generic instruction, but most coursebooks address only the three "natural genres": narrative, poetry and drama. On the other hand, as literature is seen from a historical and national perspective, contemporary texts (and contemporary genres) are not usually mentioned. Henceforth my decision to omit education as a mediating agent in this short essay.

2.2.1. Publishing decisions

Genettian observance of paratextual information as relevant for the reception of a literary piece is key in the study of literary genres. As already suggested by Dixon, Bortolussi and Mullins (2015), generic competence includes the apprehension of incidental features, such as book covers, that are correlated with books' content and provide information about the fictional genre they belong to. But again, publishing decisions not only function as advertisements of what fictions consist of, but they also riddle the audience. A book presented as a "classic" (like Penguin's restored edition of *A Clockwork Orange*, Figure 1) will attract readers that value prestige over newness, whereas one edited by a juvenile publishing house (like HarperCollins Children's Books' *Divergent* saga, Figure 2) will for sure appeal to other kind of readers.


Figure 1: A Clockwork Orange. Restored Edition



Reference: <<https://www.penguin.co.uk/articles/2021/01/clockwork-orange-anthony-burgess-covers-stanley-kubrick-design-history>>

Contemporary covers' designs for dystopian classics tend to be elegant and sometimes abstract. The use of two basic colours (often red and black) and simple drafts is easy to distinguish from more commercial, young adult productions. Against the satin texture of those more "adult" books, new editions are shiny, black or obscure with pictures of dystopian environments that attempt realism, or with representations of items or logos related to the saga's rebel community that make them easy to recognize. Publishing houses indeed have themselves a prestige, a history and an editorial line that is sufficient to influence readers' choices.

Figure 2: Divergent



Reference: < <https://www.harpercollins.com/>>

It has to be pointed out that decisions regarding the edition of a work of fiction are influenced by many factors, some of them not related to advertising but to copyright and coherence of publishing houses. Penguin Books UK gives an interesting explanation about *A Clockwork Orange*'s cover in its YouTube channel¹⁰⁷ that makes it clear that aesthetics is not aleatory or uncared. The publishing house has a tradition of original covers regarding dystopias: 1984's Modern Classics' iconic design, in which the book's title seems censored, is highly suggestive and proves the meaningful dimension paratexts can reach.

As far as I know, there are not yet publishing houses specialized exclusively in dystopias, but a view to brands devoted to editing science fiction such as Gollanz, belonging to The Orion Publishing Group, confirms the impression that there are certain conventions for covers design that tend to be avoided by more reputed publishing houses when editing a work belonging to the genre. There seems to be a willingness to reposition older dystopias as classics, sanctioning new products as less valuable or, at least, addressed to a different public. The distinction between "classics" and "young adult" shows an attempt to regulate the genre, from my point of view: it is needed to rethink the label and to

107 < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYiUKrFY4w8>>

place some texts in a different spot than others, remarking their similarities and their differences. From my point of view, behind this editorial decision, there can be found a classist view of culture that rates some works above others and that can be related to the dichotomy between highbrow and pop culture.

All in all, publishing houses shape readers criteria, but they are market-driven too. Consumers ideas influence the market as they are influenced by it: folk thought keeps regarding mainstream culture as secondary to more elevated products (classics), and dystopias are not unaffected by this impression.

2.2.2. Different metatexts

Genette's term *metatextuality* (1997) is worthwhile when speaking of comments upon literary texts that advertise them or talk about them publicly, reaching an audience sometimes equivalent to that addressed by the original text. I believe it is possible to talk about "metatexts" or "meta-genres" (using the term coined by Giltrow, 2017) that focus on a whole literary genre to bring it to the public, in a critical, popular enterprise far away from most elitist or academic essays. Those meta-genres are to be found easily in cultural journals, websites, blogs, and more recently in YouTube and other media and coexist with more serious or theoretical works regarding the same topic. Metatexts are products created by readers, and thus could be used both as comments upon the reading made of a certain work or as a transformation of it: I have chosen to place them in the "mediators" section due to their mostly informative purpose.

Encyclopaedias as the *Encyclopaedia of Science Fiction*, for instance, help readers frame texts by giving them definitions of aesthetic terms and examples to whom those terms can be applied. The entry on dystopias considers them "emotional reactions against ideas which seem various" that usually express "basic fears",¹⁰⁸ and it makes an extensive history giving an account of the topics dystopias have talked about in different periods. Besides encyclopaedias, dictionaries are also sources readers consult when they are in doubt, to prove their intuitions. Less profuse than encyclopaedias, they most times provide extremely

108 <<http://sf-encyclopedia.com/entry/dystopias>>.

simplistic definitions: Collins English dictionary defines dystopia as “an imaginary place where everything is as bad as it can be”.¹⁰⁹ I will leave a more thorough account of dictionaries’ metageneric descriptions of dystopia for another work, since it would request a comparison among many sources to extract useful information, due to the broad senses they usually offer for such generic and relatively complex terms.

Cultural reviews and magazines are more attuned to the subject of the present essay. In articles as Vulture’s “100 Great Works of Dystopian Fiction”¹¹⁰ there are interesting literary and social comments that help readers place genres in the literary system, recurring both to scholars and common readers, critical thinkers and fashion experts. Vulture’s cited list defines the genre and provides a synopsis of some works belonging to it; other texts as “How Dystopian Novels Endure Cultural Climates”,¹¹¹ from *Vox Magazine*, attempt explanations of the success of dystopias (that her author, Shauna Yates, links with Trump’s political victory) and, again indirectly, explains the rhetorical functioning of the texts. Quoting an expert on politics, Yates writes: “the setting in dystopia needs to be recognizable or familiar enough so the reader or viewer can relate it back to reality” and “it is up to the reader to be open to the warnings that are central to these novels, and [...] different novels work for each reader”. These vague assertions are inserted in the description of the “three key attributes” that make dystopias appealing. Although the publication aims to invite readers to look to some dystopian texts, it also helps them create a frame that will be used to distinguish dystopias from other texts and assigning them a value or a function.

Overviews of dystopian genre coexist with close readings that explain the relevance of different dystopian products, as Cristina Sánchez’s “Black Mirror: la distopía es hoy” [Black Mirror: dystopia is today] for *JotDown* magazine, that analyses some chapters of the TV series next to current social trends.

109 <<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/es/diccionario/ingles/dystopia>>.

110 <<https://www.vulture.com/article/best-dystopian-books.html>>.

111 <https://www.voxmagazine.com/arts/books/dystopian-novels-remain-familiar-and-relevant/article_b79dc0ea-a7c2-11e8-9459-1703b018f5fe.html>.

Halfway between cultural theory published in specialized journals and “uninformed” comments in forums, websites and social networks, cultural magazines make a great advertisement for genres, assigning them functions and uses that can attract new public to poke around different literary styles. Their study is of use to find out what are the cultural tendencies in each moment, as magazines generally focus on current issues, and how it is brought to new readers interested in contemporary topics.

2.2.3. How distributors catalogue a work: On bookshops and taxonomies

The use of dystopia as a marketing tag has not reached yet the shelves of bookshops. Dystopias are not set apart from “science fiction”, “classics”, “young adult” or “narrative” sections, which are not specific and tend to mix different generic taxonomies (it is easy to find labels as “science fiction and fantasy”, “poetry, drama and criticism” or “historical and adventures novel”, which combine different genres; an example can be seen in Spanish *Fnac*, English *Waterstones* or American *Barnes & Noble*, both in physical and online shops). I will stick to franchises because I believe they represent social modes more clearly than little independent bookshops, but my observation has proved to me that this confusing labelling is also common in less massive sites, and even in second-hand bookshops. I can figure that the messy tagging has not so much to do with lack of critical knowledge as it is a marketing strategy: it is assumed that poetry readers could be the same as drama or criticism audiences, and those interested in science fiction could be also fond of fantasy.

Despite this lack of positioning, dystopias are a trend. The proof is that during the last two years there can be found desks and decorative settings with a selection of texts belonging to the genre, thematically rearranged. AbeBooks created an entry about “The 60 Best Dystopian Books” in 2018.¹¹² And in *Fnac*, last February, in the “Literature in English” section could be seen a little stand with several dystopian classics (Figure 3). Under the title “¡It’s time to read a dystopia!” [sic] lied Ray Bradbury’s *Fahrenheit 451* and *The Martian Chronicles*, George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *Animal Farm*, Margaret

112<<https://www.abebooks.com/books/best-dystopia-books/>>.

Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* and *The Testaments*, Suzanne Collins's *The Hunger Games*, Richard Matheson's *I am Legend*, Ernest Cline's *Ready Player One*, Veronica Roth's *Divergent*, and William Goldwin's *Lord of the Flies*.

Figure 3: Stand of dystopias in *Fnac*



Reference: Author's collection

Although considering some of those books as dystopias is debatable, it is the invitation to reading them what recalls some explanation. Covid-19 crisis was considered by many a good time to immerse in the reading of dystopia: state responses to pandemics were sometimes compared to the politics of authoritative governments depicted in those same dystopian texts, and marketplaces found in the resemblance an opportunity to sell. The relation between fictional worlds represented by those books and the real world we inhabit seemed increased by the turn of events, hence *Fnac*'s decision to advertise those books.

2.3. Reading as a situated action

A particularity of cultural products is the disparity of audiences they reach. Although publishing houses have in mind specific targets when designing their editions, there sometimes are discrepancies between the audience constructed by authors and mediators and the real one. For instance, books destined to be read by young audiences, such as the *Harry Potter* saga, have ended in the hands of adult readers due to their success. The possibility of dislocated readings, that take place a long time after the production and edition of the book, only enhances this fact.

Dystopia, considered by many critics a contemporary genre addresses contemporary readers, as they represent political and social situations close to ours. In their depiction of technology and industrialization, as well as in the critique of totalitarianism, those texts' authors speak to their contemporaries, who can imagine worlds corrupted by their normalized and sometimes unevaluated way of life. It is true that, as the genre is not old enough yet, the first texts undisputedly considered as dystopias keep functioning for today's audiences. Huxley's *Brave New World*, published in 1932, continues to challenge 2021 readers, so its audience has kept increasing as time goes by. Did Huxley think of future readers when writing his text? It does not matter at all: it keeps been re-edited, and it keeps working in its "convincing" impulse.

2.3.1. Different types of readers

Whenever we are talking about readers, speakers or users of a given concept, it is tempting to feature an ideal, abstract figure that reads the text as the author expected, in the fashion of an interpretive community. A reader, in other (tricky) words, that "reads well". It is easy too to make assumptions about her level of education, her common knowledge or her taste, missing an important characteristic of literature: its varied public.

The dystopian author addresses a universal audience, trying to convince of certain points to whomever reads his texts. Albaladejo's concept of *poliacroasis* (2009) is useful for understanding the multiple receptions of every discourse: been made public, the text confronts itself with different readers with different social traits. Texts address this

heterogeneous auditory trying to fulfil the same conviction, but those readers, real and unique individuals, can read them displaying dissimilar methodologies and being affected by discursive effects unequally.

Among the different kinds of reception that take place when this polymorphous audience receives a text, we are used to telling apart “elite” and “universal” audiences (Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 34), distinguishing critics, as individuals, from the inexpert masses that receive the text in an apparently more innocent, natural and unskilled way. In the next paragraphs, I will discuss the incoherences of that distinction, showing that those “normal” readers also have complex devices and strategies to face literature through their also meta-generic comments.

2.3.2. A brief bibliographical note on dystopianism

Most theoretical approaches to dystopia come from utopian studies. I will here cite the most influential definitions used in this field, although a deeper examination of works about science fiction, cinematic genres or concrete dystopian texts could provide more information about this subject. Tower Sargent’s classification of utopias provides a good definition to start with: a synonym of “negative utopia”, a dystopia is “a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society in which that reader lived” (1994: 10).

Keith Booker’s research guide to dystopian literature consists of a commented corpus composed of the most important works of the genre. In the introduction to his critical analysis, he defines dystopian literature as

that literature which situates itself in direct opposition to utopian thought, warning against the potential negative consequences of arrant utopianism. At the same time, dystopian literature generally also constitutes a critique of existing social conditions or political systems, either through the critical examination of the utopian premises upon which those conditions and systems are based or through the imaginative extension of those conditions and systems into different contexts that more clearly reveal their flaws and contradictions. (1994a: 3).

His idea is that dystopia works through defamiliarization, and it is thus related to science fiction (as explained by Darko Suvin, 1979). The comparison of the fictional world represented in dystopian texts with utopia is radical: for Keith Booker, dystopia opposes utopianism, negating the possibility of a utopian future, but it somehow requests a betterment of the actual world through critique. In a similar book, *The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature* (1994b), he relates dystopia to the philosophical thinking of the late 19th and 20th centuries, focusing on this critical enterprise that can be thought of as a rhetorical aim of most dystopias.

Moylan proposes a more extensive account of dystopias, distinguishing two different impulses of the genre: one towards utopian outcomes and the other against them, anti-utopian.

Dystopias negotiate the social terrain of Utopia and Anti-Utopia in a less stable and more contentious fashion than many of their eutopian and anti-utopian counterparts. As a literary form that works between these historical antinomies and draws on the textual qualities of both subgenres to do so, the typical dystopian text is an exercise in a politically charged form of hybrid textuality or what Rafaella Baccolini calls "genre blurring". Although all dystopian texts offer a detailed and pessimistic presentation of the very worst of social alternatives, some affiliate with a utopian tendency as they maintain a horizon of hope (or at least invite readings that do), while others only appear to be dystopian allies of Utopia as they retain an anti-utopian disposition that forecloses all transformative possibility, and yet others negotiate a more strategically ambiguous position somewhere along the antinomic continuum. (2000: 147).

He thus places dystopia between the poles of pessimism, hope and ambiguity, that would allow for different political readings. When introducing the genre in a political scope he can be said to relate it with other kinds of rhetorical discourses whose convincing intention is clearer. So, his definition and characterization, although centred on plot, applies a function to dystopias that distinguishes them from both utopias and anti-utopias with similar storylines. Moylan also establishes a distinction between dystopias and critical dystopias, but I do not find it relevant for this article's purpose.

Gordin, Tilley and Prakash, introducing *Utopia/Dystopia* (2010), remark the presentation of dystopian narratives as "lived *experience*", linking them not only to fictions but to public and private representations of real societies:

People perceive their environments as dystopic, and alas they do so with depressing frequency. Whereas utopia takes us into a future and serves to indict the present, dystopia places us in a dark and depressing reality, conjuring up a terrifying future if we do not recognize and treat its symptoms in the here and now. (2010: 2).

The dystopian practice is then a way to “make visible various breaking points and vulnerabilities” (2010: 6) of reality; in other words, to show the readers the weaknesses of statu quo by challenging the social order from its basis.

Gregory Claeys investigation on dystopianism (2017), also devoted to extra-literary dystopias (he establishes a difference among political, environmental, and literary fictional dystopias), is interesting in its assumptions, as he situates fear and individualism at the core of the genre. Claeys explores the historical origin of dystopia, considering it a psychological state of men enhanced in the 20th century due to historical and environmental changes. It could be deduced that literary dystopias are discourses produced under the intention to recreate this psychological sense of fear and distrust of collectivism through narratives.

Although different and sometimes colluding, all those definitions seem to match my first perception of this genre as a rhetorically regulated one, valuing the critical potentiality of texts upon reality and utopian thought. Considered by some as “fear arising” and “anti-collectivist” and by others as plots with a wider range of emotional effects, dystopias seem to be, on general terms, convincing narratives that expose how defective our reality is and what it could turn about into if we do not try to better it.

2.3.3. Wikis and the dissolution of hierarchical knowledge structures

Convergence culture has changed completely the division of knowledge structures previously functioning, to the extent that telling apart mediators and readers is a difficult enterprise. Wikis and other sites where knowledge is shared and co-created by fans and experts can influence the reception of texts or genres and, at the same time, are the result of readers’ (fans’ and experts’) perception of them.

It can be profitable here to notice, in the study of dystopia, at least two sites of Wikipedia (the most known wiki on the internet): the List of Dystopian Literature is a relation of the works belonging to the genre (using the definition given by *The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction*, an online encyclopaedia written by experts in the field). The works are chronologically ordered and texts not usually advertised as dystopias (as Capek's *R.U.R.* or Kafka's *The Trial*, for instance) are included. It is interesting the Wiki editors' decision to distinguish between "fiction" and "young adult fiction" from 1990 up to today, as it seems to signal the development of the genre, addressing now to two differentiated audiences. The distinction can be also based upon the need to tell apart more serious works from others, minor or less profound due to their younger readers' interests.

The list is not only interesting because of the content it displays (that shows us what consumers regard as *dystopias*, which does not necessarily match what scholars usually think) but because of the dissensus depicted in the "talk page" annexe to the article. Users' forums centre on the indistinction of past editors between utopias and dystopias and show some implicit consciousness about what those books' content and function is, criticizing *Harry Potter's* or *Metamorphosis* inclusion in the list. Wikipedians' comments include discussions such as the following:

I haven't read *Alas, Babylon*, but isn't it a apocalyptic novel, i.e. about the end of the world, instead of a dystopian novel?

dystopias are highly dysfunctional societies. Apocalyptic stories are about the end of the world. post-apocalyptic are about what happens after apocalyptic events. Certainly a dystopia might bring about the end of the world, just as dystopian novel might be set after the apocalypse -- in the ashes, as it were.

but it seems like a lot of people confuse them.

and bad governments may, and likely would, arise after apocalyptic events, of course.

but not all bad governments or societies are dystopias. Zimbabwe is a (especially) badly run one-party state, but it is not a dystopia. North Korea is a (especially) badly run one-party state that is also a dystopia because of it's utopian ideology and pretenses.

the societies in *Brave New World* and *The Machine Stops* are well run, on the other hand, but their admirable goals -- a world of comfort without suffering -- are pursued and realized to a nightmarish degree.

The Denzel Washington movie *The Book of Eli* and novel *Blood Red Road* are post-apocalyptic but not dystopian because what little government there are little more than mere bands of robbers.

perhaps a dystopia requires an ideology beyond might makes right, a social order that aims, as in *Brave New World*, or merely pretends to aim, as in 1984, at some higher, universal good.

76.19.63.222 (talk) 05:47, 6 January 2014 (UTC) Michael Christian

You may have a point. I can't say I'm well-versed enough in the literary scholarship to know if there's generally regarded to be a bright line, but my inclination is to say there's overlap due to -- if nothing else -- the simple etymology of "dystopia" which would only require a "bad place" be the subject or setting of the work. Government is a common theme but I don't think it's necessary to explain dystopia in terms of government. Certainly there are, as you point out, noted links between utopia and dystopia -- that many dystopias seem, purport, or otherwise aim to be utopias but for one or more major flaws -- but again, I don't think it's an absolute that this must be clear in order to qualify. Of course, having said all that I was surprised that the only hit for "apocaly" when searching Dystopia was a see also link. I would recommend either discussing this distinction on Talk:Dystopia or, if you have a source, working it into that article directly before removing items from this list. --- Rhododendrites talk | 12:01, 6 January 2014 (UTC)

The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction states dystopian fictions are warnings against social and political trends that the author disapproves of, so a dystopia is not just a future where something bad happens, but **a future where the author specifically warns that something bad will happen unless the trend in the dystopia is opposed**. So *War with the Newts*, *Brave New World* and *The Handmaid's Tale* all have identifiable political trends (fascism, Fordism, Christian fundamentalism) taken to an unpleasant extreme, whereas *Alas Babylon* seems to just be a disaster novel with no trend identified and criticised by the novel.176.61.97.121 (talk) 12:47, 2 February 2015 (UTC)

I have read *Alas Babylon* and it is not a dystopian novel. Dystopian societies are societies that are currently running in which the horror is the society. Post Apocalyptic fiction is fiction where people are trying to survive a breakdown of society and build a new one. *Alas Babylon* fits in this second category. I think it should be removed from this list.Whitehatm (talk) 04:00, 11 January 2016 (UTC)

I have stressed a specific part of the response that signals the function this reader associates with dystopias following one of those “mediating”

sites, an online encyclopedia of scifi, as it shows a clear awareness of the genre's rhetoric nature.

Along with this site, Wikipedias' entry on dystopia contains a wide piece of information about what a dystopia is, when was the genre originated and where can dystopias be read. But, again, it is the discussion that accompanies the main article that interests me the most. Particularly, I would focus on commentaries of the wiki users about what a dystopia is:

I think there is a clear problem here: **people disagree on what is meant by "dystopia"**. At one extreme, a dystopia is only a novel describing life under an authoritarian regime, intended to highlight current social trends. At another extreme, a dystopia is anything set in or suggesting an unpleasant future. And *Candide* doesn't belong in any of them, but that's another story...I think I will remove *Candide* right now.

[...] Notinasnaid 21:14, 16 Dec 2004 (UTC)

No, dystopia isn't a type of novel. It's a type of society used in fiction or hypothetical settings. Thetrellan (talk) 23:11, 29 September 2014 (UTC)

This discussion gives place to a more profound one:

If you want to describe the opposite of a utopia, you wouldn't call it a dystopia. The word Utopia means a perfect society. Therefore a Dystopia would be a perfect society that is somehow sick. Or rather, things would appear perfect on the surface, but something is very, very wrong. As in *Logan's Run*, the populace at large may not be aware of any problem, choosing only to see perfection, while the individuals smart enough to question would be the ones living in fear. But that veneer of perfection would be an essential part of the definition of dystopia.

1984 therefore wouldn't describe a dystopian society but a totalitarian one which used language itself- as well as history- as a means of control. **What's scary is that it's not that far off from how things really function. Think about how much of language evolves through television and the internet, and how much these tools could accomplish, but don't. Instead they are used primarily to keep us pacified and to sell us things. They only need us smart enough to be convinced, and truly the average person does not live for higher learning. We should enjoy learning new things, but too many people lack the desire and motivation, and actually reject being taught anything they don't already know. If 1984 describes a dystopia, then we're living in one right now.**

The trouble in defining this word lies in the fact that **it is only used in a fictional sense**, and nearly always in a fictional future. Much of language evolves through misuse, and that is the case here, where so many have the word dystopia to describe totalitarian future states. Better instead to think of

dystopia as meaning dysfunctional utopia. Thetrellan (talk) 21:06, 29 September 2014 (UTC)

I think that **the reason you don't like the definition is that everyone's is different, thus, yours is probably not the same as mine.** Fisch1234 (talk) 19:54, 20 September 2015 (UTC)

It is enriching to find out that readers participating in online communities, ready to discuss aesthetical terms on a quite complex level, are aware of the variety of definitions simultaneously existing of those terms. In a way, they are conscious of the different uses that can be made of a concept and the interpretations that come out of the reading of the same materials. Whereas inexplicitly, this discussion talks about the effect a given book (*1984*) has on its readers: the realization of their near environment through the reading of a society represented in a fictional text. To this reader, this reflection causes fear, although there can be (as 'Fisch1234' makes explicit) another possible effect, as well as other meanings related to the genre. However, this feeling of fear and reflection can be found in other users' comments:

has anyone really thought about **how much of that discription matches the ethics and moral values of the united states governement?**(note the lack of capital lettering)i just wondered if im alone in this

[...]

AJ, who doesn't yet have an account.

--I know **I'm a nobody**, but I read wikipedia voraciously. I just have to agree with this person above me on the point about **the description sounding a lot like the U.S. However, it's so close that I kind of wonder if the author had it in mind while writing out the description. If not, well... that's scary.**

[...]

Ashley, who is still working up the guts (and education) to contribute meaninfully.--69.193.95.203 09:40, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

Debates about the USA being a dystopia are prolific. I will not deepen in them because they soon turn to extra-literary matters, more political than related with the way Wikipedians understand dystopias and the effects those texts have on them. Against this view that restricts dystopian critique to governments, there seem to be more extensive readings:

Just so everyone knows, the current introduction ("A dystopia is the idea of a society, generally of a speculative future, characterized by negative, anti-utopian elements, varying from environmental to political and social issues...") was written by me. I would rewrite the whole article, but I don't have the time. I am writing this in criticism of whoever wrote the previous article. It seems that the entire article is leading readers towards a false definition of what a "Dystopia" is.

The reason I rewrote the definition, is because the original article portends that a dystopia is a future where, the government has supreme, absolute control. I'll remind you that that is not the definition, and **the current collective conscience's definition is spurred by an ever growing, irrational fear of governmental control.**

People need to understand, that there is more to fear about the future than just the government. We must also be conscious of **the media, the environment, and society in general, among other things.** We are heading towards an extremely anti-social, materialistic, alienated state of mind, yet we still fear nothing but authority. It seems like, instead of "respect authority", we're aimed at a "never ever EVER listen to authority" state of mind.

It is ironic that the definition of "Dystopia" has been truncated down to "A future where people are alienated and individualism is restricted by the government.", just as definitions and words themselves are truncated by Newspeak in Nineteen Eighty-Four.

[...]

- Douglas Dean Wingate

Hate to point this out, but your authorship and personal opinions are completely irrelevant to this article.142.22.115.2 (talk) 22:24, 7 December 2015 (UTC)

It is interesting too how the criteria of the reader here to define what a dystopia is serves him or her to determine which dystopias are relevant and which irrelevant (in other words: to establish a qualitative scale to value fictional works). Along with this reflection of dystopian fiction in the real world, Wikipedians also seem to worry about the relationship between dystopia and utopia. When commenting about the similarities or distinctions of anti-utopia and dystopia, some state that a dystopia is (or is not) a failed utopia, that makes the receptor aware of the possible outcome of a good-intentioned utopia:

Oceania in Nineteen Eighty-Four and the OneState in We didn't project a facade of being "good"? Really? In whose interpretation?
~ Switch (✉ 📧 ☺ ☒) 09:44, 21 September 2007 (UTC)

I have a real problem with "anti-utopia" being lumped in with "dystopia". **An "anti-utopia" is a failed utopia--the fatal flaw in the utopia is what makes it bad.** So, in Vonnegut's "Harrison Bergeron" everyone is equal (good) but the way they achieve it is horribly oppressive (bad). *Brave New World* is a classic example of an anti-utopia, too. Compare that to Orwell's *1984*, London's *The Iron Heel* and Collins *The Hunger Games*. **In each case the powers-that-be make things worse for large swaths of the population; they have no intent on creating a perfect society, just a good one for them.** As Commander Fred tells Offred in *Handmaid's Tale*, "Better never means better for everyone... It always means worse, for some."

The distinction matters in sussing out the writer's intent. In the former, the author is focused on the difficulties of achieving utopia. The latter is more concerned in illustrating the abuse of power. [...]
Askingforafriend (talk) 16:20, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

Once again, I am not willing to participate in this discussion, which is a replica of the discussions held in the theoretical field by many experts. I find it interesting, though, to see that readers tend to compare the negative traits of the fictions they are reading with both reality and ideal societies, which causes them fright and disgust with the world they are living in and a realistic unpleasant sense of the impossible realization of hopes and dreams of equality, freedom and peace.

2.3.4. Social networking: A new reading experience

If common readers have somehow replaced experts in providing definitions and encyclopaedic information about concepts and cultural artefacts, it could be said that, through social networks, they have also replaced critics. *Goodreads* is perhaps the most known social network devoted to literature (over *Anobii* or, in Spain, *Lecturalia*). This site allows its users to rate the books they have read, join reading groups and public debates, and ask questions to literary authors. It provides a great deal of information about popular trends and readers' opinions, as they can comment on literary works and interchange their thoughts through open forums. Along with the reading, users are allowed to contribute with their own literary productions by uploading them to a "writing" section, where their texts are also rated and commented on by other users.

Although all the information contained in *Goodreads* could be analysed in many ways, I have chosen here to address users' answers to the question "Why do we like dystopian novels?", posted in a group called "Dystopia Land".¹¹³ On the 8th of September, a reader whose nickname is "Arun" writes:

[...]

At least, the more we think about utopia, intuitively it seems that it can only be achieved at great personal cost (the promised land of communism requires infinite resources which simply does not exist). I don't think there will ever come a position where we will willingly accept such a cost to create a utopia. **Our current world is definitely dystopian.** As much as I am privileged to have a computer and be able to write this post now on the goodreads website, I am also starkly aware of the poverty in my country where families barely manage one square meal a day for their kids. **A good dystopian novel often takes inspiration from the current society** and analyzes it at an extreme. The author puts tremendous effort in expressing his thoughts and **processes through the fictional story and the fictional lead character. When I read such stories, I am able to relate to character more closely and through the various events feel the effects of the dystopian world he is in.** I am able to understand what the author thinks about many situations through the story and **if I agree with his viewpoints then it allows me to reflect on our current world and understand the pitfalls that we need to avoid becoming a degenerate society.** If more people actually did that, we would stop talking about building walls and start talking about building bridges.

The comment demonstrates a profound understanding of the rhetoric nature of dystopia and complements previous readers' analysis of the genre: texts are taken as argumentations that aim for action ("the pitfalls that we need to avoid"); they are taken as a request or admonition against certain social, political, technological, industrial, environmental... practices that could turn ours into a "degenerate society". Interestingly, Arun takes agreement with the authors' viewpoints as a requisite to be affected by his writing, as it undermines the author's capacity to convince a plural audience.

Readers' conscience of the relation of dystopias with utopias, on the one hand, and the real world, on the other, is depicted by most

113<<https://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/18234194-why-do-we-like-dystopian-novels>>

interventions on the forum. Jacqui says “I think it’s because most people want a utopian societal system. But one issue was raised that a utopian society is attainable”; Richard reflects upon fear as a motive when writing “they are a cristalisation [sic] of our fears in the present. Their settings change throughout the years in which they are written”, in the same fashion Steven understands that we read dystopia “To engage with, hopefully or hopelessly, with the scary feelings that the world we enjoy may end soon and that this development is, alternatively, 1) our fault, 2) completely beyond our control, or 3) both”; Francesco’s opinion is that “people in general are into knowing how the world can be in a different way, specially if it seems to be ‘perfect’”; and Papaphilly’s comment sums up the previous responses: “I think it shows the world took a wrong turn somehow and it explores that wrong turn. The best of the genre is uncomfortably close to reality and that provides the dread.”

The historical dimension of dystopias is addressed by some readers that notice the analysis of past, real-world events some novels display. Dele writes:

For me it's also a way to reflect on the past and trying to make sure we don't repeat the same mistakes we've made as humans in the past. Many things in dystopian novels set in the future are actually things that have happened before. So it makes us question our path because we don't want to end up in a dark place that we've been before and thought we'd never see again.

Besides those readings, there are more hopeful ones that, notwithstanding, coincide with the previously explained ones. Mariija bases her ideas on dystopia upon a “diploma paper”, proving the influence of mediating metatexts upon readers’ expectations, and focus on young adult dystopias:

Well, this is a very interesting question. I was curious why I love dystopian books, why are they very interesting. Then I found the answer in one diploma paper.

In every successful and influential YA [young adult] dystopian novel, readers can count on encountering one or more of these major commonalities: (1) a **vivid and well-described setting**; (2) individuals of a group in charge with absolute power; (3) a **strong protagonist** who has been shaped by his or her current situation; and (4) a **dismal conclusion that leaves the reader feeling slightly uneasy** (Spisak 56). (1) The vivid setting of the dystopian begins with the first word of the novel. Because the reader is not currently living in the world that is being

described, it is imperative for the author to paint the picture of the setting using specific dialogue that reflects the story's culture (56). (2) Whether it is the government, a central police force, or overbearing rules imposed on the society, the oppressive force—or antagonist, which can be the society itself—is so strong that most people living in the given story have lost the ability to think for themselves (Adams).

Teenagers reading these types of dystopian stories learn that **there is a problem with the current trend of harming the world in which they live, yet they still see that there are ways in which they can continue to survive, creating a sense of hope in the worst scenarios** (3).

Hope drives the reading of those that, like Andy, feel that “if there’s hope in a world *that* messed up, I figure there’s hope for ours. And even the stories that end darkly leave room for hope that we can avoid that future”. This feeling of emancipation and conformity that seem to taint most books call into action is not exclusive to this reader. “MorteTorment (Unofficial World’s Fastest Reader)” is even more radical in this position:

I guess I love dystopias and post apocalyptica because I like to speculate on just how wrong things can go, and when you got a competent(not necessarily perfect, but at least competent) writer taking the idea very seriously, **it makes for a great escape, makes you appreciate what you have a little bit more.**

Dystopias are felt by some as a narrative device to create an attractive fiction, deepening in the worldbuilding. It has become a scheme to develop stories without the moral perspective, devoid of convictions and devoted to sheer entertainment. Alec Kerrigan writes:

Most dystopia, however, doesn't really serve as a warning, and more serves as an entertaining background (such as the Hunger Games). When society itself is a threat, heroes have something they most constantly defend against, constant contend with. **This is an excellent device for moving a narrative forward, as well as a foundation for more concrete worldbuilding.**

In tune with this perception are those that find dystopias attractive because of the verisimilitude of the worlds created. Aalam likes that dystopian novels “construct worlds that seem normal, coherent and even plausible (while, of course, they are not.)”.

Overall, readers perceptions of the genre’s function coincide in the moral understanding. Authors are seen as political commentators that report a state of affairs through exaggerated and enhanced negative

features represented in fiction. Dystopias are, thus, models that allow the audiences to gain a new perspective from which to escape from society or look back to it, acknowledging the impossibility of utopia and the frightful outcomes it could result in. The distinction between traditional and young adult dystopias made by some readers is in tune with editorial decisions. Apparently, both subgenres have slightly different effects: traditional texts are read as more “pessimistic” than new ones, whose emancipating power is greater than the convincing one.

2.4. Transformation. The generic reconstruction

As those who transform a text or a genre are people who have previously received it and, as I have previously stated, audiences are varied, so are to be expected discourse transformations coming from them. Those compositions that depart from the genre can be considered innovations that attempt to reconfigure generic stances challenging traditionally admitted features and uses of it or just regular works that keep developing the usual plots with the old characters.

Readers’ perceptions that there are books whose resemblance to dystopia places them under the “dystopian intention” are just another way to transform the traditional definition, challenging it to include new fictions that traditionalists would not accept to be dystopias. We have seen that generic decisions regarding *Metamorphosis*, *The Trial* or *Animal Farm* differ and are yet unstable, but I would affirm that their classification as dystopias is now more usual than it was before. As the genre gains in prestige, its audience increases, and more works (and more diverse) are publicized and read as dystopias. Thus, the genre is becoming more and more diffuse, as the aim for originality makes it more varied, and it grows to include fictions that historically had never been considered a dystopia before. Of course, this theory about the future of dystopias is just speculation, and we will have to wait to see if the cited books will finally be accepted or not by readers as such.

As well as this generic transformation by using the label originally, it is usual to find more specific rewritings of dystopian books. A seminal dystopia such as *1984* has been reformulated literarily at least by Anthony Burgess in *1985* and Murakami in *1Q84*, adapted to cinema in 1956 by Michael Anderson and in 1984 by Michael Radford, and

extended through fanfiction in at least 420 fanfics (some of them vaguely related to the original novel).

According to Hellekson and Busse (2014), transformative fans make the books' characters and plots their own to engage in forms of active fan participation, against affirmative fans, who only collect works to comment on them. An interesting feature of transformative audiences is their often critical approach to texts: in the same way, Burgess digresses about Orwell's misconceptions before creating a new, transformative rewriting of *1984*, fans directly engage with the writing or recreating, covering the lacks they find in the original work. A user named *quantuminferno*, for instance, declares to "love the book 1984 by George Orwell" somehow finds the need to extend Bumstead's story, trying to give further meaning to the existence of a secondary character.¹¹⁴ *High Cristal Guardian* rewrites the story from the point of view of a Thought Police agent, and *grave-walker* humanizes O'Brien, Winston's antagonist, by depicting him as a homosexual entrapped by the Party to whom Winston is a painful recall of his former lover.

Transformations through fan fiction are not perhaps the principal motors of genre changes, but they serve to represent the needs felt by readers' communities that this genre does not fulfil yet. It is true that dystopias, in their critical view of society, tend to represent minorities, but it is also true that there is still a lot of work to do to make each fan's identity present amidst the genre's works.

The study of generic transformations through rewritings of its foundational works, then, might be of use to understand how historical change has made some aspects of the texts obsolete. The incorporation of new identities to discourse communities and their need to feel addressed by the texts requires changes in the authorial figure, in this case, the main character that experiences dystopia. On the other hand, the consideration of this genre's function as related to social critique makes it necessary to evaluate the aspects of society that require further examination.

114 <<https://www.fanfiction.net/s/974048/1/Belonging>>

3. Some provisional conclusions

I have tried here to prove the effectiveness of rhetorical views of genre to explain literary phenomena, departing from theoretical explanations about how discourse works in literary communication. The enterprise, although scarcely sketched here, is promising, as it allows us to speak about social, negotiated, meanings, that measure cultural products value and provide a functional account of them.

However, there are some weak points I would like to comment on regarding this approach. First of all, it is partial: I have chosen a corpus certainly restrained, given the vastness of the internet. A wider approach to social perceptions of genre would require a newer methodology, competent at analysing a broader corpus of mediators' sites and readers' opinions and transformations. Digital humanities are promising in this respect, as computer programs permit obtaining information from archives automatically, including metadata alongside forum interactions, published papers and public pieces of knowledge.

In second place, the division here made between those four roles identified by Schmidt (production, mediation, reception and transformation) is hard to apply to our new convergence culture. As it has been seen, producers are often transforming previous works, and receptors often embody the four roles when participating in reading groups or fandom communities. The traditional view of culture as hierarchically constructed and transmitted, that considers experts and reading elites as creators of meaning that is later taught to the masses, is partly obsolete. Although it keeps permeating subjective views of genre, this notion is contested by knowledge nets and reading practices. Therefore, a rhetorical explanation of cultural products requires nowadays some thought about these blurred margins between "experts" and "novices", as the prestige system is challenged by online democratic and anonymous knowledge building structures.

All that considered, I believe the previous analysis of dystopia is coherent in showing how community members interact to shape what is valuable and what not when writing and reading texts belonging to it. Readers' opinions are strongly entrenched with editorial decisions and expert definitions in describing the genre's function, listing the books that can serve this function (dystopias and books with a "dystopian imagination"), and differentiating their status. It should be further

discussed if this last division responds to objective criteria or to metaliterary reasons derived from the social perception of traditional versus pop culture.

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The Emine Sevgi Özdamar's German without Childhood. Analysis of a Rhetorical-literary Text in a World of Displacements and Inequality¹¹⁵

Lucía Hellín Nistal

Abstract: Cultural rhetoric can be a powerful tool to think one of the biggest problems of the last decades: massive displacements pushed by hunger, misery and, in one word, the inequality that defines globalisation. Thus, we could approach this problem on the basis of the study of different cultural productions. In this study we are aiming at the analysis of a hybrid text, between the rhetorical and the literary, as it is the Emine Sevgi Özdamar acceptance speech of the Adelbert von Chamisso Prize in 1999 “Meine deutschen Wörter haben keine Kindheit. Eine Dankrede”. This prize is conceived to award authors who write in German, being different from their mother tongue. Özdamar's discourse highlights this change of language and has profound roots in her displacement. We will study this “Dankrede” in its cultural, rhetorical, literary, and social dimension, seeking to show how the structure and the different mechanisms convey a view about a society marked by displacements of a young Turkish woman writer that finds her place in the German language and thanks for it. From a transference critique anchored in the interdiscursive analysis we will not only prove useful the application of cultural rhetoric to a text with literary elements, as well as the application of literary categories to a text with rhetorical characteristics. We will also study the (critical) position of the text in a universe of displacements and inequality and we will access to the understanding of Özdamar as ectopic author which finds a lifeline in the German language.

Keywords: cultural rhetoric, transference critique, Emine Sevgi Özdamar, migration literature, displacement, globalisation

1. Adelbert von Chamisso Prize: a German intercultural literary award for a Turkish writer

Literary awards ceremonies are a *locus* where abundant interrelated discourses can be found. The awarded literary texts are at the centre and other discourses are present in different ways: the absence of the literary works that have not received the prize, the collective memory of the

¹¹⁵ This article is a result of the research carried out within the RDI project “Analogy, equivalence, polyvalence and transferability as cultural-rhetoric and interdiscursive foundations of the art of language: literature, rhetoric and discourse” (Acronym: TRANSLATIO. Reference: PGC2018-093852-B-I00), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities.

previous winners, acceptance speeches, and even texts based on all this discourses that will be published the next days to comment the award. Within the framework of a literary prize ceremony, which present its own rules and traditions, different kinds of discourses coexist and interact. This complex interaction finds its own realization in every text that conforms this discursive universe. In the present study we will approach the Adelbert von Chamisso Prize of 1999 and the acceptance speech of Emine Sevgi Özdamar “Meine deutschen Wörter haben keine Kindheit. Eine Dankrede”.¹¹⁶

The Adelbert von Chamisso Prize is a prestigious award established in 1985 with the aim of recognising and promoting the career of writers born outside Germany who show an original mastery of the German language in their work:

Up to and including 2017 the literary prize awarded by Robert Bosch Stiftung honoured outstanding German-language authors whose work is shaped by a change of culture. Furthermore, the award winners are united through their unusual way of using the language in a manner which enriches German literature (Robert Bosch Stiftung).

Robert Bosch Stiftung pioneered the creation of an intercultural literary award which, between 1985 and 2017, has played a major role in the development of intercultural literature and intercultural policies in Germany and Europe. It constitutes an example of the recognition and the willingness of German institutions to integrate intercultural, migration or *Gastarbeiter*¹¹⁷ literature into German culture. As the Chairman of the Robert Bosch Stiftung’s Management Board states, this prize has an exemplary function:

Die Chamisso-Preisträger sind nicht nur hervorragende Schriftsteller und Vertreter der deutschsprachigen Gegenwartsliteratur, sondern haben auch eine wichtige Vorbildfunktion, insbesondere für Jugendliche mit Migrationshintergrund. Uns allen ist deutlich geworden, welche zentrale Rolle die Sprache für gelingende Integration spielt. Ohne ausreichende

¹¹⁶ Published in Özdamar, 2005.

¹¹⁷ *Gastarbeiter* (literally guest worker) was the name given to foreign workers that migrate to Germany between 1950s and 1980s, when Germany, immersed in its *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle), needed unqualified workers in the industrial sector. Most of them came from Turkey, but also from Italy, Spain, Greece and other South European countries. The first time Özdamar went to Germany was one of these *Gastarbeiter*, as she narrates in the second novel of the trilogy *Die Brücke vom Goldenen Horn* (1998).

Sprachbeherrschung ist ein Leben und Arbeiten in der Gesellschaft nicht möglich (Berg, 2007: 5).

Emine Sevgi Özdamar is a writer and actress of Turkish origin settled in Berlin since the 80's of the twentieth century. She went for the first time to Germany in 1965 to work in a factory in West Berlin. Despite she had no knowledge of the German language she went to the theatre and learnt to love the words and songs of Bertolt Brecht, as she explains in her speech. Back in Turkey she studied in the school of theatre of Istanbul between 1967 and 1970 and studied the German language as well. The coup d'état of 1971, also thematised in her discourse, forced Özdamar to leave the country. It was too difficult to her to bear the reality of violence and repression in which Turkey was immersed and, furthermore, she was a member of the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*), which constituted a risk. That was one of the reasons of her second displacement to Berlin, where she worked as assistant director with Benno Besson in the Volksbühne. She will work in different German theatres and began to write: the dramatic text *Karagöz in Alania* that she will direct in 1986, short stories published in 1990 under the title *Mutterzunge*, and her first novel *Das Leben ist eine Karawanserei / hat zwei Türen / aus der einen kam ich rein / aus der anderen ging ich heraus* (*Life is a Caravanserai Has Two Doors I Went in One I Came out the Other*) awarded the Ingeborg Bachmann Prize and published in 1992. Hence, when Özdamar received the Adelbert von Chamisso Prize in 1999 she already was a renowned author in Germany and relatively successful, although since this year, when she was also awarded the LiteraTour Nord Prize, she became more successful and received recognitions as the Kleist Prize in 2004 and the Fontane Prize in 2009.

When she received the Adelbert von Chamisso Prize, besides some plays and short stories, she had already published two of the novels that are part of her autobiographical trilogy, *Das Leben ist eine Karawanserei* in 1992 and *Die Brücke vom Goldenen Horn* (*The Bridge of the Golden Horn*) in 1998.¹¹⁸ She shows a deeply knowledge of the German literature and culture in these novels and in all her works, which always present an autobiographical atmosphere and a high level of hybridism where the meeting of German and Turkish culture finds its productive character. The awarding of the Prize to Özdamar defined

¹¹⁸The third novel of the trilogy, *Seltsame Sterne starren zur Erde* (*Strange Stars Stare at the Earth*) will be published in 2003.

her as displaced or ectopic author whose work is marked by the presence of this change of *topos* but, at the same time, as valuable part of the great German literature. This achievement signalled then one of the turning points in her career and certainly speaks of the German cultural policies that seek the integration of intercultural literature, as is proved not only by the existence of this kind of prize, but, as Ruiz notes, by the inclusion of these literature in the most important German publishing houses or in the University:

[...] die allmähliche Eingliederung dieses literarischen Korpus in den Literaturkanon in deutscher Sprache, sie durch dessen Aufnahmen in die Literaturgeschichte und in die Kataloge der wichtigsten deutschen Verlage verwirklicht wurde; die Anerkennung dieser Art literarischen Schaffens seitens der Institutionen [...]; die Anerkennung in den akademischen Kreisen Deutschlands (Ruíz Sánchez, 2015: 54-55).

An inclusion that can be understood as attempt to reinforce the intercultural aspect of German society. This idea is also suggested by Beverly Weber, who extends the definition to her first German award: “After she became the first non-native speaker of German to win the prestigious Ingeborg-Bachmann literary prize in 1991, she became the figurehead of multicultural Germany, often invited to be on panels intended to celebrate immigrant culture” (Weber, 2010: 42). From these coordinates the success of Özdamar can be understood less like a legitimization of Turkish literature and more like an enrichment or even an appropriation by the German space of the literature produced in this space with labels such as intercultural, migration, *Gastarbeiter* or Turkish origin. When globalization reached its most intense expression the innovations emerging from the periphery are (or were) annexed or reclaimed by central spaces. Thus, the quest for autonomy in an internationalised literary centre may pay the price of an ethnocentric annexation.

2. A literary prize for displaced authors in the time of globalisation

The Adelbert von Chamisso Prize and Özdamar’s discourse must be placed in the context of the strongest expression of the process called globalisation. For reasons of space, we will not develop an extensive definition of a term that has found diverse meanings and uses:

As some scholars define globalization as a contemporary phenomenon linked to the development of electronic media, the rise of transnational corporations, global financial institutions, and proliferating forms of entertainment that

easily leap national boundaries, others define it as a historical phenomenon running back to at least the sixteenth century and incorporating the histories of colonization, decolonization, and postcolonialism (Jay, 2010: 2).

We consider the historical roots of the long process of globalization and, with David Harvey, we understand globalization as inherent to capitalism:

The accumulation of capital has always been a profoundly geographical and spatial affair. Without the possibilities inherent in geographical expansion, spatial reorganization, and uneven geographical development, capitalism would have long ago have ceased to function as a political-economic system (Harvey, 1995: 2).

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the qualitative leap that takes place since the 1970s. Then began a new turn of the screw of Imperialism related to big technological and communicative advances. It is a period where media, communication and migratory processes are faster and bigger than ever, national borders are challenged in different ways, transnational products are widespread, and a supra-national reality is in our everyday life. A reality immersed in a capitalist globalisation of inequality, related to the peak of neoliberalism, as Masao Miyoshi stated (Miyoshi, 2001: 289), which he places this development in the 1980s and 1990s. This reality, marked by the inequality and the contradiction between the internationalisation of capital and its need for nation-States is also lived and constructed in and by different literary spaces and borders, specially by displaced authors. The authors that change their *topos*, who we will call ectopic authors, deal directly with this conflict as they develop processes of defy, adaptation, struggle, or negotiation between two or more cultures and the displacement itself. This intense relation will have implications in the structure, language, and content of their texts.

A prize dedicated to authors that write in German whose mother tongue is different has a deep connection to displacement and globalization in, at least, two ways. Firstly, awarded authors have always experienced a displacement, often a geographic and cultural change of *topos*, sometimes (only) a linguistic displacement. Displacement have always been part of literary creation, but the massive migrations of globalisation have led to a boom of this kind of production that we call

ectopic literature. This term was first proposed by Albaladejo,¹¹⁹ who defined it as “the expression for naming that literature that has been written by authors which have moved from their original place to another place” (Albaladejo, 2007). Secondly, the establishment of this prize was part of a cultural policy that aimed to support cultural integration –the problems of this concept cannot escape anybody– and to create an image of interculturality and a harmonious coexistence of differences, as long as they remain within the frameworks set by German or European institutions.

3. Cultural rhetoric and transference critique

As it is well known, culture has a central role in every communicative act and thus is part of rhetoric. Albaladejo proposed cultural rhetoric “for the study of the cultural function of different kinds of discourses in rhetoric as well as in literature and of the cultural elements included in rhetorical and literary discourses” (Albaladejo, 2016: 21). Thus, cultural rhetoric is at the basis of the theoretical framework of this work, since it permits us to study rhetorical and literary languages as cultural constructs and to analyse the mentioned acceptance discourse placed in its context.

The text we are dealing with can be described as hybrid, as it is a rhetorical speech but also a literary text published in a book together with journalistic texts originally appeared in the German press and short stories. The application of concepts belonging to the discipline of rhetoric but also used in literary analysis is based on the idea of transference critique “que consiste en la aplicación, a discursos concretos y clases de discursos, de métodos que han probado su validez y adecuación analítica en otros discursos y clases discursivas e, incluso, en otras disciplinas” (Albaladejo, 2014: 39). Departing from a metacritical application of this concept we find that rhetoric can be applied to discourses that do not match the canonical definition of rhetorical discourse but present rhetoricity. A transference also approved by García Berrio who states: “el arsenal de categorías y estrategias hermenéuticas sobre el texto de que dispone la Retórica puede contribuir a revitalizar las disciplinas lingüísticas y poetológicas

¹¹⁹ Since then, several works have attempted different developments and applications of the concept. Some of the most relevant are Luarsabishvili, 2013; Hellín, 2015; Alfaro, 2016; Amezcua, 2016.

que se ocupan del texto artístico” (García Berrio, 1994: 205). It is worth mentioning that both kinds of discourse, rhetorical and literary, share some central characteristics, which make this transference even more pertinent. Both participate in the communicative process and, following Lotman classification (Lotman, 1982), both are secondary modelling systems, art of language discourses with a pragmatic projection. Furthermore, in this context marked by displacements and transnational relations, the concept of transferential critique, now in its analytical level, provides a framework to study the displacement or transference of elements from one culture to another developed by displaced writers as Emine Sevgi Özdamar.

Transferential critique is applied in these two levels, metacritical and analytical, but the transference will find another space in the present work, as Özdamar develops this exercise in its own writing and in the specific discourse we are studying, constructing the intersection between two cultures and languages. As Abuaisha explained, not every writer out of place presents transferential critique:

[...] «transferential critique» must be committed to «dialogicality». That is, one must prove his/her praxis in a moral «relationality» (making equality between «self» and «other» or «native» and «foreign» to have, as supposed to be, the same rights and opportunities), in an intellectual reflection on «relativity» («other» in «self», name in another, discourse in another, language in another, culture in another), and in interventional devotion to «actionality» (the revolution of the real intellectuals in praxis –reflection and action– rather than in rhetorical/dialectical structures of words) (Abuaisha, 2008: 354-355).

Özdamar is an “intellectual (displaced) writer, who lives across the borders” (Abuaisha, 2008: 355) and who builds bridges between two worlds, as we shall see below, giving place to a writing that can be understood as transferential critique, which is more than transferential criticism.

The analysis of Özdamar’s discourse will be carried out then on the basis of Cultural Rhetoric, accounting for the cultural element involved in the communicative process. The search for interdiscursive transversality that involves an interdiscursive analysis, especially central in this case, is precisely the foundation of a cultural-rhetorical analysis, as Chico Rico explains:

El fundamento del análisis retórico-cultural es el análisis interdiscursivo, es decir, el estudio de los discursos, de las clases de discursos –y de los géneros

literarios– e incluso de las disciplinas que se ocupan de los discursos, tanto en el ámbito de los estudios literarios como en el de los estudios del lenguaje y la comunicación, sin excluir otros campos del conocimiento (Chico Rico, 2015: 314).

Thus, the interdiscursive analysis is the theoretical and methodological tool that deals with the understanding of the presence and relation of different discourses, belonging or not to different discursive categories. Nevertheless, besides this analytical level, the interdiscursive analysis also permits the contrastive study of diverse methodological proposals or even diverse disciplines, seeking a mutual epistemological and methodological enrichment in the understanding of discourses (Albaladejo, 2005: 30), something that lead us again to the concept of transferential critique. We will understand this relation more clearly if we access to a definition of the two widest levels of the discursive analysis: the metanalytical level, defined by Albaladejo as “los análisis y exámenes de las distintas disciplinas relacionadas con el discurso” (Albaladejo, 2008: 261), and the metatheoretical level, defined as “las transferencias que desde el examen, hecho en el análisis interdiscursivo, se llevan a cabo como contribución e incorporación teóricoanalítica a diferentes disciplinas” (Albaladejo, 2008: 261). Based on these two last levels and on the concept of the transferential critique we propose the application of rhetorical analysis but also the projection of literary theory to the analysis of this hybrid text. This approach is warranted by its similarities with the literary discourse and by the enrichment that this theoretical transference could provide to its analysis.

Coming back to the first level, described as “el nivel en el que se sitúan los análisis de discursos concretos, así como los de clases discursivas” (Albaladejo, 2008: 261), different aspects of the discourse in question will be studied. On one hand, the analysis of the discourses presents in the text as well as their relation as part of a global structure. On the other hand, the specific discourses and the different sort of discourses presents in the text will be compared.

It is worthwhile introducing the idea of intertextuality, term introduced by Julia Kristeva in *Sèméiôtikè – Recherches pour une sémanalyse* in 1967, based on a reelaboration of Mikhail Bakhtin:

[...] une découverte que Bakhtine est le premier à introduire dans la théorie littéraire: tout texte se construit comme mosaïque de citation, tout texte est absorption et transformation d'un autre texte. A la place de la notion

d'intersubjectivité s'installe celle d'intertextualité, et le langage poétique se lit au moins, comme double (Kristeva, 1967: 85).

Thus, interdiscursivity can be expressed in form of intertextuality, thereby it is important to study the specific texts related to our object of analysis, even if it is not an explicit or direct relation, whether the whole text is present, or only a fragment, or a mention.

4. "Meine deutschen Wörter haben keine Kindheit. Eine Dankrede". A rhetorical and literary analysis

Özdamar discourse can be categorized as oratorical and, namely, as epideictic, following Aristotle classification based on "the three kinds of hearers" (Aristotle, 1926: 33) which are categorised as "a mere spectator or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of things to come" (Aristotle, 1926: 33). Consequently, there will be three kinds of rhetorical speeches, namely: "deliberative, forensic, and epideictic" (Aristotle, 1926: 33). The first of them tries to exhort or dissuade hearers who must decide on past events, the second one accuses or defends, and the decision is about the future, and, lastly, "the epideictic kind has for its subject praise or blame" (Aristotle, 1926: 33). The epideictic genre does not urge the hearers to decide, but to assess the quality of the discourse and the orator expertness, which is more related to the present:

To the epideictic [is] most appropriately the present, for it is the existing condition of things that all those who praise or blame have in view. It is not uncommon, however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or of the future by way of anticipating it (Aristotle, 1926: 35).

The epideictic genre is the closest to literary discourse. It was not in vain that Aristotle noted the use of this genre in written texts: "The epideictic style is specially suited to written compositions, for its function is reading" (Aristotle, 1926: 423). Since listeners and readers do not need to decide, but to take pleasure and maybe evaluate the quality of the text, expressive means and artistic mechanisms are of paramount importance to the aim of *delectare*, to delight. One reason more to affirm the profound relation between literature and rhetoric. It is relevant to mention that although hearers or readers do not have to decide, they do not only evaluate the quality of the text, but also may change or enrich their *Weltanschauung* and even take a position.

On another note, since Özdamar's acceptance discourse is an exercise of rhetorical communication, it is also defined by its discursivity and its perlocutive effect. The construction of the discourse can be thought with the help of the rhetorical operations or *partes artis* (Chico Rico, 1988: 58-63; Albaladejo 1989: 57-64). The orator, Özdamar, examines the communicative situation (*intellectio*), finds the topics or arguments (*inventio*), organises the material obtained in the textual macrostructure (*dispositio*) and microstructure (*elocutio*), maybe memorise the text (*memoria*) and performs it (*actio*). The orator considers the situation, the public and the aims of the discourse in every operation, specially in the *intellectio*, where the cultural foundations of the rhetorical operations become evident. Thus, she is expected to give a speech of a specific duration and characteristics. She does not need to make a jury to support her work, but she might aim to justify the previous decision. In vain would we search for a strong and evident thesis defence and, thus, the classical *partes orationis* in the service of this defence: *exordium*, *narratio*, *argumentatio* and *peroratio*. Nevertheless, the perlocutive effect is not absent from the speech as long as Özdamar does not only thank and justify being awarded, but her discourse also contains a literary and cultural proposal, a way of writing and being in the world between two cultures, and even a critic to the political situation in Turkey after the coup d'état of 1971. In a sense, Özdamar awaits a response or a reaction, she hopes for adhesion to her proposal.

The discourse was addressed to different types of receivers which could have consequences in the construction of the text. Here is useful to mention the rhetorical notion of polyacroasis proposed by Albaladejo: "to refer to the characteristic consisting of the differences between the hearers of rhetorical discourse" (Albaladejo, 1988: 156). The orator accounts for it in the production and the delivery of the discourse (Albaladejo, 1988: 156), who must consider, specially in the *intellectio*, the different levels of knowledge, cultural background, social differences, diverse interests and knowledge, ideology, and aesthetic tastes of the audience. Consequently, each hearer will interpret the speech differently. Even more being an epideictic discourse, where hearers do not need to decide: "Polyacroasis in epideictic discourses permits an interpretative range less restricted than that of deliberative and forensic discourses, and remains relatively close to the interpretative range found in the interpretation of literary texts" (Albaladejo, 1988: 163). In this case we can differentiate two (heterogeneous) groups of receivers, the hearers in the ceremony and

the readers of the text included in the book. Thus, we extend the concept of polyacrosis to reading discourses where different readers may find diverse interpretations to a speech already delivered.

On one hand, the text is an oral rhetorical discourse delivered at the award ceremony, where the receivers were the jury, guests, journalists, etc. On the other hand, the discourse will become a rhetorical and literary text to be read, included in a book together with articles and short stories written by Özdamar (2005). The reception of the discourse will be different, since the hearers at the ceremony expect a speech of an important intercultural writer and have previously heard a presentation and other discourses, while the readers do not necessarily know that this was an acceptance discourse if they do not read the note at the end of the book. At the same time, the readers will find the discourse with other texts dealing with her relation to German and Turkish culture and language that can give them a wider understanding of Özdamar's position. Furthermore, there are two different reception spaces, the place where the discourse was performed and the private reading space. Each space is a different *speelruimte*, if we use the term proposed by Huizinga, who define these spaces as “gebannen grond, afgezonderde, omheinde, geheiligde terreinen, waarbinnen bijzondere eigen regels geldig zijn” (Huizinga, 2008: 37). Each of them will have its own rules and practices, which will relate to different ways of adopting *decorum*.

Regarding the general content and structure of the discourse –specially related to the *inventio* and *dispositio*–, it begins using the first person singular in an indeterminate past. A literary game introduces the writer Adelbert von Chamisso, remembering a sentence she read once in a biography of the author. Afterwards Heinrich Heine is evoked as friend of Chamisso and a dialogue is constructed employing fragments of poems of both authors. Suddenly we are in 1975 in Turkey: “Ich schaute in Istanbul in den Himmel und dachte an Heine” (Özdamar, 2005: 126). After an explanation of the violence in Turkey at that moment, she jumps back to her first displacement to Germany, immediately related to Brecht and its theatre: “Als ich 10 Jahre zuvor zum erstenmal in Deutschland gewesen war, hatte mich ein Freund öfter zum Berliner Ensemble¹²⁰ mitgenommen” (Özdamar, 2005: 127). Some Brecht's records bring the narration again to Turkey, where she listened to them

¹²⁰ The Berliner Ensemble was the theatre established by Helene Weigel and Bertolt Brecht in 1949 in East Berlin.

seeking solace. Even when she was arrested because of her reports, some Brecht words helped her:

Gott sei dank geht alles schnell vorüber
Auch die Liebe und der Kummer sogar.
Wo sind die Tränen von gestern abend?
Wo ist der Schnee vom vergangenen Jahr?
(Özdamar, 2005: 128).

Then the narration establishes a relation between these words and an Arabic word that helped her in another situation thirty years before in Paris, a “Zauberwort” (Özdamar, 2005: 128). Reflecting on the importance of words the narration arrives to one of the centres of the text: “Ich wurde unglücklich in der türkischen Sprache” (Özdamar, 2005: 129). The Turkish language meant for her suffering and violence,¹²¹ so she went to Berlin again to work with Brecht’s disciple Benno Besson, with whom she exchanged her first German words: “Sofort machten meine ersten deutschen Wörter eine gute Erfahrung” (Özdamar, 2005: 129). Brecht poem became true, yesterday tears were gone, and the German language made her happy: “Ich drehte meine Zunge ins Deutsche, und plötzlich war ich glücklich” (Özdamar, 2005: 129). The German theatre had even the power to rescue her Turkish words: “Ich würde mit Büchner, Kleist, Lenz so glücklich, dass ich sogar meine türkischen Wörter, die ich ins Eis gelegt hatte, wieder auftaute” (Özdamar, 2005: 130).

The account remembers now one of the staging where she participated, Goethe’s *Bürgergeneral.*, where German dramaturgy is connected with Turkish popular culture. Suddenly, Özdamar raises a question she was asked so many times: “Warum schreiben Sie in Deutsch?” (Özdamar, 2005: 130), and never “Warum spielen Sie in Deutsch?”, “Warum spielen Sie in Französisch?” (Özdamar, 2005: 131). She gives a first answer explaining how she started to write her first novel in German without being aware of the decision and reflects on her relationship with

¹²¹ Dufresne explains the process by which Özdamar ends repressing the Turkish language: “Wie Canetti in der deutschen, so sind Özdamar in türkischer Sprache entsetzliche Vorgänge, grausame Urteilssprüche und unzählige Todesurteile, Hinrichtungen und entsprechende Pressemeldungen unauslöschlich ins Gedächtnis geschrieben. Die Erinnerungen an ständige Angst und Bedrohtheit, das Leiden und die Klagen um die Opfer sind aber für Özdamar so bedrückend, dass sie zunächst nur mit Hilfe einer unbewussten Verdrängung aus dem verstandesbedingten Erfassen zu ertragen sind.” (Dufresne, 2006: 120).

the German language: “Meine deutschen Wörter haben keine Kindheit, aber meine Erfahrung mit deutschen Wörter ist ganz körperlich” (Özdamar, 2005: 131). Here we find the title of the speech, the lack of an experience with the German language in her childhood, and also the intense relation between language, theatre and body. A relation that is not delimited to the German language, since she had a similar experience with the French language when she acted in Paris with Besson. The speech is closed with an answer to the question that already hung in the air, now in words of her friend and editor Helge Malchow: “Vielleicht schreibst du in Deutsch, weil du in der deutschen Sprache glücklich geworden bist” (Özdamar, 2005: 132).

In the discourse, as we have seen, several narrative threads intersect. On one hand, there is a question, raised by the middle of the text, that finds several answers, none of them definitive. This line that enquires into Özdamar’s relation with the (German) words is the main thread of the text. On the other hand, there is an autobiographical account. Özdamar speaks about the situation she lived in Turkey –this critical account can be considered a new discursive line–, her travel to France, her displacements to Germany and her life there. Finally, we can identify another line: literature. Fragments of poems as well as sentences from dramatic texts emerge intermittently to exemplify, illustrate a memory, or explain the course of her life. Elements expected in this kind of speeches are present: the acknowledgment tone included in the affirmation that Germany literature saved her, a reference to Adelbert von Chamisso, a self-portrait and an expression of her literature by means of the structure and content of the discourse, which includes the interrelation of both cultures –we should speak of three or four cultures if we include French language and think of Arabic language as separated from her Turkish culture.

Turning to the interdiscursive analysis in its analytical level, at the risk of sounding redundant, characteristics typical of different kind of discourses, fragments and echoes of other concrete discourses, an indirect influence of other texts and the absence of some others is searched.

The strong presence of features of different kind of discourses produces a generic hybridism characteristic of Özdamar and of most ectopic writers. The *Dankrede* is placed between deliberative rhetorical discourse, autobiography, and short story. If it is compared with other

acceptance discourses some recurring characteristics emerge: the presence of the award-winning writer personal history, the reference to the author that names the prize or to the precedent winners and the literary proposal of the author. Often a critic to the socio-political or cultural situation is also present, which draws the speech close to the political discourse and, thus, the public adhesion is searched for, appealing to the audience.

Comparing the present discourse with another Özdamar's acceptance discourse, the speech delivered in the Kleist Award ceremony in 2004, many characteristics are shared, apart from the features already mentioned. For instance, in the second sentence of the 2004 speech appears Kleist name: "Meine Kindheit hatte keinen Kleist" (Blamberger, Breuer, Doering and Müller-Salget, 2005: 13). A sentence that already establishes a parallelism with the previous discourse, even clearer in the first sentence: "Meine deutschen Wörter haben keine Kindheit" (Blamberger, Breuer, Doering and Müller-Salget, 2005: 13). There are also references to her childhood in Turkey and the constant presence of Bertolt Brecht, including the same fragment of Brecht's poem. The structural construction is similar, nevertheless, this second discourse presents some elements typical of rhetorical discourses absent in the 1999 speech; it is the case of the initial salutation "Verehrte Damen und Herren, lieber Hermann Beil" (Blamberger, Breuer, Doering and Müller-Salget, 2005: 13) and the direct appealing to the audience or the institution: "Ich danke Hermann Beil und der Heinrich-von-Kleist-Gesellschaft für diesen wunderbaren Preis" (Blamberger, Breuer, Doering and Müller-Salget, 2005: 18). We can state that even if "Meine deutschen Wörter haben keine Kindheit" shows some expected characteristics also presents in another of her discourses, she left outside some of the traditions of this kind of discourse, as if she were trying to scape the classical conception of the rhetorical genre in order to get closer to the literary discourse.

The *Dankrede* in question and the acceptance discourses of literary prizes in general features a high level of literariness. One proof of that is the similarity with Özdamar's literary discourses, namely her novels, for example both present autobiographical elements. Ectopic authors often include autobiographical references in their texts, even when they are not explicit autobiographies, perhaps because of the importance of their material conditions as displaced authors. Furthermore, Özdamar trilogy and the discourse we are analysing are inserted in a phase which

begins in the late 1980s when the Turkish intercultural literature written in Germany is often centred in the self and in the search of a new space and language as Şölçün explains: “Dieses Phänomen, das schon Ender der 80er Jahre zu erkennen war, begründet die deutliche Wendung von der Begegnung mit der Fremde zur Selbstbegegnung in der Fremde” (Şölçün, 2007: 142). Özdamar’s trilogy navigates between the autobiographical and the fictional narration, since she recounts the life experience of a young Turkish woman that goes from Turkey to Germany and has the same experiences as Özdamar but seasoned with magic realism. This way, the cultural encounter as well as the Turkish and the German culture find an important space in the novels, and her proposal of creating something new from this encounter as well. These characteristics are also present in the *Dankrede*.

Another sign of its literariness is the high presence of rhetorical devices, both in the novels and the discourse, specially symbols, similes, repetitions, extraordinary enumerations and metaphors. An example could be one peculiar and beautiful enumeration followed by a metaphor: “Bein einem Putsch steht alles still, die Baustellen, Export und Import, Menschenrechte. Auch die Karriere steht still. Sogar die Liebe kann stillstehen, ein grosses Loch tut sich auf” (Özdamar, 2005: 127). Özdamar explains in this extract, showing a beautiful musicality, how a military coup d’état paralyzes so different aspects as constructions, human rights, or love, and pictures the feeling that it causes creating a metaphorical image: the opening of a big hole. Although there are considerable differences between this discourse and her novels, as the magic realism of her literary texts or modifications in anecdotes, the style and the topics are similar. Apart from the similarities noted, the discourse presents some other literary elements as defamiliarization, a high level of ambiguity, the presence of fictional passages or a narrator.

To complete the interdiscursive analysis is mandatory to study the discourse intertextuality. The first intertext it is an extract of a Chamisso biography that serves as discourse opening and homage¹²² to the author that names the prize, establishing a bridge between the past when she read the biography and the moment of the ceremony. This way, Özdamar constructs herself not only as writer and orator, but as reader

¹²² That is, in a way, the laudatory episode that Aristotle attributed to every epideictic discourse: “Epideictic speeches should be varied with laudatory episodes” (Aristotle, 1926: 457).

as well. Moreover, she connects since the beginning different temporary levels. The past is especially present in the discourse, something typical of displaced authors, as Chiellino notes when he explains the central tension in intercultural literature between past and future, each of them related to a cultural space:

Aus dem Blickwinkel der Arbeitsmigranten, Exilierten und Repatriierten gestalten sich die Wege und die Ziele als ein vielschichtiges Spannungsfeld zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Da Vergangenheit und Zukunft unterschiedlichen Kulturräumen zugeordnet werden, geraten Raum und Zeit aus dem Gleichgewicht und erhalten unterschiedliche Stellenwerte. Während die Aufnahmegesellschaft die Priorität des Ortes hervorhebt, negiert sie die mitgebrachte Vergangenheit der Ankommenden. Dem Gegenüber setzen die Ankommenden die Kontinuität ihrer Vorgeschichte, d.h. Die Priorität der Zeit (Chiellino, 2007: 52-53).

The following intertexts maintain a dialectic relation in the structure and the fictional context elaborated by the author. Adelbert von Chamisso and Heinrich Heine have a conversation through extracts of their poems: opening the two first strophes of *Mein Kind, wir waren Kinder* of Heine, then Chamisso's poem *Geh' du nur hin!* and, finally, the first strophe of Heine's ballad *In der Fremde*. By means of this creative exercise of multiple intertextuality Özdamar builds a conversation between both authors upon strophes of their poems. That constitutes a new poem with a new global meaning that lead us from a narration of their supposed childhood "Mein Kind, wir waren Kinder, /Zwei Kinder, klein und froh" (Özdamar, 2005: 125) to a reflection on the passage of time and the course of a lifetime: "Ich war auch jung und bin jetzt alt" (Özdamar, 2005: 126). All strophes have the same structure of four verses but the rhyme changes, it is ABAB in Heine's strophes and AABB in Chamisso's. This way there is not a total continuity, but a global parallelism.

This exercise of intertextuality leaves also proof of the considerable influence the German poets exercised upon her and of the way she understands literature as a living reality with which she, as ectopic author, can create something new. The next citation serves the same purpose. Özamar uses Heine's poem *Anno 1829* to introduce the *topos* of Turkey in 1975, namely a moment when she contemplates the sky and remembers those verses. It also acts as hinge between this evocative memory and a more journalistic explanation of Turkey situation. Then we find a mention without quotation of Brecht's play *Arturo Ui*, the first reference to Brecht and to theatre, that from now on will be one of

the discourse central points. Following this mention there is another intertext, now a specific fragment of a Brecht's song in *Die Moritat von Mackie Messer*. She awakes the musicality and materiality of it by narrating how and when she listened to it: "Jeden Tag hörte ich mir in Istanbul die Schallplatten" (Özdamar, 2005: 127). She also highlights the translatability of the words that travel with her from Berlin to Istanbul, words that she translates to her grandmother into Turkish and then into German again to include them in the text: "Manchmal fragte sie mich: Was sagen sie? Was sagen sie? Ich übersetzte" (Özdamar, 2005: 127).

After naming the reports that caused her arrest, another mention without quotation that enriches the speech interdiscursivity, the next intertext is again a Brecht's song. At this point is more than clear Brecht's profound influence on Özdamar's work and life. These verses that console her are present in two occasions, first as promise, then as fulfilment of it. This extract of four verses can activate different relations on the receiver, depending on his cultural and literary background, as part of the phenomenon of *polyacrosis*. In this case, on one hand, the rest of the song can be remembered, or even other Brecht poems, his biography, etc. On the other hand, the version sung by Ute Lemper may also be evoked. And, in a broadest sense, these verses can induce the receiver to think of the topic *ubi sunt*, specially the verse "Wo ist der Schnee vom vergangenen Jahr?" that immediately evokes François Villon's verse "Ou sont les neiges d'antan".

There is also space for an Arabic word that connects her past in Turkey, where she learned the expression, with her time in Paris. "Bismillahirrahmanirrahim" (Özdamar, 2005: 128) is described as "ein arabisches Gebetswort" (Özdamar, 2005: 128), but the exact meaning is not explained. In her novel *Das Leben ist eine Karawanserei* this anecdote is also explained, with some variations, and it is narrated how she learn the expression, translating it for the readers: "Dann habe ich im Buch geguckt, was Bismillāhirrahmanirrahim heisst: Im Namen Gottes, oder in Namen Allahs, der schützt und vergibt" (Özdamar, 2013: 58). In this case, there is a bigger effort to translate in the novel than in the discourse. Two interesting concepts can be applied to think the presence of a language that differs from the one employed in the rest of the discourse. Firstly, the term *latenze linguistiche* proposed by Carmine Chiellino, defined as: "l'affiorare della lingua di provenienza culturale in un testo scritto ovviamente in un'altra lingua" (Chiellino,

2001: 15). The emergence of the language of the context of origin is typical of ectopic authors, carrying “una memoria culturale che si è svolta in un’altra lingua, quindi si è codificata in un’altra lingua” (Chiellino, 2001: 22). Arabic was not the mother tongue of Özdamar but belongs to her *topos* of origin and brings its cultural memory. The other concept is *erlebte Sprache* or experienced language, proposed by Ana Ruiz Sánchez, who defines it as follows applying to a Semprun’s text:

Dicho uso como lengua vivida permite al autor enunciar con mayor fidelidad la propia experiencia vivida en otra lengua y perteneciente a una memoria distinta a la de la lengua de escritura, y mantener así la coherencia que significante y significado tienen en la biografía del mismo autor. Al elegir enunciar lo experimentado como lengua vivida, el autor ancla en la memoria del lector dicha experiencia como recuerdo, como experiencia estética, como vivencia lingüística (Ruiz Sánchez, 2017: 74).

Thus, the Arabic expression and the French sentences that are present in the discourse can be understood as the result of the fidelity towards the experience lived in these languages, which transform the anecdotes in memories that are read and experienced by the receiver as such.

There is another use of the French language or, more precisely, the French culture, at the beginning of the text, when she explains that the first time she read about the place Champagne, she did not know the French language nor the country and she could not help think about the drink: “der Geburtsort von Chamisso –Champagne– rief sofort das Bild hervor, das ser in einer Champagnerflasche geboren war” (Özdamar, 2005: 125). Özdamar reproduces the way she read and understood this strange word, awakening the materiality of the word, interrupting the automatic perception of it and, in sum, producing a defamiliarisation¹²³ effect.

The singularisation of the object that appears as if it were a strange element that we have not learned how to deal with is typical of ectopic writers that work with adopted languages and cultures. It arises in the

¹²³ We employ here the term proposed by the Russian formalists, namely Shklovsky. It has been developed by other theorist as, for instance, Bertolt Brecht itself, who called it *Verfremdungseffekt*. His conception was part of his proposal of Epic theatre, centred in the effect on the audience: “Für mich bedeutete Verfremdung nur, daß man auf der Bühne nichts “selbstverständlich” sein läßt, daß man auch bei der stärksten Gefühlsbeteiligung immer noch *weiß*, was man zu fühlen bekommt, da man sich das Publikum nicht einfach in irgendwas einfühlen läßt, so daß es alles als natürlich, gottgegeben und unabänderlich hinnimmt —und so weiter” (Brecht, 1980: 133).

way the linguistic material is employed, and in the way the cultural elements are included, as in our example. This first defamiliarisation is also transmitted to readers that access to the reality narrated with a distance produced by the particular use of the language which forces an attentive and critical reading towards the displacement and the cultures at stake. This defamiliarisation has, then, a perlocutionary effect that intensifies the reception of the discourse.

The last part of the discourse is opened by a quotation, the question she was asked time and again during the past ten years: “Warum schreiben Sie in Deutsch?” (Özdamar, 2005: 130). She gives a first answering narrating an anecdote, and using a Japanese saying: “Nur die Reise ist schön – nicht das Ankommen” (Özdamar, 2005: 131), with which she identifies herself comparing the journey and her discovering of German language. Another part of the answer to this question is the only internal intertext of the discourse, the sentence that titles the text, which establish a play of echoes and repetitions that lead us again to the theatre and her corporal relation to German words. Before arriving to the end of the speech, another Brecht’s play is mentioned, *Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis*, quoted in French, as already mentioned, emphasising once more the translatability of literature. The last intertext are the last words of the speech, which she gives to her friend Helge Malchow. This sentence, not said by Özdamar, closes the different threads of the discourse, about her relationship with (German) words, her theatre experience, and her decision to write in German.

5. Özdamar: the productive character of the cultural encounter in an ectopic author

Since the text studied is a hybrid between a rhetorical discourse and a literary text, our analysis shows the enrichment that a transferential critique brings to an analysis. It proves the applicability of rhetorical tools to a text that exceeds the canonical category of rhetorical and, at the same time, the possibilities of applying literary analytical concepts to a rhetorical discourse. The *Dankrede* seems thought to be read, without references to the audience, plenty of literary devices, but, at the same time, with marks of *decorum* appropriate to the discursive situation or *speelruimte* of a literary award ceremony: a reference to the writer that named the award, the presence of Özdamar admiration and love for the German language and literature, an intercultural

proposal and even a softening of the critique to inequality, oppression and German imperialism, we usually find in her work. This last characteristic serves as reminder of the price that intercultural or displaced authors often pay to be included in a literary centre, softening the sharpest critiques or creating an acceptable hybridism that does not challenge the new space too much.

We have seen how the numerous intertexts inserted function as hinges that allow the sliding of the narration from one level to another, changing the topic and the chronotope without brusque ruptures and creating cohesion. Moreover, they are connected in different forms: repetition, contrast, or dialectic. There are intertexts belonging to different discourse classes and literary genres, and the presence of translation is undeniable, although it can be indirect and vague. Finally, at least two cultural spaces are intersected in this discourse by means of intertexts. Turkish and German culture are present and alive, providing references and necessary keys to understand the different levels of its intertextuality and interdiscursivity, and, maybe the most important effect, creating something new. This creation of something new from her two cultures exceeds the idea of peaceful intercultural coexistence and even more of the cultural integration often imposed to immigrants. That can be identified as Özdamar's agenda or programme present in her entire work, sometimes in a more explicit way related to the content of the texts, other times by means of the structure or the form employed, as the "Turkish German" employed in her novels or the dialogue and interaction of the intertexts belonging to different cultures in the text we are studying today. Özdamar herself exercise a transferential critique acting as displaced writer who lives across the borders, builds bridges between two worlds, and adopts and transmits a critical stance, even if this discourse is not her most critical text.

In this discourse Özdamar awakes the materiality of the words, playing with the defamiliarization of the different or strange that emerges from the displacement. Words in new languages are strong, have the ability to activate a new conscience of an automatized language, the power to alleviate the suffering and to rescue a lost language. They can be translated and, even without translation, they can connect Turkey and Goethe and create something new form the encounter. A creativity that defies the concept of frontiers, inequality, and imposed integration to propose a new relation of different cultures without the subordination

of one of them. Özdamar narrates the oppression she lived in Turkey transformed into the impossibility to speak the Turkish language anymore, but also the healing power of a new language, literature and culture. In her novels she delves into the inequality that gives place to displacement, speaks of imperialism, and does not avoid showing the inequalities of the German *topos*, aspects that she leaves out of this discourse centred in the gratitude for the role German Literature and language had in her life. Nevertheless, her proposal of a transcultural relation is an enemy of oppression and inequality and shows a way of understanding the globality where displacement can be a source of creation.

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Cultural Rhetoric and Translation¹²⁴

Sandra Mora López

Abstract: Cultural Rhetoric and translation theory, used together as a method of analysis of literary works, can result in a very appropriate theoretical framework to reveal the radical interculturality of the literary text, particularly present and challenging in ecotopic texts and translated texts. By means of theoretical tools such as the *partes artis*, it is possible to analyse different aspects of the production process of these literary texts, to isolate some of their specific features and, therefore, to challenge their historically non-predominant role in literary systems, from the perspective of a change to come that revalues what literary systems have of translated or hybridized.

Keywords: Rhetoric, Translation, Comparative Literature, Intercultural Literature, Deterritorialized Literature

1. Introduction

Translation provides its most suggesting results and intuitions in contact with the rest of the disciplines that study the literary phenomenon. A more complete and more detailed perception of the interactions between literary systems, both from a synchronic and diachronic point of view, has been born from its confluence with comparative literature. From its exchange with feminist, postcolonial and other theories of culture, new forms of text criticism have been born that, without the data and analytical forms coming from translation, would surely have suffered from a lack of material and textual support.

Rhetoric, as a science of discourse as a mean of persuasion, is no exception to this interdisciplinarity in which the value of translation is enhanced as a theoretical, critical, and practical apparatus of approximation to texts. Throughout the following pages we will present some meeting points in which this cooperation between disciplines has structured the understanding and development of textuality in Western

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culture, from Antiquity to the present day. Already in the Roman written culture, translation was used as a technique of reproduction of the discursive and rhetorical practices imported from Greek sources and assimilated in this new environment. Whether taken from a perspective of translation as a rhetorical and communicative function or, rather, from a grammatical perspective, as a structural examination of texts, the truth is that the thoughts of Roman rhetoricians on translation were already presented through interdisciplinary elements.

The culmination of this journey, more practical than theoretical, is materialized in the cooperation between Cultural Rhetoric, a framework developed by Tomás Albaladejo (2013), and translation, as a strategy for understanding, generating and incorporating texts to a certain culture. Thus, through the socially constructed conception of the devices that configure a text as a vehicle for ideological, referential, and informative materials, a connection with the proposals of translation is generated, as a textual and cultural practice.

2. The historical dimension of the relationship between Rhetoric and Translation

As we said, translation is in relation to Rhetoric, a connection already evident in Roman culture. In this context, this interrelation is based on the conception of translation as an imitation exercise (Chico Rico, 2002: 26) and as an active response, that is, a response that creates another text, to the understanding of the text that is received or interpreted (Chico Rico, 2002: 33). There are, therefore, the two facets of translation as a two-sided textual strategy, which always interprets in order to create a new text. Thus, by translating texts from the great Greek masters, students of Rhetoric and Grammar could acquire certain skills that would be useful to them to successfully produce their own texts, that is, as an *exercitatio* (Chico Rico, 2002: 35).

However, what is of great interest for translation research today is that Latin culture foresaw two kinds of approaches to the translation of texts, which we mentioned above, the grammatic and the rhetoric one, and made them derive from the target of those texts, as perceived by the recipient. It is easy to relate this idea to modern functionalist theories of translation, which rely on the conservation of what is established as

the main textual function, compared to other elements of content and form that are transformed into accessories.

The conception of the ontological difference between the source text and the target text in the Roman context sets the foundation for this analysis, where translation is understood as substitution (Chico Rico, 2002: 35). Translation in Rome and to a large extent in our day represents, in an etymological sense, its original. It follows that translation choices are divided into a conservation polarity, whether formal or content-oriented, without being their being able to overcome this paradigm.

I will begin by briefly commenting translation, seen from the point of view of Grammar. In this case, the latter was mainly considered text commentary and textual criticism (Chico Rico, 2002: 31). Hence, his relationship with translation had more to do with an exegetical or hermeneutic function that sought to preserve the original text through formal translations — literal, in the morphosyntactic sense — in the form of *enarratio* and *commentatio* (Chico Rico, 2002: 36). Perhaps we could draw a comparison between these conservative translations and the annotated editions with the philological translations (Hurtado Albir, 2001: 54) of our days, aimed at transmitting to the receiver an idea of the morphosyntactic form of the original.

On the other hand, there was a second approach more rooted on rhetoric ground, used and commented on by Cicero (Chico Rico, 2002: 36). In this case, as we say, rhetorical ideas permeate the purpose of the text, which is no longer a meticulous conservation of the formal section as a way of apprehending the content, but of the pragmatic-discursive section (Chico Rico, 2002: 37), that is, of all the persuasive material. If this includes modifications or adaptations, they will be justified in this context. Functional equivalence, a concept that remains predominant in translation, makes an appearance. We come down this path to the functionalist theories of translation, as we said, and to all those who care about discourse and its socio-discursive implications, within the framework of the interpretive-communicative translation method (Hurtado Albir, 2001: 54).

Rhetoric, not yet cultural as Albaladejo conceives it, has great interest in its integration with translation insofar as it contemplates the text as a full communicative unit (Chico Rico, 2008: 64). Likewise, as we have

seen, classical rhetorical thinking raised from the beginning the essential polarity that has pursued reflection and translating praxis, such as exegetical-hermeneutic and communicative-discursive approaches. Both of them derived from the consideration of language as a means of direct but specific access to a series of also specific senses, which makes that text the only source of authority over that area of reality. Thus, the texts must be transmitted with what is understood by fidelity and, at the same time, as discourses with specific and recognizable persuasive characteristics. This conception will have a strong continuity in the biblical translation tradition.

For Chico Rico (2001: 264 and 265) it will be the textual model of literary translation, as an integrator of a communicative process of some referential and ideological materials and, therefore, perfectly compatible with the rhetorical media, what the Rhetoric conceptualizes according to its own categories, that is, the *partes artis*. On the other hand, this distribution can also be used to understand and analyse the intercultural multiplication of this text in the target language and culture, with contributions such as ectopic literature (Albaladejo, 2011).

3. Cultural rhetoric and literary Translation in interrelation. Ectopic literature as a paradigm of interculturality in textual construction.

Cultural Rhetoric proposes a novel framework for researching texts, literary or not, insofar as it seeks to free itself from any claim to universality of any rhetorical schemes, by means of incorporating a cultural dimension, that is, socially constructed, in said rhetorical schemes. As proposals of interaction and mutual influence between culture and discursive-rhetorical practices of a given community, both literary communication and Rhetoric are cultural spaces, articulated as secondary modelling systems (Albaladejo, 2013: 13). According to this perspective, it is possible to find these culturally constructed anchors in discursive practices of all kinds, including, of course, literature.

In the case of the topic that we are dealing with in this discussion, literary translation, this question is even more complicated, since it is not only a question of placing a whole series of practices and frameworks associated with literary translation as such, but of conceiving within them a whole series of practices of rhetorical

construction of texts that can and do vary from one language to another, or from one cultural context to another.

This productive interrelationship can be exemplified through the specific case of ectopic literature in its similarities with translated literature, as a paradigm of the hybridity of the literary space and not as an exception to a hypothetical monolingual literary space, not translated and static from a structural and rhetorical point of view, that is, aculturally rhetorized.

Ectopic literature (Albaladejo, 2011: 1) is defined as that literature created *ek-topos*, that is, outside the cultural sphere to which the author's work could be attributed due to his place of birth and education. Since movements of people have been a historical constant, ectopic writings are more common than one might think. This derives from our still indebted conception of a historical and literary Romanticism, which sustained the creation of literary canons linked to literature and a nation or community of people. Of course, in the dawn of European national spirits this was a project with political sense, which, however, deliberately diverted the focus from the reality of the production and reception of literature, much more ambiguous and hybrid.

Thus, what ectopic literature comes to remind us of is the mobility and hybridism of principle from which scriptural practices start, now and always, revealing as an abstraction, a symptom of unprovable idealism, the idea of national literature as monolingual and a constant and autonomous cause of itself. With this we would already be summoning Cultural Rhetoric as a framework with which to understand this mobility of production structures of literary discourses and this hybridity, (inter)culturally determined. However, it is equally necessary to invoke translation when thinking about ectopic writing as the main hypothesis of contemporary writing, since literary materials, poetics, narratives, political ideas, all of them go through a process of cultural and linguistic translation, before becoming integrated into new spaces in which to continue their development.

It follows that we cannot speak of Cultural Rhetoric without speaking of translation, just as we cannot speak of culture or of any other interaction between human groups without referring, even briefly, to the role that translation has in these interactions, more conspicuous because it is elusive and semi-unconscious in our relationship with the texts. Therefore, just as Cultural Rhetoric establishes a critique of

discourse, of its internal and external form, as a culturally determined semiotic object, this aspiration is concretized in the revision of the *partes artis*, as well as of the tropes and figures. Thus, translation is simultaneously configured as an allegorical a priori of the understanding of all texts, and in front of the given text, as a series of factual, material, dual, parallel work strategies, with the text to be read, understand as much as possible and culturally reconfigure in a new form or reformulation, so that this process can be reproduced, phantasmagorically, in the reception culture, where the original will be missing and only the translation will be available.

These strategies occur in every reading, as indicated by the a priori hermeneutic translator, but they remain inactive, and what is more ironic, they also remain inactive in the reading of the already translated translation. Therefore, reactivating them by reminding the reader that he or she is facing a translation is still an act that transgresses the conventions of monolingual reading, to the extent that it activates the dual processes. However, in this reading the original text is not available, only an empty gesture is reproduced, a translator's commitment without object, to prevent the absence of the original and trust that we are reading it.

Thus, a translation of an ectopic text means placing a second mirror between original and translation, which makes the senses and forms between them bounce uncontrollably. It means translating what already started from a rhetorical translated and dual structure, which comes and returns obsessively from some already hybrid structures in one culture and language to another, without ever being able to stop. As illustrated by ectopic texts such as the trilogy of Molloy, Malone meurt and L'Innomable, by Samuel Beckett, the original, understood as a monocultural and monolingual book, has simply never existed, but we have unconsciously invented it as a productive hypothesis that maintains a status quo of watertight exchange between languages, countries and literary markets.

4. A Case Study: The Relationships Between Monolingual, Ectopic, and Translated Literature Through *Partes Artis*

As we mentioned above, the conceptual tools of the so-called *rhetorica recepta* (Albaladejo, 1989: 29) can also be used successfully to understand translation processes and strengthen their pragmatic postulates (Luarsabishvili, 2018 and Chico Rico, 2001, 2002). Our proposal is that, just as the *partes artis* can be used as a means to understand the process of creation of the literary work, they can also be used to find the ectopic elements, which in some way can also be understood as particularly dense nodes in the textual production, representing typical characteristics of translated texts. Analysing these texts in this way also makes it possible to reveal, through rhetorical tools, the multicultural nature of the texts that are supposedly monolingual, as also tacitly accepted by the distracted reader of a translation.

The scheme could be outlined as follows, employing only the constitutive operations of discourse, that is, moving away *actio* and *memoria* due to their minor importance in the context of production of translated literary discourses. In general, a slightly modified version of a theoretical model available in Mora, 2020 will be presented.

In the case of the first operation, *intellectio*, it is important to consider the notion of rhetorical field, extensively developed in the work of Stefano Arduini (2000), as a rhetorical space for the production of a given work, where it acquires its maximum communicative potential. It is in this space that the first gesture towards the creation of the text occurs.

In the translated text, as well as in ectopic writings, referential set structures are configured in a specific way from the beginning (Albaladejo, 1992: 194), that is, their set of integrated or intensified world references already reveals from its surface and its conditions of production a hybrid and complex rhetorical field. This happens due to the shattering of expectations that occurs with respect to the expected references in a literary text belonging to the community in which it is published and disseminated. On the other hand, operations of textual production of translations imply, also from the beginning, the reading of another text, with its own structure of reference set and its own rhetorical field, which configure the model that is trying to reproduce

in the new cultural space. The remains of this interaction and the result of the decisions taken in this regard will be revealed in the cultural specificities of the translated text.

Already from the *intellectio*, therefore, it is possible to find the signs of decentralization in cultural terms of all literary work. This can take place in an evident and authorized way by the author, as in the case of ectopism, invisible and unauthorized by its own invisibility, as it is in translation, or silenced but present in the genesis of the forms, themes and resources raised from its conception, as it is in monolingual literature. In all cases, establishing the rhetorical field is a complex task that becomes more difficult with the recognition of the cultural ambiguity present in the literary text and that can only be initiated by proposing it as a dynamic and flexible territory.

Let us retrieve the metaphor of the mirror that I used before as a visual representation of a state of cultural/linguistic indeterminacy of the text; the rhetorical field of a translated or ectopic literary text is similar to a liminal space where each cultural element is reflected in another linguistic element, which in turn is reflected again in another cultural element. Ectopism or translation represent ruptures of the expected movement of these reflections in new and moderately unpredictable directions, which configures a rhetorical field folded over itself, which will inevitably fold in another way as soon as it is crossed by either of these two elements. However, this is not a loss, it is a continuous development of the work in new directions that already has its germ in monolingual literature, although that potential has not yet been activated.

Secondly, we will use the *inventio* and *dispositio* operations as a method of analysis. These operations fix the first material instances of the text and already raise the concrete form in which they will be made apparent to the recipient. Finding the materials for the text and determining their disposition are two movements that relate in ectopic writing to finding a language or a non-intuitive cultural environment in the production environment from which it is written, without any other justification for the solution found than the self-justification that is the aesthetic project of the author. In this case, the difference with translation is that those who translate, normally, already know in advance the language and the cultural field in which their text will be developed. In this sense, the translator is placed in a circumstance similar to that of monolingualism,

compared to the ectopic literature, which activates several linguistic and cultural possibilities in the same text. This is another reason why ectopic literature is disturbing for a stagnant state of things in the literary sphere, since it exemplifies from its very textual conception an extension to the public space of an intimate and private linguistic sensitivity, which evidences its ability to choose its mode of expression, from among the possibilities unlocked by an openly decentralized cultural identity.

It is important to emphasize that when we talk about a decision about the language or the socio-cultural position from which we are going to write, we are not necessarily talking about a conclusion that follows chronologically a rational process of the author, but it can be a simultaneous process in the *inventio* and the *dispositio*, finding at the same time what we are trying to say and how one believes it could be said in the most appropriate way. In ectopic literature, there is a certain recurrence of a topic of loss and identity conflict (Ruiz-Sánchez, 2005), as thematic concretions of the idea of displacement that underlies the entire rhetorical construction of these works, that is, a displacement with respect to the literary, linguistic and cultural axis allegedly fixed established by the national canons.

This thematic recurrence coincides with the anxieties transmitted by many of the aesthetic projects begun in the West as early as the nineteenth century and continued in the twentieth century, in which displacement and being out of place, both in a literal and metaphorical sense, have ended up becoming topics of literary subjectivity. Of course, ectopic literature already existed before the displacement of authors, usually Central European or Anglo-Saxon, ceased to be predominantly motivated by curiosity or the search for adventure, as it happens with travel literature or the personal chronicles of authors who moved without suffering (or without revealing) a trauma, genres present throughout the entire history of literature. However, its presence or its importance in the development of literary canons can be considered marginal, if not directly neglected, until the transit between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brings to the focus of thematic attention the anxious and decentralized subject of post-Fordist capitalism to the centre of aesthetic interest in the Western canon. From that point on, the topics and the forms that could be considered specific or particularly indicated for an ectopic writing and not for a generalized sensibility, ectopic or not, become predominant, ectopizing the literary

communication or, rather, starting to reflect a change in the human experience in general.

Finally, with regard to the last operation, *elocutio*, it already emerges on the plane of the textual surface, which according to this framework is accessed after having passed through the macrotextual functions in the previous operations. It is this which is composed of a series of microdecisions, corresponding to the macrodecisions taken previously or simultaneously. The decision-making process exists in literature considered monolingual, in ectopic literature and, of course, in translation. However, the interlinguistic or intercultural decision-making process evidenced by ectopic literature is carried out by an author, that is, a figure of authority. For this reason, he enjoys the privilege of making such decisions, always protected by his or her own aesthetic or artistic will. This, of course, is also a privilege enjoyed by the monolingual author.

On the other hand, in translation, the decision-making process that represents the updating of the various potentials activated by the macrostructuring of a text, as in the other cases, does not take place under the protection of an authority figure. It occurs from a pragmatically non-existent instance in the literary tradition, an absent figure because it is invisibilized, as Lawrence Venuti has shown (2008). Therefore, the micro-structural modifications, at the level of the *elocutio*, end up being the most punished or undervalued in the consideration of the translated text, as well as the most meritorious in the monolingual text and also in the ectopic one. It is thus here, in the final operation, that he or she puts in writing the abstractions of previous textual production, where it is specified in hybrid textual material, in the case of ectopic literature with authorization, in the case of translation without it, and in the case of monolingual literature in an intertextual, generic or genetic way.

It remains to be seen to what extent the literary systems are willing to openly tolerate hybridity and contradiction vis-à-vis the cultural-linguistic monolith which, without really becoming concrete in the texts, has become an anachronism in the current panorama of global interconnection. This flexibility may explain a favourable evolution in their tolerance of the dissent of ectopism and the irregular condition of the translated text, which, as with migration, seems to be accepted only when it does not seem too foreign.

5. Final remarks

The relationships between translation and Cultural Rhetoric are, as we have seen, multipolar. When united in a joint theoretical framework, they are operative to unmask aspects of hybridity, interculturality and literary interaction that perhaps go unnoticed in other perspectives. In this sense, the notions of ectopic literature and translated literature are postulated as two concepts capable of tracing coordinates of production and textual expansion more in line with the movements of people, ideas and literary forms that have underpinned literary development, transcending unitary abstractions of the nineteenth-century type.

This interaction is also promising, insofar as it can give rise to practical analyses that assess macro- and micro-structural decision-making in the translated text, from the point of view of its rhetorical constitution. In this way, a map can be drawn of the iterations, repetitions and absences that characterize the reconstruction of rhetorical fields in Translation and the generation of translated texts of all kinds, but specifically the literary ones, because of their high communicative and emotional density.

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Cultural Rhetoric and Democratic Culture: worldview and fundamentals

Jesús Baena Criado

Abstract: The development of the western civilization implies a political order based on a democratic system. Furthermore, the other cultures, influenced by the western conception/worldview of humanity, start to consider these principles as desirables, as the correct one. Today, the political quality of a country is measured by its democratic standards specially related to administrative items of the government. However, can a democratic system be evaluated solely by those items? Democracy, since its emergence, is an administration system of people, an *instrument* without related worldview of humanity. This implies that the role of people in the system is essential for its proper functioning, attached to the concept of democracy. That role needs people to be conscious citizens of a system that is based on the own citizenship. In this way, people are not part of the democracy, but they are democracy. Nevertheless, can people be citizens without an appropriate worldview? Can people be part of democracy if they do not know nor share the concept of democratic culture? It seems a hard task for every government. Beyond these questions, can people be educated to be conscious of their own condition of citizens? In this article, we examine the relation between democracy and people in their condition as citizens. We will remember the education and political program of Greek democracy development as a mirror where we can reflect ourselves. Furthermore, we will relate the teaching of Rhetoric around the worldview that democracy proposes. Finally, we will study this relation between Rhetoric and democracy as necessary for the real development of the last one, giving as result the Cultural Rhetoric.

Keywords: Rhetoric; Cultural Rhetoric; democracy; democratic culture; worldview; democratic education; citizenship education; metaphysics; post-truth.

0. Introduction

Democracy is a system consisting of redistribution of powers among those who have citizen status (cf. Schumpeter, 1963; Rubio Carracedo, 1996, 2005). As a system consisting of administration and organization, what kind of powers are subject to redistribution and which are not, as well as the attributions of these powers, will depend on the systemic configuration that is assumed by the citizenry — either at its origin or through constitutional modifications, referendums or constituent processes—. In our opinion, the conception of democracy as a system or, reducing the concept to a pragmatic level, as an *instrument* whose usefulness is determined by the user —and not for qualities in themselves, that is, consubstantial to democracy—, this conception is fundamental for an adequate analysis of this system and for the

understanding of the existing relationships between democracy, democratic culture and Cultural Rhetoric.

Thus, we are about to deal with the first of the issues that concern us, that is, democracy as a concept and its limits and borders. The initial question in this regard is: does democracy essentially entail some kind of principle? To give a satisfactory answer, we consider that the observation of democracy from a historical perspective — specifically the Athenian— can be a great contribution. However, before turning to history, we think it is relevant to resolve some previous issues related to the conceptualizing process of democracy by humanity.

If we accept the initial premises, that is, that democracy is a system, an *instrument* for the redistribution of powers, then we can affirm that, except for the very meaning of democracy, which assumes a shared ownership of power among the members of the citizenship, should not carry any principle of its own.

Democracy, however, is often understood as a system that entails certain foundations, as if democracy, in addition to being a system, implied a set of essential ideas in relation to the human being himself and a certain commitment to a *true* reality. For this reason, we understand it as necessary to emphasize these fundamental aspects, related to the worldview of the human community that applies a democracy, before proceeding to present our proposals.

The first of all questions is that relating to the relationship between value concepts and democracy (Schwartz, 2009). In particular, and although we will deal with this aspect in greater depth later, we refer to the concepts present in the Western tradition such as those of Truth, Justice, Good, Beauty, etc. As we said, democracy is a *system*, an *instrument*, whose usefulness or effectiveness should be measured based on the success it achieves when it comes to distributing and redistributing powers among the members of a specific citizenry. As an *instrument*, democracy does not entail in any way the assumption of values, since that is not its mission.

Rather, we could agree that, when a democratic system accepts the existence of values with absolute entity, such as those already mentioned, it is due to a specific cultural tradition and not to democracy *per se* (cf. R. Inglehart, 1988; R. Putnam et al., 1993; S. Schwartz, 2009; G. Almond & S. Verba, 1963). And this is important “because each

ideology's notion of human nature sets limits on what it considers to be politically possible" (Ball, Dagger & O'Neill, 2016: 11). For this reason, we speak about the relationship between democracy as a system and the worldview of the human communities that adopt it, since depending on their own cultural tradition, the development of a democratic system can be different from each other and, at the same time, functional. Similarly, depending on one's own human traditions and worldviews, a democracy can succeed in one particular community and fail in a similar one (R. Putnam et al., 1993). In this sense, R. Inglehart (1988: 1207) will affirm:

I suggest that the cultural component of these cross-national differences reflects the distinctive historical experience of the respective nationalities. Long periods of disappointed expectations give rise to dissatisfied attitudes. These orientations may be transmitted from generation to generation through preadult socialization. In so far as early learning is relatively persistent, this contributes to the stability of distinctive cultural patterns. The fact that one can to some extent identify the historical causes of given cross-cultural differences does not of course make them disappear. They remain distinctive cultural characteristics with important behavioural consequences.

Positioning ourselves far, however, from structuralism, also the interrelation between the evaluative concepts or the ethics that a specific community practices is well attested in the classic work of M. Weber (1985). It is in this direction that we insist on the fact that, although the cultural or ethical tradition may be given, it is its presence prior to democracy, and not democracy, which implies a worldview and an assumption of concepts. However, this leads us to address the following question: can a cultural tradition that adopts a set of absolute values as ethics coexist with a democratic system? To this question, the only possible answer —*a priori*— is that it will depend on the circumstances.

A democracy, as a system, in turn implies a group or a community that considers itself a citizen. But a democratic system, however, does not require a particular conception of "citizenship" nor does it entail a principle or foundation that determines which people are part of that citizenship. Thus, we understand that citizenship is a "status granted to full members of a community. Its beneficiaries are equal in terms of the rights and obligations that it implies" (Marshall & Bottomore, 1998: 37). This concept —that of citizenship— will also be dependent on various circumstances, whether they are properly conceptual or others such as economic or social ones. A good example of this is the

conception of citizenship used by the Athenians: the number of people that made up the citizen group was notably less than the total number of inhabitants that made up the Athenian community. And, as the reference to a democracy “so far away” is sometimes criticized, no less remarkable is the conception of citizenship that has been held, especially in Western countries, of women or black people, all of which occurred in the last century. Therefore, the concept of citizenship, which is fundamental for the implementation of a democracy, can vary in the space-time framework depending on the conditions that take place in a specific community.

If we have talked about citizenship when dealing with the issue of the potential coexistence between a democracy and a set of absolute values, it is the close interrelationship that this triad maintains. In a worldview that accepts absolute values such as Justice, the Good or the Good or Beauty, the conception of democracy is subject to the belief of a specific community in the existence of these values. In this way, what is fair cannot be, in any way, the subject of open debate, but in any case, it will be for those people who have the power, capacity or knowledge to do so, and this group may coincide with the totality of what is considered as citizenship or only with a part of it.

In the same way, that which is the Truth has an existence independent of the human being and, therefore, of the human community, so that cannot be the object of discussion even when the Truth or the Just are circumscribed to a circumstance. Thus, we find an example in this regard in the speech made by Emilio Castelar (1861: 13) in 1854 when he says that “I will defend democratic ideas, if you wish to hear them. These ideas do not belong to parties or to men; they belong to humanity. Based on reason, they are, like truth, absolute, and like God's laws, universal”.¹²⁵

In another order, it is important to remember here that, as L. Wittgenstein (1973: 197) said, “ethics and aesthetics are the same”. The relevance of the words of this author resides in the fact that, given the existence of an absolute value of Beauty and of the Good or the Just, that which is Beautiful is also Good or Just and vice versa, something that finds a brilliant example in the concepts Greeks “*aristós/areté*” and “*kalòs kagathós*”, which W. Jaeger will define as “a conception of sets about human” (1971: 264). In this direction, Finley (1966: 128) will

¹²⁵ All translations from Spanish to English are made by us.

affirm that “the basic values were given, predetermined, and the same happened, consequently, with the place of a man in society and the privileges and duties that derived from his social situation”.

However, the echo of history should not make us believe that we are dealing with issues that are already past. Finley (1973: 123-124) states that

it was Plato who took the most extreme position. For him, being the whole world of experience somewhat unstable, imperfect, “unreal”, none of its things could be the object of true knowledge, but to achieve this, one had to direct the mind to the Ideas or Forms, which were the eternal and true realities. Hence, he declared himself fundamentally opposed to any science that was not reducible to mathematics and, more particularly, that was not geometry.

If the foundation of absolute principles, as a conceptual framework of a human community, has been able to sink its roots in Platonic or Christian visions in the Western world, the emergence of enlightened currents and positivism do not imply an overcoming of this scheme, but a substitution. Thus, Rubio Carracedo (1996: 245) expresses that

since then [since the triumph of democracies over totalitarian nationalism], with few exceptions, political scientists start from the superiority of the democratic regime over all others, even as the least deficient. But this has also led to a double and dangerous illusion: first, that a generalized democratic conversion of individuals had taken place; and second, that democracy became synonymous with politics.

The obvious example of this statement is the usual relationship established between Western democracies of the 20th century and Human Rights — which we will talk about later. The functioning of the latter in a democracy does not seem to differ, at least in general, from an absolute metaphysical conception of humanity, since it is a set of rights that are understood as consubstantial to the fact of being human and, therefore, do not subject to any circumstances. In no way do we position ourselves here against Human Rights, but rather we intend to point out that their acceptance occurs as unconditional and inherent to the very fact of being human, in the same way that at other times a set of concepts have been accepted similar in the same way.

However, this problem that we are referring to here is not specific to or exclusive to our time. In fact, it was these same circumstances that occurred during the emergence and development of what is usually

known as the first democracy, that is, the Athenian one, of which we had already anticipated that we would speak as a mirror where we could look at ourselves. Between one and the other, in different but similar terms, we follow Kuhn (2004: 25) when he assures that the difference “it was not one or another error of method —they were all ‘scientists’— but what we will come to call their immeasurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it”.

1. Democracy: cartography of the borders

1.a. *Democracy and the absolute metaphysical worldview*

We believe that, regarding democracy, we must address the following issues: the compatibility between democracy and worldviews based on metaphysical entities and the transmission of the worldview to the citizenry. As we have pointed out, we cannot presuppose that absolute metaphysical worldviews have been superseded in democracies because they are democracies; in this way Bunge (1989: 13) affirms that “in western cultures we have learned as children to distinguish the psychic, soulful or spiritual from the organic, bodily or biological. We have uncritically absorbed the psychophysical dualism, or soul-body, invented by some religions and metaphysical”.

In this regard, we propose three possible situations: an epistemic metaphysics, a religious metaphysics or a metaphysics of nature — sometimes, in the same worldview or in a specific community, several can coexist simultaneously, and it will not necessarily require harmony between the different currents.

1.a.i. Epistemic metaphysics

If there is an epistemic metaphysics, this will mean that the community will accept the fact that there are realities knowable and independent of the human being in which the Truth is found. In this way, regardless of the number of independent realities that this community conceives, there will also exist in society a group of people who have access to that knowledge compared to a group that does not have it, since the interpretation of metaphysical reality is always conditioned to its own existence; that is to say, there is no free interpretation of the concept, since the concept is based on a reality that it is and, consequently, it is not interpretable, but knowable.

In this worldview, an interpretation that does not adapt to that metaphysical reality is an appearance — even a real fact that, however, is only a part of reality—, but not a real knowledge about what is Truth, which, being Truth, is not interpretable. If all people know the concept, there are no reasons to establish any type of power or exercise any type of authority, since the knowledge of this metaphysical reality already allows the independent management of the individual respect to this metaphysical —as we have said, there can be only one reality, that is considered metaphysical, so we are not saying that if everyone knew this entity, the conclusion would be anarchy; rather, given the existence of a metaphysical entity that is known throughout the community, what is related to that entity does not need a government, which does not refer to the rest of the situations or to population control.

Now, if not all people know this metaphysical reality or cannot know it, regardless of the reason -either because of the Platonic aptitude criterion or because of their socioeconomic performance-, then only the group of people or the person who has access to that knowledge will be the one who determines what should or should not be done in relation to that metaphysical entity that, having existence and being Truth, cannot be subject to interpretation by those who are not part of that group, since they do not have access or ability to decide or speak on this matter. In this way, Rubio Carracedo (1996: 246) expresses about this position from Plato that “the legitimist-enlightened reaction of Plato, who invents the ‘just state’ or despotic-enlightened statist model based on a moral ontologism”; and then add on this position that

it is based on a subordinate conception of power to ontological or natural law designs; hence his proposal for the welfare state, whether in the despotic-enlightened version or in the socialist-communist version, since in both cases it is a question of applying a predetermined program, with respect to which individuals can only have an attitude of obedience, that is, of subjects (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: 247).

As we said, this scenario can occur within a democratic system; however, we wonder if this can actually be considered “democracy”. From our point of view, we think that the answer is necessarily negative; in any case, we understand that this situation finds a greater correspondence with a technocracy, and not with a democracy, since the decisions or certain decisions are restricted to the common citizenry, being able to make them exclusively by a group or a person who is considered to have the ability to know this metaphysical entity or, at

least, to know it better than others. In a certain way, we could refer here to Plato himself as the origin:

The deepest reason for all this is found in Plato's metaphysics, in his conception that there are absolute goods and truths, knowable by some men through adequate education; from which it follows, logically, that, once these absolute goods and truths are known, what most interests all of humanity is that they are the norms of human life (Finley, 1973: 133).

Something that, consequently, from this worldview grants legitimacy for decision-making. For us, in this situation, the very concept of administration, organization or redistribution of power among citizens breaks partially (or totally, depending on the number of metaphysical entities that this community conceives), which is why it does not seem to coincide exactly with the term “democracy”. In conclusion,

moral rationality is not identified with ontological rationality. From an ontological perspective, “absolute” means non-contingent, that is, it does not depend on another in its existence: “unconditioned” is also what is not subject to a condition in order to exist. But the moral world is not the ontological one. “Morally unconditioned” is that being whose value does not depend on any other, because it is valuable in itself; “Absolute moral value” means in turn that this being has an internal value, it is not worth for some purpose that is outside of itself and gives it that value, but rather it is an end in itself, valuable in itself. And it is that the ontologically contingent does not have to be morally conditioned, relative to something else in its moral value, valuable for something. Admitting this would mean incurring in a “supernaturalist fallacy”, forgetting that the moral world is not the ontological one, nor do the same categories apply to it (Cortina, 1993: 207).

1.a.ii. Religious metaphysics

Second, we find religious metaphysics. The essential difference between an epistemic metaphysics and a religious metaphysics is that the former does not necessarily entail a belief in a creative will or in an entity that has will or reason, or both. For example, there is a reasonable difference between Thales's conception of water as *arché* and Anaxagoras's conception of *nous*. A democracy could be formed in a society whose worldview is grounded in religious metaphysics (cf. Cortina, 1993): again, the number of effects of which the divinity is the cause does not matter for our purposes. This society, in the same way as in the previous case —we have explained it in the previous paragraph, so we will not repeat the same explanation—, must accept

the revelation or the relationship with it —of any type: communication, implication or action in material reality, etc.—in everyday life.

At the same time, although all people know of the existence of this divinity, not all of them will be able to establish the same contact or to the same degree as others, since if everyone could or had the capacity, as we have already said, no government would be needed. Again, therefore, one or a group of people would arise or exist who are the ones who have the capacity and the possibility of participating and deciding on matters in which the divinity influences, since only this group has the possibility of knowing their designs and understand them or to have a direct relationship with it —we believe that, during “the long medieval hegemony of the natural law model of the ‘just state’” (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: 246), the best example, in fact, of these concepts is found in the distinction between temporal power and timeless power existing in the Middle Ages and in the Modern Age in the Christian states or, particularly, Catholics and the conflicting consequences related to legitimacy, education and ethical regulation that arose from this situation. “Revealed religion inevitably creates a rift between the government and the source of moral authority” writes J. Israel (2015: 145) alluding to Holbach.

If this happened in this way, then we return to the same circumstance as in the previous case: to what extent could we speak of democracy? We think that, in any case, this conception corresponds more to a theocracy than to a democracy, so that we could not accept a priori that a democratic system is, in effect, democratic if its religious metaphysical worldview has these characteristics.

1.a.iii. Metaphysics of nature

In the third and last place, we will talk about those societies that accept a natural metaphysics. The difference between this worldview and the previous two is that metaphysics of nature bases its conception of the world on the concept of the *natural*. In this sense, an equivalence like the one we have seen before is established between what is *natural* and what is *good*, so that everything that takes place in nature, by virtue of being natural, is *good* compared to what is unnatural, which is *bad*. In this sense, there is a relevant difference between a metaphysics of nature and the imitation of the natural: the latter imitates, mimics the natural without accepting that it carries any consubstantial value. But

those who defend a natural metaphysics do assume that the idea of the natural implies a set of values.

In this metaphysics of nature, it can also be the case of the existence of groups of people who consider themselves qualified to participate and decide on the decisions that emerge from this worldview to the detriment of the rest of the citizenry. But, nevertheless, it is a scenario that has occurred in history generally circumscribed or to another metaphysical worldview (for example, the Christian consideration of the black population, who they thought lacked a soul naturally, understanding that natural originates from God) or to a particular circumstance. In this way, we find that Rousseau argued that “morality cannot be founded on reason, as they [Diderot and Holbach] claimed, or separated from religion; it is not reason but the ‘voice of nature’, as expressed in human sentiments, that is our guide in moral questions” (Israel, 2015).

We think that, in addition to the case of Rousseau, the most illustrative example due to its temporal proximity is that of the Aryan race in contrast to the rest of human beings, but we can also find examples, especially during and after the Enlightenment regarding the inferiority of women (cf. Amorós, 1990).

If, as we have said, the natural that, at the same time, is the Truth, is assimilated to the Good, everything that is natural will be Truth and will be Good for the simple fact of being in nature;

so, for example, a classical liberal or contemporary libertarian is likely to believe that human beings are “naturally” competitive and acquisitive. A communist, by contrast, will hold that competitiveness and acquisitiveness are “unnatural” and nasty vices nurtured by a deformed and deforming capitalist system (Ball, Dagger, & O’Neill, 2016: 11).

In addition to the same circumstance as in the previous situations regarding the groups that may be qualified and those who are not to intervene in the political course respect to what is considered to be derived from the natural, in this case it can be verified perhaps with more easily the volatility and relativity of the concept of the natural: depending on the actions or natural circumstances that are chosen, any position can be justified, from the superiority of a demographic community to that of one sex over the other, or how it should be legal regulation or what should be the functioning of the economy.

But, in the same way that we can relate these realities with certain negative connotations, we must indicate one of these realities that is also based on this metaphysics of nature and that we have previously indicated: it is about Human Rights. At present and in its own conception, Human Rights were conceived as consubstantial to the fact of being human, that is, they are *natural* (Ramos Pascua, 2001). Thus, Human rights assume that

there is a universal nature that can be known by rational means; human nature is essentially different from, and higher than, the rest of reality; the individual has an absolute and irreducible dignity that must be defended from society and the state; the autonomy of the individual requires that society not be organized in a hierarchical way, as the sum of free individuals (De Sousa Santos, 2000: 271).

These rights, therefore, cannot be questioned for a single reason, that is, that they are rights inherent to the nature of the human being. However, any of the problems that we have mentioned about other ideas and concepts that are based on this metaphysics of nature are, in turn, applicable to Human Rights and, in fact, both because of the progression of time and because of the interaction and knowledge of different cultures, Human Rights have shown that they are not capable of constituting themselves as an objective reality for the whole of humanity. History has also shown us that

cultural relativity means, therefore, that all cultures tend to define as universal the values they consider to be ultimate. [...] Consequently, the question about the conditions of universality in a specific culture is itself non-universal. The question about the universality of human rights is a question of Western culture. Therefore, human rights are universal only when viewed from a Western perspective (De Sousa Santos, 2000: 270).

Rather, Human Rights were created with a clear ethnocentrism by societies known as Western, as De Sousa Santos (2000: 270) confirms: “the concept of human rights rests on a set of well-known presuppositions, all of which are distinctly western”, where what is recognized as natural is what is understood as natural within the worldview of these societies. As is evident, this position cannot be considered as democratic either because, once again, its definition is violated at the moment in which the organization, administration or redistribution of powers is conditioned by what a group of people understands like what is natural, but in which the population cannot intervene, since what is natural is understood as what is Truth and what is Good.

Regarding Human Rights, the only democratic possibility is referred to by Rubio Carracedo (2005: 176) when he states that “most likely, however, is that the so-called ‘hard core’ or fundamental rights is not completely free of a historical-evolutionary process in its recognition and institutionalization”; that is, the validity of Human Rights can be based democratically through a conscious consensus of its conventional character, and not natural law.

In this way, we have stated our position on these three situations. It is possible that more situations related to metaphysics can be considered or deepened in those that we have exposed: our intention was to show those that seem more general or radical, so that they group as many as possible. In any case, our defence is clear: none of these situations could be considered as a full democracy, since a metaphysical worldview that is the cause of material phenomena and that, furthermore, implies values consubstantial to this concept is generally accompanied by the restriction of the participation of the citizens —or a part of them— when making decisions or participating in the political course, for which the redistribution of powers among the citizens does not materialize in its entirety.

To conclude this section and reinforce our idea, we consider that this reflection by Rubio Carracedo (1996: 247) is appropriate: “It must be clear, therefore, once and for all that the democratic regime is incompatible with the models of a ‘just state’ and ‘political naturalism’”, because “there can be no democracy without democrats, that is, without citizens in full exercise of their political rights, since mere formal democracy can be instrumentalized for oligarchic purposes of legitimation, turning citizens into simple electoral clients” (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: *ibid.*).

1.b. Democracy and post-truth: paradigm of the absolute metaphysical worldview

So, if we accept these approaches, democracy remains what it is and how we defined it from the beginning: as a *system*, an *instrument*. What, then, is democratic culture? Democratic culture is the set of aspects that make up the worldview of democratic society respect to itself: this is the conclusion that comes from our exposition. And we also consider that it is probably the most appropriate: analysing social behaviour in a democracy, its culture or even developing an educational model must

take into account that democracy does not entail any culture by itself, but dependent on the society that practices it. Therefore, assuming that a society of a democratic state accepts particular values, supposedly consubstantial to democracy, or assuming that the worldview or, even more, the conceptual structure of a previous worldview has been overcome, we do not believe that it is convenient.

In this sense, democratic culture is not a set of values derived from a non-existent metaphysical ontology of democracy with an absolute character; democratic culture is a conventional and circumstantial choice of a society in a specific context, so that “the democratic model, on the other hand, is based on a constitutional pact that establishes the consensual rules through which legitimate authority is exercised” (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: 247). For this reason, the promotion of a democratic culture and, later, of an education in this democratic culture must assume, at least, two questions: in the first place, the existence of conceptual and cognitive schemes typical of a different worldview and, in secondly, the circumstantiality and mutability of the decision that is adopted on what the foundations of democratic culture are at a given moment.

Now, as we have stated, by the very definition of “democracy” there are worldviews that may not fully correspond to democracy as such, establishing borders between different systems depending on the worldview that is adopted, since it limits or conditions the redistribution of powers posed by the democratic system, and even the capacity or aptitude of citizens for decision-making or participation in them. *A priori*, the direct implication that follows is that with great difficulty a democracy can be implemented from a worldview based on metaphysics.

In this way, the choice seems to be limited to those non-metaphysical currents. However, is this the circumstance in which democracy has developed today? We think that the answer is necessarily negative. Although many or all current democratic systems have a non-metaphysical theoretical configuration, the conceptual structures and concepts of metaphysical worldviews are still present in our society. In this way, ideas such as Good, Justice, Freedom, Truth, etc., continue to be present in our day-to-day life as absolute metaphysical concepts. That is to say: concepts such as “Good”, “Justice”, “Truth”, etc. are not conceived as dependent on the conception and convention of these

concepts by democratic citizens, but rather as independent and alien. In short, we could agree that current democratic societies do not judge or value actions according to the contextual circumstances in which they take place, but on the contrary, actions are usually judged based on absolute metaphysical values. Generally, these values tend to be opposite binomials: Good/Bad; Justice/Injustice; Truth/Falsehood; Identity/Otherness, etc.

We consider that evidence of our argument is constituted by the concept of “post-truth”. The term “post-truth”, very widespread and well-known today, “was defined as ‘Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’ (The Oxford Dictionaries, 2016, part 1)” (Valladares, 2021: 2), so

this is the defining characteristic of the Post-Truth world. The point is not to determine the truth by a process of rational evaluation, assessment and conclusion. You choose your own reality, as if from a buffet. You also select your own falsehood, no less arbitrarily (D’Ancona, 2017: 56).

However, we consider that this term hides a veiled metaphysical conception: that of Truth, from which other concepts are derived.

We now present our arguments in this regard, so that we can then continue with our position on Cultural Rhetoric. What does the term “post-truth” imply? As is evident, it consists of two parts: the prefix “post” and the term “truth”: the one that seems relevant to us is the second. What does “true” mean? According to the definitions presented, which are the ones commonly used, “post-truth” is characterized by giving less importance to facts than to opinions or emotions, so that each one constructs their own reality. But what does this term hide beyond the apparent? What is the opposite of “post-truth”? These issues are relevant to clarify this term. In most of the academic literature that we have consulted, there is no defence on the definition of “truth” that is proposed in contrast to “post-truth”; in any case, it is hinted at, but never explicitly argued or defended. In this way, we find, for example, that Bufacchi (2021: 351) assures that “the fact that consensus has become the dominant approach to truth may also explain, *mutatis mutandis*, the resurgence and popularity of Post-Truth”. According to this author, the consensus on what is true and what is not would be directly related to the resurgence of the “post-truth”; therefore, we understand that Bufacchi's defence consists of a return to a non-

consensual concept of Truth. We put Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1989: 67) in dialogue here when they say that “each man believes in a set of facts, of truths, that every ‘normal’ man must, according to him, admit, because they are valid for every rational being”. It could be the case that he did not defend that the concept of Truth that he proposes had a metaphysical basis, but Bufacchi (2021: 357) expresses that people have the responsibility to search for this Truth: “this duty has sometimes been called the ‘alethic obligation’, from the Greek term for truth, *aletheia*”. This statement resolves possible doubts about whether the proposed concept has a metaphysical basis or not.

Along these same lines, we find a similar defence in Brahms (2020: 3): “according to Arendt, the greatest antagonist of factual truth is an opinion, rather than a lie, particularly in light of the current predilection of blurring between fact and opinion”; in Lee McIntyre: “philosopher Lee McIntyre argues that the innovation in the post-truth phenomenon is not a denial of the existence of truth and facts, but rather is the subjugation of facts to personal preconceptions and a subjective perspective” (Brahms, 2020: 4); in Steve Fuller who, in addition, refers especially to the Athenian democracy, as quoted Brahms (2020: 15):

philosopher Steve Fuller maintained that this phenomenon is not new, and its origins can already be found during the days of Plato. In the Socratic dialogue *The Republic*, Plato maintained that the philosopher-king must hold the knowledge and the truth, and all citizens of Athens should rely on his knowledge and draw the differentiation between truth and falsehood from him. This was Plato’s formula for a stable society, and any other method for governing a country would, in his opinion, lead to chaos. As a result, Plato opposed playwrights and poets who challenged the governing position and offered alternatives to their audiences that are mere fabrications. According to Fuller, what is happening in the post-truth era of today is precisely what Plato feared would happen.

And, finally, Brahms proposes his own definition of “post-truth”

a term denoting circumstances in which our ability to clarify the reality in order to understand it and in order to function within it on the basis of facts is weakening as a result of high-intensity interference by four peak waves: the information explosion and disruptive technology; the dwindling of faith in institutions and in ‘truth tellers’; undermining postmodernist ideas; and bitter political battles (2020: 17-18).

According to the quotations that we have exposed, it is difficult not to think that the authors that we have cited here and those that Brahms cites do not propose a solution based on a concept of Truth with a

metaphysical foundation. However, is it the solution? We think that the best answer for these authors was already said by L. Wittgenstein (1973: 163-165), when he stated that

If I cannot indicate the elementary propositions *a priori*, want to indicate them must lead to obvious nonsense. *The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world. Logic fills the world; the limits of the world are also its limits. [...] What we cannot think we cannot think. Nor, then, can we *say* what we cannot think. This observation gives the key to decide on the question of how much truth there is in solipsism. Actually, what solipsism *means* is entirely correct; it just can't be *said*, it can be shown. That the world is *my world* is shown by the fact that the limits of language (*the language that only I understand*) signify the limits of *my world*. World and life are one thing. I am my world. (The microcosm).

As we have said before, we do not think that a metaphysical worldview can coexist with a full democracy. Consequently, we do not think that the problem that the “post-truth” concept indicates can or should be resolved through metaphysics.

1.b.i. Truth and fact

The first argument that we will use is the one related to the term “fact”. What is a fact? The simplest and most obvious answer is that a fact is something that *is* or something that *has been*, that is, an event in a temporal and spatial context. Thus, “a proposition is itself neither probable nor improbable. An event occurs or it does not occur; there is no middle ground” (Wittgenstein, 1973: 123). A fact, by itself, is nothing more than a fact: it does not imply a greater reality than itself. When an event occurs, we can affirm that this event is *real* or, ultimately, that this event *has been* or *is*. In this way, a falling stone is a fact, rain is a fact, a wave is a fact: none of them are *good* or *bad*, they just *are*. If a large stone falls on a house and destroys it, this is a fact that is neither *good* nor *bad* in itself, but simply *is*; “basic research, the search for new knowledge for knowledge itself, is axiologically and morally neutral. Even concepts such as subsistence level (or poverty line) and marginality are purely descriptive, not evaluative” (Bunge, 1989: 203).

If we agree with these propositions, then we can conclude that the existence of a particular fact implies nothing more than its own existence. In this sense, if a large stone falls on a house and we, who know that this has happened, say that no stone has fallen on any house,

we would be lying; if we were to say that the stone that fell was not that big compared to the house and that, if the house has been destroyed, it is the fault of poor construction without us having made the proper checks, then we would be manipulating the information about the fact. But if we say that the fact that the stone falls on the house and destroys it seems to us something negative, because of the material losses of the owners of that house (being true); or if we were to say that it seems positive to us, because the house had been built illegally on the bed of a river (being true); or if we were to say that, although this stone has fallen on this house and destroyed it, we do not think that any preventive measure should be taken because it is an extraordinary event (being true); In none of these cases would we be denying the fact, lying or manipulating the information. We are not even prioritizing our emotion over the material reality of the event.

If we have accepted before that the fact does not imply anything other than itself, this means that each human being can make a different interpretation of the fact, and that this interpretation can be rational and argued. If we approach the political reality, for example, and climate change, science can say that the increase in temperature is a fact, but this fact by itself is neither good nor bad, nor does it imply a political or economic measure. The interpretation that is made of the fact, the assessments and the decisions that are made in this regard, if they do not essentially depend on the fact itself, then they are necessarily relative to the interpretation and argumentation by society: no one would argue about a fact, since that the fact is evident, but what it means and what it implies. The result of this deliberation will be action or inaction, which will be decided according to the greatest consensus reached regarding the measures to be applied. So, is this also a form of “post-truth”? According to the quotes that we have exposed, there are authors who would consider that this should be considered as “post-truth”, as we have seen in the statements of Bufacchi. As Wittgenstein (1973: 49) indicates

The logical figure of facts is thought. [...] The totality of true thoughts is a figure of the world. Thought contains the possibility of the state of things that it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible. We cannot think anything illogical, because otherwise we would have to think illogically. It has been said once that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is that we are not able to say what an illogical world would look like.

Taking these ideas into consideration, either the term “post-truth” is not necessary, since there are already terms that define what “post-truth” refers to, such as “lying” or “manipulating”; or else “post-truth” assumes that the fact is not only the fact, but that it essentially implies and, therefore, metaphysically certain qualities or values that are not dependent on the circumstance or the human being. However, “to consider moral values as absolute is to consider them fixed and immutable, exempt from all historical and cultural variation. This approach is only defended by fundamentalists of any sign” (Rubio Carracedo, 2005: 170).

1.b.ii. Truth and value: truth or true?

Secondly, and as a consequence of the above, if the fact is not only the fact and consubstantially implies qualities and values, then it would make more sense to speak of “post-truth”: it would not be that the population prioritizes their emotions or their perceptions about the facts, but that there would be only one possible Truth about the fact. In this way, everything that any person says about the fact that does not coincide with what is said to be the Truth of the fact is, then, part of the “post-truth”. In other words: only a few people in the world know that Truth that underlies the fact or the object and, therefore, these people can judge who is telling the Truth and who is not (even though, as we have pointed out, we miss the defence of a definition of the concept “Truth” in the cited authors). However, given this circumstance, in addition to the reflections that we have previously exposed, we present our second argument: the condition of Truth.

We want to start with this reflection of Heidegger (1969: 67):

The truth is the unconcealment of what exists as existing. The truth is the truth of being. Beauty does not present itself in addition to this truth. The truth appears when it is put into action. Appearing, being this being of truth in work and being work, is beauty. Therefore, the beautiful is part of the occurrence of truth. It is not only relative to delight nor only its object. The beautiful, however, is based on the form, but only because the form was illuminated in the past on the basis of being as the existing condition of the existing.

When we use the term “Truth”, what are we really saying? What does “this fact is *truth*” mean? We expose the two possible answers: it is a description, or it is an assessment. If when we say “this fact is *truth*” we

mean by “*truth*” a term whose function is to describe the fact, then two questions arise: the first is about the meaning of using the term “*truth*”, since if a fact it is, by the fact of *being* it is already truth. In this sense, saying about something that it is truth is, in reality, an epithet, a meaningless redundancy, since what is, is already truth by the fact of being (we argue from the very definition that we have previously provided and that we reproduce: “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”, that is, we are using exactly the terms of the definition). Now, if the term “truth” is understood to refer to the existence of the fact, then we would also have to accept that the term “truth” describes a verifiable reality and, therefore, a physical reality: in no way could the term be used “truth” to describe the non-existent, the unverifiable or the metaphysical, since this would be exactly equivalent to the definitions of “post-truth”.

The second option is that we understand that the term “truth” is evaluative, and not descriptive. Thus, “truth” becomes an attribution — “truth” becomes “true”—, a quality of the objective fact. In this way, “truth” is a fact value: “truth” is “true”. If this is so, then there are two options: either the value of the objective fact is consubstantial with the fact itself, or the value of the objective fact is not consubstantial with the fact itself.

In the first case, if we say “this fact is truth” and we assume that “truth” is a value of the fact consubstantial to its own essence, then we must accept that the value of “truth” of the object is not a description, but a valuation, a quality or attribution that derives from an independent metaphysical essence of the human being. This entity is what makes the fact “truth”, and not the existence of the fact, which is why “truth” is a quality, an attribution or assessment; in other words, from this point of view there may be facts that are not “truth”, since “truth” is a value, a quality that is attributed according to its own essence, of a metaphysical nature, it will be the essence that determines its value of “truth”, and not its existence by itself (thus the division between the appearance and the real can be justified). Only in this situation of all those exposed does the term “post-truth” make sense as it is raised. Naturally, these ideas can already be found in different worldviews based on metaphysics. However, like these worldviews, the great absence is the demonstration of the existence of any absolute metaphysical entity, which has not been achieved in the 2500 years of Philosophy. Therefore, accepting the

existence of these entities as a criterion of the value of the objective does not seem to us, ultimately, different from any opinion: yes, in short, without having the ability or the will to demonstrate the existence of metaphysical entities, these are assumed as criteria, then belief in them is no longer a matter of reason, but of dogma or faith.

Secondly, we find the option that truth as a value is not consubstantial with the fact itself. However, if the truth is not inherent to the fact, it means that it is an attribution that the human being deposits on the fact since the value of truth is not independent of the human being in this situation. In this sense, if the truth value criterion has these characteristics, then we must accept that it will depend strictly on the circumstances in which the event occurs and on the person who observes it, who will have the possibility of evaluating the event as true or as false, that is: without denying the fact, if “truth” is a value not conditioned by any metaphysical entity, then the value of a fact is not dependent on a metaphysical entity but on the human being, who is the one who attributes the value and that, therefore, can attribute the value “false” to a fact. In this circumstance, the term “post-truth” would not make sense either, since its main criticism of the truth or falsity of the facts would have no foundation, being in effect conditioned to the person who assesses the fact. In this way,

theories that make a proposition of logic appear full of content, are always false. One can, for example, believe that the words “true” and “false” mean two properties among other properties, and thus it would appear as a strange fact that every proposition possesses one of these properties. [...] Thus, that proposition has taken on the character of a scientific proposition, and this is a sure sign that it had been falsely understood. The correct explanation of logical properties must give it a peculiar position among all other propositions. The characteristic mark of logical propositions is that they can be recognized only from the symbol that they are true or false; and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And it is also one of the most important facts that the truth or falsity of non-logical propositions cannot be recognized in the proposition alone. The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal —logical— properties of language, of the world (Wittgenstein, 1973: 167-171).

The conclusion that we can draw is that, for the concept “post-truth” to have the meaning that is expressed in its definition as in the proposals of the authors that we have mentioned, it must suppose an absolute and transcendental metaphysics that supports the concept of “Truth”. On the other hand, the definitions related to the term “post-truth” that we have cited here do not clarify whether this phenomenon is limited to lying

about the fact or its manipulation —whether or not it implies a narrative correlate— or whether it also extends to the rational interpretation that a person can make about a fact. In this sense, if the fact does not imply more than the fact itself, the different interpretations and evaluations that a person can make about the fact could not form part of the “post-truth” concept, since they are legitimate interpretations. If the fact is included in a metaphysical entity superior to the fact and, therefore, the existence of the fact entails a set of ideas and values, the interpretation or assessment that a person makes of a fact would form part of the concept of “post- truth”, but then its defenders should demonstrate the existence of these transcendental and the truth of these metaphysical entities, which are independent of the human being, if they do not want to fall under their own definition of “post-truth”.

Now that we have concluded our argument, we insist on our position: we do not deny the existence of the fact and, like the cited authors, we position ourselves against any form of deception, manipulation or dissemination of opinions or positions, in any sphere, not based on knowledge, research or reason. In addition, we especially position ourselves against those people who use falsehood, manipulation or irrational speech (irrational speech is not synonymous with emotional speech) in order to obtain their own benefit. But we also position ourselves against any justification or worldview based on metaphysics, both on the levels that we have indicated and, ultimately, on an ethical or political level. However, after the exposition that we have presented, what is our proposal regarding democratic culture and how is Cultural Rhetoric related to our argument? It is precisely at this point that Cultural Rhetoric acquires its full meaning.

2. Democracy and Rhetoric: worldview and culture

As we have pointed out, democracy does not imply any value or a specific worldview, although, as we have seen, it does potentially exclude some worldviews, especially those based on absolute metaphysics. “The paradigm of cosmic order is a form of justice” Burkert (2002: 68); in this sense, we must remember two ideas: that democracy must configure and decide its own worldview, in always conventional and circumstantial terms; and that the way in which a democracy materializes is not necessarily exact —because concepts such as citizenship, law, etc.—can vary in space or time from any other

democracy. To these ideas we add one, in conjunction with what has been said about the “post-truth” concept: discourse in a democracy cannot and should not be confused with democracy as such.

In this way, a democracy can be sustained on rational speeches and consensus based on the most convincing argumentation, or it can be sustained on completely false speeches, made with the intention of manipulating or influencing the will of the citizenry. Thus, the fact that one of the most frequent examples of the “post-truth”, D. Trump, has been president of the USA and, nevertheless, democracy has continued to function during and after his presidency, is proof of this. However, is a democracy really compatible with any kind of discourse?

The answer that we propose is negative; however, we insist on the idea that we have already presented: this does not mean that discursiveness or discursive diversity is a criterion of a greater or better democracy since, if it were, nothing would prevent a discourse contrary to our ideas from being considered antidemocratic. In this sense, this difference must be clear for any democracy: not all speech, even if it is contrary to the democratic system itself, is anti-democratic; for example, a speech declaimed in a democracy that proposes a temporary dictatorship (such as, for example, the case of Cincinato, bridging the gap), being this speech rational and based on the facts, is not an anti-democratic speech. On the contrary, a speech delivered in a dictatorial regime that defends democracy, basing the speech on manipulated or false facts and without rationality, is an anti-democratic speech.

Having made this clarification, we return with the answer we gave to the initial question: a democracy is not compatible with any type of discourse. This incompatibility is justified, once, by its own definition. In this sense, we must introduce a concept that, without being original, is not currently recurrent and it seems to us that it should be. The manipulation of facts, lying about facts and, ultimately, influencing citizens against their will or without their awareness is an exercise in *violence*. It is probably the greatest violence—even greater than physical—that can be exercised not on the citizenry, but on the person.

In this sense, if a discourse is based on deception or on the manipulation of facts with the intention of manipulating the will of the citizenry and, in effect, achieves its goals, then to what extent can we speak of a redistribution of powers? What real difference is there between buying

a vote with money, getting a vote through physical threat, or forcing the will and vote of the citizenry through manipulated speech? We think that there is no difference: in all of them, a person with more strength (be it physical, economic or media) has taken advantage of his situation with respect to another, who is not aware of it or who has no possibility of defending himself, to force him to do something. The difference between buying a vote, threatening physical force, or exercising this discursive violence is that in the first two, the person knows that they are being coerced and forced to do something that they may not want to do; in discursive violence, a person may not only not know that they are being coerced or attacked, but they may even think that they want to do what they are actually being forced to do.

In this direction, the fragility and “intangibility” of the word (the word is not immaterial, but literature usually refers to its fleeting condition, of something that cannot be touched or seen) should not make us think that it does not cause harm or that it does not it can be a weapon: as we have said, for us it is the most dangerous weapon and the one that can exert the most serious and radical violence. If through discourse, therefore, violence is exercised in the terms we have referred to, then the ability to redistribute power is limited by manipulation, as is the power of decision or participation in the political course, by what we cannot consider democracy either and, even, perhaps it is the position furthest from democracy. This type of power can materialize in many different forms and systems (from a tyranny to an oligarchy) although its power, instead of being based on economics or military force, is initially and exclusively based on violence through word.

But, is the solution to this problem to recover the concept of “Truth” or any kind of worldview based on metaphysics? We defend that it is not. The recovery of a concept such as “Truth”, as we have already expressed, implies the assumption that there is such a metaphysical entity foreign to the human being, so that only the person who says he knows it can say what the Truth is. Truth and what is not, regardless of the physical existence or not of the concept (of course, in the case of being physical, then a metaphysical position could no longer be defended). This violates any type of rational knowledge that does not correspond to the concept of Truth, so that the conception of reason itself would conflict with the concept of Truth. In this way,

against any dogmatism that tries to find an irrefutable foundation for knowledge or decision, critical rationalism proposes the principle of unlimited fallibilism, which must be applied both in theory and in praxis and, in what concerns us now, both in moral praxis as well as in politics (Cortina, 1993: 49).

Therefore, and definitely, “there can be no democracy without democrats” (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: 247). In this circumstance, the only possible compatibility is that we consider that there is only one way of reasoning, that is, the one that leads to the conclusion of that Truth, leaving the others as invalid. However, today we know that there is no single way of reasoning and, of course, we have gained knowledge using different ways of reasoning, from inductive reasoning to reasoning by analogy. Therefore, both due to the absence of proof of the existence of this metaphysical entity and the impossibility of ruling out different forms of reasoning as invalid due to the fact that they do not conclude what is Truth, we could not support this proposition. In short, other questions should be answered: why does the existence of an object independent of the human being imply an absolute dualism? Why does the existence of an object independent of the human being entail a metaphysical ontology? Need a metaphysical causal justification to exist? In a word, have we not learned thanks to scientific knowledge that most of the causes, previously identified with metaphysics, are actually physical? Haven't we learned that reality doesn't need justification to exist? The simplest answer, and probably the one most consistent with reality, is that reality *is*.

2.1. Worldview on the physical for democracy and Rhetoric

Thus, the worldview that we propose is this: the physical *is*. Its entity is a fact that does not imply anything apart from the very fact of being. Nothing about its properties and attributes that are not physically verifiable belongs to the entity. The qualification of any entity, the attributions that we make that are not part of the description of this entity are dependent on who attributes or qualifies the fact.

Talking about a metaphysics of nature could even seem like an oxymoron, since the word metaphysics designates another field, which is situated beyond the order of physically constituted phenomena. But that such was the origin of what was later called metaphysics [...] is what Plato himself tells us in the *Phaedo* (Vallejo Campos, 2021: 165).

Therefore, our proposition regarding the worldview that a democratic should adopt accepts the existence of the physical; the knowledge of the physical can only be descriptive, since there is no other entity beyond the physical, nor essence, nor a What-is consubstantial to the fact. Quite simply, the object *is*. What the human being can attribute to the entity that is not part of its physical properties is a human perception: false as an intrinsic property of the object, true (and valid) as a human perception.

In this way, the importance falls neither on the object nor on the subject, but on their relationship, which is circumscribed to the specific space and time in which two entities interact. Neither of the two entities can be denied since they *are*. They can be described on a factual or ontological level. But what will determine the qualification or attribution of non-physical properties of an entity will necessarily be the relationship, the interaction between both identities in a specific context; that is to say, that the attribution, the value of an entity according to who values it, is relative to the interaction of two particular entities in a specific circumstance. Is there, therefore, what is certain from this perspective? Explicitly and obviously, yes: the existence of entities is physical and testable, so the denial of an existing entity would be false. Is there an absolute valuation of an entity? Manifestly, no: the value or attributes that are not physical in an entity cannot be absolute in any way; a fruit, for example, may physically contain glucose, but it will not be, absolutely and independently of the circumstance, sweet for whoever eats it: the quality of the fruit may have changed or the person who eats it may suffer from a loss temporary taste: the only verifiable reality is that this fruit contained glucose. Definitely we defend that “the apparent/true opposition, from this perspective, is explained, therefore, in terms of the absence or presence of finality in the interpretation of nature” (Vallejo Campos, 2021: 154). Is there a conception of rationality in this worldview? Clearly, yes: the ability to reason about reality is not dependent on the existence of metaphysical entities; knowledge, neither. The rational ability to extract information, relate it and conclude different information is part of a neurological process; now, depending on what is reasoned, the conclusion may or may not be physically demonstrable.

What, then, is not physically demonstrable? As we have expressed, it is everything that is attributed or valued about a physical entity. Doesn't this affirmation include everything (or almost everything) related to the

political, economic, legal, social sphere, etc., if we start from the non-existence of metaphysical entities? Indeed, this is what our worldview proposes, because

the very nature of deliberation and argumentation is opposed to necessity and evidence, since it does not deliberate in cases where the solution is necessary, nor does it argue against the evidence. The field of argument is that of the probable, the plausible, the probable, to the extent that the latter escapes the certainty of the calculation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1989: 30).

2.2. Worldview on the non-physical for democracy and Rhetoric

We have expressed what our worldview is about the physical. Now we will explain accordingly what our vision is about the human, the artificial (which we will use to refer to everything built, elaborated or created by him in any field).

If we accept the worldview that we propose regarding the physical, then we also accept that the assessment and attribution of properties, whether rational or sensory, depends on the interaction and relationship of entities. “It is not the things that penetrate into consciousness, but the way in which we are before them, the *πιθανόν*” (Nietzsche, 2000: 91); thus, we enter a situation where, *a priori*, any perception is true from the perspective of the person who emits it, as long as they do not lie or manipulate the information. For this reason, everything that is said about the non-physical is discursive, that is, it acquires meaning from the individual as an expression represented on the non-physical reality (also on the fictitious; but this matter does not concern us in this chapter). The message, therefore, refers to something: when it deals with the non-physical, the message expresses the sender’s perception; when it deals with the physical, the message also expresses the sender’s perception, but it does not refer to its own perception, but to the physical entity as such (Wellek & Warren, 1979: 27). In this direction, we can affirm that physical reality is not discursive, but rather self-evident and manifest; however, non-physical reality, artificial reality, is a reality that arises from the interaction of two entities and how one perceives and values the other. When an individual as an entity, circumscribed to his circumstances, communicates the perception and assessment of another entity, he is referencing himself, expressing himself—we recall here the words of Wittgenstein already quoted: “That the world is my world is shown by the fact that the limits of language (the language that

only I understand) signify the limits of my world. World and life are one thing. I am my world. (The microcosm)”—; and this expression is produced through the symbolic representation of what is referenced (Baena, 2014: 15-16). Our conception of the individual regarding the world and the issuer is completely aligned with Baena's (2014, 2016, 2021) proposal: the aesthetic *inventio*, the aesthetic sender that, as we said in Wittgenstein's words, “ethics and aesthetics are the same”:

The image of knowledge unites with poetic existence, transmitting not only the incessantness of the present, but also the intensity of its form which, in its allegorical and nautical equivalence [...] is understanding and aesthetics, the source of determination that appropriates itself in the future, in the absence of existential reality, of a symbolic projection (Baena, 2021: 110).

And therefore:

The poet opens the possibility of the construction of a world, laying the foundations of knowledge, of getting involved in postponed historicity, and at the same time inquiring about the history of consciousness by articulating *ab initio* the logic that is born from that phenomenological establishment of the self (Baena, 2021: 107).

For the sender, his own expression is not speech, but is himself, because “to make the speech is to make oneself in the speech” (Pujante, 2022: 31) so that “the text is a product of human thought, composed of subjective characteristics. Subjectivity is a derivative of the individual-society relationship” (Luarsabishvili, 2019: 84); for the receiver, the artificial reality of the sender is speech.

In this communication process, after all, we must differentiate two processes: encoding and decoding. When the issuer refers to a reality, whatever it may be, and communicates it, the issuer is symbolically encoding reality. Is the encoding always the same regardless of the sender? Certainly not: the encoding will depend on multiple intervening factors: grammar, lexicon, semantics and, especially, the circumstantial experience of the sender. And what about decoding? Exactly the same process, but in reverse: the decoding will be done according to the grammar, the lexicon, the semantics and, again, the circumstantial experience of the receiver.

The communicative fact, therefore, depends on the circumstantial experiences of the sender and the receiver, which implies that any discourse (sometimes even the discourse related to physical realities,

which is merely descriptive or referential) has multiple potential interpretations. That the discourse can be interpreted, on the other hand, is due to the reason that we have already mentioned: when it is an expression of the sender that refers to the sender himself, the receiver can only interact with the discourse as a mediating reality between sender and receiver, since it lacks another form of knowledge of the reality that the sender transmits. For the receiver, therefore, the discourse is the artificial reality of the sender. We are not affirming that the discourse has some kind of metaphysical ontology that is foreign and independent of the sender or the receiver; what we are saying is that the only way to know something that only happens for an individual is through the communication of that something. If the sender encodes his perception, his assessment and represents it symbolically through language to communicate it, the only possible access to knowledge of what is represented by the sender is speech. Discourse is not reality, it represents it; but when the discourse represents a reality that only the one who emits the discourse can have access to, then the discourse operates as a reality for the receiver.

In this way, if we have agreed that according to our worldview the facts are, but do not entail by themselves and regardless of their context any value or non-physical attribution, everything that the human being can express, either through their senses or through his reasoning, with respect to the object, he does so through the word. In this sense, as we have already exemplified before, the increase of 1° of the temperature *is*, that is to say, it is a fact; by itself and out of context, it carries neither a positive nor a negative value, nor does it imply any action. Now, this increase in interaction with particular circumstances can be perceived and valued by the human being in one way or another. The perception and assessment that the human being makes of this increase of 1° is what we call artificial reality, and this artificial reality can only be referred to through words (or communication in general terms if we include visual communication; in any case, does not necessarily affect our argument). Thus, physical reality refers us to a fact with respect to which the human being can react; but the reaction, the decision regarding that physical reality, although it depends on the physical, is developed and taken from the artificial reality. But by referring the word to an artificial reality whose only access is the word as such, the importance of the study of the word and of discourse become capital, both for the emission and for the reception of any message. In conclusion,

according to Habermas, it takes us from a concept of reason developed in terms of *reflection* by the philosophy of the modern subject to a concept of rationality, developed in terms of *communication* by the philosophy of *intersubjectivity*, from a reason centred on the *subject* to *communicative rationality*, from the “paradigm” of *knowledge* of the object to that of *understanding between subjects*, capable of speech and action (Cortina, 1993: 126).

3. Rhetoric and Cultural Rhetoric

It is in this circumstance that we inscribe Cultural Rhetoric. As is evident, “Cultural Rhetoric” is made up of two terms; in order to correctly understand this expression, it is especially relevant to define “Rhetoric”.

Rhetoric, as such, is a system, an analysis and production instrument. There are many different definitions of “Rhetoric” throughout history. In general, the academic world and also society tend to accept that “Rhetoric was, above all, the art of persuasive public speaking” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1989: 37). On the other hand, Lausberg (1983b: 13) states that

by “Rhetoric in the broad sense” one must understand the “art of speaking in general” exercised by everyone who actively participates in social life, by “Rhetoric in the strict sense” (“scholar Rhetoric”), the “art of speaking of the parties” (especially before the courts), constituted an object of education from the 5th century BC.

However, the term “persuasion” —that, as we can see, Lausberg does not include in this definition, although he does in other— does not seem appropriate to us since it imposes a purpose on Rhetoric that does not necessarily have to be given. In this way, if we refer to the commonly accepted definition, we would have that the purpose of Rhetoric is twofold and consecutive: firstly, to speak well, and secondly, to persuade, something that Lausberg (1983a: 84) also expresses: “the general definition *ars bene dicendi* is limited by some theorists in a specialized sense and in a double direction, that is, in terms of the field of application of the discourse and in terms of its purpose”.

However, do we only speak well to persuade? Is there another discipline that, unlike Rhetoric, is only dedicated to “speaking well”, with no other purpose? As is evident, we do not only speak well in order to persuade, nor is there another discipline that studies how to “speak well” without

persuading. Therefore, we do not understand the term “persuasion” as appropriate in relation to the totality of Rhetoric, in the same way that it does not seem to us that from its origin Rhetoric has only developed as a discipline in order to persuade. Rather, we defend that Rhetoric should be understood “as a carefully graded, conscious process of exchanging values” (García Berrio, 1984: 38), so that if we introduce the term “persuasion” it should be understood either as the predisposition of being persuaded by the receiver or as the predisposition to bidirectional persuasion. Said in another way by Hernández Guerrero and García Tejera (2004: 15): “the oratorical speech is a sign of recognition and mutual offer —of hospitality— between the speaker and the public”.

Rhetoric does not pursue the exercise of violence through the word, using it against the receiver: all Rhetorical discipline is built with the intention of building and developing effective communication (Lausberg, 1983b: 13), understanding that “effectiveness” here means that the communication fulfils its purpose, transmitting and clarifying function. It is not possible, therefore, to think that the intention of Rhetoric as a discipline is the exercise of manipulation, although there are those who have used it for this purpose.

For this reason, we approach other proposed definitions that seem more convenient to us. We find, for example, in Curtius (1976: 99) that “Rhetoric means 'science of speech'; originally, then, it teaches how to construct discourse artistically”, so that this author already includes the “artistic” concept, to which we will return later. On the other hand, García Berrio (2008: 512) also proposes a definition of Rhetoric “as a linguistic discipline that has as its object the communicative human discourse”; García Berrio (1984: 17) understands that “classical Rhetoric, like its current implantation, was a complete science of expression, or better, of expressiveness”. Of all the definitions on Rhetoric, those that we have exposed and those that we have not, we understand that the one proposed by García Berrio is the one that best defines Rhetoric as a discipline, that is, the science of expressiveness.

3.1. Democracy, philosophy and Rhetoric: the conflict between worldviews

Now that we have defined what Rhetoric means from our perspective, we proceed with our arguments regarding Cultural Rhetoric. If Rhetoric is a system, a science of expressiveness, an instrument for the analysis and production of expressiveness, Rhetoric by itself does not imply any value, any worldview, any external principle or foundation or alien to its own condition. That is to say: as was the case with democracy, Rhetoric cannot entail a culture by itself, but Cultural Rhetoric must be decided from the convention. Thus, “culture plays an essential role in Rhetoric, both in regard to the contents of the discourse and the cultural nature of its construction and, therefore, to the consideration of the Rhetorical discourse itself as a cultural construction” (Albaladejo, 2013: 3).

But Rhetoric has a fundamental difference with democracy: while democracy is a system that conceives a social organization that redistributes power among citizens and, therefore, by definition excludes certain worldviews, Rhetoric as a science of expressivity is dedicated to the study of expressivity, and expressivity occurs in any worldview, at least, known so far. That is to say: whether it is a worldview based on metaphysical entities or not, in any of them the expressiveness of the human being is produced.

If this is so, then why should Rhetoric decide what its worldview is? Chico Rico (2015: 305) states that “the need to recover Rhetoric in all its parts responded to the negative characteristics of an absolutely impoverished theoretical-Rhetorical heritage reduced by centuries and centuries of cultural erasure and conceptual oblivion”. Actually, it is not a different process from other disciplines: physics as a science developed as a discipline even while accepting a divine presupposition. Naturally, the way in which the world is conceived conditions the development of a discipline: “dualism is part not only of ordinary knowledge, largely fossil, but also of the worldview of many scientists” (Bunge, 1989: 13). As in the case of physics, all sciences have been conditioned at one time or another by the worldview they assume and from which they develop. The Rhetoric, of the same, is not a discipline alien to this circumstance.

But we intend to deepen this idea: we not only defend that Rhetoric, as a discipline and as Cultural Rhetoric, must decide what its worldview

is; we defend that the decline of Rhetoric is not due to being a manipulation instrument, but rather to the lack of understanding of Rhetoric as heir to different worldviews. If we accept the idea that Rhetoric is an instrument and that, as evidenced by history, any regime can use it and, in fact, has used it, it is easy to conclude that Rhetoric is not democratic, just as it is not aristocratic nor is it monarchical: Rhetoric, as an instrument, simply *is*. Any relationship between Rhetoric and a system of government or administration is a perception, a conceptual deposit about it that is not found in the Rhetoric itself. However, depending on the worldview adopted by the Rhetoric, its uses and its development will be determined by that worldview.

We turn to its origin and its relationship with sophistry. Within the worldview of the sophists, like the atomists, there is no metaphysical entity that transcends matter, as we have already said. This automatically eliminates the concepts of Truth, Justice, Good and Evil in absolute terms that find their origin particularly in the Pythagorean and Orphic doctrines (Finley, 1973; Rohde, 1973; Bernabé, 2004; Vernant, 1986; Gernet, 1980; Nestle, 1975; Escohotado, 1975; Dilthey, 1974), closely related to religious and metaphysical worldviews. If the concepts of Truth, Justice, Good and Evil, etc., do not exist, in the political, social and legal sphere it has an immediate effect: actions, which for the sophists are merely actions, do not have a value by themselves, but it is human beings who value actions according to their circumstances.

A society that establishes a common assessment regarding a fact or a set of facts agrees on the value of an act, but this act still does not have this value in itself (Dilthey, 1974: 68). On the other hand, the valuations that are established respect to a particular act depend on the context in which they occur, so in a different context the same act could be valued in a completely opposite way. In addition, the disappearance of metaphysical concepts such as Truth or Good have another effect on public life: if these concepts do not exist, acts cannot be measured with criteria such as Truth or Good, since these concepts do not exist.

The sophists, then, understand that the actions that do not correspond to these concepts must be valued by different ones that are consistent with their own worldview (Nestle, 1975: 117; Escohotado, 1975: 158). In this way, the Truth becomes probable, plausible; the Good becomes the useful, the appropriate, etc., all this always strictly dependent on its

context and always, we remember, in the field of *nomos*, not in the field of *physis*; in the field of *physis*, we can affirm with Rodríguez Adrados (1975: 188) that the sophists have much in common with the atomists, so we could consider them equivalent; besides the fact that Protagoras was a disciple of Democritus. Ultimately, it does not matter whether the actions correspond to the Truth or not because the absolute Truth does not exist; what matters now is that political, social, and economic action be useful, beneficial, adequate, probable, possible, but not True or Good. In this worldview of the sophists, the Rhetoric initiated by Corax and Tisias fits perfectly: the concept of probability and, with it, that of likelihood correspond to the conceptualization of reality constructed by the sophist movement.

In addition, the *isonomy* present in Athens since Cleisthenes is followed by *isegoria*, that is, the Athenians also acquire the equal right to use the word. In an incipient democratic system, *isegoria* is necessary, but then a new need arises: the communicative one, with an obvious purpose: to achieve the transmission of the message in the most efficient way possible. In this sense, we then have to establish a distinction within the Rhetorical body: all the figures, techniques and Rhetorical mechanisms are not the same nor do they fulfil the same function. Rhetoric includes figures such as the anaphora, the epithet, the metric or the rhythm and, at the same time and as we have pointed out, probability arguments. Those figures whose functions are related to the effectiveness in the transmission of the message constitute the invariable technique of Rhetoric, since they are not dependent on a worldview, but rather are related to human cognition itself and are established from experience. For example, an anaphora or a metaphor as communicative techniques (also cognitive; cf. Albaladejo, 2014: 42) are exactly the same in a worldview based on metaphysics as in a worldview such as the sophist; however, as we have already pointed out, an argument based on probabilities (also an argument from *Tópoi*, cf. Lausberg, 1983a: 236) does not make sense in most metaphysical worldviews (of course, there will be exceptions or argumentative ways of making the one compatible with the other but, ultimately, a metaphysical worldview will always be biased to find the cause or the end in the metaphysical entity). In conclusion, while Rhetoric is an instrument that can be used by any worldview, not all Rhetoric is always compatible with any worldview.

Thus, we introduce the third of the aspects, the one related to the epistemic question. So far, the main worldviews that we have exposed

also entail an epistemic theory or position. Each of them is formed based on what that worldview assumes as reality, so that a worldview based on metaphysics will conceive knowledge deductively, while a worldview such as the sophist conceives it inductively. This change is radical: when teaching to argue, one is also teaching to reason according to the procedure or method that supports the argument. In this way, argumentation and reasoning are conditioned by the assumed worldview.

When the sophists adopt Rhetoric, a communication tool, they not only develop it as a communicative system, but also deposit their own worldview in it: practically all the types and forms of argumentation that we have preserved from the Rhetorical body of the sophists do not conceive, for example, in almost no case, deductive reasoning (Nestle, 1975: 115). But, from the worldview of the sophists, deductive reasoning would be rarely used, since there are no axiomatic principles from which to draw a deductive conclusion, while arguments based on inductive reasoning would be the most frequent and common in a sophist discourse. Thus, we can conclude that the body of the Rhetorical discipline elaborated by the sophists is made up of two parts that, for the understanding of our proposals in this chapter, are different and it is important to be aware of this difference: on the one hand, Rhetoric as communication tool; on the other hand, Rhetoric as an instrument of a worldview. These parts are not equivalent to each other and should not be confused: as we have indicated, the first will most likely work in any context and within any worldview, while the second will only work within the worldview that has been deposited in the Rhetorical discipline.

We believe that the best example of what we are affirming is, in fact, Dialectics or Logic. When currents based on metaphysics began to use Rhetoric, as is the case with Socrates and maieutic or Aristotle and his Rhetoric, they also deposited their worldviews in the Rhetorical body. In this way, the dialectic becomes the form of argumentation of the metaphysical worldviews, constituting at the same time Logic as the discipline that bases the argumentation. The argumentative model par excellence now becomes the syllogism, based on deductive reasoning, and regulated by Logic, which also evaluates the Truth of the premises. In this sense, it is worth emphasizing the following: the sophistical argumentation, which is expressed in different ways, does not take Truth as a criterion since that which is material and evident does not

need argumentation, since it is and, as we said, the only thing that human being can do about it is to describe it. In this way, the argumentative possibilities that the sophists have are multiple, varied and very rich since, not having the need to apply truth criteria, what indicates that an argument is correct or not is its validity, that is, if the information of the reasoning has been correctly linked to extract the conclusion that is presented. However, worldviews based on metaphysics do not only evaluate validity, which remains in the background, but the main criterion becomes truth: if the premises are true, the conclusion will be true. This notably reduces the argumentative possibilities and, of course, makes the argumentation models of the sophists invalid with respect to the knowledge of the Truth.

In conclusion, based on the example of the sophists, we can agree that Rhetoric is a tool, a discipline that systematizes the mechanisms for the effective transmission of a message, a science of expressiveness. As an instrument, Rhetoric can be used by any regime, since Rhetoric as such does not carry any consubstantial or essential value in itself. To clarify this vision that we offer, we have shown that we can divide the Rhetorical body into two well-differentiated parts: on the one hand, that which is related to human cognition, such as anaphora, metrics or metaphor and that, therefore, they do not depend on any worldview; on the other, that which is built and created from a specific worldview based on what it considers reality to be and, therefore, the epistemic conception with which it is related to reality.

3.2. Rhetoric, worldview and knowledge

This proposition then allows us to differentiate between worldview and Rhetoric, since they are not equivalent: in the case of the sophists, they deposit their worldview in Rhetoric, developing argumentative models and, in particular, elaborating what we call *inventio* according to their way of thinking, understanding the world: “Throughout nine centuries, Rhetoric shaped, in many different ways, the spiritual life of the Greeks and Romans” (Curtius, 1976: 99). On the other hand, a worldview based on metaphysics also deposits in Rhetoric its conception of *inventio*, of what is known and how it is known. If we agree to this point, then: does the classical body of Rhetoric make sense for a metaphysically based worldview? The answer is naturally in the negative: although that part which is only related to human communication and cognition —and

which therefore only depends on human cognition itself and its development— may be useful, everything that exists in Rhetoric as legacy of the sophistic worldview and, later, of similar worldviews, can in no way be of use or even make sense for a metaphysical worldview. In addition, from this worldview it is possible to understand and develop David Pujante's proposal regarding constructivist Rhetoric (Pujante & Alonso Prieto, 2022).

From the perspective that we have just exposed, it is from which Rhetoric ends up becoming ornament, since any other utility is invalid for a worldview of the characteristics that we have exposed. It might not be so if these worldviews had not elaborated alternative models, such as dialectics or formal logic; but as dialectics develops (we remember that, in principle, within Rhetoric) and logic, any inventive or argumentative model of Rhetoric that does not conclude in the Truth is automatically invalid for use in society. On the other hand, as we have pointed out, Rhetoric as a discipline has a peculiarity: it is made up of two equivalent but different parts. The first, which includes all the tools aimed at making the transmission of the message effective; the second, oriented to the generation and construction of the message.

Specifically, we will talk about the second: Rhetoric is not solely and exclusively a discipline dedicated to linguistic communication, but within the parts of Rhetoric we can find *inventio* as the first. What is *inventio*? The definition is complex. To begin with, it is one part that is not situated in the discourse, but in its previous moment: the rest of the parts (*dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria* and *actio*; Chico Rico (1989, 1998) proposes the inclusion of the *intellectio*; cf. Lausberg, 1983a: 235) of Rhetoric already assume the existence of a discourse or, at least, of a message.

We could say that the *inventio* is the part of the Rhetoric in which the message is generated, in a very summarized and general way; *inventio* is “a productive-creative process; consists in extracting the possibilities of development of the ideas contained more or less hidden in the *res*” (Lausberg, 1983a: 235). However, it is precisely the fact that the *inventio* is placed before the discourse or before the message that allows and enables Rhetoric to be so dependent on the worldview from which it is used: from the *inventio* it is legitimate to ask, what is known?, while, how do we know? We defend that *inventio* is *thought*; by the individual condition of the human being with respect to the world —

“I’m my world”—, we consider *inventio* to be aesthetic thought. Can *inventio* really be understood as thought? Aristotle (1974: 195-196) argues that “what is related to thought can be seen in our treatise on Rhetoric, since it is more typical of that discipline. It corresponds to thought everything that is to be achieved by means of the parts of speech”. What does “thought” mean for Aristotle in this context? “This consists in knowing how to say what is involved in the action and what is relevant, which, in speeches, is the work of politics and Rhetoric [...]. There is thought, on the other hand, in which they demonstrate that something is or is not, or in general they manifest something” (Aristóteles, 1974: 150-151).

In this way, if a person, whose worldview is based on metaphysical entities, initiates an inventive process in Rhetoric, his *inventio* will be conditioned by what he thinks he can know, by how he can know what he knows or, in other words, by what he can know; in other words, for what it can say, what it can say about it, and how it can say it. In this way, the *inventio* from a worldview, for example, religious can potentially understand that a person whose actions are good is inspired by or related to divinity, or that what he can talk about or how he can talk about it must be in harmony with the divinity or direct towards that divinity. Proof of this is the large number of Rhetorical treatises made in the Middle Ages, the Modern Age and at the end of the Enlightenment, in which the authors whose worldview had a metaphysical basis deposited that worldview in all inventive processes, displacing or reconverting the classic resources according to their worldview. Although it is not the only one, we put Luzán as a representative example of our affirmation (2008: 204):

But, since it is not enough to learn how to act, but it is necessary to act as one has learned, it is necessary not only to illuminate the understanding with the light of what is true and impose what is good and just, but it is also necessary to achieve the will and move it to practice what is true already learned and what is just already known.

At the same time, those treatise writers who did not have a worldview based on metaphysics wrote completely different treatises or writings on Rhetoric (Lorenzo Valla (2011), Cascales (1779), Minturno (1725), etc.).

4. Cultural Rhetoric and democratic culture: a common worldview

Finally, it only remains for us then to present our conclusion regarding Cultural Rhetoric. As we have seen, Rhetoric is an instrument, a science of expressiveness that does not carry, as a science, any intrinsic value or principle. Now, depending on the worldview from which it is used, the development of Rhetoric as a science will be conditioned —any worldview, in this sense, conditions; our intention is not to connote certain worldviews as negative or more limiting than others, even if we are not in favour of them—. “Definitely, it is about assuming our condition as subjects who live in complex and plural societies, which give us a personal and community identity” (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: 193), so that

This approach leads us to a concept of moral education as the self-constitution of the moral person, capable of constructing cooperatively (that is, through argumentative deliberation and social interaction) balanced moral judgments, which translates and interprets contextually and responsibly (that is, in a specific historical and social situation) in their usual practice both in the public and private spheres (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: 66).

So that, from a worldview that is not based on metaphysical entities, from Rhetoric one can make use of all its tools, including those inherited from metaphysics; but the same phenomenon does not occur in reverse. Anyway,

it is in society where Rhetoric works fully and where its activity acquires true meaning. Rhetoric is a science and a technique that arises from society and is oriented to society as an instrument at the service of social communication. However, Rhetoric cannot adequately develop its social dimension in any type of society; it is in democratic societies where this dimension is fully exercised (Albaladejo, 2020: 37).

If we insert Rhetoric within democracy, in the terms in which we have dealt with during this chapter, we can conclude that Rhetoric, like democracy and within a democratic system, cannot be assumed from a metaphysical position. Thus,

one of the fundamental reasons for the delay in considering the need for moral education, both in general and especially in Spain and in the Latin American world, has been the relative moral homogeneity of our societies, deeply anchored in traditional axiological approaches (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: 64).

Added to this is the fact that all Rhetoric includes models of argumentation, not demonstration or dialectics, which are based on the worldview that we have already reflected here; that is, one in which the existence of the physical is accepted, but not that its existence implies any value or consubstantial attribution beyond the physical.

In this sense, Rhetoric acquires its maximum exponential: from this position, Rhetoric becomes decisive, since it allows the most appropriate expression of the message of that artificial reality that we have spoken about, because “communication is a *sine qua non* condition for the formation of interpersonal relationships. Human society, made up of individuals, needs the continuous transfer of information between its members” (Luarsabishvili, 2019: 84).

As a science of expressiveness, but not necessarily persuasive, Rhetoric then is not oriented to victory over the rival or to the conviction of the audience, but to the analytical and productive study of expression as such: in this way, Rhetoric allows an expression that cannot be understood as normative, but as appropriate to the specific message that a specific issuer wants to express in a specific circumstance before a specific audience. This is justified by a fact that sometimes seems to be ignored: Rhetoric is not a discipline that has “invented” its figures and tools. Rather, the people who have dedicated themselves to the construction of the Rhetorical discipline have systematized expressivity from observation as a phenomenon that it is, that it occurs: it is a discipline whose development extends temporarily from its emergence to the present, for example, expressing itself through other branches such as marketing, journalism, advertising, law, education, etc. In this way, “the person must be able to choose autonomously between the alternatives or moral dilemmas that are offered to him, but his solution must be 'teachable', that is, it must be able to be justified through rational intersubjective argumentation” (Rubio Carracedo, 1996: 66).

The expression, as a phenomenon, of the human being is what Rhetoric takes as the object of its science, reflecting and systematizing the expression based on the communicative intention, the expressive need and the usefulness of each resource. As we said, from a worldview in which actions, reactions and decisions take place in artificial reality, from physical reality, Rhetoric is the science that enables and guarantees the use of reason, argumentation and rational and

democratic consensus, despite the fact that some authors consider that consensus is guilty of phenomena such as “post-truth”.

5. Conclusions

At the beginning of this article, we have presented a problem that in the words of R. Inglehart (1988: 1207) is “the fact that one can to some extent identify the historical causes of given cross-cultural differences does not of course make them disappear. They remain distinctive cultural characteristics with important behavioural consequences”. Culture naturally is made up of many factors; we have focused on those related to worldview, its relationship with knowledge and, consequently, its relationship with identity and expression.

“The place of Rhetoric in culture, in the construction of identity and the horizon of people, human groups and societies is located in the field of Cultural Rhetoric” (Albaladejo, 2013: 18); therefore, we have expressed throughout the article what we defend that configures the construction of identity, the horizon of people, human groups and societies in relation to democracy and Rhetoric. From this defence, we have in turn defined what democratic culture is, that is, the dynamic that derives from a particular worldview in a democratic system. This democratic culture, based on the worldview that we have proposed, allows its expression and its total manifestation, so that “democracy, as a species to the genus politics, is incapable of being grounded in a transcendent principle. So the only thing that grounds or founds democracy is an absence: the absence of any human nature” (Nancy, 2011: 66), so that “in this respect, democracy is a description and/or an evaluation of a being in common founded upon the mutual recognition of fellows and upon the independence of each group wherein this recognition is shared” (Nancy, 2010: 39). However, without the concept of *isegoria* that we have mentioned, democracy cannot be conceived, since there is no possibility of equitable use of the word and, therefore, there is no redistribution of power because the discourse could be potentially unidirectional. For the concept of *isegoria* to be manifest, it needs citizens to be able to use the word equitably. We have also referred to the worldview in which the exercise of the word occurs, expressing the worldview that we defend both in relation to physical reality and the reality that we have called artificial.

In that worldview, which we believe is the most appropriate for democracy, expressiveness, reasoned argumentation and dialogue constitute the heart of democratic culture. The discipline that is in charge of the study of expressiveness and that serves as an instrument for the transmission of information to be effective and, therefore, the expression of the individual on artificial reality is produced, is Rhetoric. Rhetoric, as we have indicated, is an instrument: by itself it does not imply any value or any democratic system, so that it has been used throughout history by many regimes and inserted into different worldviews. But Rhetoric, in addition, has collected in its corpus the heritage of those who have developed it from each of the worldviews, mainly in the *inventio*. We have verified how the Rhetorical body proposes argumentative models that, as we have indicated, cannot be conceived or accepted from metaphysical worldviews, dialectics and logic come into play. On the other hand, according to the worldview that we have offered, the most reasonable position is the one that accepts argumentation, and not demonstration—which is reserved for the physical sciences—, as rationality over artificial reality. In this way, Rhetoric recovers a worldview from which it can fully manifest itself and, thus, Rhetoric “builds the identity and horizon of people, human and social groups”, becoming Cultural Rhetoric. This happens because the Rhetoric, now cultural, allows the identity construction according to the individual condition and circumstance, and not with respect to a metaphysical concept of the Truth, the Good or the Beautiful. By conceiving artificial reality, democratic culture has a development space where the aesthetic issuer expresses himself as an individual in the plural, society, and where society can be constructed as an identity according to the set of senders.

In conclusion, we have presented our arguments regarding the initial issues, democratic culture and Cultural Rhetoric. We hope that, through our exhibition, we have proven and defended that, from our proposal, the aesthetic emitter contributes from his identity to the construction of the collective identity, and in this way society, from the common of emitters, can build and express their identity through democracy.

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